

Editorial Foreword

THE CULTURAL DIFFUSION OF FREUDIAN THOUGHT. Dispassionate discussion of the reception given to Freud's ideas would, not long ago, have been an achievement in itself. Now the passage of time has done its inevitable work even for this subject of intense dispute. Although the intellectual battles once so central are by no means resolved, some historical perspective becomes natural. Recognizing the moment, John Burnham organized a conference on the reception of Freudian theory as an important topic in the history of science and of modern Western culture. We are especially grateful to him for his help in making some of those papers available to *CSSH* as well as for his analysis of the results of this complex project in comparative study. These essays have many dimensions. With apostolic fervor, Freudians considered the progress of their doctrine as a measure of the openness of mind of individuals, professions, and whole societies. In this light the essays here continue the interest in cultural innovation to which *CSSH* devoted a conference of its own (see *CSSH*, 11:4). Often the adaptation of particular Freudian techniques brought distortions rather like those that accompany the importation of technology (see Rogger, Bailes, and Brown in 23:3), but in addition Freudian doctrine provoked resistance that was self-conscious, deep, and diffuse. Responses to Freud expose something of the interior life of learned professions and professional institutions (on the legal professions, see Khare and Morrison, 14:1; on medicine, see Figlio and Sussman, 19:3), but they also reveal the powerful play of culturally rooted attitudes that were available in almost limitless array to be mobilized when much more than science seemed to be at stake. In Germany and the Netherlands, the rejection of materialism on philosophic grounds created an important predisposition favorable to Freud, and Ilse Bulhof finds that some of those sympathetic to the Viennese doctor had been drawn to spiritualism as well. Anti-Semitism and traditional sexual mores (so commonly cited) were not enough, Hannah Decker argues, to explain the strong resistance to Freudianism in Germany, where the tendency to reject the new psychology was fed by professional and national pride as well. Eventually, crushing opposition from the political right proved decisive in Germany and Spain. Everywhere the small groups of intellectuals who adopted the cause and disseminated the new vocabulary confronted resistance so broadly based that Freudian views would seem to have little chance. Yet Thomas Glick's remarkably wide-ranging study shows that Freudian concepts found extraordinary resonances in Spanish society. Although encounter with Freudian concepts tested cultures in very complicated ways, comparison is possible and in these three cases full of surprises.

WOMEN IN SOCIETY. Fashion should, of course, reveal a lot about social roles (see Kuper on costumes, 15:3), and no argument about the victimization of middle-class Victorian women would omit a reference to corsets and bustles. But Mel Davies claims that styles can also have unexpected social consequences, specifically, that the tightlaced corset lowered middle-class fertility (compare Neuman, 20:3, and McLaren, 18:2). Even readers who prefer that great social changes be assigned appropriately significant causes will not soon forget Davies's depiction of the tortures of tightlacing. The review essays assessing recent works on women in contemporary Islam and in the modern West supplement earlier surveys (Rogers, 20:1; Ross and Rapp, 23:1), part of the ever-growing awareness that there is little about society that cannot be illuminated by the study of women's roles. But the juxtaposition of these two essays also raises some striking challenges. Joyce Riegelhaupt proposes that such universal needs as provisioning, socialization, and ritual can be made categories for comparing women's roles in different societies. Books on women in the modern West, however, emphasize the importance of work, class, and politics (Minge-Kalman, 20:3; Scott and Tilly, 17:1; Mintz, 13:3). And it is difficult to extend such Western concerns to Islam without risking new sins of ethnocentrism (but see Papanek on *purdah* and Youssef on feminine behavior, 15:3); the segregation of women, as David Waines notes, can also mean the segregation of men from the crucial and enduring social networks that are maintained by women.

WAR WITHOUT A STATE. History, historians have complained for centuries, is too often limited to accounts of politics and wars. For much of European history, nevertheless, the struggle to build and maintain states that were desperately tested by frequent wars can indeed be seen as a summation—if not necessarily the central achievement—of social life. Not surprisingly, the vocabulary of European political discourses reflects that experience and, when extended to other societies, carries an assumption of similar institutional relationships. Perhaps, Peter Manicas argues, the ancient Greeks correctly understood their own society when they reflected more on civil strife than on formal warfare; almost continually engaged in the former, they could rarely sustain the latter for long. His study underscores both the singularity of the city state (see Runciman, 24:3, and Finley, 19:3) and the degree to which armies reflect the social structure that sustains them (Ness and Stahl, and Bowen, 19:1). In contrast, medieval nomads thrived on the constant warfare of mobile predation; but in Rudi Lindner's anthropological-historical analysis, they are shown to have used kinship as a flexible political form that proved ultimately vulnerable to defeat and to extended success (on the historical opportunity provided by the Hungarian plain, see den Hollander, 3:1 and 3:2). Greek history seen to have been without sustained warfare has fresh lessons to teach; nomads, who like barbarians have had a bad press (see Jones, 13:4), had a history of their own that deserves to be recovered.