

INDIAN UNREST IN THE PERUVIAN SIERRA IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY¹

A watershed in Peru's development, and perhaps its most traumatic experience as an independent republic, was its humiliating defeat at the hands of Chile during the War of the Pacific (1879-1883). The impact of the war was profound. Virtually every aspect of Peruvian political, economic, and social life was affected. The army was defeated, the country invaded, and Lima occupied. By the peace treaty, Peru's nitrate-bearing southern provinces were handed over to Chile, depriving it of its most important source of income. The economy of the country was further undermined by the war-time destruction of many coastal sugar and cotton plantations. Economic collapse was accompanied by political chaos. Fighting continued after the end of the war as forces loyal to General Andrés A. Cáceres, who had carried out an effective guerrilla campaign against the Chileans in the sierra, now aimed their guns at the Chilean-imposed government of General Miguel Iglesias. In December 1885 they captured Lima, paving the way for Cáceres' election as president.

The war also unleashed great social unrest. The country's underprivileged and exploited took advantage of the war-time chaos to strike back at their oppressors. Indians, Chinese coolies, and the descendants of black slaves participated in uprisings during the war that aroused fears of racial warfare and prompted the white community to sue for peace with Chile.²

¹ Research for this paper was funded in part by the Central Research Fund of the University of London and the Canada Council.

² For the situation during the war and immediately after see Heraclio Bonilla, "The War of the Pacific and the national and colonial problem in Peru," *Past & Present* (Nov. 1978), No. 81, pp. 92-118. See also Jorge Basadre, *Historia de la República del Perú 1822-1933: Sexta Edición Aumentada y Corregida*, 16 vols. Lima, (1968), VIII and IX.

The effects of the war continued to be felt long after the withdrawal of the Chileans and Cáceres' victory over Iglesias. Economic recovery was slow and the government was constantly short of funds. Political turmoil had not ended; rural officials who had fled during the occupation and the subsequent civil war were not replaced, so that the re-establishment of central control was delayed. Resistance to the military leaders resulted in frequent rebellions. The most successful of these occurred in 1895 when forces led by the charismatic Nicolás de Piérola overthrew Cáceres' second government and inaugurated an unprecedented period of civilian rule. Social unrest also continued. The chaotic conditions allowed the exploited to renew their demands for changes and the exploiters to step up their pressure on the former. In both cases the result was further unrest and agitation.

The most militant of the exploited groups during the post-war period was the Indian population living in the sierra. Their response was a measure of the problems faced by the country after the war as well as the extent of those problems. Their response also refutes the view of the time that the Indian was a passive individual who required some sort of paternalistic direction to be transformed into a productive entity. The Indians were blamed for Peru's defeat in the war and for the country's general backwardness. They were seen as incapable of providing the dynamic stimulus needed for modernization and development. Typical of the views expressed in post-war Peru were those of a Puno correspondent of the Lima newspaper, *El Comercio*, who signed himself "Sinchi Roca." Writing in 1884 he asked, "What is an Indian?" and answered, "One hundred and fifty pounds of flesh arranged in human form, capable of much if taught, totally incapable at the moment because he is more ignorant than he was before the conquest."³

Simplistic evaluations of this sort bore a grain of truth, but they tended to distort more than they clarified, especially with regard to the Indians' reputed passivity. For centuries this sector of the population had suffered exploitation at the hands of the Spaniards⁴ and the Peruvian elite. Independence brought an intensified attack on the Indians' traditional

³ *El Comercio* (Lima), May 24, 1884. Even commentators who were sympathetic to the Indians tended to see them as "submissive" or helpless. See Dora Mayer, *The Conduct of the Cerro de Pasco Mining Company* (Lima, 1913), p. 40; José Carlos Mariátegui, *Siete Ensayos de Interpretación de la Realidad Peruana* (various editions).

⁴ See for example John R. Fisher, *Government and Society in Colonial Peru, 1784-1814* (London, 1970), pp. 14-16.

way of life as the republican governments, responding to the concepts of liberalism, tried to break up the Indians' communal forms of landholding and transform them into private producers. The Indians were also called on to pay a personal contribution or head tax which they greatly resented but which survived until 1854 because it constituted an important element of government income.⁵ The Indians did not accept these impositions silently. Since the conquest, Peru's history has been marked by frequent uprisings, rebellions, and revolts involving the Indian population. In the late colonial period the most famous of these was the Tupac Amáru rebellion of 1780.⁶ During the independence wars the Indians fought on both sides, but won nothing for their sacrifice. The subsequent civil and international wars that disrupted the first decades of Peru's development as a republic provided further opportunities for them to demonstrate their resentment at the treatment they were receiving. Often that resentment manifested itself in attacks on the local exploiter, whether an official, hacendado, priest, or even neighboring village. In the latter case, disputes over ownership of communal lands could lead to land invasions or other forms of violence.⁷ In the war with Chile the Indians once again were called on to fight. Although ignorant of the causes of the conflict and even of the identity of the belligerent nations, they did the bulk of the fighting. But again they received nothing for their efforts.⁸ This time, however, they did not return peacefully to their sierra homes after the signing of the peace treaty. Developments during and after the war aroused the Indians, and for more than a decade the sierra was wracked by unrest which occasionally raised new fears of racial warfare and helped to delay Peru's post-war recovery.

The initial agitation of the Indians was a result of their war-time mobilization and the lack of local authorities who usually maintained control over them. The Indians took advantage of the circumstances to turn on their local oppressors, fomenting what the American minister to

⁵For a resumé of the major trends of this early period see Thomas M. Davies, Jr., *Indian Integration in Peru. A Half Century of Experience, 1900-1948* (Lincoln, 1970), ch. 2.

⁶For a recent survey of the literature on this particular rebellion, as well as an indication of the problems which beset the Indian population both then and subsequently see Leon Campbell, "Recent research on Andean peasant revolts, 1750-1820," *Latin American Research Review* (1979), XIV, No. 1.

⁷For the case of the Mantaro Valley in the 1870s see Carlos Samaniego, "Peasant movements at the turn of the century and the rise of the independent farmer" in Norman Long & Bryan R. Roberts (eds.), *Peasant Cooperation and Capitalist Expansion in Central Peru* (Austin, 1978), pp. 50-52.

⁸Davies, *Indian Integration in Peru*, p. 34.

Peru described as a "war on the whites."⁹ This was most evident in the central sierra where the Indians were armed by Cáceres to fight first the Chileans and later the army of Iglesias. Cáceres spoke Quechua and enjoyed a very close relationship with the Indians. However, he was unable to maintain his control over them and they used their arms to attack the local white population, besiege Huancayo, and expropriate lands and appropriate livestock which they claimed to be rightfully theirs. He managed to reassert some control in 1884 by executing the ringleaders, but the civil war with Iglesias created new uncertainties. The American minister commented that Cáceres "seems to have the organized sympathies and interest of the Indian race with him in a degree to which they have perhaps not often been excited since the final overthrow of the Inca power there. There seems to be something of a national race phase to the conflict which is exceptional as compared with previous revolutionary movements in Peru."¹⁰

The result was, as the prefect of Huánuco reported in 1886, an Indian population that remained "bellicose and highly aroused." He blamed the great leniency and prudence of the local officials who depended on the guerrillas for their authority. Thus, villages had been freed from supplying "services and extraordinary expedients" and had "acquired such a firm belief in their own strength that in the name of a poorly understood right of sovereignty they believe themselves authorized to name the governing officials without reference to the order and hierarchy established by the Constitution and the laws and to the proper channels which control the selection of political and judicial authorities."¹¹

⁹ United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1883* (Washington, 1884), pp. 726-727.

¹⁰ United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1885* (Washington, 1886), p. 627. For the wartime uprisings see Bonilla, "The national and colonial problem in Peru," pp. 113-115; Gavin A. Smith, "Socio-economic differentiation and relations of production among rural-based petty producers in central Peru, 1880 to 1870," *The Journal of Peasant Studies* (1979), VI, No. 3, p. 290; Gavin A. Smith & Pedro Cano H., "Some factors contributing to peasant land occupations in Peru: the example of Huasichanca, 1963-1968" in Long & Roberts (eds.), *Peasant Cooperation and Capitalist Expansion*, p. 166. For Cáceres' ties with the Indians see W. B. Parker, *Peruvians of To-day* (Lima, 1919), p. 182; *El Comercio*, Feb. 4, 1885; Amazonas, May 19, 1884, D10661; Ancash, Mar. 29, 1885, D4270. (The documentary material for this paper comes from a little-used source, the reports of various government officials from the sierra departments that are presently stored in the Sala de Investigaciones of the Biblioteca Nacional in Lima. The reports were written by the prefects of the departments, the subprefects of provinces, the governors of towns, and visiting officials on assignment in the area. For the sake of brevity in the footnotes I have reduced the title of the documents to the geographical region, the date, and the catalogue number in the Sala de Investigaciones.)

¹¹ Huánuco, Jan. 10, 1886, D3852.

The Indians' expropriation of estates produced long-term disputes as the former owners tried to reassume control once some order had been re-established. In one instance the dispute lasted six years, probably prolonged by the actions of other hacendados in the area. In 1887 the owners of the Laive estate in the central sierra claimed the livestock of some Indians who had refused to pay pasturage fees. The latter retaliated by attacking the hacienda; in the ensuing fight one of the Indians was killed. Further confrontations between the locals and troops produced fears of more serious trouble and in an attempt to end the original dispute, the hacendado agreed to sell his expropriated estate to the Indians. However, they failed to appear with the agreed sum on the appointed date, at which the government intervened and ordered immediate payment or return of the land. The Indian villagers remained dissatisfied and ready to take matters into their own hands: subsequently they expropriated more property in the area, leading to new confrontations and legal wrangling.¹²

The lack of central control which allowed the Indians to agitate in this manner had other effects which were even more important in fostering the unrest that marked this period. It left local officials, hacendados, and priests free to operate as they wished and they took advantage of the situation to make exorbitant demands on the Indians. Commentators charged that they were demanding free personal services and *corvée* labor on public works projects from the Indians; they were usurping Indian lands and forcing them to sell their wool, livestock, and produce at low prices; and priests were demanding large amounts of produce as fees for celebrating religious functions.¹³ The pressures became so great that eventually the patience of the Indians snapped and they struck back at their exploiters, unleashing new uprisings and rebellions that kept the sierra in turmoil.

The worst exploiters of the Indians seem to have been local officials who continued the pattern set during the colonial period. Their abuse of the Indians was the most frequent cause of unrest and was the principal factor behind the most serious rebellion of this period, the 1885 uprising in the Callejón de Huaylas known as Atusparia's revolt.

¹²Junín, Sept. 1886, D11941; Huancayo, May 1889, D12845; Huancayo, 1896, D5041; *El Comercio*, Oct. 20, 1887, Jan. 4, 1889.

¹³Details of the exploitation can be found in Puno, May 30, 1888, D4569; Junín, June 23, 1888, D3978; Cuzco, July 13, 1888, D3975; Apurímac, May 31, 1892, D4581.

This particular revolt was a response to the actions of the prefect of Ancash, Francisco J. Noriega. During his prefecture he introduced several schemes to restore the war-torn economy of the area and at the same time profit himself. He forced the Indians to work for him and on public works projects without remuneration, altered the tax system, imposed a monopoly on the sale of salt, made the locals pay for new plaques after he had the streets renumbered, and allowed the police to take the Indians' animals and crops without payment. His most unpopular act was to reimpose the hated personal contribution. It provoked vehement protests from the Indian *alcaldes* who claimed that because of the war and a bad harvest they were incapable of paying the amount demanded, but they might consider a lesser amount if it could be paid in much-devalued paper currency. One alcalde, Pedro Pablo Atusparia, who was in jail for refusing to provide straw to re-roof the barracks, was tortured to reveal the names of those who had issued the protest. Noriega then arrested some of the other *alcaldes* for failing to collect the personal contribution and for protesting the treatment of Atusparia. The final indignity was perpetrated by the local governor who ordered the arrested *alcaldes*' braids, a symbol of their authority, to be cut off.

The officials seem to have felt they had little to fear from the Indians for shortly thereafter they released Atusparia and the other mayors. They quickly learned their mistake for almost immediately a violent and bloody revolt broke out. On March 2 some 8,000 Indians attacked and captured Huaraz, forcing Noriega to flee. The leader of the movement was Atusparia. He was assisted by a miner from Carhuaz, Pedro Cochachín (or Cochachi), more commonly known as "Uchcu Pedro." Under their direction the Indians captured other major centers in the Callejón and gained control of most of the department of Ancash.

The aims of the Indians were mixed. From Lima it appeared that they wanted to create an Indian republic. *El Comercio* reported that the Indians had issued a decree claiming to be the sole owners of Peru and that they were going to restore their lost rights.¹⁴ This was not true of Atusparia. His primary concern seemed to be to end the oppression by local officials. His followers, after capturing towns, destroyed tax records and police documents which had been used to conscript Indians for public works projects and for the army. Their looting of stores

¹⁴ *El Comercio*, June 22, 1885.

suggests that they were also responding to the economic hardships that followed the war. Meanwhile, Atusparia protected the white community and chose local whites to be the new officials, indicating that he planned no fundamental changes in the status quo.

On the other hand, there were some leaders, like Uchcu Pedro, who wanted more basic changes. He seemed determined to recreate an Indian state, allowing only Quechua speakers into his army and calling for the elimination of the white population and the destruction of their property. When his forces captured Yungay in April they massacred soldiers and white civilians and looted stores.

Another goal may have been to overthrow the government of General Iglesias. Some among Atusparia's staff had ties with Cáceres and tried to transform the rebellion into a pro-Cáceres movement. However, they had little success and won only a few adherents.

The mixed objectives of the leaders served to divide the movement and, together with other weaknesses, ensured its eventual suppression. In early May a government force defeated and captured Atusparia at Huaraz. Uchcu Pedro managed to escape and for a few months carried out a guerrilla campaign, disrupting communications, commerce, and industry in the area. In late September he was lured into a trap by a friend, captured, and executed.

For the Indians the cost of the revolt had been very high. According to *El Comercio*, the battles in which Atusparia fought cost 3,000 Indian lives. Many were killed in the fighting which saw thousands engaged on either side, while others were executed by the government forces. The returns were minimal. Few concrete improvements were won and exploitation continued.

The Indians seemed to hold their leaders responsible for these failures. They demanded a new alcalde to replace Atusparia and in July 1886 *El Comercio* reported that the former leader was now living in Lima, fearful of returning to the Callejón where he was unlikely to die a natural death. The same newspaper reported his death in November 1886; other sources claim that he was poisoned by Indian opponents in August 1887.¹⁵

¹⁵ For these and other details of the revolt see Jeffrey L. Klaiber, *Religion and Revolution in Peru, 1824-1976* (Notre Dame, 1977), pp. 58-70; Félix Alvarez-Brun, *Ancash: Una historia regional peruana* (Lima, 1970), pp. 199-208; Basadre, *Historia de la República del Perú*, IX, p. 35; Luis Alayza y Paz Soldán, *Mi País. En Las Breñas del Perú* (Lima, 1944), pp. 302-304; *El Comercio*, June 5, 22, July 3, Aug. 13, Oct. 9, 1885, July 9, Nov. 29, 1886.

Exploitation by local officials was not limited to the Callejón de Huaylas. It was repeated elsewhere, although never with the same violent results as Atusparia's revolt. Exactions by officials led to protests by the Indians in Huancavelica in 1886, Barranca in 1887, and Tarma in 1896. In Huancavelica the Indians were antagonized by an increase in the rent for grazing which, they argued, was both impossible to pay, because of the post-war situation, and unjust, because in the past they had paid the personal contribution, supplied the armies with livestock and fuel, and personally served the municipality.¹⁶

In other areas similar abuses produced a more militant response. In 1887 the governor of the district of Carhuamayo was assassinated after he forced local villagers to work on his lands without pay and imposed fees to support primary schools in the district. In September 1888 mine workers in Cerro de Pasco rioted after the subprefect arrested Indians off the streets and forced them to work in the mines for eight to ten days under the whip of the foreman. They could secure their release only by paying a fine of 1 or more soles. Skeptical of the accuracy of the reports the government appointed a judge to enquire into the situation. In August 1889 Indians in Lambayeque went on strike after being forced to work on repairing the course of a river. Four years later 150 Indians in the Cuzco area rioted and sought the head of the subprefect who had conscripted them to work on a public road.¹⁷

The years from 1895 to 1897 were a period of intense Indian unrest, primarily in the southern department of Puno. Once more local officials could act without restraint as the country was beset by civil war and political uncertainty with Piérola's victory over Cáceres. Many officials were illegally collecting the personal contribution which Cáceres had re-introduced while in power but which Piérola abolished on assuming office. Uprisings occurred in Chucuito in April 1895, Huancané in April 1896, Juli in October 1896, and Ilave in April 1897. In each instance the exactions of local authorities were blamed. In Chucuito Piérola's soldiers had stolen the Indians' lands; in Huancané the governor had continued to collect the personal contribution and the prefect had made unjustified financial demands on the Indians; in Ilave the governor had been

¹⁶ Huancavelica, Nov. 9, 1886, D7167; Chancay, 1887, D7350; *El Comercio*, Aug. 25, 2nd ed., 1896.

¹⁷ Junín, June 23, 1888, D3978; Cerro de Pasco, Sept. 1888, D11447; *El Comercio*, Aug. 21, 1889, Dec. 7, 1st ed., 1893.

exploiting the Indians for ten years, demanding that they cultivate his lands and taking their animals and wool. In April 1897 he imposed a new tax and threatened to take half their possessions if they resisted. The resulting rebellion involved several thousand Indians of whom over 300 were killed before it was crushed.¹⁸

Similar types of abuses with similar results continued into the new century. There were uprisings or threats of uprisings in Juli in 1902, Huaraz in 1904, and Caraz in 1905, and in every case the principal cause was the actions of the local officials.¹⁹ It appears that despite the restoration of some degree of political stability, the government had either failed or made little effort to re-establish control over its sierra appointees. The result was further unrest in this part of the country which did little to maintain that sorely won political stability and undermined hopes for economic development.

The actions by officials which led to unrest were not always a result of the post-war lack of central control. In some instances officials were complying with government directives for which they were not personally responsible but which antagonized the Indians as much as their own actions. Of these, Cáceres' reintroduction of the personal contribution and Piérola's imposition of a salt tax were most detested. Both were a direct result of the war's effect on the economy: the country was bankrupt and the government had to utilize whatever means were available to create new sources of income. When he reimposed the personal contribution in November 1886, Cáceres may have been economically sound in his reasoning, for his government was in desperate financial straits and the Indians, although comprising the majority of the population, contributed little directly to the government.²⁰ However, Atusparia's revolt should have warned him of the likely result and, as it transpired, his reimposition of the Indian head tax produced ten years of agitation. The tax amounted to only 2 soles per annum but, as Indians from Huaraz noted in a petition to Cáceres, being paupers they were unable to afford even this small amount. They asked for relief, citing their past association with the president, their contributions during the war,

¹⁸ Klaiber, *Religion and Revolution*, pp. 51, 57; Davies, *Indian Integration in Peru*, p. 36; *El Comercio*, Apr. 23, 2nd ed., May 15, 2nd ed., 1896, Apr. 23, 2nd ed., May 1, 2nd ed., 1897; Chucuito, May 23, 1898, D4557.

¹⁹ Chucuito, Jan. 1902, E217; *El Comercio*, Jan. 18, 2nd ed., 1904; Huaylas, Apr. 1906, E662.

²⁰ Huánuco, Mar. 29, 1885, D4020.

and the tax's failure to provide them with the protection it was supposed to offer.²¹

The authorities encountered great difficulty in collecting the tax, as Cáceres himself was forced to admit. Even the appointment of a rural police force failed to ensure its collection. One problem was that there was a lack of metal coinage in circulation and the Indians refused to accept devalued paper bills for their wages when they took jobs to obtain the necessary funds. As a result, they frequently lacked the money to pay the tax. Elsewhere, they simply refused to pay or tried to avoid payment by refusing to accept unwanted jobs.²²

Some Indians responded more strongly. In 1887 those in the Puno area were on the verge of rebellion. They were reported to be under the influence of agitators from Bolivia who used the promise of abolition of the tax to spur them to action. That same year 100 Indians in the Ica area rose against the tax. In Huanta there were several outbreaks of violence. In 1887 troops had to be called in to quell the trouble; the following year a band of 30 to 40 mounted men were reported to have attacked villages and roads in the area urging the locals to refuse to pay; and in 1892 new confrontations occurred. Similar uprisings occurred in Huancabamba in 1888, Ancash and Huancavelica in 1890, and Huancaray in 1895.²³

Piérola abolished the personal contribution on assuming office and thereby reduced the frequency of agitation resulting from this particular cause. (He did not eliminate it entirely for local officials continued to collect the tax on their own.) Piérola, however, also needed money, in particular to ransom the Chilean-held provinces of Tacna and Arica, and like Cáceres he tried to take advantage of the large Indian population. His means was to introduce a tax on salt. This was a less direct imposition than the personal contribution, but it aroused the same animosity for it was levied on an essential commodity and fell on the sector of the population who could least afford it. As a result, new unrest flared, disturbing once again the fragile tranquility of the sierra.

In March 1896 the government commissioners in Azangaro were lucky to escape with their lives after they told local salt workers that the govern-

²¹ Huaraz, Mar. 24, 1887, D8075.

²² *El Comercio*, July 28, Nov. 19, 1887; Amazonas, July 13, 1889, D11394.

²³ Puno, June 8, 1887, D4558; Ica, Dec. 1887, D5389; Ayacucho, June 25, 1888, D10843; Huancabamba, Aug. 1888, D6824; Director de Gobierno, June 5, 1891, D4521; Huancavelica, June 15, 1892, D4507; Apurimac, Nov. 30, 1895, D4580.

ment had made its exploitation a state monopoly. In September there was a similar incident in Urubamba when officials tried to collect the tax and troops had to be called in to pacify the aroused Indians. The following month several villages in Chucuito and Juli rebelled against the tax as well as the personal contribution which local officials were continuing to collect.²⁴ There were further uprisings in Cajamarca and Ayacucho. The most serious occurred in Huanta where the Indians killed the government official collecting the tax and then engaged in a six-month rebellion which was marked by great savagery on both sides. The roots of this particular uprising involved more than just the salt tax. Like other incidents, there were subsidiary causes. In this case a lack of specie in the area had produced economic difficulties. Politics were also involved: supporters of Cáceres had led the initial uprising but then lost control of the movement.²⁵

Resistance to the tax continued into the new century. In 1902 meetings to protest the tax in Cuzco, Urubamba, and Calca were followed by attacks on the salt deposits and the removal of the officials in charge.²⁶

While exploitation by officials and unpopular taxes were the principal causes of the Indian unrest, other factors linked to the unsettled post-war conditions of the country contributed to the turmoil. The political rivalry that marked the period occasionally degenerated into violence. During the presidential election of 1890 hostility between the supporters of the two major candidates led to the assassination of a deputy in Huanta who headed one of the local factions. Several thousand of his Indian followers rose, killed the leader of the opposing faction, and engaged in guerrilla warfare behind the dead deputy's son.²⁷ In July 1899 supporters of ex-President Cáceres in Azángaro rebelled against the government and led their Indian employees in a campaign of destruction against haciendas in the province.²⁸

More important was the impact of religion. It played a vital role in the lives of the Indians and, as Fr. Jeffrey Klaiber has shown, was a key factor in the Atusparia revolt. It was evident in other movements of the

²⁴ *El Comercio*, Mar. 31, 2nd ed., 1896; Cuzco, Oct. 8, 1896, D8655; Puno, Oct. 1896, D7811.

²⁵ Klaiber, *Religion and Revolution*, pp. 56-57; Alayza y Paz Soldán, *Mi País*, p. 104; Jean Piel, "The place of the peasantry in the national life of Peru in the nineteenth century," *Past & Present* (Feb. 1970), No. 46, pp. 129-130.

²⁶ Cuzco, July 25, 1902, E172.

²⁷ Ayacucho, July 21, 1890, D5564; *La Opinión Nacional* (Lima), Feb. 4, 14, 1890.

²⁸ Azángaro, May 31, 1899, D4559; Puno, June 15, 1900, E836.

period as well. For example, the uncertainties of the time fostered religious feeling which manifested itself in messianic movements. One of these appeared in the department of Ancash in 1891 led by a 42-year old Indian named Basilio Ocaña. His racial origins are, in fact, unclear for he spoke Spanish and wore a beard. He was illiterate but as a youth memorized the scriptures taught to him by a priest. In 1884 he had visions and believed that God had chosen him to realize a great work. He later denied that he had intended to lead the Indians and claimed that all he wanted was to save his soul, but the Indians viewed him as a new messiah sent by God to save them. The local white population viewed him in much the same terms, fearing that he intended to re-establish the Indians' rights. They had little to fear: Ocaña proved an ineffective leader and reports of his movement appeared in the Lima press only after his arrest. He was subsequently brought to the capital for trial.²⁹

More often the role of religious leaders during this period was similar to that of other officials. In some instances local priests demonstrated the same exploitative tendencies as the local officials and with the same results. For example, in February 1887 Indians in the province of Chucuito rebelled following excessive financial demands by their priests for burials, weddings, and baptisms. The subsequent trouble in this area in 1895-1897 was also linked to the demands made by priests.³⁰ In other instances priests assisted the Indians in their struggles, although sometimes spurred by non-religious factors. In 1895, at the time of the Piérola rebellion, an uprising in Huánuco was led by a priest whose motivation seems to have been political for he was related to a local politician with Cácerist connections. In January 1902 a rebellion in Chucuito was partly the responsibility of the local priest who inflamed the Indians against the lieutenant-governor.³¹

As the century came to a close the pattern of Indian unrest was beginning to change. No longer were the effects of the war with Chile the principal cause of their discontent. By now central authority had been re-established and was proving effective. Of greater importance was the impact of modernization, especially the improvement of communications and transportation into the interior which broke down the isolation of the sierra. It meant that goods produced in this area could

²⁹ *El Comercio*, Oct. 2, Nov. 28, 2nd ed., 1891.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1887; Klaiber, *Religion and Revolution*, p. 57.

³¹ Klaiber, *Religion and Revolution*, pp. 54-55; Chucuito, Jan. 1902, E217.

now be moved more cheaply to the coast and beyond. As a result, mines in the center expanded, creating a need for both workers and food. In the south the completion of the railway to Sicuani in 1894 increased the profitability of wool production. Land values rose and attempts were made by the rich and the powerful to expand their estates at the expense of Indian holdings.³² Usurpation of Indian lands was not a new phenomenon: it had been common during the colonial period and continued into the republic. During the period under discussion it led to a number of insurrections in 1887 in the Puno region where all the available land was divided among Indian peasant producers and large haciendas. Other attempts at altering the Indians' traditional way of life produced a similar response. In 1891 several hundred Indians in the province of Cangallo attacked and besieged for four days a hacienda whose new owners had changed the working arrangements and tried to introduce a savings plan.³³ Confrontations of this sort were to become more frequent as the capitalist mode of production began to be applied more and more widely in the sierra during the twentieth century. And, while continuing to employ their usual means for obtaining improvements, the Indians, in keeping with the changing times, were also turning to the courts for relief.³⁴

Modernization and capitalism altered the form of Indian agitation in other ways as well. With the expansion of mines and coastal and sierra estates, the Indians were transformed from peasant farmers into wage earners. Many of them were recruited through the system known as *enganche*, which did not create a true proletariat but did draw the Indians into a money economy and gradually transformed them into wage earners.³⁵ As a result, their struggles increasingly took the form of modern industrial agitation as they engaged in strikes to obtain improvements in their working and living conditions. Thus, with the declining impact of the War of the Pacific and the increasing effect of modernization violence had not ended, but the motivations and the strategies of the participants were changing.

³² For the Mantaro Valley, see Smith, "Socio-economic differentiation," p. 289. For the southern region, see Rosemary Thorp & Geoffrey Bertram, *Peru 1890-1977. Growth and Policy in an Open Economy* (London, 1978), pp. 64-65.

³³ Puno, June 8, 1887, D4558; *El Comercio*, Dec. 18, 1st ed., 1891.

³⁴ For example, see Julian Laite, "Processes of industrial and social change in highland Peru" in Long & Roberts (eds.), *Peasant Cooperation and Capitalist Expansion*.

³⁵ For *enganche*, see Peter Blanchard, "The recruitment of workers in the Peruvian sierra at the turn of the century: the *enganche* system," *Inter-American Economic Affairs* (1979), XXXIII, No. 3.

There are several conclusions to be drawn from the rebellions and uprisings that occurred in the Peruvian sierra in the late nineteenth century. The most obvious is that the effects of the war were not restricted to the coast, but covered much of the interior as well and continued to affect the country until at least the end of the century. One group who suffered because of the situation was the Indian peasantry and their suffering frequently roused them to rebellion. It should be noted that this was but one aspect of their resistance: Jean Piel has found that the late nineteenth century was also a period of widespread Indian banditry,³⁶ which was another response to the same causes. The Indians' agitation contradicts the commonly held view that they were passive and prepared to accept any privations without protest. Furthermore, although their struggles were usually focussed on local problems, the impact was often much wider, reaching on occasion as far as the capital. Their more violent uprisings produced fears among the white community of imminent racial warfare or the creation of an Indian republic. Of equal importance was the fact that the Indians' unrest was an obstacle to political stability and economic development in the sierra. As such it played a vital role in hindering Peru's recovery from the war which had set everything in motion in the first place.

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³⁶ Piel, "The place of the peasantry," p. 130.