

that, when the West rallied under American leadership to halt that expansion, it was acting in its own legitimate defense rather than in a spirit of aggression. But China, when the United States undertook its containment, had not expanded. . . . To anyone familiar with the dynamics of revolution a theoretical danger of expansion did exist, and this justified vigilance. . . . Because it had not in fact expanded, however, and because the United States was in the position of denying the new Chinese Government's right to govern even in China proper, the United States was, in this case, the party that appeared to be playing the role of aggressor in Asia.

Halle was well aware that too many of the people concerned with foreign policy analysis, formulation, and execution have come to treat mere concepts as if they were reality with such alacrity that we customarily mince about on tip-toe with our noses out of joint whenever someone suggests that "expertise" (the knowing of something without quite being obsessed or able to explain why or how one knows whatever it is that is known) is a rational basis for action. And he also knew that this conceptual arrogance, which is entailed by the journalistic misapprehension of science, is at the base of the mythology which misleads us into piecemeal actions that make our foreign policy prophesies self-fulfilling.

Unless we seriously believe that only those matters which are amenable to systematic conceptual description and categorization effect the course of trends and events in which we are interested, then we had better pay attention to, say, experts who promulgate little theory, because they know too much, but who have usually been right about matters to which they have turned their undivided attention.

Quite contrary to popular belief, nay faith, science does not deal with explanation, except incidentally. Rather, it is concerned with prediction. Where, then, there is demonstrated accuracy, never mind an inhibiting or promiscuous narrative, there is science.

It might be precious but it is surely instructive to point out that one of the most systematic of foreign policy analysts has a conceptual vocabulary of less than 100 words. Clinical psychology classifies as a low-grade moron anyone with a vocabulary of less than 500 words; and as paranoid anyone whose conceptual orientation to the world in which he lives is perfectly tautological—a status fopishly courted by the systematic theorist.

W. R. Campbell

Dear Sir: In the spirit of collegial reciprocity, we have dutifully studied Dr. Campbell's letter in order to ascertain whether it is in fact responsive to our article. We have concluded that it is not. Dr. Campbell sets up a straw man—on at least two scores.

First, Dr. Campbell takes us to task for "making a plea" for systems theory, while in fact we do no such thing. Our standpoint is that of the observer commenting

on the work of others. We adopt the posture of the analyst not the advocate.

Second, Dr. Campbell accuses us of imputing to systems theory a scientific status, which, again, we do not do. To us, systems theory is nothing more than a medium of intellectual exchange—a way of approaching, organizing, and understanding reality. We hasten to emphasize that "system" has no objective reality, let alone any utility for prediction.

If we had done what Dr. Campbell suggests, we might have become "cranky" enough to question the validity of the links he seems to want to establish between morons, paranoids, and systems theorists. We might further have wondered why the same links do not extend to "experts who promulgate little theory."

Cynthia H. Enloe and Mostafa Rejai

"THE GREENING OF CHARLES REICH"

Vancouver, B. C.

Dear Sir: Since moving to Canada about one year ago, we have continued to enjoy our copies of *worldview*, which we hasten to complement you on as constantly improving in depth and awareness over the past two years. . . .

I just had to take exception to Dr. Bernard Murchland's *approach* to Charles Reich's book (*worldview*, February). I have no feeling for an apologia for *Greening*, but I certainly do for such approaches as Dr. Murchland's. One of Reich's reasons for writing was undoubtedly an effort to escape the ideological hang-ups of writers like Murchland. And as one dealing in the problems of theological communications, I tremendously appreciate Reich's efforts at communication. At least I feel I "hear" what Reich is attempting to say.

If one begins a criticism of a critic whose logic is substantially encased in Reich's Consciousness I, whose *contemporariness* rings like a *nineteenth-century* popularist, it would hardly be justified to expect sensitivity to youth culture. But, Mr. Murchland, saying so just won't make it go away. Youth culture is not an "idea" or a commodity; it is an experience. Its mentors use ideas to relate to it, just as you do; but it has no rationale. If Reich's problems are political, their solution, to the youth culture, is strictly "not" political. The Murchland critique is rationalistic. But Reich's Consciousness III is a-rationalistic. It patently rejects Hegelian dialectical relationships as a sign of "life"; it accepts it for what it is, a sign of the mind! Consciousness III deals with the dialogue relationship of self with selves, personalistic and existential. The theme of the new mood, perhaps falsely attributed to the so-called youth culture, is awareness. It is this awakening to an awareness of ourselves and our world that Reich proposes. . . .

From my efforts at relating to the American political science scene in classroom and political activities, I must certainly take exception to the "translation" of Reich by Murchland.

Charles E. Argast

April 1971 17