

Social Philosophy & Policy

Responsibility

CONTENTS

MICHAEL S. MOORE	Causation and Responsibility	1
KENNETH W. SIMONS	Negligence	52
LEO KATZ	Responsibility and Consent: The Libertarian's Problems with Freedom of Contract	94
RODERICK T. LONG	The Irrelevance of Responsibility	118
JOHN STADDON	On Responsibility in Science and Law	146
MICHAEL STOCKER	Responsibility and the Abuse Excuse	175
ALVIN I. GOLDMAN	Why Citizens Should Vote: A Causal Responsibility Approach	201
HENRY S. RICHARDSON	Institutionally Divided Moral Responsibility	218
SUSAN SAUVÉ MEYER	Fate, Fatalism, and Agency in Stoicism	250
ALFRED R. MELE	Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck	274
NANCY SHERMAN	Taking Responsibility for Our Emotions	294

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