

# The Objection to Systematic Humbug

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Is it quite all right to shake hands with murder in your heart?

## I. The Nature of the Problem

The view that our feelings do not concern morality, that we have no duties about them, that it does not matter what we feel, so long as we act correctly, is often attributed to Kant. I am sure he did not hold it, and shall argue as much presently. Certainly it is not surprising that people have credited Kant with such a view. He did lay himself open to that suspicion, because he was too busy shooting at contrary errors to resist it.

What is much more surprising, however, is that this view has, seriously and unmistakably, been put forward and prevailed in the central British Empiricist tradition. I call this surprising, because one might hope that Empiricists would be more careful than Rationalists over questions about Feeling. G. E. Moore ruled that our feelings were outside our control *almost always*.<sup>1</sup> (He did not discuss the rare exceptions, and his followers have paid no attention to them, so I shall ignore them here.) We can normally control nothing but our outward actions, he said, so our normal duties can only require these actions. So precepts like 'love your neighbour' or 'thou shalt not covet' cannot possibly be understood literally and seriously as commands meant to be carried out. He concluded that they are just hypothetical commands, saying what *would* have been our duty if we had been able to do it.

This is odd. Why should such hypothetical commands concern us at all—any more than, say, the instructions in a book on athletic training concern the paraplegic who leafs through it for amusement? Moore did not explain. Like Mill, no doubt, he simply took it for granted that a sharp line divided all judgments about action, logically, from judgments about any sort of motive, including feeling. 'The motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent.'<sup>2</sup> For he too, like Mill, believed that the rightness or wrongness of actions

<sup>1</sup> See his paper on 'The Nature of Moral Philosophy' in *Philosophical Studies*, p. 316.

<sup>2</sup> *Utilitarianism*, Ch. 2, p. 17 (Everyman edn).

was entirely a matter of their consequences. And he was just as bankrupt as Mill was, and as any other consequentialist must be, on the question what 'the worth of the agent' might mean.<sup>3</sup>

Since Moore, British Empiricists have paid even less attention to the topic, which withered in the brief but arid summer of dogmatic Behaviourism. Mill's idea that feeling was irrelevant to morality, and Moore's that it was uncontrollable, no doubt prepared people's minds to accept the suggestion that it was more or less non-existent. They expressed this usually in the easiest possible way, namely by ignoring it. Interesting arguments to support the position can however be found, e.g. in Stuart Hampshire's *Thought and Action*.

That inner feeling is altogether 'mythical' or non-existent is a peculiar metaphysical position, which belongs to crude, primitive Watsonian Behaviourism. Philosophers usually avoid it because it is so mysterious; what could it mean to say that what evidently occurs, and is part of Experience, is unreal? (That rather crude instrument, Occam's Razor, cannot deal with such questions.) The point of more subtle forms of Behaviourism, however, is to suggest that, though real enough, inner feeling is, for this or that purpose, *unimportant*. Philosophers as well as psychologists have often had occasion to say this. But the purposes for which they think it unimportant vary, and so do the more important things which they want to bring forward in its place. Since importance is entirely relative to purpose, this means that their doctrines are very different, and need to be argued separately. (Compare the position of someone who said, quite generally, that 'plants are unimportant'. Without a context, this is nonsense.) It is an interesting and unlucky fact that the words in which such views are naturally put tend to approximate them to each other, and to the simple metaphysical doctrine of non-existence. (People still reach for Occam's Razor, however little it helps them.) In ordinary thought, the ideas of Unreality and Unimportance are very closely linked. Dreams, phantoms and pink rats are called Unreal, not because they do not occur, but because they do not matter. That is why unsophisticated people, reading *The Concept of Mind*, commonly take Ryle to be saying that Mind is Unreal, simply because he constantly plays down the importance of inner factors, not just in relation to this or that purpose, but generally.

In *Thought and Action* (which is a far more subtle book) Hampshire makes great efforts to avoid this wholesaleness. He carefully concedes that inner struggles and the like are not mythical or illusory. In fact he stresses their importance *as preludes to action*, and declares the wholeness of morality against those who want to reduce it to talk:

<sup>3</sup> See a good recent discussion by Bernard Williams in *Utilitarianism For and Against*, Ch. 5 of his contribution.

The 'reduction' of moral judgments to quasi-orders and recommendations is like the behaviourist's reduction of inner thoughts and feelings to their natural expression in behaviour: it is a confusion between a necessary precondition and the essential nature of that which develops from it (p. 143).

But in spite of this he insists that nothing that goes on within is to count literally as an action. 'Mental actions', even if so described, are not *real actions*. (Compare 'real coffee' or 'real cream'.) They have only a 'shadowy and parasitical nature'. They depend for full realization on their being later translated into outward form (p. 163). In them there is 'no performance' (p. 160), nothing which we try to do and can succeed or fail in doing. They are not part of 'the only solid and substantial world that there is' (p. 163).

What does this mean? If we are not doing ontology, the most natural interpretation seems to be the moral one, which says that what we think and feel has little or no importance or value unless it produces outward action, that we ought not to be much interested in it.<sup>4</sup> It cannot be assessed or valued apart from the action it produces, and this not just because of the ignorance of the bystander, but from the subject's own angle as well. To make this point, what is needed is a *moral* argument. We should need to compare the merits, the value, of concentrating on one's inner life with those of concentrating on one's outer, to examine excesses at both extremes, and to show where the proper balance lies. But to do this would absolutely require that we should admit the reality of the inner life. If we are to blame the introverted and contemplative, we must blame them for what they actually do. This cannot be reduced to their *failure* to act outwardly. There could be all sorts of reasons for that, and introversion is only one of them.

It cannot be right, either, to suggest as Hampshire does that thoughts and feelings which do not lead to action are unimportant because, though real, they are actually rather *rare*, a somewhat perverse and artificial occasional product of over-civilization:

A man to whom we attribute a rich inner life of belief and disbelief, of unexpressed doubt and self-questioning, must be a man of great powers of self-restraint, to whom the inhibition of action is natural. He has cut away the substance of human routines and chosen to live with their shadow. He does not shout, but he exults inwardly. . . . This habit of inhibition, which replaces the substance of perceptible behaviour with its shadow in the mental life of thought and feeling, is the process of civilization (p. 165).

<sup>4</sup> It is worth noting that *Moore* could never in any case have endorsed this view, since he said firmly that 'by far the most valuable things which we can see or imagine are certain states of consciousness' (*Principia Ethica*, p. 188).

This is an empirical remark, and it is contrary to experience. Throughout human life, thought constantly exceeds action, not because action is suppressed, but because the imagination is so rich and fertile. It constantly produces twenty times as much material as could possibly be lived, much of it of a kind which could not possibly point that way. Keats's sonnet

When I have fears that I may cease to be  
Before my pen hath gleaned my teeming brain

rightly speaks of *teeming*. The difference between him and the rest of us is not in the quantity of the harvest, but in the quality. Striking further examples are the wide speculative curiosity of young children—particularly their love of stories—and the strong, continuing fascination of gossip, even about people we shall never meet. These things are obviously among the roots of art. It is true that in the long run we do manage to use much of this stuff for action, and that we think we should try to do so. But—as is notorious in the case of scientific research—we cannot tell in advance which parts will be usable. We do not collect it for use, but for delight and because we cannot possibly help it. If this did not happen, art would be quite inexplicable. Hampshire, unlike Ryle, minds about making sense of art, and it causes him bad headaches. He has to treat it as something exceptional and paradoxical, an occasional white blackbird, a centre of peculiar mental activities which mysteriously *do* have value even though they do *not* lead to action.<sup>5</sup> In general, he rules, 'thought cannot be thought, as opposed to day-dreaming or musing, unless it is directed towards a conclusion, whether in action or judgment' (p. 159). So what is wrong with day-dreaming or musing? After all, they are normally included as ways of 'thinking'. Day-dreaming may perhaps be treated as by definition idle, but *musings* is quite general. It would naturally cover all Keats's reflections in the sonnet just mentioned, notably those he concludes with:

Then on the shore  
Of the wide world I stand alone, and think,  
Till love and fame to nothingness do sink,

and Shakespeare's in Sonnets like 125 and 116. The poets there describe what they *do*. And what they do is certainly not just preparing to write poetry.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> See *Thought and Action*, pp. 119, 216–222 and 245–250. The same view is more fully, though more crudely, expressed in his earlier paper, 'Logic and Appreciation' in *Aesthetics and Language*, W. Elton (ed.) (1952). I cannot here discuss his more central concern in *Thought and Action*—that of putting *speculative* thought beyond the control of the Will.

<sup>6</sup> Nor is it just preparing to weep, moan, etc. Expressive acts can be performed by actors. They do not give point to feelings, but vice versa.

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The dismissal of day-dreaming and musing has, I think, to be a moral judgment, a remark about the part such things should properly play in life.

Hampshire, however, does not pursue this moral enquiry. Instead, he uses decidedly ontological language. What is *shadowiness*? Hampshire defends talk of shadows as an 'almost unavoidable metaphor' (p. 160). But it seems manifestly unsuitable. The relation between a shadow and the tree that casts it is almost opposite to that between murderous thoughts and the murder they point to. First, the causal direction has been reversed. Trees cause shadows; possible future events cannot cause present thoughts. Second, the direction of representation is also wrong, though this is perhaps a little less obvious. Murderous thoughts are not photographic copies or reflections cast by that unavailable event, a future murder: after all, it may never occur. They are projections of existing motives, which indeed they *represent*, though in a subtler sense—they express them, they body them forth. Those motives, along with existing information, determine all details of the plan. They are thoughts, but such thoughts are as real as TNT. They can be quite as influential. But their reality does not consist in, or depend on, their being so. Both thoughts and TNT exist fully now and have their own properties. They can be studied in themselves, not only in their actual or likely effects.

I cannot here go into these ontological questions properly. I think myself that 'the only substantial and solid world that there is' must contain people's thoughts and feelings along with all its other jumble of real features. I believe Hampshire thinks this too. There is no need for special Kinds or Degrees of Reality. Nor can things depend for their reality on their actual or likely effects. They can however depend for their *value* on these. Some things do. Toothbrushes and teaspoons, for instance, have value only as Means. The question is, are human thoughts and feelings in the same position? This question cannot be decided by branding them as having an inferior kind of reality. Ontologically, there are no second-class citizens.

If I am right in turning from the ontological to the moral question, what Hampshire is doing is telling us not to be content with thoughts and feelings as substitutes for outer acts. He is insisting, as Behaviourists too have rightly done, on the importance of outer activity, and therefore on the unsatisfactoriness of Idealist models (including Hume's) which show it as a shadowy by-product of thought. He is making room for such moral points as Sartre expresses more directly—that it is no use claiming to be a worker unless you work, a writer unless you write, or a lover unless you do something about it. 'There is no love apart from the deeds of love.'<sup>7</sup> Both Moore and Mill were no doubt also interested in this same theme. It is a moral point of obvious importance, something which really needs

<sup>7</sup> *Existentialism and Humanism*, p. 41 (Mairet trans.).

saying to Idealists and to moralists absorbed in the extremer versions of Justification by Faith. But it is still one-sided. Exclusive attention to it leads to moral results every bit as repulsive, eccentric and pointless as the contrary obsession.

## II. The Moral Issue

To show this, I shall illustrate now what is wrong with Moore's moral position by an example. I take, out of a great range, a rather simple and schematic one which I hope will fit a wide variety of situations, primitive and civilized, private and public, academic and political.

### *Example*

Peter and George, once friends, have long been carrying on a feud. It had a point once, and those concerned have much enjoyed it. But it is now growing clearly pernicious to their parties and even to themselves. They see that they must unite against a common threat. So a reconciliation is arranged. They see the need for this and accept it fully, and tomorrow they are to meet to confirm it publicly. So what do they do today?

Peter does what I suggest most of us would try to do in his situation. While carrying on his ordinary outward occupation, he tries to do something about the tumult which the prospect produces in his feelings. He tries, however feebly, confusedly, and unwillingly, to get into a more possible frame of mind for this difficult meeting. He makes an effort to think about George in a way foreign to his recent habits—not as a type-cast enemy, but as an individual with his own feelings, an individual whom he once knew. He tries to check his habitual spiteful brooding on George's sins, and to remind himself for once of the provocations which he himself has given. Spasms of shame for once get a hearing. And so on. It does not work well, he has an upsetting afternoon—but still, he tries.

But George, who has been reading Moore, does nothing of the sort. His feelings, he sees, are in no way under his control. He pays them no attention; they continue to seethe as usual, but he knows that he must behave correctly and make a friendly impression. For this he relies on what is significantly called *acting*. So he spends the afternoon practising friendly gestures in the glass, and the evening briefing his aides on how they should smile, where they should stand, what remarks they should feed him. . . .

Peter, in fact tries to alter his feelings to fit the acts he knows he ought to do. George ignores his feelings entirely and concentrates on getting the act exactly right. Common sense has several points to make about the contrast:

1. *Both enterprises are possible.* It is simply a mistake to assume, as Moore did, that what Peter attempts cannot be done. Certainly it cannot be done *completely*. Certainly it is hard, and more in the nature of an endless project that one takes on than a smartly completable 'duty' as featured on the duty-sergeant's list. But then, very many duties are of this kind—for instance, the duty to help somebody, or mankind's duty to put an end to war, which Kant discussed so shrewdly in his book *Perpetual Peace*. To say that we cannot complete a job is never to say that we can do nothing about it.

Moreover, George's project too has exactly the same drawback. He needs to take people in; can he do that *completely*? He may set himself a moderate pass standard, such as not waking obvious suspicion—but then Peter too can set himself a pass standard if he likes. Beyond that, a vista stretches before George of *degrees* of cordiality which he might register, degrees of confidence which he might evoke... The actor's life is not really very like the duty-sergeant's. Prolonged acting, continued off the stage and quite unsupported by feeling, is not only exhausting, it is interminable. This brings us to the second point:

2. *Normally, both things will be attempted, and attempted as aspects of a single project.* One enterprise will simply not make sense without the other. (Peter, too, must pay some attention to outward preparations, though they will be different ones.) The division of act and motive is, in the great range of normal cases, a vicious abstraction, and the motive must include the feeling. And this is still true although:

3. *There does exist a range of cases where, for special reasons, we distinguish and contrast them.* There are some outward duties which really can be performed effectively even without bringing oneself to a suitable state of feeling—for instance, sending money through the post, or performing simple manual work while nobody else is present. This kind of case seems to have obsessed moralists like Moore, Sartre and Hampshire. They are struck by the hypocrisy of those who support their refusal to wash up by claiming *either* that they are offering feeling instead, *or* that suitable feeling is absent, and that this makes the action impossible. To hypocrites of this kind, it is right to say that 'there is no love apart from the deeds of love'. This corrective, however, seems most often called for in public and political life, which is the chief domain of empty feeling. Private, personal life, by contrast, seems rather more often prone to the contrary plague of hypocrisy by empty *acts*, dead ritual or emotional exploitation. 'She lives for others; you can tell the others by their hunted look.' In dealing with people whom you actually *meet*, you have got to have more of love than the deeds. Still further, and more startlingly:

4. *There also exists a range of cases, and pretty important ones, where all that matters is the feeling.* It makes perfectly good sense that we should be ashamed of some feelings, regardless of likely consequences:

Remembering that night long afterwards, Ivan recalled with particular disgust how he would suddenly get up from the sofa and quietly, as though terribly afraid to be seen, open the door, go out on the landing and listen to his father moving about and walking in the rooms on the floor below—he had listened for a long time, for about five minutes, with a sort of strange curiosity, with bated breath and a thumping heart. But why he had done all this, why he was listening, he did not of course know himself. That ‘action’ of his he called ‘contemptible’ all his life afterwards; and deep inside him, in the recesses of his heart, he thought of it as the vilest action of all his life (Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, Part II, Book 5, Ch. 7).

The reasons for Ivan’s view are good enough and I do not want to oversimplify them here. Putting it baldly, I suppose the point is that in those moments he positively gave up trying to make sense of the confusion surrounding his father and resist the gathering evil. He dropped instead into the role of a passive and voyeuristic spectator—observing, as at a play, the old man’s lustful and anxious waiting for Grushenka; consenting, as at a play, that the next act should, if it so chanced, reveal that his despised step-brother will murder the old man, making no change in his decision to leave early in the morning, endorsing, by his passiveness, the intentions of that step-brother whom he loathes, becoming his puppet. He gave up. On ‘behaviourist’ views, the only thing wrong with that is that it makes his father’s murder more likely. But it follows from this that everything would be quite all right if he could keep this state of mind and merely *act* differently.

Or again, that if his actions were fixed and he must in any case leave in the morning, it would not matter what he felt.<sup>8</sup> In fact, more generally, it would never matter how abysmally mean and odious our motives were, provided it could be guaranteed that we were also too cowardly and apathetic ever to act on them. Feelings, on this view, have value only as a means, like a sum of money or a piece of furniture. And this is psychological nonsense. I say this flatly; I shall be expanding the point. But it brings me to the most interesting side of the matter—namely, why systematic humbug, however skilful, will not do; why we cannot accept George’s methods, even if they were made completely and lastingly effective.

<sup>8</sup> It should, I think, be freely conceded that Dostoevsky and the novelists who have followed him have often weakened their case by exaggeration and paradox. They have sometimes unrealistically ignored or belittled the outer life. This has been a reaction against the contrary bias. Both excesses are bad. But Dostoevsky at his best does not do it, and I do not think he is doing it here.

What consideration moves us to reject that bargain? A number of names could be given to it—common honesty, straightforwardness, sincerity, simple-mindedness, even a kind of laziness, but a very special kind. Actually, many people in this position, if they were asked why they did *not* take up systematic humbug, and offered a course in perfecting it, would hardly know what to answer, so obvious, so central and taken for granted is the objection. ‘I could not live like that’—But why not? The objection is in fact the missing piece of many puzzles, a piece too little noticed by empiricists, one which makes nonsense of any sharp division between action, thought and feeling. It is our need for coherence—for the unity of the personality. We cannot accept a radical, lasting separation between our inner and our outer lives without mortal damage. The continuity between them is not just contingent and associative; it is conceptual. Dislocate the logic of the emotions, and life becomes, not just unfamiliar, but deeply unintelligible and inhuman. We all fear madness. In spite of recent romanticizations of it, each of us still endorses this fear as completely justified. And it is a fear of that dislocation. The active core of the personality will not have disruption of this kind. Man is not held together only by consistent thought or by the shape of the surrounding landscape. He holds himself together (up to a point and with great difficulty) by virtue of a *feeling*—a strong wish for order and unity.

### III. What Practical Reason Is

But this wish, this feeling, this motive, has in common speech a very interesting name. It is called Reason.<sup>9</sup> Making sense of one’s life is what ‘reason demands’. Going to pieces is ‘losing one’s reason’. And Peter will naturally think of his enterprise as an attempt to ‘reason with himself’, to be more Rational and Reasonable. Now this cannot just mean ‘consistent in his thoughts’. Mere intellectual consistency is compatible with all sorts of aims; you have only to drop those which turn out not to fit in. There is nothing internally inconsistent about George’s project, provided he chooses his premisses. The maxim that ‘one should always deceive others when convenient’ would fit quite well, for instance, in a framework of strict Hobbesian egoism, or of a carefully Benthamite Utilitarianism; better still into one of Solipsism. That does not settle the question whether these views are themselves Rational or Reasonable. Here we want more than internal consistency. We ask, are they frameworks suitable to contain the aims of such a creature as man?—or, of course, of whatever other species a rational being may belong to. Actually,

<sup>9</sup> These remarks may sound a trifle slapdash. I have discussed the matter much more fully in *Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature*, forthcoming from the Cornell University Press. See particularly Chapter 12.

even to test their consistency, we would have to consider the conditions of life for that species, and among those conditions is a given emotional constitution. So we have to consider general types of feeling, as well as thoughts and actions.

When Peter struggles against his vindictiveness as an 'unreasonable feeling' he means by this that it does not make sense in the context of other feelings necessary and proper to human beings. And if, on the other hand, he gives way to it, thereby involving everybody in ruin, he is guilty of an *irrational* vindictiveness—that is, one for which no serious human aim provides a justification, one which is slightly mad. This would still hold even if he had managed to evolve an internally consistent Luciferian system of topsy-turvy aims to justify it, unless that system itself had somehow been meshed convincingly into the framework of human needs. No one has yet shown signs of succeeding in doing this, although immoralists have long been promising it.<sup>10</sup> In fact, it may well be time to prosecute Immoralism for fraud under the Trade Descriptions Act.

This is how the notions of reasonableness and rationality work. And that is why Hume went wrong in his discussion of what is Unreasonable. He viewed 'reason' simply as a fact-finding capacity. He therefore said,

It is not contrary to reason for me to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger (*Treatise*, II, iii, 3).

But anyone in a position to say 'me' and 'my finger' must be a member of a given primate species, with a given repertory of satisfactions. He is also, since he uses language, a member of a given culture, and one who recognizes others as present for him to speak to—therefore no solipsist. If he can *prefer*, he is a being already mature enough to compare prospects, one who has therefore already narrowed down the given repertoire to form a system of priorities. He is not a blank, disembodied intellect. His next job is to think what the new proposal means, what it involves, what follows from it, to what it commits him, how it affects his existing aims. He tries to understand what principles of choice could go with it or dictate it. We call proposals *unreasonable* when we cannot get intelligible answers to these questions, or when those suggested would not fit in with other necessary elements of human life in any way that makes sense.

When we tackle these points, our reflection has all the obvious marks of Reasoning. It can be consistent or inconsistent, clear or confused, relevant or irrelevant, a solution or a failure. And on all these points other people, if properly informed, can judge as well as ourselves. But it is *practical* reasoning. So Hume does not recognize it.

His mistake is even more instructively clear on the previous page where he calls Reason the Slave of the Passions. He does this in well-justified

<sup>10</sup> See a very interesting discussion of phrases like 'evil, be thou my good', by E. Anscombe, *Intention*, sec. 39.

protest against the misleading picture of a *conflict* between Passion and Reason. But his Employment Model is no better. *All* dramatizations which set 'Reason' as one participant over against other aspects of the personality are confused. We are still suffering from the Romantic Revival's insistence on doing this, with the hope of making Reason somehow the villain of the piece, when in fact it is more like the containing scene of the drama.<sup>11</sup> All such dramatizations, including Hume's, make the real continuity of our nature inexpressible.

To show this, we must ask how, on Hume's model, 'the passions' would ever reach agreement on the orders to be passed to Reason. Outside the committee-room door sits Speculative Reason, the slave or secretary. It has provided the factual data, and is waiting to be told what to do. Inside are the Passions, arguing. Vindictiveness, Vanity, Ambition, Laziness and the rest shout louder and louder; how are they to agree? Such a secretary, unless it does what secretaries sometimes do and decides for itself what to put in the minutes, will have nothing to act on. What has gone wrong? Simply that, by Reason, we do not mean such an inactive secretary, but at least the Chairman, and more plausibly the whole well-ordered gathering. We mean the core of the personality, the central I, the subject who owns 'the passions' as his attributes, who is himself vindictive, vain and all the rest of it, but who is more than these attributes, and can, unless he abdicates, to some extent arbitrate between them, and decide gradually which sort of person to be. He—that subject—feels, thinks *and* acts. The relation between these aspects of his life is never just contingent. They must all be seen as expressions of a single personality. In that context, it is sharply evident that some arrangements make better sense than others, and many make no sense at all. The question how we distinguish them, and what are the problems of doing so, is one of enormous practical and theoretical importance. It is one on which the tradition of Mill and Moore is systematically bankrupt, though (as for instance Butler or William James can show) such bankruptcy is not at all necessary to Empiricism.

If we want serious and realistic philosophic discussion of Choice, of the various ways in which our central self finds expression, we must turn to the tradition of Kant. It is not anti-Empiricist to do this. An Empiricist is, basically, a fellow who wants the facts considered, who respects the complexity of experience and will not sacrifice it to a slick intellectual scheme. But experience shows us that (1) in general, the human personality is really very complex, and (2) in particular, one of the most striking

<sup>11</sup> Thus Blake—'Those who restrain desire, do so because theirs is weak enough to be restrained; and the restrainer or reason usurps its place and governs the unwilling' (*The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*). But where there is conflict, one desire *must* be restrained, even without 'Reason'.

facts about it is its need for unity, for an order that will make that complexity manageable.

Each of us has only one life to live, and needs therefore to live it as some sort of coherent whole. Emphasis on this can be called Rationalism. But if so, it is of a kind which is in no way opposed to Empiricism, but completes it, since it is needed for the proper describing of experience. And the slick intellectual scheme proposed by Moore gives us the worst of both worlds. Its attempts to be economical make it downright cheap and shoddy. It misrepresents experience entirely.

#### IV. Kant's View

What, then, about Kant?

Kant said that act and motive must be seen as continuous and judged as a whole. Here, I shall suggest, common sense is with him. He treats the choosing, active self as something conceptually continuous and intelligible, without Mill's mysterious barrier between motive and act. But Kant's trouble is, notoriously, that he tries to exclude feeling from this map. He treats it as something contingent. And it is not contingent. Feelings are not bare matter, bare sensation. They have their form, the thought which they enshrine, and the form always limits the possible matter. Curiosity cannot *feel* like a longing for ice-cream, nor vindictiveness like wanting a day in the country. And these are necessary, not contingent truths.

This is Kant's trouble. His Empiricist critics have never taken it seriously enough. They could not do so, because they too were committed to the vicious abstraction of 'Feeling' from its proper context. They have accepted the terms in which both Kant and Hume saw the dispute—pitting Reason against Feeling and never asking, what sense could either make alone? What kind of motive, in particular, would 'Reason' be alone?

Kant said that Reason could itself produce action; that it could be practical, and indeed that 'the Will is nothing but Practical Reason'.<sup>12</sup> This surprises people. How can Reason have that force? Kant did not crudely overlook this question. Nor did he, as Mill thought,<sup>13</sup> just take it for granted that people's desire for Happiness would supply the motive. He argued that a rational being could not (as a matter of *logic*) be indifferent to the fate of other rational beings. A creature which did not think of itself as one among many, a creature which did not act as such, had no respect for its fellows, attached no importance to their interests, would just not be a rational being.

<sup>12</sup> 'Reason... can of itself be practical'; 'will is nothing else than practical reason'. *Groundwork*, pp. 27–29, Beck's translation (title *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*); p. 75, Paton (title *The Moral Law*).

<sup>13</sup> *Utilitarianism*, pp. 4 and 49 (Everyman edn).

The price of egoism is not just emotional solitude like Richard III's:

I shall despair. There is no creature loves me  
And when I die, no soul will pity me;

it is *conceptual* solitude, the collapse of thought. There is no one to talk to, no one worth arguing with, no one to agree or disagree. Not only is this very boring (after all, dislike of such solitude is supposed to be part of God's reason for creating the world) but, worse than that, Kant thought it destroyed reasoning itself—since a valid reason is one which anybody would think so, not what seems so from a single standpoint, and the notion of *anybody* requires a range of possible positions. So—no community, no reasoning. We can put this in more modern terms by saying: no language, no reasoning. And only a social being could have a language. Or again we could say: man needs fellows to find his own identity. 'Through the *Thou* a man becomes *I*.'<sup>14</sup> So a rational being has, by definition, to be a social being, to respect other rational beings, take them seriously, think them and their purposes important, regard them as ends and not just as means. Solipsism is not just a view that happens to be mistaken. It is mad. And so, Kant thought, we do have a *reason* to respect other people—a reason which does not depend on feeling.

He did not class as feeling the strong motives which move us to reason at all.

He did not do so, partly because he naturally thought of 'feeling' as a term for the kind of thing which the German Romantics were praising as Feeling in his day and which still often monopolizes the name—floods of tears, storms of passion, love at first sight, scenes and embraces, spasms of self-pity, and finally, if possible, shooting oneself in despair. ('*Then* they'll be sorry. . .'. The romantic suicide of Young Werther was surely always on Kant's mind when he wrote the *Groundwork*.<sup>15</sup>) But behind that there was the serious question of *passivity*. In a sudden spasm of pity, Kant said, we are passive; it *happens* to us. In deciding to help someone on principle, we are active. And there is a quite special kind of value in the active component.<sup>16</sup>

He was surely right to value it. But he over-simplified in suggesting that it could conceivably occur on its own.

Every thought about values has to have its passive, contemplative element. We cannot really think injustice is bad if it does not at some point sicken us—although, as Kant rightly said, we have to go on resisting it even when that feeling intermits. (His example of the man who still does right even when for the time his whole capacity for feeling is absorbed

<sup>14</sup> Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 28.

<sup>15</sup> *The Sorrows of Young Werther* was published in 1774, made a great stir, and served as the bible of the religion of Feeling. It was followed by a wave of student suicides. Kant's *Groundwork* came out in 1785.

<sup>16</sup> *Groundwork*, Beck, pp. 43–53; Paton, pp. 88–99.

by misfortunes of his own is excellent here.<sup>17</sup>) But there has to be a readiness, in normal circumstances, to lay oneself open to the feelings involved; to respond emotionally in the appropriate way. The Greek (particularly Stoic) insistence on Dignity is a bad guide here. The Stoic Apathēs, the man without feeling, too dignified to be moved at all by the death of his own children, is not really a specially rational being.<sup>18</sup> Indifference is not a conceptually proper response to this situation in such a creature as man. And mere constitutional coldness has no sort of merit at all. Butler rightly comments on this sort of thing:

In general, experience will show, that as want of natural appetite to food presupposes and proceeds from some bodily disease; so the apathy the Stoics talk of as much supposes or is accompanied with somewhat amiss in the moral character, in that which is the health of the mind. Those who formerly aimed at this upon the foot of philosophy, appear to have had better success in eradicating the affections of tenderness and compassion, than they had with the passions of envy, pride and resentment; these latter, at best, were but concealed, and that imperfectly too (Sermon V, p. 93).

Aeschylus, much less on his dignity than some Greeks, said that we learn *through suffering*.<sup>19</sup> He was quite right. And this is not just contingent; it is not like, say, the stimulating effect of a tonic.<sup>20</sup> *What* we learn then depends (conceptually) on the form that this particular suffering took. And it has formal connections with other states of feeling. We learn both to feel and to act differently in quite specific ways.

There is no room in Kant for the possibility that feeling may educate thought. This, of course, is what is wrong with his treatment of Affection. Ever since Schiller's early jibe, people have pointed out that, on Kant's principles, it seemed better to hate one's friends and do good to them on principle than to be naturally glad to do so.<sup>21</sup> Had Kant in fact been the kind

<sup>17</sup> *Groundwork*, Beck, p. 14; Paton, p. 64.

<sup>18</sup> See e.g. Epictetus, *Diss.* III, xxvi, 1.36; Marcus Aurelius *Meditations*, V. 34, VII. 15, 26; VIII. 47.

<sup>19</sup> *Agamemnon*, 177. The word is *pathos*.

<sup>20</sup> Plato's panegyric on Romantic Love, magnificent though it is, must, I think be understood in this way. That love should move us towards Philosophy, and so towards our salvation, seems to be just an extraordinary and celestial piece of luck. It does nothing to recommend taking love itself, or any other feeling, seriously. This is true at least of the *Phaedrus* piece (244–257). That in the *Symposium* (204–212) does come rather nearer to an explanation.

<sup>21</sup> In doggerel translation, Schiller's verse runs:

'Gladly I serve my friends, but I do it, alas, from affection.  
Hence I am plagued with doubts that I am not a virtuous person...?'  
'Surely the answer is clear. First you must learn to abhor them,  
Then you can do with disgust that which the law ordains.'

of foolish pedant who could possibly suppose this true, we could forget about him. But his writing constantly shows that he was not.<sup>22</sup> How are we to state the truths he saw while clearly excluding this absurd corollary?

Kant does not deny that affection has value. He gives it Conditional Value. This groups it with such things as Intelligence, Resolution and Ambition, things which can have great value in the right context.<sup>23</sup> Their value depends on the presence of a Good Will. (Good Will acts as a plus sign, Bad Will as a minus.) Now with Intelligence and the rest, this seems right. As Kant says, they will not make a man good, and they can make a bad man, not only more dangerous, but actually *worse*, because he understands more fully just what he is doing. But will *affection* do this? (Nero loves Poppaea; both of them are unmitigated crooks; is the situation *worse* than it would be if neither of them cared for anybody?<sup>24</sup>) And *what sort of a Good Will would that be which existed quite independent of affection for any creature?* If a rational creature has to be a social creature, it has also to be a creature with affections. To suppose otherwise is an illicit abstraction.

In a human being, *Pure Will*—pure activity without any receptive, contemplative element—is arrogance, pig-headedness, blind push, deliberate arbitrariness. Calling it Good Will means already that it has acknowledged a value—has bowed to it, respected it, ‘looked towards’ it, recognized it as not to be moved away; seen it, as Kant says, as ‘a worth which stands in the way of Self-Love’.<sup>25</sup> The model of *God* as pure activity, as a being that need not compromise his dignity by this acceptance of values, has made it hard to see this. But people who think of God in this way do not in fact hold him out as a model for human imitation—and clearly they had better not; the point of such conceptions is to stress God’s otherness, indeed his unintelligibility. Those who want to see him as more intelligible would do better, I think, to think of him neither as active nor passive, but as somehow both, transcending that contrast. The Christian tradition does in fact break with the notion of pure activity in supposing him capable of love. As Thomas Traherne put it:

... It is very strange; want itself is a treasure in Heaven; and so great a one that without it there could be no treasure. God did infinitely for

<sup>22</sup> See for instance the passages which Paton has collected in a paper called ‘Kant on Friendship’, *Proceedings of British Academy* 42 (1956).

<sup>23</sup> *Groundwork*, Beck, pp. 9 and 15–16; Paton, pp. 59 and 63–65.

<sup>24</sup> See (or rather hear) Monteverdi, *The Coronation of Poppaea*.

<sup>25</sup> Paton translates, ‘Reverence is properly awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love’. But this cannot be right. ‘Demolishes’ is quite incompatible with Kant’s clearly expressed acceptance of the necessary function of Self-Love on p. 85 (Beck, pp. 39–40) and elsewhere. Beck, like Abbott, translates the word ‘thwarts’, which seems a natural and satisfactory rendering for ‘*abbruch thun*’. Kant does not need extra trouble.

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us, when he made us want like Gods, that like Gods we might be satisfied. The heathen deities wanted nothing, and were therefore unhappy, for they had no being. But the Lord God of Israel, the Living and True God, was from all eternity, and from all eternity wanted like a God. He wanted the communication of his divine essence, and persons to enjoy it. He wanted Worlds, He wanted Spectators, He wanted Joys, He wanted Treasures. He wanted, yet He wanted not, for He had them (*Centuries of Meditation*, I.41).

In any case, Kant for one knew very well that God's position must be *formally* different from man's, and that it is utter nonsense to suppose us called upon to imitate his metaphysical status.<sup>26</sup>

Thus, to praise Will without feeling makes little sense. But equally, however highly we may value feeling, we do not actually praise Feeling which is divorced from Will. Real Affection or Love has to include steady, rational Good Will. That is what distinguishes it from sentimentality. It is not just a flow of emotion to which the owner is passive, like a rain-storm or the flow of bile. It has its active side. It is an *attitude*, positively endorsed by at least part of the personality. If we love in spite of ourselves, the split is *within* the personality; it is formally quite unlike having-flu-in-spite-of-ourselves. (That is why Catullus found it so agonizing.<sup>27</sup>) And if someone claims to love, but shows no Good Will towards the person loved—entirely refuses to recognize their rights and interests—a central element in the concept of love is missing. And it is perfectly sensible to say that this 'is not love', but e.g. pride, greed, passion, vicarious ambition or sentimentality. Examples might be the blindly possessive parent, or Herod giving orders that his wife Mariamne should be killed after his death.

And

love is not love  
Which alters when it alteration finds  
Or bends with the remover to remove.  
(Shakespeare, Sonnet 116)

Or of course we can say that it *is* love, but object to that kind of love:

'Why, with so evident an intention of offending and insulting me, did you choose to tell me that you liked me against your will, against your reason, even against your character?'

as Elizabeth Bennett put it (*Pride and Prejudice*, Book II, Chapter XI).

<sup>26</sup> For God's position, see *Groundwork*, Beck, pp. 29–31 and 51–53; Paton, pp. 77–78 and 95–96.

<sup>27</sup> 'I hate her and I love her. If you ask me why I do this, I cannot answer. But I feel it happen, and I am in torment.'

In short, *respect is the backbone of love*, and Kant was absolutely right to say so. But if a vertebrate is no good without its backbone, the backbone is also little good without the rest of the creature.

Respect, for Kant, is a feeling, but a feeling distinguished by its function; by its formal properties. It is *that* feeling (whatever its actual emotional tone) by which we recognize a worth which we did not make and cannot alter; by which we concede the otherness of others. ('Respect is consciousness of a worth which thwarts my self-love.') This is its mark, and so, Kant says, its importance lies in that formal characteristic and not in its appeal as a feeling.<sup>28</sup> It has the same sort of importance in the practical sphere which feelings of discomfort at a confused thought and relief at a clearer one have in the theoretical sphere. It matters because of what it shows, not because of what it feels like.

*But the two things cannot be separated.* Certainly the feeling-tone of respect can vary immensely—it can be more or less reluctant, exasperated, awe-struck, astonished, puzzled or radiant—but there are limits. What sort of respect would that be whose feeling-tone was entirely that of contempt, amusement or despair? When we feel an unwilling respect, it is usually the feeling which arrives first and forces the thought. Yet to Kant *all* feelings are a contingent matter:

... it is of the utmost importance ... that we should not dream for a moment of trying to derive the reality of this principle (of duty) from the *special characteristics of human nature* ... Whatever ... is derived from the special predisposition of humanity, from certain feelings and propensities ... can give us a subjective principle—one on which we have a propensity and inclination to act—but not an objective one (*Groundwork*, Beck, p. 43; Paton, p. 88).

### V. The Application of Kant's Views

So, to return to our original question: Did he really mean that it does not matter at all morally whether we hate our friends, provided that we act properly and conceal the fact sufficiently?

Taking up the pen of a frustrated novelist, Kant answers the question:

<sup>28</sup> The notion that a certain situation could conceptually demand a certain sort of emotional response, which is mooted in this very remarkable footnote on Respect (Beck, pp. 17–18; Paton, pp. 66–67), got further attention in the *Critique of Judgment*, where Kant explores the position of Beauty as being what we take to be 'a *ground* of delight to all men' and not just a cause of it (p. 50, Meredith trans.). Though struck by the strangeness of this, he insisted that it must be right.

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... If nature had implanted little sympathy in this or that man's heart; if (being in other respects an honest fellow) he were cold in temperament and indifferent to the sufferings of others—perhaps because, being endowed with the special gift of patience and robust endurance in his own sufferings, he assumed the like in others or even demanded it; if such a man (who would in truth not be the worst product of nature) were not exactly fashioned by her to be a philanthropist, would he not still find in himself a source from which he might draw a worth far higher than any that a good-natured temperament might have?<sup>29</sup>

*And he might*—on three conditions:

- (1) That there is *little* sympathy in his heart, meaning rather less than others, not actually none;
- (2) That on *some* other important matters he does show feeling—e.g. a burning passion for justice; and
- (3) Rather harder—that we are sure that it is only Nature (and Fate) which did the inadequate implanting; that he has not been active with the weed-killer himself.

(1) and (2) If he seems literally to have *no* feeling on any subject, I think we shall find him so mysterious that we shall not know how to judge him at all—we may just give up and consider him a *lusus naturae*; we shall hardly anyway say 'There is an exceptionally good man'.<sup>30</sup> This just shows how important right and appropriate feeling is in our moral assessment of people. Kant did not make this extreme suggestion.

Again, if he feels very strongly about e.g. justice, but never about any individual, we shall worry, because normal human feeling moves outward from the particular to the general. We have good reason to suspect Pride, Wrath, Envy or some other fly in the ointment. For (3), much more than in Kant's day, we shall now ask about such a man. 'How did he get like that? Is he deliberately suppressing feeling out of a fear of it?' Chronic states of feeling are not just things that happen to us, 'occur', as Moore puts it (p. 321). They express our choice. Feeling has its active, deliberate side.

Certainly indifference to other people can *come over us*. Any depression will produce it. But we can fight it. It is often perfectly possible, given time, to rouse oneself to genuinely like and mind about people. This possibility, so prominent in Kant's mind, is often dismissed as a piece of humbug on his part. But in fact it is the only defence against humbug.

<sup>29</sup> *Groundwork*, Beck, pp. 14–15; Paton, p. 64.

<sup>30</sup> Spock of *Star Trek*, it should be noted, does not show *no* feeling. He just shows rather less than those around him. As these are a bunch of hysterical television actors, behaving like television actors, this accounts for his well-earned popularity.

Iris Murdoch gives an excellent example of this in *The Sovereignty of Good*. She describes a mother-in-law, M, beginning to suspect that she has always been unfair to her daughter-in-law, D, and trying to do something about it. Since D is dead, or at least far distant, this something has to be a solitary affair. It is not the preparation for any action. But it is certainly not idle day-dreaming either. In 'trying to be fair', M is making a real, not an imaginary effort. She is trying to do something real, something difficult, something which she ought to do. (Any of us, realizing that we are caught in a mean, resentful cycle of brooding on the absent, knows this perfectly well.) What has she to do? Iris Murdoch rightly points out that what is called for is not the performance of some monstrous, inexplicable effort of will, which will directly transform her attitude, like some kind of sorcery. It is something both more complex and much more natural. She has simply to *attend* to the matter, raising new questions, both about D and about her own attitude:

M tells herself, 'I am old-fashioned and conventional. I may be prejudiced and narrow-minded. I may be snobbish. I am certainly jealous. Let me look again' (p. 17).

She must *look*. She must go back, that is, to the facts—but not with the old principle of selection, not by the familiar paths, worn smooth by self-righteous brooding. Different possibilities must be raised, different ways of classifying tried out. It can then turn out—quite genuinely and not because she decided in advance to fake the evidence—that D, to a less prejudiced eye, is

not vulgar but refreshingly simple, not undignified but spontaneous, not noisy but gay, not tiresomely juvenile but delightfully youthful, and so on.

These new thoughts new carry feelings with them. Those feelings are real, not artificial or false, and they are none the less real for having been reached with an effort.<sup>31</sup> Deliberate rethinking of this kind plays a very great part in the normal development of our relations with other people. We very often have a prejudice against strangers, a prejudice which does not melt quite on its own, but which we must break down by a conscious effort at fairness. (Or, of course, we may start with a prejudice in favour of a plausible rogue, and need serious, disinterested efforts before we can see through him.) Once our attitudes to people settle, we often forget that we ever had to make these efforts. And of course we do not always have to make them in absence. (This point is introduced into M's case for a special

<sup>31</sup> See N. Dent, 'Duty and Inclination', in *Mind* (October 1974), for a more thorough explosion of the idea that there has to be something false or unnatural about deliberately altering one's feelings.

reason. It is important that it can happen, but it would be most misleading to suggest that it is normal.) It occurs constantly, as a completely ordinary element in our personal relations, that we deliberately reason ourselves out of a bad state of feeling.

But the Empiricist tradition, just as much as Kant, has ignored this simple truth. Thus Moore explains that the commandment 'Thou shalt not covet' could not possibly be meant or followed literally, since people could control their stealing, but not their covetous desires. It is therefore an 'ideal rule'. I do not think that he really thought of this just as a hypothetical command, but as a sort of pious hope which might influence us indirectly—perhaps by *causing* different feelings to arise in us on their own.

But if we really could not control our feelings, how could we control our acts? Of course it is true that, if I must act *instantly*, I must act on the motives which I have now. But if I have even five minutes, I can do something about the motives too. I can see to it, for instance, that I do not shake hands with murder in my heart, but with some sort of serious attempt at good feeling. And if I fail, I have *not* succeeded in controlling my act—since the act of shaking-hands-with-murder-in-one's-heart is a different one from the alternative; doing it without. This is not just cheese-paring. Common moral consciousness will at once recognize the difference. And any more serious kind of act, such as 'advising someone' or 'looking after him when he is lonely' or indeed 'being reconciled' cannot be done at all, even in its outward manifestations, without the proper motives. (This is not just a contingent remark about the limits of human guile. The deceiver simply *will not know what to do*.) Actually, as I have suggested, only a limited range of more or less economic acts can be separated from their motives at all—and even they often only by a good deal of duplicity. (The unpleasant taste of bread-given-with-contempt has often been remarked on: it can persist even when the givers are absent.) We can only keep up this separation by carefully choosing acts cited under limited descriptions which keep them external. This means taking small examples—therefore either trivial or incomplete ones; turning away constantly from my Duty to my Parents or the Whole Duty of Man or the Duty of Procuring Perpetual Peace to the Duty of Not Smoking in Non-Smoking Carriages.<sup>32</sup> Such microslices of the moral life are unmanageable.

## VI. Confusions About the Will

Why did Moore take this strange line? I am pretty sure that he was operating with a quite unrealistic notion of the Will, not as Practical Reason, but

<sup>32</sup> See R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals*, p. 176.

as Sorcery or Blind Push; one that may be described as the Public School Notion. (I speak as one who has suffered from being brought up on it—‘You seem to have no willpower’.) He writes:

I cannot . . . by any single act of will directly prevent from arising in my mind a desire for something that belongs to someone else, even if, when once the desire has arrived, I can by my will prevent its continuance; and even this last I can hardly do *directly* but only by forcing myself to attend to other considerations which may extinguish the desire . . . (By contrast) the action (of stealing) is *directly* within the control of my will (p. 316).

But attending to other things is the natural and proper way of changing one’s thoughts and feelings; it is not a second-best; there is no quicker and more direct alternative. That is how ‘the will’ works. The ‘other things’ need not of course be irrelevant. When tempted to take my neighbour’s bicycle, I can hold off by reminding myself how much he needs it or the like (Practical Reasoning). Moore’s assumption that he can control the *act* directly—without any movement of the attention—depends, I think, on picking the example of theft, something he has no temptation to commit in any case. Someone who from time to time *does* steal will tell a very different story. And a better example for Coveting might be Envy of a friend’s fame and success. This coveting does not consist simply in having a sudden isolated thought, ‘how I would like his position’. Moore is quite right to say that we cannot help this. It consists in welcoming, encouraging and developing that thought—instead of deliberately attending to other things, and, if that fails, tackling our meanness, and reasoning ourselves out of envy into a better state of feeling. Unless we can do that, we shall *not* in fact be able to resist saying and doing mean and spiteful things to him if we get the chance; we are on a road at whose end stands Iago. Our only other way of controlling our acts is duplicity; *concealed* malice. And the suggestion that there is nothing wrong about that unless it explodes into action really does stink. ‘Good Will’ is not the power to do the right thing suddenly while still wallowing in habitual ill-will, envy, self-pity or the fear of life. It is the power to change such emotional habits, over time, through vigorous attending and imagining, into better ones, which will incidentally be ones from which doing the right thing becomes natural. Certainly *occasional* actions ahead of and contrary to one’s current state of feeling are possible and necessary. As Aristotle says, someone who is trying to become just must start by doing just acts, without enjoying them. Only after practising in this way for some time will he begin to enjoy them as the just man does.<sup>33</sup> But

<sup>33</sup> For the sort of circle which genuinely arises here, see *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 1, and III, 5, even more interestingly, for the effect of this on our responsibility for being the kind of people that we are.

this kind of thing cannot be the norm, and if constantly done it carries the strong danger of self-deception endemic to all high spiritual pretensions. Normally, Good Will is utterly dependent on self-knowledge, on studying and understanding our disastrous habits of feeling. By attending to such habits *and* attending to considerations which show that they stink, we can in fact gradually control them, replacing them by better ones and feeling differently. There is nothing artificial, inhuman or bogus about this. The artificiality belongs to the other enterprise—that of trying to act correctly without attention to one's feelings. Nowell-Smith gives a dreadful, though tiny, example of this; that of an 'Oxford don who disliked common-room life and whose presence caused himself and others acute distress. Yet he attended Common-Room assiduously because he thought it his duty to do so. He would have done better to stay at home' (*Ethics*, p. 247). Certainly. But I do not know why Nowell-Smith supposes this man to be acting according to Kant. Kant's Good Will is the rational will; it involves a great deal of hard thinking, and this man has not thought at all; he is behaving like a fool. If he thought, he would *either* see that it was better to stay at home, *or* set about learning how to meet his colleagues and enjoy it.

We all know that it is this kind of revolution in feeling that is often required of us. Did Kant not know this? I am sure that he did, and that he took it for granted—as he safely could, since it is a common sense point and one prominent in Christian teaching. He did not remark on it, because his whole controversial weight was thrown against sentimentalism. But I cannot find any passage where he denies it. And a famous one which has been taken as adverse really assumes this point:

It is doubtless in this sense (as a practical command) that we should understand too the passages from Scripture in which we are commanded to love our neighbour and even our enemy. For love out of inclination cannot be commanded; but kindness done from duty—although no inclination impels us, and even though natural and unconquerable disinclination stands in our way—is *practical*, not *pathological* love, residing in the will and not in the propensions of feeling, in principles of action and not of melting compassion . . . (*Groundwork*, Paton, p. 65; Beck, 15–16).

In the first place, Kant is here talking about *enemies* and *neighbours* who are not friends—he is not recommending us to take this same attitude to everybody. And *some* disinclinations may be unconquerable without its following that we can never learn, by an effort, to love somebody better. In the second, 'kindness done from duty' *cannot* mean 'the proper actions according to the rule-book, and to hell with the state of mind'. Kindness is kindness; it has an internal component as well as an outer one. It tries to reach both outward and inward, to grow into a mutual feeling; often it

succeeds. Kant puts the point more plainly in the fuller passage in the Preface to the *Metaphysical Elements of Ethics*:

Beneficence is a duty. He who often practises this, and sees his beneficent purposes succeed, comes at last really to love him whom he has benefited. When, therefore, it is said: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, this does not mean, Thou shalt first of all love, and by means of that love (in the next place) do him good; but: *Do good* to thy neighbour, and this beneficence will produce in thee the love of men (as a settled habit of inclination to beneficence) (Abbott, p. 313).

Actual love is required in the end. But almsgiving with hatred or indifference in the heart is not *any* sort of love; it is not practical love any more than pathological. Kant remarks a little later that hatred is not just a spasm of feeling; it is a set attitude, and therefore deliberately vicious (p. 319). And the same would, I think, be true of contempt, dislike or even chilly indifference—if they occurred as set attitudes to those towards whom we recognize a duty. This becomes clearer still in a remark made on p. 312:

*Hatred of men*, however, is always hateful, even though without any active hostility it consists only in complete aversion from mankind (solitary misanthropy). For benevolence still remains a duty even towards the manhater, whom one cannot love, but to whom we can show kindness.

This makes it clear that in ordinary cases benevolence *ought* to lead to actual love. That this progression should meet its Waterloo in the occasional manhater is not surprising; Kant, here as elsewhere, has a realistic view of the actual possibilities. But we still have a duty of *kindness and benevolence* towards him, and no stretching of language will reduce that to mere outside actions.

Thought, feeling and action are conceptually, not contingently, connected. They are aspects of the one thing: conduct.

It is no use trying to unscrew the outside from the inside of the teapot.

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