

work) involved male opposition to female bartending after the end of Prohibition. One bartender insisted that on the job you had to know when to talk to the customers and when not to talk and “show me the woman who knows that” (p. 167). On this issue waitress locals exhibited their ambivalence over the propriety of women in such traditional male craft work and cultural space. Black female bartenders in Chicago in their own locals fought alone to try save their jobs while they faced the grim alternatives of prostitution or poverty. White women in the union did not help, but their inaction and loyalty to waitressing as a craft proved costly. By the 1940s, male waiters successfully excluded women from lucrative jobs as banquets, exclusive restaurants, and in night clubs especially in San Francisco and New York City. The loyalty of organized waitresses to their craft and their ambivalent views about gender equality led in the 1960s and 1970s to a collision with a younger, more feminist generation of waitresses.

In a disappointingly short section on work culture and family life, Cobble provides a statistical profile of forty women leaders who may or may not represent the rank and file in the union. Still, the reader wants to know more about such leaders as Myra Wolfgang of Detroit and Lucy Kendall, to whom the book is dedicated. The skills of adversarial confrontation and maneuvering achieved by these activist women on the job and the union did not help them deal with challenges to the food service industry or anti-union policies of the 1970s and 1980s. Most importantly, they did not understand the younger women who became temporary waitresses while waiting for other lines of work to open to them. These young women, convinced that opportunities awaited them in traditionally male work, were indifferent and even hostile to waitressing as a craft or a life-long occupation. Young male and female workers in the fast food business wanted only minimal training, accepted minimum wages, and cared little for health care benefits. The sensitivity of younger, feminist women toward sex discrimination and sexual harassment were at odds with the more reserved attitudes of older union waitresses like Myra Wolfgang who clung to protective legislation and sex segregation as a solution to worker grievances. The progressive culinary unions that emerged in the 1980s in Massachusetts and California created a different model: heterogeneous in race, sex, and ethnicity and with interests in health care, housing, and community safety. They emphasized equality and inclusiveness rather than difference and craft tradition as the vehicle for women unionists.

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SHIRAISHI, TAKASHI. *An Age in Motion. Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912–1926.* [Asia East by South.] Cornell University Press, Ithaca [etc.] 1990. xxiv, 365 pp. \$ 34.95.

This is a fascinating book. Having researched the archives extensively, Shiraishi manages to translate crucial empirical data relating to the struggle for emancipation into historical drama. The early emergence and unfolding of national consciousness and anti-colonial protest and action is brought to life through a number of life stories and by relating the experiences of several pioneering individuals. The central

dramatis personae in this study are Mas Marco Kartodikromo, a passionately fierce journalist and agitator and the main hero of Shiraishi's book; the charismatic mediator and mass-movement orator Raden Mas Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto; the pious Muslim and anti-colonial fighter Hadji Misbach; and the morally principled, non-communalist and secular modern nationalist Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo.

The book rejects the approach historians traditionally follow by not regarding this period in terms of a transition to or preparation for the era of modern party nationalism; the period is considered instead in its own terms: as one that saw the emergence of the Pergerakan, the "Movement", a world of *kaum muda*, a generation breaking with the submissive past, experimenting with new methods, journals, meetings, rallies, and campaigns in order to awaken and mobilize the nation-in-the-making.

The locale chosen is Surakarta, one of the two principalities in Inner Java, and particularly its capital, Surakarta, or Solo, which was seen by Dutch Javanologists as the supreme centre of classical Javanese language and culture. Solo was in fact an ethnically pluralized town, with relatively substantial minorities of Chinese and Europeans (Eurasians in particular) living alongside Arabs. Solo was famous for its batik industry, which was managed by Javanese entrepreneurs; these entrepreneurs were often dependent, however, on Chinese and Arab firms for raw materials and, to a lesser extent, on Chinese and Arab firms for marketing their products abroad. The Surakarta principality, the Sunanate, constituted one of the least socio-economically stable, if not the most unstable, areas of Java because of the long-standing impact of exploitation by the traditional aristocracy on the one hand and that by Chinese entrepreneurs and capital on the other. In an era of increasingly modern capitalist influence, intensified colonial administration, and the extension of educational facilities, etc., the specific combination of historical conditions that prevailed in the area proved to be the ideal setting for the emergence of the Sarekat Islam (SI). The SI developed from a *ronda* – a mutual help and vigilante organization set up to protect the interests of a group of batik entrepreneurs and their followers in a specific urban quarter, Lawean, against bandits and Chinese competitors – into the greatest mass movement Java has ever seen.

The emergence of the SI in this way was detonated by the rise of Chinese nationalism, which in turn owed much to the Republican Revolution of 1911. Chinese self-consciousness and pride had a provocative effect on the Javanese. The rise of the SI was preceded by many years of journalistic activity, which began in Dutch, Eurasian and Chinese newspapers mainly published in Malay. It is a pity therefore that Shiraishi did not make use of Ahmat B. Adam's excellent Ph.D., "The Vernacular Press and the Emergence of Modern Indonesian Consciousness (1855–1913)", which provides a wealth of detail relating to this for the period after the 1850s. These journalists, who began their own newspapers after about 1905, helped to create an audience oriented towards progress, reform, modernization, and eventually emancipation, through participation in the Pergerakan.

The first radical to achieve national importance was the leader of the "central" SI, Tjokroaminoto, who was to play a major part in inspiring mass rallies, balancing the different tendencies and local factions, and in keeping the colossal and fluid movement together and preserving its status as a legal organization; between 1914 and 1917 he was a "satria under the protection of the government". Marco was very

different: a freelance journalist, he was repeatedly persecuted for press offences and spent many years in jail. He became an important figure with the upsurge of radicalism in 1917, which saw growing socio-economic tension, rising prices, the birth and growth of trade unions, strikes, and the rise of socialism as a new radicalizing force. Semaoen, the leader of the railway union, personified this new radicalism, which also saw the development of the SI Semarang and, some years later, the Communist Party. The process of radicalization in 1917–1920 reached its apogee in Surakarta. Two very different characters figured prominently here: Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Hadji Mohammad Misbach. Mangoenkoesoemo was a Dutch-educated physician, intellectual and secular nationalist and had been a member of the People's Council (1918–1921) since 1918. His nationalist credentials were impressive; he had been a co-founder of the Eurasian-dominated nationalist party, Douwes Dekker's Indische Partij, which had been banned in 1913. Misbach, educated in religious schools, was an intensely pious Muslim propagandist and fiery anti-colonial agitator and he had a strong hold over popular audiences, both urban and rural.

There was still no clear ideological and political demarcation between organizations; but it was only within the relatively open and inclusive society that characterized Surakarta, with its comparative acceptance of different ethnic groups, that Insulinde, the successor to the Indische Partij, could become a rallying point for radical opposition to both the traditional (*priyayi*) élite and the Lawean batik entrepreneurs who were the original founders of the SI. So it was possible for a staunch Muslim leader to become a leading force behind a secular organization that was transformed into the Sarekat Hindia, a regional mass movement mobilizing the peasants.

Since radical peasant actions were regarded by the colonial government (and, one might add, by any government in Indonesia) as posing the most dangerous threat, rigorous suppression followed. This marked the end of the so-called liberal Ethical Policy of the Pergerakan, and it helped simultaneously to terminate the period of racial inclusion, giving way to a sharpening of racial differences and increasing social heterogeneity; this paved the way for a period in which political party organizations were set up along stricter lines, particularly after 1926. The years 1920–1923 were marked by a schism in the Pergerakan. The ISDV/PKI (the Communist Party) succeeded in penetrating the SI and in expanding its influence, both radicalizing the Pergerakan and precipitating countermeasures by its Muslim leaders. These leaders broke the growing power of the PKI (1921–1923) by consolidating the (modernist) Muslim character of the SI. But the retreat from the radicalism that had characterized the Pergerakan left them relatively isolated as a religious party and left the PKI as the most powerful national anti-colonial force. After the suppression of the remnants of Pergerakan radicalism in the principalities in 1923, the PKI was left as sole heir to the previous era of populist radicalism; it was a dangerous legacy though given that this was also a time of effective government repression and particularly, one might add, since the PKI neither established cadres for long-term legal elementary trade union work (to fall back on in reactionary times) nor for protracted guerilla war. A desperate chaotic revolt ensued.

Shiraishi concludes that the Pergerakan was a dynamic process involving the translation and appropriation of new concepts (from the West); ideas were put in

motion; in a period of revolutionary awakening, new forms and languages were provided; in waves of popular radicalism leaders thought, wrote, talked and acted in the first person. After the destruction of the Pergerakan, with the emergence of Sukarno's Nationalist Party in 1926–1927, the era of party predominance over individuals commenced.

Shiraishi's book has definitely changed our understanding of the first decades of the struggle for emancipation in Java. Some criticism is appropriate though. The text is too long and repetitious, and the style is evidently inspired by enthusiasm bordering on idealization. More seriously, the author tends to overestimate the force of the massive Pergerakan. Ruth McVey has pointed out (1965) that the SI's enormous peasant following began to decline progressively from as early as 1916. Actually the Pergerakan never constituted any threat to the *status quo*; and it could be suppressed by the quite limited use of force by the government. Moreover, direct confrontations with the Dutch were few. Popular aggression was mainly directed towards other Indonesians and against the Chinese – and not exclusively against the authorities. After having mentioned the beatings and killings of Chinese people up to 1913, the author is silent on this issue though. The Kudu incident of 31 October 1918, in which a large part of the Chinese quarter was burnt down and eight Chinese people were killed and thousands more forced to flee to Semarang, is not mentioned; nor has the author drawn attention to the fact that the growing hostility to the Chinese, and the growing ethnic nationalism in general, was not something from which the communist leaders could distance themselves, and from which even Semaoen did not dissociate the PKI completely. The weakness of the Pergerakan was partly a result of the late appearance on the political scene of a modern intelligentsia; it was only after 1926–1927 that one capable of providing party political leadership emerged.

Because figures like the secular and broadly anti-communally oriented Tjipto and Soewardi were few in 1912–1913, no secular nationalist and predominantly Indonesian movement capable of securing a position of hegemony could be launched. This left the way open for a Pergerakan mass movement controlled by pious Muslims and inspired by a mixture of Javanism, Muslim culture, Western democratic and social ideas, and anti-colonialism. The élite consisted of a coalition of old and new middle-class elements. Though nationalism, communism and Islam had not yet emerged as three well-defined and competing movements within Indonesia, a movement with a strong Muslim stamp in Java was structurally incapable of transforming itself into *the* definite and predominant nationalist movement, notwithstanding the temperate modernism of figures such as Tjokro and Salim. It is true, for example, that the degree to which ISDV Marxists succeeded in penetrating the SI drove the SI élite to emphasize its Islamic character and thereby helped to ensure its isolation, while the ISDV also radicalized the Pergerakan to a degree far greater than its size might have suggested. When the PKI revolt was launched, nothing ensued that resembled a socialist revolution based on class war, and where there was fighting on any scale the PKI had to rely on its powerful Muslim allies in two countries characterized by an old established ethno-religious anti-colonial resistance: Banten (West Java) and the Minangkabau (West Sumatra).

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