

ABSTRACTS

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On the significance of Hannah Arendt's The human condition for sociology, KURT H. WOLFF, Brandeis University. Arendt's book is an analysis of the *vita activa*, which comprises the three human activities of labor, work, and action. Her presentation involves a critique of modern and current conceptions of them and of many other social phenomena, and an emphasis on distinctions customarily neglected. The interpretation of her book, disregarding the many factual statements it contains, proceeds in a theoretical vein, analyzing her major conceptions, and then turns practical, asking what we as social scientists who listen to her must do (focusing on "behavior" and "action", "values", the means-end scheme, and man's historicity and dualism). The paper concludes with a brief explication of areas of research seen to emerge out of Arendt's work.

Meaning, referring, and the problem of universals, AVRUM STROLL, University of British Columbia. The problem of universals, at least in its modern form, often begins from questions which seem, in principle, decidable by the sorts of experimental procedures carried on in descriptive semantics, or in applied linguistics. These are questions about the role which pronouns, common nouns, adjectives etc. play in natural languages. But these apparently scientific questions are interpreted by philosophers in ways which give rise to metaphysical conundrums — to problems which are not in principle decidable. The paper traces some of the factors which impel philosophers to interpret these questions in the way they do. The author's thesis is that questions about the roles which linguistic expressions play are often interpreted as questions about the meaning of these words, and these, in turn, are thought to be questions asking for the identification of differing sorts of objects in the universe (e. g., particulars, universals). The author attempts to show in detail why such interpretations of ordinary questions are improper.

Remarks on the ancient distinction between bodily and mental pleasures, MARIA OSSOWSKA, University of Warsaw. The author tries to show that the old distinction between bodily and mental pains and pleasures, still maintained by many ethical writers, deserves to be forgotten. An analysis of the possible interpretations of this distinction leads to the opinion that people call mental those pleasures which they have in high esteem and that they treat as bodily pleasures the ones less approved. Thus the distinction which was expected to contribute to an elaboration of a hierarchy of values already implies one, and the statement that mental pleasures belong to a higher order is a mere tautology.

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Predictability in life and in science, VILHELM AUBERT, University of Oslo. It is a significant coincidence that social science tends to assume a universal human need for predictability, and also uses predictive power as the basic criterion of scientific truth. It is claimed here that man's need for predictability often is crossed by a need for uncertainty and chance. Thus it seems doubtful that the methodological canon of predictability can be anchored in the universal usefulness of social predictions. Some important cases of decision-making seem to be more concerned with the past than with the future. The task of the social sciences cannot be completely separated from philosophical problems, since it is part of a continuous endeavour to clarify the image of man.

*The ethics of resistance to tyranny. An attempt to formulate some of the dilemmas involved**, HARALD OFSTAD, University of Stockholm.

*The inquiring mind. Notes on the relation between philosophy and science**, ARNE NÆSS, University of Oslo. There is nothing, either in the recent developments of philosophy or in the development of the sciences, which should prevent philosophy from continuing its role of mother-science and the sciences from influencing methods and conclusions of philosophers. The inquiring mind respects no boundaries between disciplines except those which are imposed by differences in questions raised. But basic questions, whether raised by philosophers or by scientists, tend to have components requiring co-ordination of research or analysis of highly different disciplines. Both Anglo-Saxon and continental developments in philosophy justify, however, a distinction between cultivating philosophy and being engaged in solving or resolving a philosophical problem, the former comprising the latter.

Of words and uses, J. A. FODOR, Oxford University. This paper is devoted to an investigation of one variant of the 'use theory of meaning'. It explores the possibility of characterizing the use of a linguistic unit in terms of non-linguistic facts regularly associated with utterances of the unit in question. It is argued that such regularities are associated with only a small sub-set of English sentences, and then only when these sentences occur in 'standard' contexts. An attempt is then made to characterize the relevant sense of 'standardness' in terms of the role of this concept in a theory of language. In the final section of the paper, some consideration is given to the problem of generalizing the theory to cover sentences which are not regularly associated with recurrent non-linguistic features.