

PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS

JEAN AUSTIN

FIRST a word about my title: 'Happiness' is ground upon which so many angels have feared to tread that it seemed not inappropriate for me to rush in. It is a subject to which we all do give thought, not only with the force majeure of professional philosophising, but in our personal lives; however, in trying to sort the subject out a little, and it is one about which both our literature and our thinking are notoriously muddled, I fear I may rather have generated confusion than diminished it. In attempting by a somewhat roundabout method to clarify a little the sort of question, though scarcely, I am afraid, the sort of answer, that is appropriate to such thought, it has, perhaps inevitably, seemed necessary to consider in almost as much detail the more fashionable subject of Pleasure; and here too, with less excuse, the points I wish to make are abbreviated and unashamedly oversimplified. An Aunt Sally, however, has its uses, and my neck is not so precious that it cannot afford to be stuck out.

I must begin by pointing out that I shall not be considering *feeling* happy, in so far as it is to be distinguished from *being* happy: euphoria may be produced by drugs, and however interesting or relevant to morality this may be, it is not my concern here. I shall confine myself to 'happy' as predicated of a person, or of the life of a person, or a portion of that life. My paper will fall roughly into two parts, each part itself being divided into sections. I shall first try to show the seductiveness, and the dangers (they often go together) of taking it as a psychological fact, as Mill did, 'that each person desires his own happiness'. I shall then go on to examine the two favoured quasi-specific 'ingredients' of happiness, pleasure and virtue. In doing so I shall have to discuss what seems to be the real villain of the piece, the verb *to want*, which appears disguised in the statement 'that each person desires his own happiness' and wriggles its way through the most subtle expositions of the case for either ingredient, wriggles its way in such a fashion that the case for each ingredient is shown to be inextricable from the other. The second, shorter, part will start in a negative way and I hope will reach, though very tentatively and certainly contentiously, a more positive denouement. Here I shall discuss certain predicates which seem logically incompatible with the predicate happy, and, by a somewhat contrapositive method, I shall try to sketch very briefly the way that to me happiness seems to lie.

Mill states as a 'fact', and in a later passage implies, given his analysis of the word 'happiness', that it is a *psychological* fact that each

person desires his own happiness. In this he might seem to have Aristotle's support in his statement that there is agreement as to the 'name' at least of what he calls the '*general*' aim (each activity according to him having its own particular aim), viz. 'happiness'. There is indeed a plausibility about the statement that we do all want to be happy; perhaps too much plausibility: the suspicion that it has the ring not of truth, but of necessary truth. And this of course would entail that it was not a statement of fact at all. 'Want' is scarcely an unequivocal verb, but for the moment allowing it to stand for what both these philosophers and many others have intended to claim, why should 'happiness' be, as it is, the generally favoured candidate for what we all want? Aristotle suggests that on a different plane its general philosophical grammar is parallel to that of the word 'health'. None of us, nor, I suspect, any physiologist, would like to offer any positive definition of what it is to be healthy. A man cannot be called 'healthy' if his body is suffering from any specific disorder, though it is not so certain that the removal of a limb or perhaps of a more vital organ would be clearly incompatible with health. One could not be jaundiced but healthy or tuberculous but healthy, though one might be without a leg but healthy or even without a lung but healthy. That it should be healthy is perhaps the highest assessment that could be given of a man's bodily condition (of his body's condition: scarcely of his body itself which could be assessed more highly in other dimensions, such as that of beauty or strength). That he should be happy, not content but happy, is comparably the highest assessment of his total condition: and here again it is an assessment leaving room for possible surprise, in the same way that it may surprise us that a man may be healthy without a lung. He may be crippled but happy, in pain but happy, unsuccessful but happy, poor but happy, unscrupulous but happy, a victim or a martyr but happy. These cases vary very widely, and I shall be returning to some of them in more detail in the later part of this paper. My point here is that though, as the word 'but' suggests, the achievement in the particular circumstances may surprise us, the total assessment is satisfactory. The parallel that Aristotle draws may safely be pressed so far: it is obviously vulnerable in other respects, but perhaps less so than it may appear to be. A man's physician is the best authority on his bodily health: it might be natural to think that the man would himself be the best authority on his happiness. This is true in that it would be absurd (except where the word has become clinical, and equivalent indeed to mental health), to assess a man as happy in the face of his own denial of this assessment; but it would on the other hand be equally absurd to allow his own assertion as sufficient grounds for such an assess-

ment. To do so would not only be to let in again cases of euphoria, but to allow an idiosyncratic assessment which might be in place where the question was one of pleasure or enjoyment, but not where it is one of happiness. If this is indeed an assessment of man's total condition the assessment must be in accordance with the standards accepted by the society in which he lives and precludes outrages to these.

I hope this point will be made clearer in what I have to say about pleasure, and more explicit in the second part of this paper. To state that a man is happy is to assess his total condition, of which of course his own reactions to his condition are a part. Since it is of his total condition it is inevitably a temporal assessment, an assessment over a period, and an assessment of which the man or his life is an equally proper subject. As subjects, a man and his life differ only to the extent that his life or life history will include all his experiences and accordingly statements about the latter cannot be made until it is complete. But this does not matter very much. It is an indifference which is reflected in our verbal habits, and is itself illuminating as to the nature of the assessment. We speak of a happy life, a happy childhood, a happy month in New York, a happy week or hour in someone's society: equally of a happy man, or being happy while one was a child or for the ten minutes between his making his proposal and his taking it back again. In each set of cases a period of time is implicitly or explicitly judged. Unlike bliss or ecstasy or, significantly, pleasure, happiness cannot be momentary, and, though in fact it may not endure, it cannot be seen as essentially transitory. Again, and perhaps this follows at least in part from my previous discussion, it is an assessment that we are more inclined to make about other people or about our past than about our own present condition. For an assessment of happiness to be in place, as for an assessment of health, nothing essential must be wrong or be seen to be wrong, and it is this negative force that gives the word its power: it is non-specific. What in fact will determine whether things will go right or wrong we are unable to specify in advance. If there were a simple recipe it would scarcely remain a philosophical problem. It is not, however, only a philosophical difficulty, but perhaps in this case really a psychological fact, and one of which we are deeply aware, that though we may very much want some specific object or to bring about some specific state of affairs, we may not at all like it when we have done so. This is the moral of many legends: we may have to use the last of our three wishes to wish away the sausages that landed on our nose as the result of the granting of the first; if we are allowed only one wish we may not be able to end the tragedy of Hippolytus' death. We simply cannot tell

in advance what may go bad on us. Wealth, celebrity, devotion, all have their attractions and as notoriously their hazards. It seems that to be happy is something it is safe to want, but *too* safe: safe just because it is sufficiently non-specific to be non-significant as an object of wanting.

I have obviously cheated in the brief list I gave just now of possible happiness-producing objects of wanting; I omitted the two most favoured, most sophisticated and significantly least specific candidates: pleasure and virtue. These have always had their adherents, among them the two authors whose names I have already mentioned: Mill, who claimed that 'by happiness is intended a balance of pleasure over pain', and Aristotle, who, though he was careful to stress that in order for the word to be in place, certain external conditions must be fulfilled, defined happiness essentially as 'an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue'. I shall take each of these as a protagonist of the ingredient upon which he places most stress. I choose them partly because even the briefest outline of their views, all that I can give here, should be enough to show, on the one hand, the need each felt to accommodate within the total picture the other's candidate, and, on the other, what perhaps lies behind this need, the difficulty to which I have already attended, the equivocation, ambiguity, open texture, what you will, of the verb *to want*—a verb at least as much in need of clarification as its object in the original dictum that *what we all want is to be happy*. Pleasure and virtue then are the favoured candidates, but they are not quite parallel candidates. That pleasure is what we want might itself look like a necessary truth: Mill not only defines happiness in terms of pleasure, but seems at times to use the words interchangeably. That we want to be virtuous might be taken by many to be plain false: the relationship between virtue and happiness has no such specious simplicity. That virtue will cater for what we want has to be shown. The use of the verb to want is not a simple one, and it is consequently about this that I must first make a few fairly obvious points.

The verb Mill himself most commonly uses is 'desire', but 'desire' is a verb which apart from its use in philosophical discussion naturally takes only a specific object, and that object, usually among those classes of things Mill would not have had us 'desire'; he has simply extended its use to cover the normal range of the verb 'want'. His choice, however, of the verb desire is not quite irrelevant. It might well have been influenced by the fact that 'desire' is the standard translation of the Greek verb *epithumein*. This certainly was used in such a way that hedone, pleasure, does seem to have been an internal accusative, comparable for instance to the English construction

according to which it follows that if we smell, it is a smell we smell. Or perhaps more nearly parallel to the Greek—if we have a craving, and if this craving is satisfied, satisfaction is logically inescapable. If we desire it might seem *eo ipso* that it is pleasure we desire—pleasure or what in Greek were the natural external accusatives to *epithumien*, food, drink and sexual satisfaction: to these I shall be returning in considering pleasure. Given for the present this internal accusative construction, if we desire (and it is worth noting the verb is not so very unlike the verb to crave: desire as such is uncomfortable), and if our desire was satisfied, it would be logically necessary that pleasure should follow. The converse, however, was not true; hedone could be the object of other verbs, just as it is in order to *choose* pleasure rather than duty, or indeed the reverse.

Mill uses the verb to *desire*, but uses it to cover the range of the verb to *want*—a range which includes significantly the range also of the verb to *choose*. It is not therefore unfair to claim that it is an analysis of the verb to *want* that is relevant to Mill's thesis. That its range is very wide is indeed undisputed, and I shall not here enter the controversy as to whether it may significantly take anything as its object: it is enough that such a controversy can exist. We can undoubtedly want an apple or a drink, to listen to music or to go for a walk, to enjoy ourselves or to fulfil our obligations. A case has been made that everything we do as 'free agents', not under duress, we must in some sense have 'really' wanted to do. This thesis in its turn may be relevant to Aristotle's case for virtue; I shall accordingly be alluding to it under that heading. Meanwhile I should like first to distinguish it from the verb to wish, and then to compare it with the artificial verb to will, or the natural verb to choose. The grammar of the verb to wish allows us to use it of any state of affairs that our imagination can compass. We can wish we were wealthy, that we had been alive in the sixteenth century, that we were children again, or at the moment that we could visit the moon. The verb to want, on the other hand, commits us to a state of affairs which is at least seen as theoretically possible. It would be in place to want to be wealthy, but not to want to be alive in the sixteenth century or to be a child again, and to want to visit the moon would be to project oneself forward to the time when tickets will be available. There is, however, unfortunately a difference between theoretical possibility and realisation. It is in place, logically and psychologically, to want to spend the only capital one possesses on a new car, and to want to spend it on a holiday abroad, but it is not possible to spend the same capital twice. Though x, y, w, and z may each be independently realisable the realisation of one may be incompatible with the realisation of one or more of the others; wanting incompatibles is the

human predicament. We may have to choose between incompatibles: choose what we 'really' want, and in describing our position, the 'having chosen' may be suppressed: we should correctly describe the result of a choice as 'wanting' x, y, or z alone. Our choice or our will commits us to what is seen as realisable by us, given our particular situation: we cannot will incompatibles. The sort of objects the verb to want may take may be here and now incompatible with each other, they may be long-term or short-term, they may be specific or general. There is a difference between wanting to play baseball, and wanting pleasure, since though for one man the first might be a specific substitute for the second, this would not be true for us all: there is also a difference between wanting to fulfil our obligations and wanting, say, to read five hundred examination papers—two differences which again I hope will be made more clear in my discussion of pleasure. At every level there may be a conflict between what we 'really' (suspect word) want to do or have; and we may be forced to choose, the choice not always being between what appear to be commensurables. It may not be difficult to choose between drinking and not drinking, or even between pleasure and duty, but alternatives do not always present themselves so neatly categorised. It is very possible to choose to do what in many senses we do not want to do, and not to choose what we do want to do. To add a little more confusion it must be remembered that though 'choose' does not cover the range of 'want', 'want' importantly does cover the range of 'choose', and so may well be substituted here where I have used the latter verb. This logical slipperiness of the word *want* reflects, I think, the psychological impossibility of predicting whether when we have *got* what we *want*, and perhaps its consequences, we shall in fact *like* it. And to like what one has got, rather than to get what one wants, is a necessary, though not perhaps a sufficient, condition of happiness.

I may want something but not like it when I have got it. If something gives me pleasure, that is, to that extent, that. The difficulties about prediction reflected in the verb to want do not *as such* reappear in discussing pleasure, though of course we may be mistaken as to what *in fact* will give us pleasure. *These* difficulties may not be there, but many, as I have already suggested, do reappear; and there are others at least as germane to the subject—of these I cannot do more than indicate, or raise without answering, those that seem relevant to my central topic. To start with, the word may be used in a specific and narrow sense as a contrary of pain. That is to say that if we agree to there being a group of sensations identifiable, as such, as being painful, we must equally agree to there being a group of sensations identifiable as those of pleasure: here pleasure would be equivalent to the Greek *hedone* used as an internal accusative of *epithumein* and

take as its specific substitutes the appropriate external accusatives I mentioned earlier. In this sense, which, though historically it was taken as basic, is in fact not the most usual, just as it is in order to speak of 'degrees' of pain, it would be possible, as the Utilitarians did, to speak of 'degrees' of pleasure.

A more common use covers roughly the range of the verb to *enjoy*. If we find pleasure in deep-sea diving or in playing billiards or in listening to Mozart, we would naturally describe ourselves as enjoying these activities. The grammar of this is assimilated to that of enjoyment, in that just as there are not two separately identifiable activities involved in enjoying playing billiards, playing billiards and enjoying oneself, there is no separately identifiable 'pleasure' to be found in the pleasure we take in playing billiards. But whereas the verb to enjoy has a subjective and autobiographical ring about it—I could never safely assume that what I enjoy anyone else would necessarily enjoy—the noun pleasure sounds dangerously objective and impersonal, as though pleasure was an identifiable characteristic that certain activities had, or might have, in common. It is in place to speak of *enjoying* listening to Mozart *more* than playing billiards, and consequently of *finding more pleasure* in the former than in the latter: this in its turn sounds as though *degrees* of pleasure were in place again here, as they might be in the first use I mentioned. If one enjoys *x* more than *y* it is a matter of *preference*, and a scale of preferences is a much more complicated affair than a calculus of degrees. It is here that part of the early Utilitarian confusion lay. One may in fact *prefer* many things to pleasure itself, or enjoyment, just as one may *choose* other things than these, however much one may want them. One may prefer to those activities it would be natural to claim to find pleasure in or to enjoy, fulfilling one's obligations, sacrificing one's standard of living to one's children's education, dying for one's faith or one's country, activities which under their specific descriptions it would be most unnatural to *find pleasure in* or to enjoy. The martyr may *choose* to go to the stake and perhaps find *happiness* in doing so, but unless he is also a masochist he will not *find pleasure in* the flames.

This leads to a third shift in the use of the word 'pleasure', again tied to the link between pleasure and wanting. This I think comes about through first identifying pleasure, in the first, 'sensation', sense with the second, 'enjoyment', sense, in which preference but not degree is in place, and then indulging in something like the fallacy of the illicit converse. It does not follow that because we *prefer* *x* to *y* we necessarily take more pleasure in *x* than in *y* in the sense that we *enjoy* *x* more than *y*. If we prefer *x* to *y* it may be said that we *want* to do *x*, and do *x* *gladly*, or even *take pleasure* in doing *x*, but

pleasure here has become a comparatively empty, formal, word, far from its significance either as a 'sensation-word' or an 'enjoyment-word'. It was with this last shift that Aristotle, in his defence (if it was such) of morality, made most play.

Now for the protagonists themselves, Mill for pleasure, Aristotle for virtue, and the need each felt to accommodate the other's candidate. Mill states that 'to think of an object as desirable . . . and to think of it as pleasant are one and the same thing, and to desire anything except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant is a physical and metaphysical impossibility'. He defines the will as an 'off-shoot of desire', and suggests that this may be conditioned into desiring not only the 'higher' intellectual pleasures but, more generally, virtuous activity. First then he takes *pleasure* as an internal accusative to *desire* which as I have said may be legitimate in the Greek, but is dubious in English, and certainly mistaken when he extends, as he does, the range of the verb *to desire* to cover the range of the verb *to want*. By so doing he elevates, or reduces, the statement that we desire pleasure to a necessary truth. But he felt the need to accommodate not only the plausible candidates as substitutes for the internal accusative, the pleasures of sensation, but also the intellectual pleasures, and the virtues, within the general picture in order to justify his original dictum that 'happiness consists in a balance of pleasure over pain', and so committed himself to a reduction of morality in terms of pleasure. He saw that 'amount', whatever that means, of pleasure experienced will not alone do to determine an assessment of happiness, or some, such as the Marquis de Sade, or Hitler, whom he would not have liked to do so, would have qualified to be so assessed; but he cheated in his attempt to reduce to terms of pleasure the moral element normally present in such an assessment. The experiencing of pleasure, the capacity for enjoyment may well again be a necessary but not a sufficient condition of happiness. For *what* we enjoy does rather matter; it makes a difference *in what* we find pleasure. He was aware of the shortcomings of his own candidate. Aristotle, who though he was careful to stress that external circumstances could rule out the possibility of assessing anyone as happy, stressed, as many others have, the moral element. It is perhaps a necessary truth that it is socially desirable that morality should flourish, and, though, whether or not it is a necessary truth that we desire pleasure, people do not generally require to be persuaded of the delights of pleasure, they may well need to be convinced that there *are* delights in being virtuous: there have consequently always been plenty of advocates of virtue as a necessary ingredient of happiness. It obviously would not be fair to place Aristotle simply among these any more than it would be fair to place Mill

simply among the advocates of pleasure. Starting at the other end from Mill, Aristotle defined happiness essentially as an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. He took as the test of a virtuous man, as distinct from the man who happened to perform a virtuous activity, the pleasure taken in its performance. Aristotle was perfectly well aware of the use of the word, or its Greek equivalent *hedone* (it does seem to be curiously equivalent)—which I have suggested covers the range of enjoyment. If a man consistently indulges himself in doing what he enjoys doing, our assessment of his happiness may depend to a large extent upon our approval or disapproval of what he enjoys doing. This I think is the claim he makes in the last book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and is an admission of the important part that enjoyment must play in any assessment of happiness. But, and it is quite clear in the context, it is not in *this* sense that he is using the word as a test of the virtuous man: it is in the third and emptier sense. To state that one *will enjoy* doing *x* is to make a *prediction*, and perhaps a risky one: to state (truly) that one *will gladly* do *x* is not to make a prediction at all. Aristotle's virtuous man acts gladly, not with enjoyment. He is concerned, and properly concerned, with the man who *gladly* hangs on to his shield or returns upon it, rather than throwing it away, or *chooses* or *wants* to do so, rather than with the man who *enjoys* such a situation in itself. Some people may, but most do not, enjoy exposing themselves to probable wounding or death in battle: many have *chosen* to do this when other real possibilities have been open to them, have *opted for* it and have done so *gladly*: they have *taken pleasure* in it. Bravery, physical bravery, was a virtue that played a larger part in the lives of Aristotle's contemporaries than it does in our own, but it would not be hard to find parallels among the virtues with which we are now more concerned: for instance, kindness. There is a distinction between *enjoying* a wearisome journey on someone else's behalf and doing it *gladly*: between *finding* pleasure in the struggle and *taking* pleasure in the service we are doing. To claim that the more virtuous activities a man can *gladly* do, the greater his share of *happiness*, may well be in order, but it is not to claim that his share of *pleasure* in its 'fuller' sense is the greater. Mill would like the most virtuous man to be he who has the largest share of the *right* kind of pleasure and is therefore the happiest. Neither pleasure alone, nor virtue, is satisfactory as an ingredient of happiness—ingredient anyhow is a term more suited to cookery than to philosophical analysis: but perhaps this is because happiness is not to be analysed at all, at least not in terms of *wanting* and *getting what one wants*, but within the general framework of a society as consisting of *liking and enjoying what one has got*; and that is a different matter.

My second and much shorter part will be diffident, contentious

and probably obscure. I intend only to sketch a line of discussion that might prove more fruitful than comparatively straightforward analysis. I mentioned before that there are certain conditions which, though in general we do not expect them to be compatible with happiness, are in fact sometimes found to be so. Though perhaps it is not common for the poor, for those in pain, or those deprived of companionship, to be happy there is no logical nor presumably any psychological absurdity in describing anyone as 'in pain but happy', 'poor but happy', or 'alone but happy'. Such examples are logically in order. The relationship between logic and psychology is obviously too complex for me to discuss here: perhaps it is enough to say that since in this area at least we learn psychology at its most elementary level through learning the use of those words which embody traditional and no doubt superficial psychological distinctions, there are good enough grounds for allowing logic to be our guide as to what, at the same level, is, or is not, psychologically in order. It is worth, therefore, considering such examples as: 'mean but happy', 'unkind but happy', 'malevolent but happy', 'evil but happy', 'wicked but happy', 'malicious but happy', 'frustrated but happy', 'lonely but happy', 'anxious but happy', 'remorseful but happy', 'bored but happy', 'resentful but happy'. A mixed bag to start with, but they seem to fall into groups. The first, 'mean', 'unkind', 'malevolent' and 'evil', are all morally pejorative and heavily so: they all strike one as logically incompatible with the predicate happy, and in their case this incompatibility arises from the impossibility of a combination of moral condemnation with a favourable overall assessment. They may be compared with the following pair, 'malicious' and 'wicked', which may seem odd but are not so quickly to be dismissed as out of order. Malicious, by contrast with malevolent, is a term of trivial condemnation, perhaps not of condemnation at all. Wicked, on the other hand, by contrast with evil, is an attribute typically of actions, and in so far as it is applied to people, it is to people whom we see as outside our own moral system: we may condemn their actions but they themselves escape our condemnation to the extent that the morality they outraged was not shared by them. The oddness of these last two expressions illuminates the absurdity of the first group which I might invoke to support my original thesis that the predicate 'happy' implies an assessment of a man's total condition, a part of which is his moral environment.

The second group, 'lonely', 'frustrated', 'anxious' and 'remorseful', seem to be interesting in another way, and a way that I hope is relevant to my central thesis that happiness is not so much a question of getting what one wants, but of enjoying what one has got. There

is for each of these four predicates a near parallel which does, as they do not, seem to be compatible with the predicate 'happy'. 'Alone but happy' is in order, 'lonely but happy' is not. 'Unsuccessful but happy' is in order, 'frustrated but happy' is not. 'Aware of peril but happy' is in order, 'anxious but happy' is not. 'Guilty but happy' is in order, 'remorseful but happy' is not. How precisely *being alone* differs from being *lonely*, how *being unsuccessful* differs from being *frustrated*, how *being aware of peril* differs from being *anxious* or how *being guilty* differs from being *remorseful* would be difficult to say, and whether the pairs are indeed parallel is itself contentious. All I can say here is that there seems to be some sort of objectivity about each of the first predicates which the second lacks. To put it more positively, and to stress again my earlier point, it is not our situation as such, but our general feelings about, and reactions to, such situations which will determine whether or not we are happy. Feelings and reactions are notoriously, perhaps as a matter of logic, not within our control, but the identification of a situation and the disentangling of this from our reactions will itself depend upon our viewpoint: and a viewpoint is as notoriously something it is possible to change. It may be a fact that one is *alone*, in an empty house or in a crowd, but *that* one is *alone* is not in either case the only relevant fact to be taken account of in assessing or describing one's situation: it would be open to us to concentrate upon an infinite number of its other aspects, and the mere attempt do so would constitute an escape from the unhappy condition of *loneliness* and its essential egocentricity. Similarly, however many projects or ambitions we have had, and in which we may have failed, unless we confine our view to our own failure, or more dangerously to the unfairness of our lot, there must always be some further attempt, perhaps at another level, to be made. *That* one has failed, or had an unfair deal, may be of immense importance to *oneself*, but its importance can be diminished by bearing in mind that that importance is usually *confined* to oneself. Faced with a hazardous situation, as we all are at times, the constitutionally anxious man is not usually so much distressed by the possibility of a specific disaster as by a fear of *he knows not what*. It is this element of *knowing not what*, whether it is a matter of the difficulty inherent in their nature, of predicting and specifying consequences, or whether of assessing the impact upon oneself of an identified hazard, that is the painful element in *reasonable* anxiety: in *reasonable* anxiety, the absence of reason makes this element the stronger. To objectify and specify as exactly as possible what it is one fears, is itself to relieve one's anxiety. Finally, we all make mistakes and we most of us do things we know we ought not to have done. It is laudable to feel distress at the consequences of such acts,

but wrongly egocentric to dwell upon the fact it should be *oneself* who was responsible for these. The disaster, if it was one, must be *regretted in itself*, but *remorse*, though it may function as a useful deterrent to future wrong doing, contains an element of self-indulgence that if again one can sufficiently objectify, one can to that extent rightly diminish.

The last two of my examples, boredom and resentment, differ from the previous group in that I have been unable in their cases to find any objective neutral predicates which look even speciously parallel. If one is resentful one may or may not be suffering from an injury, one may or may not be imagining one. If we nurse resentment or foster it, and these are the natural metaphors, it is upon our own grievance that we concentrate. The field of possible resentment is the field of interpersonal relationships, and within this field anything may be a cause of resentment, since, where we are most vulnerable, and for most of us it is here, anything may wound. We may not be able to do much about the wound, but imagination may help us to avoid its festering, by enabling us to eliminate or at least explain, which can be to excuse, the intentional element which is the most dangerous, in its infliction. To nurse resentment is to allow egocentricity to exclude anything else. Again one can be idle and bored or over-busy and bored. If one is bored one is not liking what one is doing, and one can be bored in such a way that nothing one could be offered would be what one could conceivably enjoy doing. One is by definition excluded from any interest or involvement in what is going on around one: these conditions being precisely those that might save us in any of the four more specific predicaments I have discussed above. These two words, then, and I am very far from suggesting that they are alone in this, do seem to refer primarily to those characteristics which distinguish those predicates which are incompatible with the predicate, 'happy', from their, in my context, 'neutral' parallel predicates. They both entail undue egocentricity and suggest at least a refusal to use the imagination. They are both essentially subjective and '*feelings*' seem to have re-entered the picture in a big way. As a conclusion I can only suggest, as I did to begin with, that though happiness as an assessment of a man's overall condition must depend ultimately upon his feelings, this is *not* to equate *feeling* happy with *being* happy. Our feelings may not be within our control but they in their turn depend upon what is at least to some extent a matter of choice: what *viewpoint* we in general adopt. Not to see oneself as the victim of fortune may be to force her to bestow upon one her most precious gift: to see oneself as happy.

St Hilda's College, Oxford.