

to inductive logics which are on a scale with logical truth and falsehood as failing to realize the theory dependence of induction. This position provides a strong argument for local induction and is supported by a rich and suggestive metaphysics: “. . . a reality as posited by a theory is not logically ‘transparent’ in relation to experience. A reality is posited or claimed to be so-and-so by a theory, and experience is selected and brought to bear on such ontological claims or posits. But there is no logical or invariant relationship between these two acts. . . .” (pp. 229–230) Bogdan sees his approach as leading to a new view where we see “. . . knowledge as a move from theories to other theories via experience. . . .” (p. 232)

There are interesting approaches to induction and stimulating criticisms in this volume. This is inclusive of those essays which were mentioned only briefly or not at all: Roger Rosencrantz ‘Cognitive Decision Theory’ James H. Fetzer ‘Elements of Induction’ Klemens Szaniawski ‘On Sequential Inference’ Günter Menges and E. Kofler ‘Cognitive Decisions under Partial Information’ Håkan Törnebohm ‘On Piecemeal Knowledge-Formation’ and Raimo Tuomela ‘Confirmation, Explanation, and the Paradoxes of Transitivity’. But the essays, for the most part, still speak to a more specialized audience than either their topic or their authors deserve. Although all the articles are previously unpublished, most of them require both a strong knowledge of the literature in inductive logic and specific acquaintance with the author’s previous writings. There are two sorts of omission in this volume that should be mentioned: First, there is no discussion of Goodman’s Paradox which represents a very powerful argument for local induction. Second, and more understandable given space limitations, are alternative analyses such as that of Gilbert Harman, Mary Hesse, Richard Jeffrey, or Wilfred Sellars. There is a fine selected and well organized bibliography. *Jonathan E. Adler, Brooklyn College, C.U.N.Y.*

CORRECTIONS

Is Preacceleration of Particles in Dirac’s Electrodynamics a Case of Backward Causation? *The Myth of Retrocausation in Classical Electrodynamics*, (43: 165–201, 1976), p. 178 line 13, “now” should read “not”; p. 200 line minus 8, “then” should read “than”; p. 180 line 17, “bedore” should read “before.”