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Comparative Theory and Political Practice: Do We Need a ‘State-Nation’ Model as Well as a ‘Nation-State’ Model?¹

ALL INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC STATES HAVE A DEGREE OF CULTURAL diversity, but for comparative purposes we can say that, at any given time, states may be divided analytically into three different categories:

1. States that have strong cultural diversity, some of which is territorially based and politically articulated by significant groups that, in the name of nationalism and self-determination, advance claims of independence.
2. States that are quite culturally diverse, but whose diversity is nowhere organized by territorially based politically significant groups mobilizing nationalist claims for independence.
3. States that may appear to be relatively culturally homogeneous.

In this article, I will call countries, part of whose territory falls into the first category, ‘robustly politically multinational’. Canada (owing to Quebec), Spain (especially owing to the Basque country and Catalonia) and Belgium (owing to Flanders) are ‘robustly politically multinational’. India, owing to the Kashmir Valley alone, merits classification in this category. Furthermore, at various times the Mizo Movement in north-east India, the Khalistan movement in the

¹ This is a slightly revised version of the *Government and Opposition*/Leonard Shapiro Annual Lecture I delivered at the Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association, Bath University, 13 April 2007. The lecture, as I told the audience, was based largely on a forthcoming book, Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz and Yogendra Yadav, *Democracy in Multinational Societies: India and other Polities*, Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008. To preserve the tone of the original lecture, I will often use the word ‘I’, but it should always be understood by the readers that the argument flows out of my exchanges and writings with my two co-authors. My research on comparative federalism in general, and specifically on India and Sri Lanka, was supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation.

Punjab, and the Dravidian movement in southern India, as well as other movements, have also given a multinational dimension to Indian politics.

Switzerland and the United States are both sociologically diverse and multicultural. However, since neither country has significant territorially based groups mobilizing claims for independence, both countries clearly fall into the second but not the first category. Finally, countries such as Japan, Portugal and the Scandinavian countries fall into the third category.

What political implications do these three very different situations have? A major implication is that, if at the time of the inauguration of competitive elections, a polity has only one significant group that sees itself as a nation, and there exists a relatively common sense of history and religion and a shared language throughout the territory, nation-state building and democracy-building can be mutually reinforcing logics.

However, if a polity (like Spain at the death of Franco, India at independence or Belgium after the 1970s) has some dimensions that are politically robustly multinational, as well as deeply multicultural, nation-state building and democracy-building will be conflicting logics. This is so because one of the nations will be privileged, and the others, in Charles Taylor's sense, will be less recognized.² They may even be marginalized.

For a number of years, my long-time co-author, Juan J. Linz, and I, and a new co-author, Yogendra Yadav, from the Centre of Developing Societies in Delhi, have been thinking about what, if any, set of norms, social practices, party coalitions and political institutions might be compatible with social peace and political democracy within a politically robust multinational polity. We are not against nation-states. If they exist, fine. We are also not against peaceful negotiated secessions, but my focus in this article is what, if anything, can be done, if the goal is peace and democracy in one state, *and* the overall polity is close to a situation that I have described as 'robustly political multinational'.

This question has been under-theorized and under-examined. What follows is an attempt to address this difficult, but not unsolv-

² See Charles Taylor's 'The Politics of Recognition', in Amy Guttmann (ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, revised edition 1994, pp. 25–74, esp. 51–61.

able, problem. To begin this inquiry, let me illustrate how the 'nation-state' ideal type is sharply different from an alternative ideal type that Stepan, Linz and Yadav call the 'state-nation' ideal type (see Table 1).

If we are concerned with varying degrees of ethno-mobilization in a polity, in what political context is a democratic 'nation-state', or a democratic 'state-nation' most probable, and most improbable? Are there some circumstances in which neither ideal type is probable? Theory, and empirical experience, indicate that 'context matters' for what general type of state institutional arrangements are appropriate, or even possible, given different intensities of ethno-cultural mobilization. In terms of ethno-mobilization and its relationship to state structures, there can be three sharply different contexts.

The first is a *nation-state* context. If only one significant, territorially concentrated, politically activated sociocultural identity exists, democratic nation-state crafting is possible. State structures can be unitary (e.g. France and Japan in the nineteenth century) or symmetrically federal (e.g. Australia in the early twentieth century and the German Federal Republic after the Second World War).


The second context is a *state-nation* context. If significant multiple but complementary identities exist, democratic state-nation crafting is possible, but nation-state crafting will probably be quite conflictual. The least conflictual state structure would be asymmetrical federalism, in which some cultural prerogatives are constitutionally embedded for subunits with salient and mobilized territorial identities (e.g. Belgium, Spain, Canada and India).

Third is what I call a *pure multinational* context. If almost no emotionally moving polity-wide common symbols exist, if almost all of the functions of the central state have been transferred or acquired by national subunits, if most citizens in subunits of the state primarily identify with 'national' aspirations in these units and see these units as nation-states *in potentia*, the political identities will tend to be singular and conflictual and there will be little loyalty to central state authorities. In this ethnocultural context, crafting a democratic, federal, 'pure multinational' polity in one territory is extremely improbable, due to interacting, probably violent, conflicts between secessionist attempts and possible recentralization efforts (e.g. Yugoslavia in the late 1980s). These three, quite different, contexts are depicted visually in Figure 1 below.

Table 1
Democracy and Cultural Nation(s): Two Contrasting Ideal Types of Democratic States – 'Nation-State' and 'State-Nation'

	<i>Nation-state</i>	<i>State-nation</i>
<i>Pre-existing conditions</i>		
Sense of belonging/ we-ness	Awareness of, and attachment to, one major cultural civilizational tradition. This cultural identity corresponds to existing state boundaries with minor exceptions	Awareness of, and attachment to, more than one cultural civilizational tradition within the existing boundaries. However, these attachments do not preclude identification with a common state
<i>State policy</i>		
Cultural policies	Homogenizing attempts to foster one core cultural identity; non-recognition of multiplicity of cultures. Only one official language allowed in the state. Unity in oneness	Recognition and support of more than one cultural identity, even more than one cultural nation. Two or more official languages are allowed. All within a frame of some common polity-wide symbols. Unity in diversity
<i>Institutions</i>		
Territorial division of power	Unitary states or symmetrical federations	Federal system. Often de jure, or de facto, asymmetrical. Can even be a unitary state if aggressive nation-state policies are not pursued and de facto state multilingual areas are accepted
<i>Politics</i>		
Ethno-cultural- territorial cleavages	Not too salient	Salient and are recognized and democratically managed
Autonomist and/or secessionist parties	Autonomist parties are normally not 'coalitionable'. Secessionist parties are outlawed or marginalized in democratic electoral politics	Autonomist parties can govern in federal units and are 'coalitionable' at the centre. Non-violent secessionist parties can sometimes participate in democratic politics
<i>Citizen orientation</i>		
Political identity	Single identity as citizens of the state and overwhelmingly as members of the same cultural nation	Multiple but complementary identities
Obedience/loyalty	Obedience to the state and loyalty to the nation	Obedience to the state and identification with institutions, neither based on a single national identity

Figure 1
Democratically Probable and Improbable Relationships between Activated, Territorially Concentrated, Sociocultural Identities and Political-Institutional Strategies



In Figure 1, the circle in the upper right-hand side space that I call 'pure multinationalism' has deliberately been given a non-continuous and faint border to indicate that the polity is more porous and has a substantially lesser degree of 'stateness' than either a nation-state or a state-nation. I have also put numerous small circles and ovals within this space to indicate that these are really a cluster of aspirant nation-states within this weak state. The situation depicted in the upper right-hand corner is inherently unstable as a single democratic state. The two most likely re-equilibrations are: (1) that the aspirant nation-states become independent states and the previous single state fragments; or (2) that there is an attempt at authoritarian recentralization by a major ethnopolitical military component of the threatened state.

In the late 1980s, the two ethno-federal states of the former USSR and Yugoslavia could analytically be said to have occupied space analogous to the upper right corner of Figure 1. At the last count, 25 near 'nation-states' have emerged, often with substantial bloodshed and repression, out of these two ethno-federal states. Given this, is it right to assert, as many have done, that all ethno-federal

arrangements are ‘state-subverting’?³ Or, is such a deduction a dangerous half-truth, yet one more example of the ‘tyranny of the last instance’? As I hope to demonstrate in the rest of this article, the ideal type of ‘state-nation’ must be radically differentiated from the ideal type depicted in the upper right-hand box in Figure 1 that I call ‘pure multinationalism’.

The question I want to explore now is whether the somewhat ethno-federal arrangements in the state-nation ideal type are necessarily state-subverting mechanisms? Or, can there be identifications, norms, practices and institutions that can facilitate the construction of a democratic polity close to a state-nation ideal type?

THE ‘NESTED GRAMMAR’ OF STATE-NATIONS

On theoretical and empirical grounds I would like to make the case that there are arrangements that cohere in an unusual, almost counter-intuitive, nested policy grammar that may facilitate the emergence and persistence of a state-nation.⁴ There are seven phrases that are an intrinsic part of this grammar:

1. An Asymmetrically Federal, but *not* a Unitary, or Symmetrically Federal State;
2. Individual Rights *and* Collective Recognition;
3. Parliamentary, *instead of* Presidential or Semi-Presidential, Systems;
4. Polity-Wide *and* ‘Centric-Regional’ Parties and Careers;
5. Politically Integrated but *not* Culturally Assimilated Populations;

³ Even though in her book, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999, Valerie Bunce does not explicitly argue this point, many scholars who read her book have employed its analysis of the Yugoslavian and Soviet experiences to make the case that ‘ethno-federal’ institutions *by themselves* are ‘subversive’ institutions for stateness and peace. See, for example, David John Meyer, ‘Ethnic Territorial Autonomy and Post-Soviet Ethnic Political Mobilization’, unpublished PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, 2007. For a related argument see Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, New York, Norton, 2000. For her part, Bunce refers to ‘national federalism’ as one of the most important ‘subversive institutions’. She argues correctly that national federalism helped produce over time a ‘disintegration’ of the Soviet, Yugoslav, and Czechoslovak states.

⁴ The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines grammar as a ‘means of indicating the relations of words’.

6. Cultural Nationalists *versus* Secessionist Nationalists;
7. *Earned* Pattern of Complementary, even though Multiple, Identities.

Why Probably an Asymmetrical Federal State?

A federal, rather than a unitary state, is part of the grammar because federal state structures allow a large territorially concentrated cultural group, with some serious nationalist aspirations, and possibly a language with its own script, to exercise self-government in that territory. Why asymmetrical? In a symmetrical federal system all units must have identical rights and obligations. It is politically possible, however, that some territorially concentrated and culturally diverse groups have in their history acquired prerogatives that they would want to retain or reacquire, and it is also possible that some tribal groups that control a large territory (such as the Mizos in India) would only agree to join the federation if some of their land-use laws, found nowhere else in the polity, were respected. Bargains and compromises on these issues, which might be necessary for peace and voluntary membership in the political community, are negotiable in an asymmetrical federal system, but are normally unacceptable in a symmetrical federal system.

Why Individual Rights and Collective Recognition?

The polity would not be democratic unless *throughout* the polity individual rights were constitutionally inviolable and state protected. This necessary function of the centre cannot be devolved. But in Charles Taylor's sense, some territorially concentrated cultural groups, even nations, may need some collective recognition for rights (beyond the classic liberal rights that Michael Walzer calls 'Liberalism 1'). Such collective recognition of rights (which Walzer calls 'Liberalism 2') might be necessary to enable members of some groups to thrive culturally and to exercise fully their classic Liberalism 1 individual rights.⁵ Walzer argues that Liberalism 2 'allows for a state committed

⁵ See Taylor's previously cited 'The Politics of Recognition'. An elegant development of a variant of this argument is found in Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*,

to the survival and flourishing of . . . a (limited) set of nations, cultures and religions – so long as the basic rights of citizens who have different commitments or no such commitments are protected'.⁶ There may well be concrete moments in the crafting of a democracy where individuals cannot develop and exercise their full rights until they are active members of a group that struggles and wins some collective goods common to most members of the group. These collective, group-specific, rights might be most easily nested in asymmetrical federalism. For example, if a large territorially concentrated cultural group speaks a different language with its own script, some official recognition of the privileged right of that language to be used in self-government, and in schools, radio and television, might be necessary to enable the individual rights of the members of this unit to be realized. Furthermore, for a state-nation, individuals in their ethno-federal units may not be able to participate fully in the overall federal polity, if in addition to their right of self-government in their own language, some polity-wide link language is not maintained.

The identification and loyalty of the practitioners of territorially concentrated minority religions with the centre may very well be reduced if the majority religion is the established religion throughout the territory. In such cases, it may encourage identity with the state-nation if *all* religions are recognized and possibly even financially supported. The financial support of religions, majority and minority, is of course a violation of classic US or French separation of religion and State doctrines, but it is not a violation of any person's individual human rights.⁷

Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986, esp. chs 8 and 10; and his *Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in Morality of Law and Politics*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, esp. preface and chs 1, 6 and 8.

⁶ The quote from Michael Walzer is from his 'Comment', in Guttman, *Multiculturalism*, p. 99. For a somewhat different approach to group recognition, see Will Kymlicka's discussion of 'group specific rights' in his *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995, esp. ch. 4.

⁷ See Alfred Stepan, 'The World's Religious Systems and Democracy: Crafting the "Twin Tolerations"', in Alfred Stepan, *Arguing Comparative Politics*, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 213–54. Also see Alfred Stepan, 'The Multiple Secularisms of Modern Democracies', draft paper prepared for a September 2006 SSRC Working Group for a forthcoming volume *Rethinking Secularism*, to be edited by Mark Juergensmeyer. For an authoritative analysis of India's pioneering 'equal respect, equal support' form of secularism, see Rajeev Bhargava, 'The Distinctiveness of Indian Secularism', in T. N. Srinivasan (ed.), *The Future of Secularism*, Delhi and

Why a Parliamentary instead of a Presidential or Semi-Presidential System as Part of the 'Grammar' of a State-Nation?

The elected executive in a presidential or a semi-presidential system is an 'indivisible good' – it is necessarily occupied by one person, from one nationality, for a fixed term. However, a parliamentary system creates the possibility of a 'sharable good'. That is, there is a possibility of other parties, composed of other nationalities, helping to constitute the ruling coalition. For example, if no single party has a majority, parliamentarianism is *coalition-requiring*. Furthermore, because the government can collapse unless it constantly bargains to retain the support of its coalition partners, parliamentarianism often has *coalition-sustaining* qualities. These 'sharable' and 'coalitionable' aspects of a parliamentary executive might be useful in a politically robust multinational society.

Why Polity-Wide and 'Centric-Regional' Parties and Careers?

If all the parties in the polity get the overwhelming majority of their votes from their own ethno-territorial unit, trust in, and identity with, the centre will probably be low. Many analysts would call such parties 'regional-secessionist'. Political life in a polity dominated by such regional-secessionist parties would approximate the upper right-hand 'pure multinational' space depicted in Figure 1.

However, if the polity contains some major polity-wide parties that regularly need allies from regional parties to help them form a government at the centre, and if the polity-wide parties often help their regional party allies to form a majority in their own ethno-federal unit, then the logic of incentives at work here makes these so-called regional secessionist parties actually 'centric-regional' parties, because they regularly co-rule at the centre. This coalitional pattern is best facilitated if both the polity-wide and the regional parties are 'nested' in a parliamentary system that itself is nested in an asymmetrical federal system.

Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 20–53. Also see Rajeev Bhargava, 'Political Secularism', in John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig and Anne Phillips (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 636–55.

Why ‘polity-wide careers’? If some polity-wide language (such as French or English) is created or maintained, many university-educated members of a regional nationality group who do not speak the majority language in the country (say Hindi in India or Sinhalese in Sri Lanka) can still successfully pursue polity-wide careers in law, communications, civil service and business. If they can pursue such polity-wide careers, citizens may have strong incentives not to ‘exit’ from career-enhancing, polity-wide ‘networks’.

Why and How not Culturally Assimilated but nonetheless Politically Integrated?

In a state-nation, many cultural, and especially ethno-national, groups will be educated and self-governing in their own language. They will thus probably never be fully culturally assimilated to the dominant culture in the polity. This is a reality of ‘state-nations’.

However, if an ethno-federal group sees the polity-wide state as having helped to put a ‘roof of rights’ over its head, and if its ‘centric-regional’ party is ‘coalitionable’ with polity-wide parties, and regularly helps form government at the centre, and many individuals from the ethno-federal group also participate in, and feel they benefit from, polity-wide careers, they can be politically integrated into the polity-wide state-nation.

Why and How Cultural Nationalists Could Act Against Secessionist Nationalists?

Ernest Gellner forcefully articulated the position of many nation-state theorists when he famously asserted that: ‘Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent . . . Nationalist *sentiment* is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle . . . A nationalist *movement* is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind.’⁸ Thus I am constantly admonished not to advocate state-nation ethno-federal

⁸ All quotes are from the influential opening paragraphs of Ernest Gellner’s *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1983, p. 1. Emphasis in original.

policies because all cultural nationalism inevitably becomes 'secessionist nationalism' with eventual demands for independence.

However, we can have a situation in which a 'cultural nationalist' movement, nested in an asymmetrical federal, and a parliamentary system, wins democratic political control of a component unit of the federation; and governs and educates the citizens of its territory in the language, culture and history of their nation, and is also coalitionable at the centre.⁹ If such a cultural nationalist movement in control of an ethno-federal unit is challenged by secessionist nationalists who use, or threaten to use, violence in order to secede and become independent, the ruling 'cultural nationalists' would risk losing the treasured resources they have acquired, and it is quite possible that they would use the political and security resources now under their control *against* the secessionist nationalists.

Why 'Earned' Complementary as Well as Just Multiple Identities?

In the non-zero sum polity-wide system produced by the six nested policies and norms I have just discussed, it is very possible that many citizens of the multinational society could be strongly identified with, and loyal to, *both* their culturally powerful ethno-federal unit *and* to the polity-wide centre. They would have such complementary identities because the centre has recognized and defended many of their cultural demands and, in addition, helped structure and protect their full participation in the overall politics of the polity. Such citizens may also have strong trust in the centre because they see the centre, and the institutions historically associated with it, as helping to deliver some valued collective goods, such as independence from a colonial power, security from threatening neighbours, and possibly even ensuring a large growing and common market. If this is so, the overall polity has earned their complementary and multiple identities.

⁹ However, it cannot be excluded that if there is a conflict between secessionist nationalists and the central state apparatus over the use of force, there might be a convergence on some issues in the dispute between cultural nationalists and the secessionist nationalists.

AGGREGATE TESTS OF TRUST AND IDENTITY: NATION-STATES VERSUS STATE-NATIONS

The question that is now, correctly, in the reader's mind, is whether such a 'state-nation' can work. For, of course, a major claim of nation-state theorists and advocates is that only a nation-state can generate the necessary degree of trust in the major institutions of the state that a modern democracy needs.

Let me do a simple empirical test of this claim by examining comparative trust in the entire universe of federal systems that have been democratic for at least 25 continuous years. In my judgement, there are 11 such countries; in alphabetical order they are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Spain, Switzerland and the United States. Fortunately, the World Values Study administered surveys in all 11 of the countries.¹⁰ We thus have data for the degree of trust in five key political institutions for all 11 countries. These key institutions are: the central government, the legislature, the legal system, the civil service, political parties and police.

To go further with our test, let us now divide our 11 countries into those countries closest to the nation-state ideal type in that they (1) are symmetrically federal; (2) have no constitutionally embedded ethno-federal dimensions; and (3) are not de jure officially multilingual. These countries are: Austria, Germany, Australia, the USA, Brazil and Argentina. Those countries in our country set that are closest to the 'state-nation' ideal type in that they (1) are asymmetrically federal; (2) have constitutionally embedded ethno-federal features; and (3) are constitutionally multilingual are: India, Belgium, Canada and Spain. I will add Switzerland to this set because, even though it is symmetrically federal, it is much closer to a state-nation type than to a nation-state type, if one studies Table 1.

¹⁰ Many scholars consider the World Values Study the gold standard for comparative survey work. There have been four waves of this survey done since it first began in 1980. The latest wave, conducted in the year 2000, included 76 countries. The World Values Study is under the overall supervision of Ronald Inglehart, the programme director for the Institute of Social Research at the University of Michigan. For a discussion of these surveys, see Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, appendix A, pp. 243–6. For more detail on the additional surveys used in this article, consult the appendix to Stepan et al., *Democracy in Multinational Societies*.

When we examine the average country trust scores for the five key political institutions for each of these polities, we get the following very surprising results (see Table 2).

The ‘closer to the nation-state, the greater the trust’ claim is obviously not supported by these data. Neither is the claim that ‘any use of ethno-federal devices is subversive of the state’, because *all* of the countries close to the state-nation pole have some ethno-federal features *as well as* strong polity-wide trust. Advocates of the inherent superiority of nation-states also base their arguments on their

Table 2
Ranking of Citizens’ Trust in Six Major State Institutions within the World’s 11 Long-Standing Federal Democracies is Better among State-Nations than Nation-States

<i>States closest to ‘state-nation’ model</i>	<i>Rank of trust (the lower the number the more the trust)</i>
India	3.0
Switzerland	3.7
Canada	4.0
Belgium	6.3
Spain	7.2
<i>States closest to ‘nation-state’ model</i>	<i>Rank of trust (the lower the number the more the trust)</i>
Brazil	4.6
Austria	5.0
USA	5.9
Germany	7.6
Australia	8.0
Argentina	10.6
‘State-nation’ average	4.8
‘Nation-state’ average	7.0

Sources: The data for all countries but Austria, Belgium and Canada are from Ronald Inglehart et al., *World Values Survey: 1995–97*, Michigan, Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan, 1997. The data for Germany is from the *Lander* of the former West Germany. Canada, Belgium and Austria were not included in the 1995–97 survey. The data for these countries is from *World Values Survey: 1990–93*. For both the 1990–93 and 1995–97 surveys the question numbers were, from top to bottom, 142, 144, 137, 141, 143 and 145. Question 143 was not asked in Canada. Questions 142 and 143 were not asked in Belgium or Austria. See Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz and Yogendra Yadav, *Democracy in Multinational Societies: India and other Polities*, Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, chapter 2.

assumption that only a nation-state can generate the necessary degree of strong identity and pride in membership in the state that is best for a democracy. However, when I examined the average World Values scores for 'strong pride' in being a member of one's country, I found that the results are statistically indistinguishable between nation-states and state-nations, with the latter actually having marginally more pride. In the survey, 83 per cent of the respondents in the nation-state set expressed 'strong pride' in being a member of their country, but in the multilingual, multicultural polities closest to the state-nation ideal type, 84 per cent expressed 'strong pride'.

INDIA AS A STATE-NATION?

India would seem to be one of the most difficult cases for our argument that multiple and complementary identities, and democratic state-nation loyalties, are possible even in a polity with significant 'politically robust multinational' dimensions, as well as intense linguistic and religious differences. At independence, at most 40 per cent of India's population could communicate with each other in Hindi. Furthermore, there were at least nine other languages used by 13 million to 32 million inhabitants of India, almost all with their own scripts.¹¹ Indian society also had large communities of almost every world religion – Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Sikhs and Christians. Even after partition in 1947, India had a major Islamic population. In 2008, India's Islamic population constitutes a 'minority' of at least 140 million, which makes it the world's third- or fourth-largest Islamic population in any country, exceeded only by Indonesia, Pakistan, and possibly by Bangladesh.

The question of India's comparative poverty is relevant to the potential 'scope value' of our state-nation concept. How wealthy does a country have to be, before it can utilize state-nation policies? The scope value concerning wealth would seem to be quite great

¹¹ In descending order of number of speakers (excluding Hindi) Telugu, Bengali, Marathi, Tamil, Urdu, Gujarati, Kannada, Malayalam and Oriya were all spoken by between 32 to 13 million inhabitants of India. For an analytical discussion of these figures see the classic, Jyotirindra Das Gupta, *Language Conflict and National Development: Group Politics and National Language Policy in India*, Berkeley and London, University of California Press, 1970, pp. 31–68.

because India's per capita income in purchasing power parity is almost eight times less than any of the three other 'politically robust multinational' democracies. Of the four multinational federal democracies in the world – Spain, Canada, Belgium and India – India is the only country that does not have an advanced industrial economy. The 2005 per capita income in current international dollars of the four multinational federal systems in descending order was; Canada \$33,375, Belgium \$32,119, Spain \$27,169 and India \$3,452.¹² But before analysing India's overall situation I want to stress that India has many problems, and its policies towards women, Muslims and 'very poor' should be, and could be, greatly improved (see Table 3).

Given this great poverty, areas of policy failure, and unrivalled cultural diversity, what do the people who live in the territory of India think of the state that rules their territory? Do they identify with India or not? Do they trust Indian institutions or not? Do the citizens share important politically relevant attitudes in common? In short, is India close to, or far from, having political attitudes supportive of a state-nation?

Let us attempt to examine these questions. If a country is actually close to being a state-nation, what should we be able to document in terms of public opinion? On theoretical grounds, it would seem reasonable to insist that if people live in a territory, and have attitudes supportive of what I call a 'state-nation', three key sets of attitudes should be empirically present and verifiable:

1. positive identification with the overall state-wide polity as well as with their own ethnic-linguistic culture;
2. strong trust in the major polity-wide institutions of the state;
3. as strong support of democracy as the polities in nation-states with roughly comparable years as democracies and roughly similar levels of socio-economic development.

Fortunately, we can explore these questions for India in comparative perspective, because, as I have indicated, India and all the

¹² All data is taken from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators 2006*, Washington, DC, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2006. Figures are given in GDP per capita using current international dollars in purchasing power parity (PPP).

Table 3
Comparative Indicators of India's Human and Income Poverty

Average GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2000 (US\$) among Arend Lijphart's universe of the 36 continuous democracies of the world from at least 1977 to 1996	\$20,252
India's GDP per capita in PPP in 2000 (US\$)	\$2,358
India's human development index (HDI) ranking among the 173 countries of the world ranked by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	124th out of 173
India's HDI ranking among Arend Lijphart's 36 continuous democracies	34th out of 36
India's human poverty index (HPI-1) among the 88 developing countries ranked by the UNDP	55th out of 88
Adult female literacy rate in India	45%
Percentage of underweight children in India at age 5 'Great poverty' level	47%
All India	23%
Muslims	31%

Sources. UNDP, *Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World*, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 149–52, 157–9, 172, 190–3, 224. Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, New Haven, CT, and London, Yale University Press, 1999, see table 4.1 for Lijphart's universe of the 36 countries in the world that were all continuous democracies in his judgement from at least 1977 to 1996. Government of India, Prime Minister's High Level Committee, 'Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India' (Sachar Report), A Report by the Prime Minister's High Level Committee, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, November 2006.

long-standing federal democracies have been included in most of the rounds of the World Values Study (WVS). For India, we have exceptionally rich data, because, in addition to the WVS data, Yogendra Yadav, Juan J. Linz and I constructed many questions of direct relevance for exploring our state-nation hypothesis for the State of Democracy in South Asia (SDSA) of 2005 and Yogendra Yadav was the director of India's National Election Study (NES) of 1999 and 2004, the latter with a census-based sample of 27,145, both studies conducted at the Centre for the Study of Developing Studies in Delhi. Yadav has also done numerous single-state surveys in states that at one time have had conflicts with the centre, such as

Mizoram and Punjab, or that currently has a conflict with the centre, such as Kashmir.¹³

With this rich survey data, let us see whether India scores positively on the three key sets of attitudes that I argue should be present and verifiable if India is actually close to the state-nation ideal type.

How much pride do Indians have in their state compared to the 10 other long-standing federal democracies? At the aggregate level, only respondents from the United States and Australia, express more pride in being members of their state than those from India (see Figure 2).¹⁴

My confidence level concerning respondents' pride in being Indian is strengthened by the fact that pride questions were given twice by WVS and once by SDSA 2005, and the results in all three surveys are quite similar (see Table 4).

In order to explore our state-nation hypothesis, however, it is crucial that we examine the attitudes of India's largest religious minority – Muslims – to see how similar or dissimilar they are from the attitudes of India's religious majority, Hindus. We also should explore the attitudes of the 'scheduled castes', the group that were formerly called 'untouchables', because they were historically many of the poorest and most socially marginalized of India's citizens. If we combine 'very proud' and 'proud', Muslim and scheduled castes' responses concerning our pride variable are virtually indistinguishable from the all-India average (see Table 5).


Let us now examine the data for our second variable, which concerns state-wide trust in political institutions. Pippa Norris, in her book *Critical Citizens*, constructed a political institutional confidence scale for 21 democracies. In this scale, India ranked at the top of the 21 countries (see Figure 3).

¹³ Yogendra Yadav is generally considered India's most distinguished public opinion specialist.

¹⁴ Concerning Switzerland, as the reader will see later (in Table 6), consistent with our idea of state-nation, of the 11 long-standing federal democracies, Switzerland has the highest percentage of people with confidence in the central government and the second highest percentage of people with confidence in the legal system. So while they may not have pride in being Swiss *as such*, they nevertheless have great pride in their Swiss institutions. On the complex issue of pride (or lack thereof) in the German nation, see Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, 'Nationalgefühl und Glück', in Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Köcher, *Die verletzte Nation*, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1987, pp. 17–74.

Figure 2

How Proud are You to be an Indian/Brazilian/ . . . ? Responses in the 11 Long-standing Federal Democracies (percentage who answer 'very proud')



Source: The data for all countries is from response to the question 'How proud are you to be (nationality)?' Ronald Inglehart et al. (eds), *Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook Based on the 1999–2002 Values Survey*, Mexico, DF, Siglo XXI Editores, 2004.

Table 4

Pride in India, 1990–2005 (per cent)

	WVS 1990	WVS 1995	WVS 2001	SDSA 2005
Very proud	67	66	67	61
Proud	25	19	21	28
Not proud	5	8	5	3
Not at all proud	3	1	2	1
Don't know/No answer	0	6	5	8
N	2466	2040	2002	5387

Source. WVS = different waves of the World Values Survey; SDSA = State of Democracy in South Asia survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in 2005.


Let us go back to the World Values Survey (WVS), which elicits respondents' trust concerning six major politically relevant institutions. Within our set of the 11 long-standing federal democracies, India scored the highest of the 11 countries in trust concerning its

Table 5
Pride in India for all Citizens and for Muslims and Scheduled Castes, 2005
 (per cent)

	<i>All India</i>	<i>Muslim</i>	<i>Scheduled caste</i>
Very proud	61	58	57
Proud	28	31	31
Not proud	2	1	3
Not at all proud	1	2	2
Don't know/No answer	8	8	7
Total	100	100	100
N	5387	635	1023

Source: State of Democracy in South Asia Survey, conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi in 2005.

Figure 3
Institutions and Political Trust in India and 20 Other Democracies: 1990–93



Source: Pippa Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, figure 11.2, p. 229.

legal system, parliament and political parties, and the second highest concerning central government and the civil service, and the second lowest (correctly in my opinion) concerning the police. Let us look at how the three countries – India, Switzerland and Canada – who scored the best on trust were ranked (see Table 6).

Table 6

Citizens Who Affirmed a 'Great Deal' or 'Quite a Lot' of Trust in Six Major Institutions: Percentages Among the Three Top-Ranked Federal Democracies

<i>Institution</i>	<i>India</i>	<i>India's Rank</i>	<i>Switzerland</i>	<i>Canada</i>
Legal system	67	1st	65	54
Parliament	53	1st	41	38
Political parties	39	1st	25	n.a.
Central government	48	2nd	50	38
Civil service	53	2nd	43	50
Police	36	10th	67	84

Source: The data for India and Switzerland is from Ronald Inglehart et al., *World Values Survey: 1995–97*, Michigan, Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan, 1997. Canada was not included in the 1995–97 survey. The data for Canada is from *World Values Survey: 1990–93*. For both the 1990–93 and 1995–97 surveys the question numbers were, from top to bottom, 142, 144, 137, 141, 143 and 145. Question 143 was not asked in Canada.

The third variable that we need to examine is Indian support for democracy in comparison to some important 'third-wave' democracies. Respondents in India indicate substantially more support for democracy, and more opposition to authoritarian rule, than do the nation-states of Korea, Chile and Brazil. And, if we only utilize 'valid' responses – that is, if we eliminate 'don't knows' and 'no answers', as is often done in survey analysis – India compares favourably with Spain and Uruguay, and is overwhelmingly more supportive of democracy than Chile, Korea and Brazil (see Table 7).

INTEGRATING AND DISINTEGRATING STATES: TAMILS IN INDIA VERSUS TAMILS IN SRI LANKA

Let us now shift from surveys and attitudes, to policies and outcomes. Let me specifically contrast how India, following state-nation policies, politically integrated the Tamils in the south, and how Sri Lanka, following nation-state policies towards the Tamils in the north, has almost disintegrated the state.¹⁵

¹⁵ In this article, I will keep footnotes to Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka to a minimum, but the interested reader can consult the two chapters on this question in the previously cited Stepan et al., *Democracy in Multinational Societies*.

Table 7
Attitudes Towards Democracy and Authoritarianism in India and Five Selected 'Third-Wave' Democracies: Percentage Agreeing with the Following Statements

	Uruguay	Spain	India 2004	India 1999	Korea	Chile	Brazil
'Democracy is preferable to any other form of government' (per cent of valid responses excluding Don't know/No answer)	80 (85)	78 (83)	70 (88)	60 (83)	58 (54)	52 (54)	41 (48)
'In some circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic government'	8	9	4	6	27	18	21
'For someone like me, a democratic or a non-democratic regime makes no difference'	6	7	6	7	8	25	23
Don't know/No answer	6	6	20	27	7	4	15
N	1,213	10,000	27,148	8,133	1,037	1,200	1,240

Source: The data for India are from the *National Election Study, 1999* and *National Election Study, 2004*, of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi. Data for Uruguay, Brazil and Chile are from the *Latino Barometer 1996*, directed by Marta Lagos. The Spanish data are from the *Eurobarometer 37, 1992*. The Korean data are from the *Korea Democracy Barometer, 2004*, directed by Doh Chull Shin.

One could make a case that, of this near 'matched pair', India started in the more difficult position because some important Tamil leaders, such as Periar, were associated with the Dravidian secessionist movement, which burned the Indian flag at independence and the constitution when it was released.¹⁶ Indeed, there had been a long series of conflicts and riots between Dravidian Tamils and the Brahmin Hindu northern elite in what is now Tamil Nadu. We can thus say that there was a 'politically robust multinational dimension' to politics in Tamil Nadu, despite the fact that many Tamils felt great attachment to the polity-wide independence movement led by the Congress Party.

Sri Lanka started in an easier position in that for one hundred years before independence there had been no politically significant riots between Sinhalese, who were largely Sinhalese-speaking Buddhists, and the Tamils, who were largely Tamil-speaking Hindus. In fact, the first president of the Ceylon Congress Party was a Tamil. Tamils had done well in English-language civil service exams in Ceylon and though interested in greater power-sharing, it is still true to say that at independence there had been no Tamil claims for devolution or federalism, much less independence. Ceylon also had a much higher per capita income than India, and could have made modest side payments to some Sinhalese groups, especially the

¹⁶ See Narendra Subramanian, *Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: Political Parties, Citizens and Democracy in South India*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, where he says, for example, that 'Tamil Nadu was the first Indian state, in which secessionist/autonomous impulses developed', p. 131, and that 'Perier called for the creation of a separate country in which the Dravidia-as-Sudra would enjoy primacy', p. 105. Also see Eugene F. Irschick, *Politics and Social Conflict in South India: The Non-Brahmin Movement and Tamil Separatism, 1916–1929*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1969. For two important reviews of the literature of the Dravidian movements see M. S. S. Pandian, 'Beyond Colonial Crumbs: Cambridge School, Identity Politics and Dravidian Movement(s)', *Economic and Political Weekly* (18–25 February 1995), pp. 385–91; and N. Ram, 'Dravidian Movement in its Pre-Independence Phases', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 18–25 February 1979, pp. 377–97. Also see Alfred Stepan, 'Federalism, Multinational Societies, and Negotiating a Democratic "State Nation": A Theoretical Framework, the Indian Model and a Tamil Case Study', in K. Shankar Bajpai (ed.), *Democracy and Diversity: India and the American Experience*, New Delhi, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 225–61.

Buddhists, which had been marginalized during the period of British colonial rule.¹⁷

The potential issue of Tamil separatism in India had become a non-issue 35 years after independence, and the Sri-Lankan non-issue had become a bloody civil war for secession that has been raging for a quarter of a century. Why such radically different outcomes? Much, but of course not all, of the explanation, I believe, is related to the radically differential application of the nested policy grammar I discussed earlier. Let me conclude with a comparative table highlighting the state-integrating state-nation policies followed by India, and the state-disintegrating nation-state policies followed by Sri Lanka. Table 8 suggests a strong affirmative answer to the title of my article.

¹⁷ Gananath Obeyeskere, a distinguished anthropologist of Sinhalese origins, asserts that 'the antagonism between Tamils and Sinhalese is rooted in the country's history but has been exacerbated into inter-ethnic violence *only since 1956*'. See his 'Origins and Institutionalization of Political Violence', in James Manor (ed.), *Sri Lanka in Change and Crisis*, New York, St Martin's Press, 1984, pp. 153–74, quote from p. 153, emphasis added. S. J. Tambiah, a equally distinguished anthropologist of Tamil origins, writing in 1986, argued that 'Sinhalese–Tamil tensions and conflicts in the form known to us today are of relatively recent manufacture . . . [they] owe more to the ideas and polemics of contemporary "nationalist" ideologues and the politics of nation making and election winning than to earlier concerns and processes'. See his *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy*, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1986, esp. pp. 13–64, quote from p. 7. The classic political development book on Ceylon was written by Howard Wriggins, who commented that 'unique among South Asian countries, Ceylon's decade of independence was without civil war or protracted public disorder'. 'In no other country in the whole of South and Southeast Asia, from the Persian Gulf to the arc of Indonesia had there been such public peace'. See Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960, quotes from p. 328 and p. 282, respectively.

Table 8
*The 'Grammar' of Politically Handling Actual or Potential Politically Robust Multinational Societies Peacefully and Democratically:
 Contrasting Strategies of India and Sri Lanka towards Tamils*

<i>Grammar for recognizing multinational society</i>	<i>Tamils in India</i>	<i>Tamils in Sri Lanka</i>
1. An Asymmetrically Federal, but <i>not</i> a Unitary, or Symmetrically Federal State	At independence, some Tamil leaders in India had a 'robustly politically multinational' dimension. However, the constituent assembly created an asymmetrical federal system, which allowed for linguistic reorganization throughout India in the late 1950s which enabled the new state of Tamil Nadu to be administered in Tamil and gave cultural autonomy to Tamils. The Constitution allowed for four levels of federalism and the regular creation and formation of new member states out of old member states.	At independence, Tamils were not 'robustly politically multinational' but only wanted power-sharing. No constituent assembly was held, and the constitution declared Sri Lanka a unitary state. After 1956, the Sinhalese-Buddhist majority increasingly advanced majoritarian nation-state policies. None of the three Sinhalese-Tamil pacts that promised some devolution (in 1957, 1968 and 1983) were ever honoured, as there was always a total insistence on retaining a unitary state. Sinhalese-Buddhist majority in 2007 still against any form of federalism or even devolution.
2. Individual Rights and Collective Recognition	<i>Language:</i> After intense political negotiations, Tamil, English and Hindi all allowed. <i>Religion:</i> Secular, but state follows an original 'equal respect and equal support' formula to all religions. State gives extensive subventions to all religions for monuments, buildings, pilgrimages, etc. <i>Affirmative action:</i> One of the world's earliest and most extensive uses of affirmative action.	<i>Language:</i> Imposition of Sinhalese as only official language and Tamil and English marginalized. <i>Religion:</i> After initially following the nineteenth-century British liberal approach of no state support to any religion, makes Buddhism official religion of state and extends subventions only to Buddhist religious activities and sites. <i>Affirmative action:</i> Nation-state Sinhalese Buddhist majoritarianism has blocked any type of affirmative action for minorities. However, there is some affirmative action for the majority.
3. Parliamentary <i>instead of</i> Semi-Presidential or Presidential Systems	Parliamentarism created a 'shareable good' in the executive, which allowed regional, even potentially secessionist, parties to help form a ruling coalition at the centre. Since 1999, the ruling coalition at the centre has always contained between 13 and 23 parties, many of them ethno-cultural regional parties.	The initial highly majoritarian parliamentarism was amended in 1978 to become an unsharable semi-presidential executive system in which the president has more powers than in France. No northern-based Tamil party has been in any coalition at the centre in the last 35 years.
4. Poly-Wide and 'Centric-Regional' Parties (and Careers)	Tamils, due to 1-3 above, and the great coalitional capacity of their poly-wide and centric-regional parties have won a disproportionate share of federal ministries in independent India and have been a constituent part of many ruling federal governments in the centre. After the mid-1970s, no significant 'regional separatist' parties existed in Tamil Nadu, and all Tamil parties were 'centric regional'. Due to trilingual language agreements and educational programs, Tamils as individuals participate fully in poly-wide careers in the public and private sectors.	Tamils, due to 1-3 above, especially after 1956, lost virtually all their coalitional ability in poly-wide politics and government formation. No elected Tamil from the north ever became a federal minister after 1957. After the mid-1970s, no major 'centric-regional' Tamil parties existed, and all subsequent major Tamil parties were 'regional separatist'. Language requirements, and Sinhalese nation-state policies, forced Tamils out of most poly-wide public sector careers and even weakened poly-wide educational, and private sector, career options for some Tamils as individuals.

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|---|---|--|--|
| <p>5. Politically Integrated but <i>not</i> Culturally Assimilated</p> | <p>Given the fact that India was very plural with a multinational component in society, there was a recognition by most political leaders that robust Hindu/Hindi nation-building would be a conflicting logic with democracy-building, and eventually Tamils politically integrated into Indian polity.</p> | <p>Despite the fact that Ceylon was very plural with a multinational component in society, robust nation-state policies were implemented that increasingly marginalized the once politically integrated Tamil community. 'Indian Tamils' were disenfranchised in 1948; all members of pro-autonomist Tamil parties had to leave parliament in 1983. By mid-1980s Sri Lanka became 'robust politically multinational' with Tamil LTTE guerrilla leaders politically unintegratable.</p> | <p>With growing marginalization of Tamil culture and language, secessionist nationalists grew as a social force after the mid-1970s. By the mid-1980s, violent guerrilla secessionist nationalists, with explicit separatist goals, were the power leaders of the Tamil community. Tamil leaders with only cultural nationalist goals nearly politically invisible by late 1990s.</p> |
| <p>6. Cultural Nationalists <i>versus</i> Secessionist Nationalists</p> | <p>With electoral political conquest of the federal state of Tamil Nadu by Tamil parties, cultural nationalists achieved many of their goals and increasingly opposed secessionist nationalists. By the late 1990s, secessionist nationalists, as a social and political force explicitly advocating separatist goals, virtually disappeared.</p> | <p>With growing marginalization of Tamil culture and language, secessionist nationalists grew as a social force after the mid-1970s. By the mid-1980s, violent guerrilla secessionist nationalists, with explicit separatist goals, were the power leaders of the Tamil community. Tamil leaders with only cultural nationalist goals nearly politically invisible by late 1990s.</p> | <p>Tamil political, administrative and economic elites (many based in the capital of Colombo) initially had both Ceylonese and Tamil identities. Due to marginalization in electoral politics, and growing state discrimination and repression, polarized and conflicting identities gradually became increasingly dominant among the Tamils. Now, nearing twenty-fifth year of a bloody secessionist civil war.</p> |
| <p>7. <i>Earned</i> Pattern of Complementary, even though Multiple Identities</p> | <p>Strong Tamil identities remained, but polity-wide Indian identity grew increasingly as the state of Tamil Nadu, led continuously by Tamil parties since the mid-1970s, emerged as a major player in Indian politics. Earned multiple and complementary identities strongly supportive of the Indian state became dominant among Tamils.</p> | <p>Tamil political, administrative and economic elites (many based in the capital of Colombo) initially had both Ceylonese and Tamil identities. Due to marginalization in electoral politics, and growing state discrimination and repression, polarized and conflicting identities gradually became increasingly dominant among the Tamils. Now, nearing twenty-fifth year of a bloody secessionist civil war.</p> | <p>Tamil political, administrative and economic elites (many based in the capital of Colombo) initially had both Ceylonese and Tamil identities. Due to marginalization in electoral politics, and growing state discrimination and repression, polarized and conflicting identities gradually became increasingly dominant among the Tamils. Now, nearing twenty-fifth year of a bloody secessionist civil war.</p> |