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## International Organization

**George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom**

Is the Good News About Compliance Good News  
About Cooperation?

**Beth A. Simmons**

Central Bank Independence Between the World Wars

**Robert B. McCalla**

Why NATO Survives

**Graham Bird**

The IMF and Developing Countries

**Craig N. Murphy**

Gender in International Relations

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# Abstracts

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## **Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?**

by George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom

Recent research on compliance in international regulatory regimes has argued (1) that compliance is generally quite good; (2) that this high level of compliance has been achieved with little attention to enforcement; (3) that those compliance problems that do exist are best addressed as management rather than enforcement problems; and (4) that the management rather than the enforcement approach holds the key to the evolution of future regulatory cooperation in the international system. While the descriptive findings above are largely correct, the policy inferences are dangerously contaminated by endogeneity and selection problems. A high rate of compliance is often the result of states formulating treaties that require them to do little more than they would do in the absence of a treaty. In those cases where noncompliance does occur and where the effects of selection are attenuated, both self-interest and enforcement play significant roles.

## **Rulers of the game: central bank independence during the interwar years**

by Beth A. Simmons

Central bank independence is associated with restrictive monetary choices that can be deflationary within fixed exchange-rate regimes. Because central banks act to counteract domestic inflation, they put a premium on domestic price stability at the expense of international monetary stability. Evidence from fifteen countries between 1925 and 1938 shows that the more independent central banks took more deflationary policies than were necessary for external adjustment. Central banks in general were more restrictive under left-wing governments than they were under more conservative regimes and often were more restrictive than required for external equilibration. This suggests that policies of independent central banks designed to enhance domestic price stability may force deflationary pressures onto other states in the system and potentially destabilize a fixed exchange-rate regime.

## **NATO's persistence after the cold war**

by Robert B. McCalla

Neorealist theories help explain alliance formation and longevity but have trouble explaining why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continues to exist after the cold war. Organizational theories further our understanding by noting that organizations have strong survival instincts, yet NATO survives only as long as its

members wish it to. To understand NATO's persistence after the cold war, we must turn to international institutionalist theories to explain why, contrary to neorealist expectations, NATO remains the key international security institution for its members. International institutionalist theories add the conception of NATO as part of a broad multilevel and multi-issue relationship among member states, and this broader context is necessary to explain NATO's persistence.