

# BUREAUCRATIC - AUTHORITARIANISM REVISITED\*

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With the publication in 1973 of *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*,<sup>1</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell initiated a new phase in the debate over the relationship between social change and politics in Latin America. In contrast to most of the political development literature of the 1950s and 1960s, O'Donnell argued that social and economic modernization in the context of delayed development is more likely to lead to authoritarianism than democracy. His analysis focused on the emergence of military regimes in Argentina and Brazil in the middle 1960s—regimes that he labeled “bureaucratic-authoritarian” to distinguish them from oligarchical and populist forms of authoritarian rule found in less modernized countries. O'Donnell's suggestion that an “elective affinity” exists between higher levels of modernization and the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in South America anticipated the military takeovers of the 1970s in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina. The timeliness of his argument, together with its broad theoretical implications, stimulated considerable discussion, which culminated in the recent publication of a volume devoted to the exploration of themes raised by O'Donnell.<sup>2</sup>

In a series of more recent essays, O'Donnell has shifted his theoretical focus and attempted to analyze the workings, impact, and dynamics of bureaucratic-authoritarianism.<sup>3</sup> This recent work raises critical questions about the relative importance of political, social, economic, and other factors in accounting for patterns of change once authoritarian rule has been imposed. Yet to date discussion of O'Donnell's work has continued to center largely around the problem of explaining the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarianism. As a result the analysis of similarities and differences among cases of bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA) rule has been neglected in favor of broader comparisons or submerged within a dis-

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cussion of conceptual issues. The present essay attempts to redress this imbalance by assessing O'Donnell's theoretical contribution to understanding the evolution of bureaucratic-authoritarianism. It focuses specifically on the hypotheses that he has advanced to account for major variations among cases and explores their validity in the light of recent historical experience.

#### MODERNIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIC-AUTHORITARIANISM

O'Donnell's 1973 book dealt only parenthetically with the problem of explaining variations in the impact, performance, and degrees of consolidation of bureaucratic-authoritarianism.<sup>4</sup> After analyzing the weaknesses of the assumptions, methodology, and classifications that had emerged from modernization theory and suggesting a more appropriate conceptualization of the relationship between modernization and politics, O'Donnell focused his analysis on the factors that led to attempts to impose bureaucratic-authoritarianism in Brazil and Argentina during the 1960s. He thus employed concepts and variables that emphasized general similarities between the two cases.

O'Donnell explained the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in Brazil and Argentina primarily in terms of the growing political weight of lower middle- and working-class groups (the "popular sector"), the appearance of economic "bottlenecks," and the increased significance of technocratic roles. He suggested that the "horizontal" industrial growth of the two countries, based on consumer goods import substitution and the expansion of the domestic market, had created the basis for populist coalitions that encouraged the economic and political incorporation of the popular sector. As the "easy" stage of import substitution was exhausted, leading to the appearance of economic problems such as inflation and balance-of-payments crises, as well as a reduced ability to respond to the demands generated by popular sector activation, the populist coalitions collapsed. According to O'Donnell, at that stage the increasingly significant technocratic role incumbents in both private and public sectors, who attributed the growth crisis to the political activation of popular groups, became the "core" of a coup coalition. The resultant military regimes attempted to exclude and deactivate the popular sector and implemented policies designed to maximize the "biased set of indicators" used by technocrats to measure economic performance.

To distinguish the post-1964 and post-1966 Brazilian and Argentine regimes from other types of South American authoritarianism, O'Donnell classified them as "bureaucratic-authoritarian political systems." The term "bureaucratic" was used to emphasize features specific to authoritarian systems at "high" levels of modernization: "the growth of organizational strength of many social sectors, the governmental at-

tempts at control by 'encapsulation,' the career patterns and power bases of most incumbents of technocratic roles, and the pivotal role played by large (public and private) bureaucracies."<sup>5</sup> O'Donnell thus linked high levels of modernization with a new type of South American authoritarianism.<sup>6</sup> His proposed classification explicitly dismissed the military nature of these regimes as "typologically inconsequential." In O'Donnell's view, "What matters most are the policies of each system and the social problems to which it responds, the coalition on which it is based, and whether or not it attempts to exclude and deactivate the popular sector."<sup>7</sup>

It is difficult in a brief summary to do justice to the innovative character of *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*. O'Donnell was hardly the first to criticize modernization theory, but his arguments were particularly persuasive, in part because they were grounded in a detailed analysis of the Argentine case. Nearly half of his book was devoted to a discussion of the democratic political "game" in Argentina and to the changes that led to the 1966 attempt to inaugurate bureaucratic-authoritarianism. O'Donnell thereby offered not only a valuable synthesis of the literature on Argentina, but also an original interpretation of the economic and political crisis of the 1960s that stressed the qualitative difference between the 1966 coup and earlier military interventions. By drawing comparisons between the Brazilian and Argentine cases, O'Donnell generalized beyond the Argentine data to emphasize the larger theoretical implications of bureaucratic-authoritarianism.

Moreover, O'Donnell's study synthesized several intellectual traditions that had tended to remain disparate. He moved easily between the theoretical language of North American political science and the history of Latin American social and political events. His analysis had an historical-materialist character because of its focus on the manner in which social and economic contingencies structure political developments. At the same time O'Donnell's key concept, bureaucratic-authoritarianism, was distinctly Weberian, particularly when presented in conjunction with such "Weberianisms" as the role of "expertise" in shaping the action of "technocratic role incumbents" and the "elective affinity" between modernization and authoritarianism.

In short, O'Donnell recast modernization theory by arguing that "the processes set in motion by high-level modernization tend to generate authoritarianism."<sup>8</sup> His reconceptualization of the modernization process and characterization of its political consequences made an original contribution to our understanding of political change and have continued to serve as an important focal point for scholarly research and debate.

THE EVOLUTION OF A CONCEPT

In a series of recent essays O'Donnell has broadened his major concept. Throughout his original work the referent of bureaucratic-authoritarianism was the "political system," which had the status of a dependent variable.<sup>9</sup> Change in this variable (e.g., from democratic to bureaucratic-authoritarian) was the consequence of the interplay of a set of independent variables such as class interests, popular sector activation, economic processes, and the rise of technocracy. In O'Donnell's later works the referent of bureaucratic-authoritarianism shifts to the "state," a change of considerable theoretical significance.<sup>10</sup>

The state, for O'Donnell, is an aspect of the relations of domination in society embodied in law and public institutions and reflected in ideology.<sup>11</sup> Under democracy the manner in which the state reinforces and maintains class domination is obscured by the claim of the state to represent and defend the nation, to rest upon the consent of the citizenry, and to realize the aspirations of the people. This "objectified" state appears to be "above" class interests, and the legitimacy of its institutions allow it to serve as the organizational focus of consensus within society. O'Donnell argues that the BA state, in contrast, is unable to achieve legitimacy. Its dependence on international capital weakens its claims to represent the nation; it is self-imposed rather than based on the consent of its citizenry; and it transparently serves the interests of the upper bourgeoisie, rather than the people. Such a state must depend openly upon coercion, further reducing its claim to legitimacy. Consequently, while the BA state may appear monolithic, O'Donnell suggests that it is in fact characterized by "fragilities."<sup>12</sup>

While a lack of legitimacy and a related dependence on coercion characterize the BA state, these features alone do not define that state. O'Donnell recently offered the following definition:

BA is a type of authoritarian state whose principal characteristics are: 1. It is . . . guarantor of the domination exercised through a class structure subordinated to the upper fractions of a highly oligopolized and transnationalized bourgeoisie. . . . 2. In institutional terms, it is comprised of organizations in which specialists in coercion have decisive weight, as well as those whose aim it is to achieve "normalization" of the economy. . . . 3. It is a system of political exclusion of a previously activated popular sector. . . . 4. . . . BA is based on the suppression of two fundamental mediations—citizenship and *lo popular*. . . . 5. BA is also a system of economic exclusion of the popular sector. . . . 6. It corresponds to, and promotes, an increasing transnationalization of the productive structure. . . . 7. . . . it endeavors to "depoliticize" social issues by dealing with them in terms of the supposedly neutral and objective criteria of technical rationality. . . . 8. In the first stage . . . it involves closing the channels of access for the representation of popular and class interests.<sup>13</sup>

In this expanded definition the theoretical status of bureaucratic-authoritarianism is considerably altered. The defining characteristics

now include several features that O'Donnell's earlier work suggested were causes of "political system" change (such as class interests), as well as others (such as changes in economic structure) that are subsequent to and hence logically consequences of the emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarianism. Thus, in O'Donnell's recent essays, bureaucratic-authoritarianism no longer constitutes part of an explanatory theory, in the usual sense of the term, but becomes a broad, descriptive label applied to a typified end-state, defined by the conjuncture of at least eight factors—in short, an "ideal type" in the Weberian sense. O'Donnell himself has made this explicit: "The result is an analytical creation, a 'constructed type' that does not seek to describe completely or exactly any of the cases attributed to it, though they approximate to it sufficiently to be included in a category which reveals common general patterns."<sup>14</sup>

Ideal types may be highly suggestive, yet they present two characteristic problems. First, they aggregate several variables, tending to obscure the relationships among those variables and leading to the need for unspecifiable circumlocutions such as "elective affinities" between variables. Second, the relationship between empirical reality and the ideal type becomes problematic: the latter is neither a hypothesis to be tested against the facts nor an empirical generalization based upon them. Dealing with these problems has been a common theme of those who have worked with the issues raised by O'Donnell.<sup>15</sup>

The expansion of an already complex concept creates particular problems for the analysis of similarities and differences among cases of BA rule. By defining bureaucratic-authoritarianism partially in terms of its consequences, O'Donnell logically rules out the possibility of falsifying key generalizations about the social and economic impact of political change. The questionable nature of the relationship between reality and the ideal referent also raises questions about which cases provide a basis for evaluating his account of patterns of change subsequent to the emergence of authoritarian rule. O'Donnell makes allusions chiefly to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay; but he suggests that Spain, Mexico, Greece, South Korea, the Philippines, Poland, Hungary, and Austria have at various times been characterized by states with "important similarities" or "correspondences" to bureaucratic-authoritarianism. Yet there are a variety of differences between these cases and the definition of the BA state. Mexico, for example, which in the past O'Donnell has described as such a state, at the very least lacks the institutional dominance of the military, abolition of democratic mechanisms, and open rejection of citizenry and people as legitimating referents. It is therefore not clear that such cases can properly be designated as BA states, leading to a corresponding uncertainty as to whether they provide information with which to generate or test propositions.<sup>16</sup>

THE IMPORTANCE OF THREAT

The crucial variable identified by O'Donnell as conditioning the development of bureaucratic-authoritarianism is the level of perceived threat to the existing socioeconomic order generated by the precoup crisis. The level of prior threat not only represents a difference in originating circumstances; in O'Donnell's view it shapes subsequent features of the BA state and accounts for differences among cases. "The economic and political crises that precede the BA admit variations from one case to another that have repercussions on the specific characteristics of the BA that results."<sup>17</sup> These repercussions are discussed throughout O'Donnell's more recent essays. The following quotation illustrates the nature of his argument.

What do these differences in threat level imply? The general answer is that the greater the threat level, the greater the polarization and visibility of the class content of the conflicts that precede implantation of the BA. This, in turn, tends to produce a stronger cohesion among the dominant classes, to prompt a more complete subordination of most middle sectors to them, and to provoke a more obvious and drastic defeat of the popular sector and its allies. . . . A higher threat level lends more weight, within the armed forces, to the "hard-line" groups . . . and closely connected, a higher threat level leads to . . . more systematic repression for the attainment of the political deactivation of the popular sector. . . .<sup>18</sup>

Other political consequences of a higher threat level specifically identified by O'Donnell are that the alliance that initially supported the BA state's implantation disintegrates more rapidly;<sup>19</sup> that the likelihood of disillusioned supporters of BA rule participating in a decisive challenge to the state is reduced;<sup>20</sup> that the appearance of an effective political challenge takes longer ("the BA has more time");<sup>21</sup> and that a return to democracy is less likely to be proposed from within the state apparatus.<sup>22</sup>

O'Donnell also argues that threat levels explain variations in economic policies and economic performance. The short-term consequences of a higher threat level that he has specifically identified include: (1) more careful adherence to orthodox economic policies,<sup>23</sup> (2) more immediate inflows of external public assistance to help stabilize the economy,<sup>24</sup> (3) more difficulty in reducing the rate of inflation to acceptable levels, (4) less capacity for the state to invest, (5) less probability of rapidly restoring economic growth, (6) slower restoration of investor confidence,<sup>25</sup> and (7) by implication, less immediate success in attracting long-term private foreign investment.<sup>26</sup>

The hypothesized consequences of high threat outlined above play an important role in O'Donnell's analysis of the evolution of bureaucratic-authoritarianism. He argues that the BA state passes through three stages. The first stage is characterized by orthodox policies designed to attract long term foreign capital, the expansion of state con-

trols to extirpate the threat from the popular sector, and the narrowing of the BA state's base of political support. The resolution of the economic and political crisis associated with the emergence of BA rule, coupled with substantial entries of foreign capital, allow for the transition to the second stage. During this stage the "duo" of the state and international capital is transformed into a "ménage à trois" through the incorporation of the national bourgeoisie into the ruling coalition, and economic policy becomes more nationalist and less orthodox. O'Donnell argues that "the statizing and nationalizing trend takes place against the background of the continuing mutual indispensability between the BA and international capital," which to some extent turns foreign investors into "hostages of the internal political game." The formation of the "ménage à trois" reduces the political isolation of the BA state and contributes to its viability by decreasing the likelihood of the formation of an opposition coalition between the national bourgeoisie and the popular sector. However, "underlying political-institutional irrationalities" remain unsolved and pull the BA state into a third stage characterized by "decompression" and the search for some formula which can provide the legitimating mediations necessary for stable hegemony, yet not threaten the system of domination.<sup>27</sup>

According to O'Donnell's analysis, threat not only shapes the first stage of BA rule, but conditions the movement to the second one. "Two factors appear particularly important in determining the speed with which this nationalist and statist path . . . emerges as an alternative. One of them involves the different levels of threat that precede each BA. The second involves the issue of how quickly and decisively the initial economic policies of the BA state meet with success." Inasmuch as the second factor, economic success, is also a function of the level of threat, threat appears to be *the* decisive variable accounting for the evolution of bureaucratic-authoritarianism and for differences among cases. However, in O'Donnell's formulation, the relationship between threat level and success in development to the second stage is not linear. Low threat levels, as in the 1966–70 Argentine case, lead to rapid economic recovery and the emergence of an effective challenge to bureaucratic-authoritarianism that precludes the transition to the second stage. High threat levels, on the other hand, lead to slow economic recovery and problems in constituting the "duo," let alone the "trio," as in the cases of post-1973 Chile, post-1973 Uruguay, and post-1976 Argentina.<sup>28</sup> Only in the case of an intermediate prior threat level, post-1964 Brazil, has economic recovery occurred without the serious political challenges that prevent transition to the second stage.

As a result of the emphasis placed on threat, which accounts not only for some of the defining characteristics of bureaucratic-authoritarianism, but also for variations over time and between cases, other vari-

ables receive limited attention in O'Donnell's recent essays. O'Donnell makes a single reference to "the specific history of the armed forces" as a relevant factor, mentions the relative autonomy and militancy of the working class in one footnote, and deals with the issue of internal market size in a single passing footnote reference to long-term trends.<sup>29</sup> He also fails to incorporate such variables as the condition of the world economy, decision-making structures, and institutional arrangements within his theoretical framework. Also noteworthy by omission in O'Donnell's recent work is the concept of modernization. The absolute size of the modern sector plays an important role in the propositions set forth in *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* but disappears from his analysis of the dynamics of the BA state. This variable does not even appear in his discussion of economic policies and performance.

The character of O'Donnell's recent work therefore differs significantly from that of his 1973 book, which stressed the dynamic of the "game" constituted by social groups with specific policy interests struggling for advantage under the rules of a given institutional framework. His recent approach is more abstract and tends to bypass postcoup institutional arrangements and political maneuverings in favor of an emphasis on underlying questions of class interest and political legitimacy. The central role assigned to precoup threat levels in explaining developments under bureaucratic-authoritarianism reflects this shift in perspective.

Obviously, a key question raised by this theoretical approach concerns the extent to which precoup threat accounts for postcoup developments. Does prior threat exert a decisive influence upon patterns of change following the emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarianism, or can variations among cases be traced to other factors? This essay explores the issue through a comparative analysis of the five cases that fall most clearly within the BA category: post-1964 Brazil, post-1966 Argentina, post-1973 Chile, post-1973 Uruguay, and post-1976 Argentina. It treats the presumed consequences of threat as hypotheses and evaluates them with reference to the initial period of authoritarian rule.

#### THREAT AND REPRESSION

The major variable used by O'Donnell to explain similarities and differences in BA rule is not easily operationalized. As defined by O'Donnell, "The 'threat' concept refers to the degree to which internal and external dominant classes and sectors considered that the breach of the capitalist parameters and of the society's international alignments was imminent and willingly sought by the leadership of the popular sector."<sup>30</sup> Thus O'Donnell uses the concept "threat" to refer to "perceived threat." However, the latter is an intervening variable that he suggests is influ-

enced by three factors: the *level* of popular activation, the *rate of increase* of such activation, and the *ideology* of activated groups (non-Marxist ideologies such as Peronism posing less perception of threat than Marxist or socialist ideologies). O'Donnell describes Chile in 1973 as a case of high threat, Brazil in 1964 as a case of intermediate threat, and Argentina in 1966 as a case of lower threat.<sup>31</sup> Recently he has added Argentina in 1976 and, by implication, Uruguay in 1973 to the high threat category.<sup>32</sup> He has not, however, ranked the three high threat cases in terms of prior threat levels.

One of the most important hypothesized consequences of threat is repression. O'Donnell uses the latter term to refer to the various forms of coercion employed by authoritarian regimes for "the attainment of the political deactivation of the popular sector and for the subordination of its class organizations, especially the unions."<sup>33</sup> While repression does not distinguish bureaucratic-authoritarianism from other forms of authoritarian rule,<sup>34</sup> the use of coercion against previously activated lower middle- and working-class elements has been a common characteristic of recent authoritarian rule in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil. The conditions surrounding the emergence of BA rule in these countries, particularly the threat posed by popular sector political activation, unquestionably provide a basis for understanding this similarity.

Marked differences in the use of repression, however, have characterized BA rule in the four countries. O'Donnell suggests these contrasts may also be related to originating conditions. He explicitly argues that higher threat levels lead to "more widespread and systematic repression," including "stricter control of the communications media" and more repression applied against trade unions. He also indicates that threat levels affect the pattern of repression. "A high threat induces both the initial application of repression and the willingness to continue to apply it." Repression, in turn, plays a major role in his analysis of political dynamics, inasmuch as it theoretically affects the level of political activation and the likelihood of a serious opposition challenge during the initial stage of authoritarianism.<sup>35</sup>

Even the Brazilian and post-1966 Argentine cases, to which O'Donnell most consistently refers, raise some questions about this line of argument. During the initial period of BA rule, the level of repression was not notably higher in Brazil than in Argentina. The retention of the electoral arena in Brazil, for example, left open possibilities for popular sector influence that had been closed by the Onganía government in Argentina. Differences in the level of repression only became marked after 1968, when mass arrests and the widespread and highly institutionalized use of torture appeared in Brazil for the first time.<sup>36</sup> Yet, according to O'Donnell's analysis, Brazil in 1968 was already making the transition to the second stage of BA rule, whereas bureaucratic-authori-

tarianism in Argentina was collapsing. Since the initial level of postcoup repression fails to explain these differing paths, O'Donnell's account of regime dynamics and the relevance of prior threat levels for understanding the variations between the two cases appear questionable. The escalation of repression in Brazil after the initial period of BA rule can be explained more effectively in terms of postcoup developments, particularly the rising influence of "hard line" officers and the emergence after 1967 of church, student, labor, and guerrilla opposition, than in terms of the threat associated with regime origins.

The more recent high threat cases also cast doubt upon the significance of originating conditions for explaining postcoup patterns of repression. The greatest threat occurred in the Chilean case, marked by the highest percentage of labor force unionization, the sharpest rate of increase in union membership and other forms of political participation in the years preceding the coup, the highest strike rate, and the control of the precoup government by a Marxist dominated coalition.<sup>37</sup> In Chile a break with capitalism was more than a threat; it had already begun. In accordance with O'Donnell's hypothesis, initial repression associated with the coup was also extremely high. It resulted in five to thirty thousand deaths and forty-five to fifty thousand political prisoners.<sup>38</sup> Six months after the coup the cumulative total of political arrests was estimated at eighty thousand.<sup>39</sup> However, subsequently the rate of arrest and execution diminished considerably.

In Argentina before the 1976 coup, the proportion of the work force unionized was somewhat lower than in precoup Chile; the strike rate had increased,<sup>40</sup> but otherwise the level of popular sector political activation had not changed significantly; and, although a strong guerrilla challenge had appeared, neither the precoup government nor the leadership of the popular sector was Marxist. Unlike Chile, the coup itself did not give rise to high levels of violence. However, repression, which began even before the military takeover, accelerated rapidly in the following months. In January 1977, Amnesty International reported that there were five to six thousand political prisoners in Argentina and that an incalculable number of others, variously estimated at three to thirty thousand, had been abducted or had "disappeared" over the previous two and a half years.<sup>41</sup> More recent reports indicate that political detentions, abductions, and deaths attributable to security forces continued after 1977, but estimates of the total number of persons affected vary widely. Three years after the coup human rights organizations in Argentina estimated the total number of "disappearances" at five to fifteen thousand persons.<sup>42</sup> Other estimates suggest that thirty to one hundred thousand Argentines were imprisoned, kidnapped, or killed during the first three years of military rule.<sup>43</sup>

In precoup Uruguay the proportion of the work force unionized

was similar to Argentina;<sup>44</sup> the strike rate had increased significantly;<sup>45</sup> the Tupamaro guerrilla movement had reached major proportions; and the leadership of the trade union movement was Marxist. However, capture of the government by groups seeking to break with the capitalist economic order was not a serious threat, given the poor showing of the Frente Amplio in the 1971 elections. Also, by 1973, when the incremental process of military takeover culminated in an *autogolpe* or clear regime change, the army had eradicated the Tupamaro challenge. Yet, on a per capita basis, the level of political imprisonment in Uruguay exceeded that of the other high threat cases. Amnesty International estimated in 1976 that there were six thousand political prisoners, or one for every five hundred persons in the population. As of 1979 the government was still holding one in every one thousand citizens under detention as a political prisoner, without taking into account either the approximately five hundred thousand Uruguayans who had fled into exile or those who, in 1978 and 1979, continued to be detained and interrogated for short periods of time without formal charges.<sup>46</sup> Cumulative figures for the 1973 to 1977 period alone indicate that seventy thousand persons were detained, or more than one for every thirty adults.<sup>47</sup> As of 1980 Uruguay had also experienced the most sustained use of repression to demobilize the popular sector. Restrictions on strikes and the arrest of trade union leaders, for example, began before the coup and continued through 1980. Indeed, a case could be made that the level of repression in Uruguay between 1973 and 1980 exceeded that of Chile, despite the lower level of threat.<sup>48</sup> On the other hand, far more deaths resulted from the Chilean military coup. In 1979 Amnesty International estimated that the number of "disappearances" and deaths due to torture in Uruguay over the preceding six years equalled less than two hundred.<sup>49</sup>

These three recent cases thus offer some support for the hypothesis originally developed by O'Donnell to explain the contrasts between BA rule in Brazil and Argentina during the 1960s. The level of postcoup repression in all of the high threat cases has vastly exceeded that of post-1964 Brazil and post-1966 Argentina. The evidence is somewhat more ambiguous with respect to differences within the high threat category. The Chilean case can be ranked first both in terms of the level of threat and the initial level of repression, but available information provides no basis for drawing a sharp distinction between the initial level of repression in post-1973 Uruguay and post-1976 Argentina. How the latter two cases should be ranked in terms of threat also remains unclear, particularly since O'Donnell makes no direct reference to guerrilla movements as a form of popular political activation contributing to the perception of threat. In any case, the three high threat cases differ less with respect to the initial level of repression than to the pattern of repression. Whereas

a steady tapering off of high initial levels of violence characterizes the Chilean case, in Uruguay and Argentina low initial violence was followed by the rise of repression. Insufficient time has elapsed to compare the Argentine case, but the patterns of postcoup repression in Chile and Uruguay also differ with respect to the length of time the government maintained highly repressive controls, including those directed specifically at trade union activities and the communications media. Prior threat levels consequently offer only a partial basis for understanding variations among the five cases.

#### POLITICAL DEACTIVATION

A second major hypothesized consequence of prior threat is the political exclusion or deactivation of the popular sector. O'Donnell argues that higher threat levels lead to more success in political deactivation, because of the impact of threat on repression, which is an intervening variable. Political deactivation, in turn, plays a major role in his analysis of the evolution of BA rule. More deactivation during the initial stage of authoritarianism theoretically facilitates the transition to the second stage. Thus, according to O'Donnell's analysis, political deactivation partially accounts for variations in policy performance, political alignments, and degrees of consolidation of bureaucratic-authoritarianism over time.

Assessing the impact of threat upon the subsequent deactivation of popular sector groups presents difficulties, given the clandestine nature of most political organizations and activities under BA rule. In addition, O'Donnell fails to provide unambiguous guidelines for selecting indicators of deactivation. He defines political activation as the capacity to transform political preferences into political demands.<sup>50</sup> He also indicates (1) that the distinguishing characteristic of exclusionary efforts aimed at deactivation is the elimination of the electoral arena, as opposed to the elimination of strikes or demonstrations, and (2) that the retention of the electoral arena, even if surrounded with constraints on parties representing the popular sector, provides an important channel for popular sector influence.<sup>51</sup> Consequently, it could be argued that, contrary to O'Donnell's hypothesis, the *least* deactivation occurred in the medium threat case. The Brazilian military did not eliminate the electoral arena. Until the announcement of Institutional Act No. 2 in October 1965, even the old political parties remained on the political scene. On the other hand, O'Donnell's comparison of the Brazilian and post-1966 Argentine cases suggests that retention of the capacity to press demands through strikes and other forms of protest by organized labor is the key indicator of success in deactivation. But in this case too the

evidence suggests patterns that do not conform entirely to O'Donnell's arguments.

Looking first at the Brazilian and post-1966 Argentine cases, the relationship between prior threat levels and political deactivation does fit O'Donnell's hypothesis insofar as the most relevant indicator of deactivation is labor protest. But, as indicated above, variations in the level of initial repression fail to account for the difference in political deactivation. Consequently, the argument linking higher threat to more deactivation is not convincing. Long-standing contrasts in the political awareness of subordinate groups, the structure of the labor market, and the related strength and autonomy of union organizations in Brazil and Argentina account more readily for the greater success of the Argentine working class in pressing demands than variations in the level of prior threat or initial repression. As O'Donnell argued in *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*, a much higher level of repression would have been required to achieve the deactivation of the working class in Argentina than in Brazil.<sup>53</sup>

The differing outcomes of the effort to consolidate BA rule in Argentina and Brazil may also have led O'Donnell to exaggerate the differences in popular sector activation in the two cases. In 1971, for example, he wrote: "When the socioeconomic implications of the 'bureaucratic-authoritarian' systems became fully apparent, they triggered 'social explosions' in the Argentine modern areas, while they aroused *no significant opposition* in Brazil." He related the difference to the "retention of the relatively high level of political activation by the Argentine popular sector."<sup>54</sup> Despite theoretical shifts, O'Donnell's recent work also attributes importance to the Argentine *cordobazo* of 1969 and omits discussion of the opposition that emerged in Brazil after 1967.<sup>55</sup> Yet, objectively, the opposition in Brazil did pose an important challenge, particularly in view of the activities of the urban guerrillas. The development of important opposition to BA rule also took approximately the same amount of time in the two countries, contrary to O'Donnell's argument that higher threat creates more time for the consolidation of BA rule. To the extent that events prior to the *cordobazo* provide a basis for arguing that opposition appeared more rapidly in Argentina than in Brazil, other factors, particularly the previously mentioned contrasts in subordinate group political awareness and organization and the relatively slow pace with which the break with constitutional democracy took place in Brazil, explain the difference more effectively than variations in the level of prior threat or initial repression.

The higher threat countries also offer mixed support for the hypothesis that more threat leads to more deactivation. The success of deactivation has varied considerably among them. Despite high levels of

repression, the Argentine military encountered severe problems in curbing labor protest between 1976 and 1980. Major strikes, work stoppages, and sabotage repeatedly disrupted both private and public-sector firms.<sup>56</sup> In the province of Buenos Aires alone more than thirteen hundred labor conflicts were reported in September and October 1978.<sup>57</sup> On the other hand, the military enjoyed considerable short-term success in deactivating organized labor in the other two high threat cases. During the first five years of BA rule, Uruguayan and Chilean labor leaders issued statements attacking the government,<sup>58</sup> but limited evidence exists of strikes or other forms of disruptive popular protest. After 1978 the two cases began to diverge considerably, as controls on communications media and labor organizations were relaxed in Chile. The relative success of the military in dismantling guerrilla groups and other forms of armed resistance in the three countries has varied along similar lines. Whereas armed resistance disappeared rapidly in the wake of the Uruguayan and Chilean military takeovers, the Argentine military fought a relatively protracted battle.

While important links can be found both between prior threat and repression and between repression and deactivation, overall the evidence suggests that threat levels provide an insufficient explanation for variations in deactivation. If deactivation is used to refer to the absence of party and electoral activity, then the least deactivation occurred in Brazil during the initial stage of BA rule, and no important differences exist between the high and low threat cases. If, on the other hand, the retention of the capacity to press demands through strikes and other forms of organized protest is more relevant, then military efforts to deactivate popular sectors during the first years of BA rule proved least successful in Argentina, under both the "low threat" conditions associated with the 1966 coup and the "high threat" conditions preceding the 1976 one, and most successful in the Brazilian, Uruguayan, and Chilean cases. The importance of armed resistance has also failed to vary consistently with prior threat levels.

#### ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

O'Donnell's recent writings explicitly single out prior threat as a significant variable for explaining similarities and differences in economic performance during the early phase of BA rule. O'Donnell argues that "the lower the level of prior crisis and threat, the greater the probability of rapidly achieving normalization and restoring economic growth. . . . Inversely, the higher the level of prior crisis and threat, the less the probability of achieving success (even from the point of view of the leaders of the BA and their allies) in the normalization of the economy." Key indicators of the perpetuation of the economic crisis that precedes

BA rule include higher rates of inflation, the absence of economic growth, and drastic reductions in popular consumption.<sup>59</sup>

As indicated by table 1, the rate of economic recovery subsequent to the implantation of bureaucratic-authoritarianism broadly conforms to O'Donnell's generalizations. Far more serious economic crises surrounded the emergence of BA rule in the 1970s than in the 1960s, and the short-term economic performance of the five cases reflects this difference. The contrasts between Brazil and post-1966 Argentina, on the one hand, and the subsequent higher threat cases, on the other, are particularly striking with regard to both rates of economic growth and inflation. Differences within the high threat category also partially fit O'Donnell's arguments. During the four years following the military takeover, Uruguay experienced less inflation and more rapid rates of industrial and GDP growth than post-1976 Argentina or post-1973 Chile.

In addition, shifts in real wage and price levels suggest that post-

TABLE 1 Selected Indicators of BA Economic Performance

	GDP Growth (average annual % change) <sup>a</sup>	Consumer Prices (average annual % change) <sup>a</sup>	Industrial Activity (average annual % change) <sup>a</sup>	Unemployment Rate 3 Years after BA Installation	Real Wages (total % change) <sup>b</sup>
Argentina, 1967–70	5.0	16.7	6.6	4.3	+2.8 <sup>c</sup>
Brazil, 1965–68	5.5	39.9	6.4	4.2 <sup>d</sup>	–7.1 <sup>e</sup>
Uruguay, 1974–77	3.4	66.9	5.1	12.7	–25.0
Argentina, 1977–79	2.6 <sup>f</sup>	170.4 <sup>f</sup>	2.2	1.5	n.a.
Chile, 1974–77	1.4	296.0	0.6	17.0	–18.4 <sup>g</sup>

Source: World Bank, *World Tables*, 1976, pp. 48–49, 60–61; International Labour Office, *Year Book of Labour Statistics*, 1977, pp. 460–61; Instituto Brasileiro de Estatística, Fundação IBGE, *Anuário estatístico do Brasil*, 1968, p. 427; U.S. Department of Commerce, *Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States: Argentina*, May 1980, p. 3; World Bank, *Uruguay Economic Memorandum*, 1979, pp. 3, 197; ECLA, *Economic Survey of Latin America*, 1969, pp. 109, 126; *ibid.*, 1971, p. 79; Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía, *Comentarios sobre la situación económica, segundo semestre 1979*, p. 14; IMF, *International Financial Statistics Yearbook*, 1979, p. 55; Inter-American Development Bank, *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America*, 1976, p. 8; *ibid.*, 1978, p. 10; John R. Wells, "Brazil and the Post-1973 Crisis in the International Economy," in *Inflation and Stabilisation in Latin America*, ed. Rosemary Thorp and Laurence Whitehead (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), p. 229; United Nations, *Yearbook of International Account Statistics*, 1978, II, pp. 217–43.

<sup>a</sup>Post-1976 Argentine data refer to three-year averages. Data for other cases refer to four-year averages following the year of BA installation.

<sup>b</sup>The percentage reflects a comparison between real wages in the year of BA installation with real wage levels four years later.

<sup>c</sup>Basic industrial wages.

<sup>d</sup>First quarter 1968 survey of São Paulo and selected regions.

<sup>e</sup>Manufacturing wages in the State of Guanabara.

<sup>f</sup>Provisional data.

<sup>g</sup>Change between 1972 and 1977.

1966 Argentina experienced less economic dislocation than post-1964 Brazil; however, the two cases fail to differ very significantly in terms of the speed with which economic growth was restored. Two years after the 1964 coup, Brazil achieved a 5.1 percent rate of GDP growth, which compares very favorably with the 4.6 percent increase in the Argentine GDP two years after the 1966 coup.<sup>60</sup> The average annual GDP and industrial growth rates for the four years following the 1964 and 1966 coups also appear very similar. In view of the link drawn by O'Donnell between short-term economic performance and BA survival, this similarity is noteworthy, because post-1964 Brazil and post-1966 Argentina provide the clearest examples, respectively, of successful and unsuccessful attempts to impose bureaucratic-authoritarianism.

The similarity between the Argentine and Brazilian rates of economic recovery in the 1960s also raises some important questions about the possible influence of variations in the *timing* of the emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarianism on economic performance. The average rate of economic growth in Latin America as a whole has fallen since the military seized control in the high threat cases. The combined GDP of the region only increased at the average annual rate of 4.2 percent in the 1975–78 period, as compared to 8.5 percent between 1968 and 1974.<sup>61</sup> Average annual rates of change in inflation and industrial production show a similar deterioration after 1974. These trends reflect changes in the world economy, particularly the low and declining rates of economic growth in the industrial economies with which the region carries on most of its trade, the rise of protectionist barriers, and the related slowdown in the expansion of world trade. The terms of trade for Latin America as a whole also deteriorated sharply after 1975 and averaged 17 percent less in 1978 than in 1973.<sup>62</sup> The policy options and rates of economic recovery of the three recent high threat cases have unquestionably been constrained by these changes; indeed, the terms of trade for the three countries showed particularly unfavorable trends in the 1970s. Between 1973 and 1975 the terms of trade for Uruguay and Chile dropped, respectively, 65 and 29 percent, largely because of rising import prices.<sup>63</sup> The decline for Argentina in these years, which equalled 35 percent,<sup>64</sup> continued after the 1976 coup. According to ECLA, the countries' terms of trade reached their lowest level in fifty years in 1977.<sup>65</sup>

At the very least, the correspondence between trends in the world economy and rates of BA economic recovery suggests that prior threat levels provide only a partial explanation for variations in economic performance. All three high threat cases confronted unfavorable conjunctions of external conditions, whereas the only clearly identified cases of low and medium threat emerged under comparatively favorable world economic conditions. Moreover, despite differences in threat level, the rates of economic growth of the two BA cases which emerged

in the 1960s hardly differ. To the extent that it can be argued that the economy recovered more rapidly in post-1966 Argentina than in Brazil, the difference might also be related to the timing of BA emergence relative to shifting external economic trends.

The timing of BA emergence also offers a basis for understanding the extent to which efforts to attract foreign investment met with success in the initial period of authoritarian rule. An "increasing transnationalization of the productive structure," which O'Donnell lists as a defining characteristic of the BA state,<sup>66</sup> more adequately describes developments in non-BA countries, such as Colombia, during the 1960s than trends in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile during the 1970s. In direct contrast to Brazil and post-1966 Argentina, none of the three recent military regimes succeeded in attracting large inflows of foreign capital in forms other than loans and credits during their first years in power. Net private direct foreign investment in Chile *decreased* by U.S. \$500.2 million in the four years following the military coup (1974–77). During the same period in Uruguay, net direct foreign investment showed no change. A comparable figure for Argentina is not available, but during 1977 net private direct foreign investment only equalled U.S. \$51.4 million.<sup>67</sup> High levels of prior threat and crisis can be related both directly and indirectly to these trends; but foreign investment levels reflect external as well as internal conditions. For example, changes in foreign sensitivity to the human rights issue as well as conditions in Chile account for the failure of the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation to extend guarantees to foreign investors in Chile after the 1973 coup. Overall, the international context in which the Brazilian and post-1966 Argentine regimes emerged created far more favorable conditions for foreign investment than those confronted by recent regimes. The fact that the "Brazilian miracle" has already occurred constitutes in itself an important source of variation between conditions in the 1960s and 1970s. By the 1970s multinationals had already located major export-oriented investments in Brazil.

Long-standing differences between the economies of the four countries also suggest that correlations between the level of prior crisis and threat, on the one hand, and short-term rates of economic recovery, on the other, need to be evaluated carefully. The contrasting growth rates of post-1964 Brazil and post-1973 Uruguay, for example, cannot be explained solely in terms of prior threat. A variety of factors, including limited market size and low rates of rural investment, have contributed to a lack of economic growth in Uruguay since the 1950s. Indeed, by Uruguayan standards the 3.4 percent GDP growth rate achieved between 1974 and 1977 might qualify as an "economic miracle."<sup>68</sup> Between 1950 and 1960 the country experienced a zero growth rate. From 1960 to 1973 the average rate of GDP growth only equalled 1.2 percent. In con-

trast, the average rate of GDP growth in Brazil during the 1950s exceeded 6 percent.<sup>69</sup> Not only do such marked historical differences in economic performance raise questions about the extent to which the economic and political conditions surrounding military seizures of power can explain postcoup economic performance, they also suggest that the success or failure of BA economic policies cannot be evaluated adequately strictly on the basis of cross-national comparisons of postcoup performance. O'Donnell has emphasized the importance of short-term economic performance to explain variations in the internal political cohesion of BA regimes. *Perceptions* of the relative success or failure of economic policies are consequently critical. A country's previous standard of economic performance undoubtedly conditions these perceptions. The use of such standards of comparison might explain the varying survival rates of BA rule in Brazil and Argentina during the 1960s more persuasively than simple cross-national standards; yet it should be emphasized that no relationship exists between prior levels of threat and postcoup economic success as measured by previous standards of economic performance.

Changes in popular consumption standards, as reflected in real wage and unemployment data, raise a final set of questions about the relationship between threat and rates of postcoup economic recovery. Given the enormous controversy that has surrounded the analysis of postcoup income distribution, real wages, and employment in all five cases, such data must be used with considerable caution. Nevertheless, "the drastic reduction in popular consumption prescribed by economic orthodoxy"<sup>70</sup> appears far more evident in the Chilean and Uruguayan cases than in post-1976 Argentina. Between 1977 and 1979 Argentine unemployment remained extremely low, although possibly not as low as the official figure presented in table 1 suggests. Moreover, while real wages fell sharply in 1976, both before and after the coup, the 1978 report of the Inter-American Development Bank observed that "available statistics on average real wages of industrial workers indicate that they have held steady since the second quarter of 1976, with fluctuations around 10 percent."<sup>71</sup> The May 1980 U.S. Department of Commerce report on Argentina also suggested that real wages had improved during 1979 for manufacturing workers in the private sector.<sup>72</sup> The paucity of data on real wages, as opposed to basic minimum wage rates in post-1976 Argentina, makes it difficult to confirm this trend, particularly in view of the "fluctuations" referred to by the IADB. For example, official data show that real wages for industrial workers improved 11.6 percent between June 1976 and June 1979, but real wages also fell below the June 1976 level in eight of the thirteen subsequent quarters.<sup>73</sup> Problems in assessing real wage rates in post-1976 Argentina are further exacerbated by questions about possible distortions in official price indices during

the period of price control. Nevertheless, available information does suggest that employment levels remained higher in post-1976 Argentina than in any of the other four cases and that real wage levels have fallen less drastically than in the other high threat cases.

Real wage trends in Uruguay and Chile are also not fully consistent with O'Donnell's generalizations. Popular consumption standards suffered more dramatic reverses in these countries than in either post-1966 Argentina or post-1964 Brazil during the initial period of BA rule; but existing evidence suggests that real wages deteriorated more steadily between 1973 and 1977 in Uruguay than in Chile, despite a lower level of prior threat and despite, as discussed below, the application of less orthodox economic policies. In this connection it should be emphasized that, because of the continuing controversy over real wage levels in Chile, the figure for the percentage change in Chilean wage rates presented in table 1 refers to the 1972 to 1977 period as a whole. Real wages in Chile achieved exceptionally high levels in the base year (1972) and began to drop sharply even before the coup. The Chilean figure therefore reflects both pre- and postcoup declines in real wages as well as subsequent improvements. As of 1977 no trend towards rising real wages was evident in Uruguay.

These discrepancies between O'Donnell's generalization and indicators of popular consumption standards also point to the importance of variables other than prior levels of threat and crisis. A comparison of the interaction of economic conditions, government policy, and labor union activity in the four countries exceeds the scope of this paper, but differences in the organizational structure of the labor movement, its prior degree of experience in defending itself against military repression, the nature of the labor market, and government policy all appear relevant for understanding the postcoup variations noted above.

In summary, marked differences have characterized the economic performance of countries under similar forms of political domination. Prior threat provides some basis for understanding these differences. High levels of threat both reflected and contributed to the severe economic crises associated with military takeovers in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina during the 1970s, and, not surprisingly, the short-term economic performance of the economy in all three of these cases compares unfavorably with that of Brazil and Argentina in the 1960s. To use a metaphor much favored by the military in the Southern Cone, the rate of recovery has tended to vary with the severity of the "illness." However, varying threat levels were linked with very similar rates of postcoup economic growth in the cases of post-1966 Argentina and post-1964 Brazil, raising questions about (1) the relevance of economic performance for explaining postcoup political dynamics, and (2) the impact of other variables, particularly international conditions, on postcoup eco-

conomic performance. Variations among the three high threat cases also point to the possible relevance of other factors.

#### ECONOMIC ORTHODOXY

Partially because of the hypothesized impact of threat on economic performance, O'Donnell also attempts to explain variations in economic policy in terms of the conditions surrounding the emergence of BA rule. He argues that "success in restoring growth will increase the temptation . . . to abandon orthodox economic measures" and that "the higher the level of prior crisis and threat, the less the probability of achieving success . . . in the normalization of the economy, but, for this very reason, the greater is the certainty on the part of the upper bourgeoisie that orthodox economic policies will be maintained."<sup>74</sup>

Assessing the relationship between prior levels of threat and the orthodoxy of government policies presents difficulty, not least because there is room for considerable disagreement over the choice of appropriate indicators of orthodoxy. O'Donnell specifically mentions the discontinuation of state interventionism, drastic reductions in the fiscal deficit, the return of potentially profitable activities to the private sector, and the elimination of subsidies to consumers and inefficient producers;<sup>75</sup> but orthodox policy prescriptions vary with the economic problems they are intended to address. Moreover, orthodox policies usually are combined with unorthodox ones, and there is no single touchstone by which varying mixtures can be ranked as more or less orthodox. The five cases also differ significantly in terms of their prior deviations from orthodoxy, raising again the issue of appropriate standards of comparison. For example, prior to the coup, Chile had an exceptionally large state sector. Despite the enthusiastic efforts of postcoup policymakers, the state sector of the economy remained large after 1973. Judged by such indicators as the ratio between government spending and GDP, postcoup Chile might be classified as the *least* orthodox in its economic policy. Yet, just as postcoup Uruguay's economic performance appears exceptionally successful relative to previous growth standards, Chile might be rated as the *most* careful observer of orthodox policy prescriptions on the basis of indicators of rates of change in selected aspects of state economic activity.

Variations in the *timing* of the emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in the four countries introduce additional problems. As noted above, all three high threat cases initially confronted adverse external economic conditions that seriously limited their policy options and introduced comparatively strong pressures in favor of orthodoxy. Comparisons between the degree of orthodoxy displayed by the BAs of the 1960s and 1970s thus provide a dubious basis for generalizations about

the relationship between threat and orthodoxy. In addition, economic orthodoxy and the international capitalist audience to which BA authorities tailor their policies have changed over time. Discussing orthodoxy in the initial stage of BA rule, O'Donnell identifies the "zealous judges of what is 'reasonable' in economic matters" as the "public organizations of world capitalism, the World Bank, and above all, the International Monetary Fund."<sup>76</sup> But, during the 1970s, the IMF and other official lending agencies lost the position of dominance they occupied during the 1960s. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the loss of credibility in the U.S. dollar, the emergence of the private international Eurocurrency market, and the related expansion of lending to the LDCs have all contributed to this trend and created important differences between the stabilization policies of the 1960s and 1970s. The rise in international liquidity also coincided with, and to some extent encouraged, a loss of confidence in the import substitution policies of the past.<sup>77</sup> Such changes further complicate comparisons between the high and lower threat cases.

With these considerations in mind, it should be noted that the comparisons presented in table 2 fail to offer much support for O'Donnell's hypothesis. The table suggests that a very wide range of variation

TABLE 2 Indicators of BA Policy Orthodoxy<sup>a</sup>

	Central Government Deficit as % GDP (annual average)	Central Government Expenditures as % GDP (annual average)	M <sub>1</sub> Average Annual Growth (%) <sup>b</sup>	Ratio of M <sub>2</sub> to GDP (year of coup) <sup>c</sup>	Ratio of M <sub>2</sub> to GDP (4 years after coup) <sup>c</sup>
Post-1966 Argentina	1.1 <sup>d</sup>	8.4	24.6	23.8	26.1
Brazil	1.4	9.8	49.8	19.5	19.6
Uruguay	3.1	16.2	63.1	21.3	31.1
Post-1976 Argentina	3.7 <sup>e</sup>	10.2 <sup>f</sup>	148.2 <sup>e</sup>	n.a.	n.a.
Chile	1.6	22.1	231.7	39.7	14.3

Source: Inter-American Development Bank, *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America*, 1972, p. 405; *ibid.*, 1978, p. 433; Albert Fishlow, "Some Reflections on Post-1964 Brazilian Economic Policy," in *Authoritarian Brazil*, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 72; *Quarterly Economic Review of Argentina*, 2nd Quarter, 1980, p. 9; IMF, *International Financial Statistics Yearbook*, 1979, pp. 88, 89, 116-19, 137, 433-35; *idem*, *International Financial Statistics*, October 1980, p. 44.

<sup>a</sup>Figures represent four averages following year of BA installation unless otherwise indicated.

<sup>b</sup>M<sub>1</sub> refers to currency, coin, and demand deposits.

<sup>c</sup>M<sub>2</sub> refers to M<sub>1</sub> plus quasi-money.

<sup>d</sup>Average of 1968, 1969, and 1970.

<sup>e</sup>Preliminary estimate for three years after coup.

<sup>f</sup>Preliminary estimate for 1977 and 1978 only.

characterizes BA policy and that varying degrees of orthodoxy are not readily explained by differences in prior threat and crisis. As judged by the size of the fiscal deficit, which is probably the least ambiguous indicator of economic orthodoxy, the low and medium threat cases (post-1966 Argentina and Brazil) stand out as very careful observers of orthodoxy. Two of the three high threat cases, on the other hand, pursued unorthodox fiscal policies and accumulated fiscal deficits that averaged over 3 percent of GDP. Prior deviations from orthodoxy cannot account for these findings. The Uruguayan central government deficit, for example, which equalled only 2.6 percent of GDP in 1972 and 1.4 percent in 1973, *increased* under military rule to over 4 percent of GDP in both 1974 and 1975.<sup>78</sup> The Brazilian military government, on the other hand, *reduced* the government deficit, which equalled 4.2 percent of GDP in 1963 and 3.2 percent in 1964, to 1.6 percent in 1965.<sup>79</sup>

Variations in the level of central government spending relative to GDP are also inconsistent with O'Donnell's theoretical propositions. As noted above, by cross-national standards central government spending in Chile accounted for an exceptionally high proportion of GDP after 1973. Although the proportion declined in comparison to the Allende period, it remained higher than in 1970. Government spending also reached high levels in postcoup Uruguay and accounted for a higher proportion of the GDP than in 1970.<sup>80</sup> In short, there is no evidence that fiscal orthodoxy varies directly with prior threat and crisis levels. If anything, the data suggest the opposite relationship.

Other variations in economic policy also fail to offer much support for O'Donnell's propositions, although the lowest and highest threat cases might be classified, respectively, as the least and most orthodox. The March 1967 Argentine stabilization program, for example, called for reductions in the fiscal deficit, lower protective tariffs, and the removal of constraints on capital movements. But these policies were combined with other less orthodox measures such as wage controls, "voluntary" price guidelines, subsidies to nontraditional exports, and a policy of "compensated devaluation." The latter policy coupled currency devaluation, which produced an undervalued peso, with a tax on traditional agricultural exports. Far from returning potentially profitable enterprises to the private sector, in 1969 the Argentine government nationalized foreign-owned overseas telecommunications companies.<sup>81</sup> In most critical respects, Chilean policy falls at the other end of the continuum. During the first years of military rule the government drastically reduced international trade taxes, eliminated most price controls and subsidies, sharply restricted the growth of the money supply relative to GDP, and dismantled the state sector of the economy. By February 1977 denationalizations had reduced the number of firms held by the state development agency from 494 to 45.<sup>82</sup> The short-term economic policies

of the other cases fall between these two extremes. Yet policy orthodoxy has not varied consistently with levels of prior threat or rates of economic recovery. Three years after the Brazilian military coup, for example, both nominal and effective rates of protection for manufactured goods were cut more than 50 percent. Uruguayan policymakers, in contrast, only reached agreement on the gradual liberalization of tariff barriers in December 1978. As of 1979, the maximum tariff rate in Uruguay still exceeded 100 percent, as compared to a maximum rate of 85 percent in Argentina and a uniform rate of 10 percent in Chile.<sup>83</sup>

A comparatively low level of economic orthodoxy also characterized other Uruguayan policies during the first years of military rule. Beginning in 1973, a series of orthodox policy pronouncements called for the restoration of economic growth and price stability through greater use of the price mechanism, reduced state participation in the economy, increased private investment, and the opening up of the economy to foreign competition. But while Uruguayan policymakers, particularly Vagh Villegas, who headed the government's economic team between 1974 and 1976, endorsed a set of policies very similar to those adopted by the "Chicago boys" in Chile, Uruguayan policy actually followed a very different trajectory during the first few years of BA rule. Indeed, in many respects Uruguay pursued even less orthodox policies than post-1966 Argentina. While verbally assigning monetary restriction a primary role in the fight against inflation, Uruguayan policymakers retained *both* wage and price controls. Many of these controls were eliminated or relaxed over time, but in 1978 approximately half of the goods and services making up the consumer price index still remained subject to government regulation.<sup>84</sup> Large fiscal deficits, which precluded sharp restrictions on the growth of the money supply, point to related departures from orthodoxy. In addition, the Uruguayans pursued economic restructuring on the basis of grants of special industrial credits and tax exemptions; subsidized nontraditional exports through tax rebates (*reintegros*), which averaged 18 percent of the f.o.b. value of exports and included rates as high as 39 percent; retained high tariffs; imposed import deposits; increased the real level of public investment, which accounted for 42.2 percent of new investment in 1977 as compared to only 25.9 in 1972; and, with the exception of a municipal bus company, failed to convert state enterprises to private ownership.<sup>85</sup> Far from correcting distortions in relative prices, these policies intensified an already pronounced trend towards discrimination against the livestock subsector where Uruguay's greatest comparative advantage theoretically lies. According to the 1979 World Bank study of the Uruguayan economy, the domestic terms of trade dropped 36 percent against agriculture between 1973 and 1977.<sup>86</sup> Hence, although government policy shifted away from emphasis on redistribution and import substitution

industrialization and incorporated certain orthodox elements, such as the freeing of the foreign exchange market, the overall management of the economy in the 1973 to 1977 period cannot be characterized accurately as orthodox. Nor can significant changes in the economic structure of the country, notably the growth of manufacturing exports, be attributed to orthodox policies.

In late 1978 signs of a shift towards more orthodox policies appeared in Uruguay. In addition to the tariff liberalization program, mentioned above, the government announced the removal of restrictions on the pricing and marketing of beef.<sup>87</sup> It remains to be seen if these changes herald a fundamental reorientation of Uruguayan policy and a possible basis for linking threat with variations in government policy over the long run. Many announced shifts towards economic liberalism in Uruguay, such as the 1975 plan for automobile import liberalization or the cuts in export rebates scheduled for 1979, have been postponed or scuttled.<sup>88</sup> In addition, of course, the relative recency of bureaucratic-authoritarianism precludes long-run policy comparisons. Existing evidence, however, suggests the absence of any clear relationship between threat and orthodoxy in the first phase of BA rule as well as the absence of any single pattern of policy development over time.

But perhaps more important, fundamental differences exist between the development strategies adopted by BA regimes—differences that cannot be discussed simply in terms of the issue of orthodoxy. The Onganía regime in post-1966 Argentina pursued economic growth through the expansion of industrial exports and the growth of producer goods industries. Between 1964 and 1974 Brazilian policy encouraged the manufacture of consumer durable goods and export diversification. The Uruguayan regime, at least until 1980, emphasized the expansion of manufacturing exports, while Chilean development policy de-emphasized manufacturing in favor of the expansion of primary production and nontraditional exports such as fruit and forestry products. The contours of post-1976 Argentine development strategy remained somewhat unclear four years after the coup. The continuing emphasis placed on the problem of stabilization created serious difficulties for producers in all major sectors; however, sharp reductions in tariff levels combined with the maintenance of an overvalued peso, which reduced export competitiveness and encouraged imports, placed domestic industry in a particularly disadvantageous position. As of mid-1980 a variety of other signs, including shifts in the tax system, also pointed to a shift away from import substitution industrialization towards the promotion of primary sector exports.<sup>89</sup>

While such brief characterizations of development strategy necessarily simplify reality and exaggerate the coherence of government policy, they do make the point that important differences exist between

the development policies adopted under BA rule. O'Donnell has implicitly recognized this point by dropping "deepening" of the industrial structure from his list of BA defining characteristics; but he has also noted that the evident failure of policymakers in the recent high threat cases to pursue "the type of import substitution implied by deepening" reflects "the result of a crisis which leaves little latitude for divergence from economic orthodoxy. But this pattern will not necessarily be followed in the long run, at least in the cases where economic growth is not excessively limited by a small internal market."<sup>90</sup> Leaving to one side the theoretical controversy surrounding "deepening," which has been aired elsewhere,<sup>91</sup> the difficulty is that neither market size nor threat persuasively explains variations in BA policy. In addition, while it can be argued that BA rule limits the range of policy variation and leads to some policy similarities, such as efforts to attract foreign investment, the evidence linking BA rule to a distinctive set of policies remains rather weak. Not only have the policies adopted under bureaucratic-authoritarianism differed considerably, but important similarities exist between BA and non-BA policies. As Albert O. Hirschman has pointed out: "Policies which look in Brazil as though they are due to the regime change which took place in 1964 were subsequently adopted elsewhere under diverse political auspices."<sup>92</sup>

The limitations of O'Donnell's explanation of similarities and differences in BA economic policies point to the importance of other factors, including, in particular, the institutional structure of the state. The relative autonomy of technocrats in shaping economic policy, the channels of access and differential opportunities for interest groups to exert influence, the structure of military power, the relationship between the military and civilian economic groups, and the institutional role of the armed forces in the decision-making process have varied from case to case and affected economic policy. Given the collegial decision-making structure established by the military in Uruguay, for example, it is hardly surprising that government policy after 1973 was characterized by caution, vacillation, and a tendency to shelve the unpalatable orthodox economic policy recipes recommended by civilian advisors.<sup>93</sup> Efforts to balance the budget, convert public sector enterprises to private ownership, and reduce the protection of import substitution industries all encountered substantial military opposition. As reflected in the emphasis placed on manufactured rather than agricultural exports in Uruguay, industrialists, who enjoyed greater access to decision makers than rural elites and who were able to capitalize upon nationalist sentiments within the military, proved particularly adept at cultivating military "protectors."<sup>94</sup> Some similar, but far more muted, tendencies were evident in post-1976 Argentina, where interest in preserving the military's own industrial complex, Fabricaciones Militares, and personal links between

the military and industrialists delayed efforts to reduce tariff barriers and open up the mining sector of the economy to foreign investment. A comparatively centralized and personalistic structure of power in Chile, on the other hand, limited the involvement of the military institution in the formation of economic policy, enhanced the autonomy of civilian technocrats, and facilitated the implementation of "hard" orthodox decisions. Weak links between the military and industrial leaders also contributed to a policy much less favorable to domestic industry, although as of 1980 Chilean industrialists were reportedly emulating their Argentine counterparts by providing retired military officers with seats on their boards of directors.<sup>95</sup>

In summary, prior threat levels do not explain adequately variations in economic policies during the early phase of BA rule. While the orthodoxy of policy pronouncements has increased since the 1960s, economic policy has not varied consistently with either the pace of post-coup economic recovery or prior levels of threat and crisis. The policies pursued in the high threat cases differ as markedly as the policies pursued by BA regimes confronting varying levels of prior threat and crisis. In particular, a brief review of BA policies fails to support the hypothesized relationships between economic orthodoxy, on the one hand, and prior levels of threat or economic performance, on the other. High threat has been associated with comparatively orthodox policies (Chile) and rather heterodox policies (Uruguay); strong short-term records of economic growth have been associated with both relatively orthodox (Brazil) and unorthodox (post-1966 Argentina) policies; and, contrary to the argument that economic recovery under conditions of high threat necessitates careful adherence to orthodoxy, the initial postcoup performance of the Uruguayan economy outdistanced that of Chile. Inasmuch as economic performance conditions, as well as reflects, economic policy, some links can be drawn between levels of prior threat and postcoup policy; however, factors such as the decision-making structures and political coalitions that have emerged under BA rule account more readily for policy variations than the levels of threat surrounding BA emergence.

#### POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS, DOMINANT CLASS COHESION, AND MILITARY UNITY

Finally, according to O'Donnell's analysis of postcoup dynamics, prior threat levels influence dominant class cohesion, the alignment of political forces, and the internal unity of the military during the initial period of BA rule. Threat theoretically thereby plays a critical role in determining the prospects of BA collapse or survival.

Specifically, O'Donnell has attempted to explain the divergent

paths of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in Brazil and Argentina during the 1960s in terms of the comparatively lower level of threat in Argentina that increased both the incentives and opportunities for a rapid realignment of political forces around nonorthodox, nationalist, and statist policy alternatives.

On one hand, the state's controls over the popular sector exploded. On the other, the opposition of the domestic bourgeoisie and many middle sectors, which already had converged with the popular sector, could not be systematically repressed. On the contrary, such convergence seemed to offer an acceptable alternative for more than a few military officers and technocrats, thus deeply splitting the BA's institutional layers.<sup>96</sup>

O'Donnell argues that this realignment of forces "inevitably shook the recently renewed confidence of the upper bourgeoisie" and thus further contributed to the erosion of "the internal cohesion of BA and, along with the great social explosions of 1969–1970, hastened its demise."<sup>97</sup> O'Donnell suggests that in Brazil, in contrast, a higher level of threat contributed to the maintenance of an alignment of political forces that was favorable to the continuation of ties between the upper bourgeoisie, the principal base of social support for BA rule, and the armed forces, the central actors in the BA institutional system.

O'Donnell thus employs three interrelated lines of argument to link threat with variations in BA cohesion and political alignments during the first phase of BA rule. First, because of their hypothesized impact on repression and political deactivation, threat levels influence the opportunities for the emergence of an effective opposition challenge. Second, prior threat affects the willingness of disillusioned supporters of bureaucratic-authoritarianism to forge an alliance with popular sector groups that can challenge BA rule. As O'Donnell has argued in general terms: "Depending on the lesser or greater degree of previous threat, those who withdraw their support because of the policies of economic normalization may or may not, respectively, combine with the excluded sectors and participate, as in Argentina in 1969, in a decisive challenge to the BA state."<sup>98</sup> The third line of argument incorporates economic performance and policy orthodoxy as intervening variables. Briefly stated, O'Donnell argues that more threat gives rise to mutually reinforcing trends towards more orthodoxy and less economic success, which in turn enhance internal BA cohesion. However, O'Donnell also argues that economic orthodoxy disillusioned many of the BA state's initial supporters and creates tensions between the transnationally oriented upper bourgeoisie and the more nationally oriented armed forces. Hence his writings provide at least some basis for arguing that high threat levels *both* increase and decrease the incentives for a realignment of political forces that threatens the internal cohesion of the BA state. Add to these theoretical complexities the obvious problems involved in

operationalizing a concept such as “dominant class cohesion,” and it becomes very unclear what type of evidence, if any, provides an appropriate basis for evaluating O’Donnell’s generalizations.

The persistence of BA rule in countries such as Chile and Uruguay, despite long-standing traditions of constitutional government, provides one possible indication of the validity of O’Donnell’s theoretical arguments. Yet, as the unheralded collapse of authoritarianism in Portugal suggests, the weaknesses of nondemocratic regimes often become evident only at the time of the postmortem. Dominant class cohesion, the absence of alliances between the popular sector and disaffected BA supporters, and military unity provide unsatisfactory and even teleological explanations of regime persistence if the latter is the major indicator of the former conditions. In addition, the previous review of hypotheses linking threat with variations in repression, deactivation, economic performance, and policy orthodoxy casts doubt upon the theoretical arguments that O’Donnell employs to link threat with variations in political alignments and BA cohesion. Some support exists for the first line of argument outlined above, which links threat to variations in repression and political deactivation, although it does not account adequately for the differences in political alignments and BA cohesion that emerged in Brazil and Argentina during the 1960s. The weakness of the evidence linking threat with policy orthodoxy also casts doubt upon O’Donnell’s analysis of postcoup political developments. The Uruguayan case, in particular, suggests that to the extent that threat explains variations in political alignments and BA cohesion, the impact of threat on repression and class alliances is more important than the hypothesized relationship between threat and policy orthodoxy or economic performance. Given the comparatively nonorthodox orientation of Uruguayan policy between 1973 and 1980, the argument that high threat creates more time “for the application of orthodox policies and for continuing, in an overt and almost exclusive form, the alliance with the upper bourgeoisie” appears unconvincing.<sup>99</sup>

Similarities and differences in political alignments during the initial stages of BA rule also raise questions about the adequacy of O’Donnell’s analysis. As reflected in economic policies, the supporters and beneficiaries of BA rule have varied, even under similar conditions of prior threat. Whereas in Chile and post-1976 Argentina, industrialists suffered drastic setbacks during the first few years of BA rule and voiced opposition to government policies through their respective interest groups, SOFOFA and the Unión Industrial Argentina, in Uruguay even small industrialists producing for the local market benefitted from BA rule, largely because the combination of lower labor costs and high tariffs allowed them to raise their profit margins.<sup>100</sup> Comparatively cheap credit, subsidies, and tax deductions placed export-oriented in-

dustries in Uruguay in an even more enviable position. Howard Handelman's interviews in 1976 with Uruguayan elites confirm these trends. While rural elites voiced criticism of government policy and did not view military rule as beneficial to their sector, industrial leaders were highly supportive.<sup>101</sup>

Political tensions between the military and disaffected rural elites in Uruguay, who at least traditionally have been described as part of the "dominant class," also assumed extreme proportions after 1973, despite high prior threat. In 1975 the military arrested the president of the Federación Rural for his criticism of government policy. The following year landowners participated in an unofficial strike.<sup>102</sup> It is far from clear how such manifestations of discontent can be reconciled with the view that high threat enhances dominant class cohesion, particularly since the political discontent of landowners in Uruguay cannot be attributed to economic orthodoxy, but rather to departures from orthodoxy. While the Uruguayan case may lend support to the argument that dominant class cohesion depends on orthodoxy, at the same time it casts doubt upon the link between threat and dominant class cohesion. The divisions between elite groups in Uruguay during the initial phase of BA rule closely resemble those that emerged in Argentina after 1966. Long-standing variations in socioeconomic structure, which have created similar patterns of sectoral conflict in the two countries, have contributed to this similarity and explain variations in dominant class cohesion more persuasively than prior threat.<sup>103</sup>

Military cohesion provides another possible basis for assessing the cogency of O'Donnell's arguments, since BA rule depends on the institutional support of the armed forces, and, as noted above, O'Donnell has linked divisions within the BA's "institutional layers" with conditions of lower threat. Yet, again, the problem is that authoritarian institutions tend to conceal opposition tendencies, and the significance of the latter cannot readily be weighed, given the relative importance of coercion and consent in authoritarian settings. To add to these problems, the availability of information about military dissent is likely to vary with levels of prior threat for two reasons. First, high levels of repression characterize the early phase of BA rule in the high threat cases. Second, more recent opposition tends to be more politically sensitive and hence more subject to censorship.

With these considerations in mind, the evidence that military cohesion varies with the level of threat surrounding the emergence of BA rule is less than impressive. Indeed, there is some basis for arguing that high threat initially gives rise to less cohesion. Within the Chilean military, arrests, executions, and forced retirements in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 coup indicated considerable tension. The Uruguayan case, in which high ranking officers were dismissed, arrested,

tortured, and imprisoned, also suggests that the deep societal divisions that preceded the emergence of BA rule under high threat conditions affected the military institution. On the other hand, the initial division of the military in Brazil, as indicated by the purging of the officer corps, exceeded that of post-1976 Argentina.<sup>104</sup>

Insufficient time has elapsed to generalize about longer term variations, but the Chilean and Uruguayan cases suggest that, even under conditions of high prior threat, military cohesion presents a continuing problem. The 1978 ouster of the air force representative on the Chilean junta and the related resignation of eighteen of the top twenty air force generals on active duty clearly point to a lack of cohesion. Conflict also continued after the coup in Uruguay. Following the arrest of between twenty and fifty officers in March 1977, the Uruguayans altered the military code to permit the immediate cashiering of any officer. In May 1977, forty-six officers were purged under the code, including at least three generals and a large number of high ranking naval officers, and in September of the same year, twenty-six colonels suffered the same fate. Despite the purges, factional struggles in the Uruguayan military continued during 1978 and 1979.<sup>105</sup> Inadequate information makes it difficult to account for these trends, but they do suggest that high levels of repression may exacerbate divisions within the military at the same time that they create new incentives for military cohesion and the perpetuation of military rule. In addition, the continuing major shake-ups of the command structure of the Uruguayan and Chilean armed forces indicate that factors other than prior threat, including the previous role of the armed forces and prior strength of constitutional traditions, may affect the cohesion of the principal institutional actor in the system of authoritarian control.

In summary, comparisons among cases of BA rule suggest that prior threat does not effectively account for variations in dominant class cohesion, the alignment of political forces, and military unity. Low dominant class cohesion has characterized the initial period of BA rule under both conditions of high threat (Uruguay) and low threat (post-1966 Argentina). As indicated by the execution, arrest, and involuntary retirement of military officers—all of which suggest the presence of very fundamental divisions—high threat has been linked with both low initial military unity (Uruguay and Chile) and high initial unity (post-1976 Argentina). The alignment of political forces has also varied under conditions of similar threat, although striking differences do exist between the low and high threat cases with respect to the speed with which disillusioned supporters of BA rule have attempted to combine in alliances with the popular sector. These findings, together with the weakness of the link between threat and key intervening variables, such as policy orthodoxy, obviously raise questions about the importance of

prior threat for understanding variations in BA cohesion and political alignments.

#### CONCLUSION

O'Donnell's original analysis of generic similarities in the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes was a singularly important theoretical contribution that redefined authoritarianism as a predictable, rather than anomalous, outcome of modernization in the contemporary South American context. His more recent work has raised a new set of significant theoretical issues and focused attention upon important similarities in the goals, governing methods, and problems of legitimation that characterize recent military regimes in the more industrialized nations in the region.

Yet, as O'Donnell has expanded his analysis to accommodate additional cases and explain postcoup developments, he has increased the conceptual ambiguities in his work without accounting for important differences among bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. As the preceding survey of postcoup developments suggests, O'Donnell's hypotheses linking prior threat levels to variations in patterns of repression, political deactivation, economic policy and performance, political alignments, and elite cohesion are not supported by comparative data. The findings also fail to lend much support to O'Donnell's other arguments suggesting causal relationships among these variables.

Furthermore, O'Donnell's description of the phases through which bureaucratic-authoritarian rule passes appears to be a generalization from the Brazilian experience that does not fit other cases or explain differences among them. The statizing and nationalizing trends evident in Brazil after the first few years of authoritarian rule have not emerged elsewhere. Given certain other unique characteristics of the Brazilian case, including the persistence of political parties, elections, and other preexisting institutional arrangements and legitimating mechanisms after 1964, as well as initial dissimilarities among the other cases, there is little reason to anticipate that countries governed by bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes will develop according to the Brazilian or any other single modal pattern.

The weaknesses of O'Donnell's analysis of postcoup developments reflect the limitations of an approach that is rooted in an ideal type. Such an approach has been useful in identifying basic similarities and in raising fundamental questions about the ability of exclusionary military regimes to overcome the contradictions that prevent their legitimation; but it has led to the use of concepts and variables that obscure variations among cases and fail to provide an adequate theoretical framework for their explanation. The concept "prior threat," for example,

helps account for political similarities among cases of bureaucratic-authoritarianism as well as political differences between countries such as Colombia and Chile. But, as O'Donnell recognized in *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*, explaining variations among cases of bureaucratic-authoritarianism calls for the examination of factors other than those used to explain regime emergence or to establish a typological similarity.<sup>106</sup> At various points in this essay such factors have been identified. While a systematic exploration of the role they have played in shaping developments subsequent to the emergence of authoritarian rule clearly exceeds the scope of this paper, further avenues of research and analysis can be suggested.

Latin Americanists concerned with the analysis of authoritarian political systems may well benefit from the lessons of several decades of intensive research and theoretical discussion of Communist party regimes in Eastern Europe. After repeated efforts to explain the dynamics of such regimes in terms of originating conditions and generic characteristics, scholars found it more productive to examine the continuing interaction between changing environmental influences and political processes. This shift reflected a growing recognition that the ideal types, or "syndromes," which initially guided the interpretation of Eastern European politics, obscured similarities between Communist and non-Communist states and created an unrealistic picture of communism as a highly unified political phenomenon that, due to similarities in ideology and structure, functioned according to highly predictable patterns. Changes in Communist rule over time, particularly within the Soviet Union, also led to dissatisfaction with concepts and models that, as Richard Cornell has put it, analytically "stopped" the process of historical development at one point in time by emphasizing the role of certain social and political influences in determining the nature of the political system.<sup>107</sup> To obtain a better understanding of Eastern European politics, scholars adopted a wide variety of new approaches designed to collect more reliable and systematic evidence, to analyze the complex interplay among political goals, structures, policies, and contextual variables, and, above all, to identify the factors producing as well as resisting change over time.

The focus of research on Latin American authoritarianism must undergo a similar shift if we are to generate a more satisfactory analysis of postcoup developments. Bureaucratic-authoritarianism cannot be understood adequately either on the basis of a list of interrelated traits designed to define it or in terms of causal models concerned with explaining its emergence. The debate over these issues is important and will undoubtedly continue, but the effort to explain the political dynamics and social impact of bureaucratic-authoritarianism calls for a rather different research emphasis—one concerned with analyzing the factors

that have shaped the struggle for power and its outcome subsequent to regime imposition. Precisely such a focus informed O'Donnell's earlier work on the breakdown of democracy, which emphasized the nature of the political "game" rather than the determining character of originating conditions or the underlying class character of the state.

At a minimum the effort to understand bureaucratic-authoritarianism demands more systematic and empirically grounded comparisons among cases and consideration of a broader range of explanations of postcoup developments. One set of factors that particularly requires more attention in a causal analysis of postcoup outcomes stems from the international context. As suggested previously, capital flows, terms of trade, fluctuations in the expansion of the world market, and other exogenous variables impose constraints on policy choices and appear relevant for understanding the relative economic success of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in Brazil and Argentina during the 1960s. Given the critical, but highly variable, nature of the international linkages of the national economies in question, the impact of shifts in the world economy upon policy warrants more careful analysis.

Variations in the organization, consciousness, and political resources of key social actors also need to be considered in developing a more adequate explanation of postcoup developments. The large size, strategic location, and organizational experience of the industrial working class in Argentina, for example, accounts for important aspects of government policy in both post-1966 and post-1976 Argentina. The presence of a large marginal population and the related weakness of trade union organizations in Brazil created a far broader range of policy options and allowed the military to maintain control over subordinate groups with comparatively minimal dependence on naked coercion. Similarly, the organization of the military accounts for certain variations between cases. For example, the exceptionally centralized and personalistic structure of military power in the Chilean case after 1973 created considerable autonomy for technocrats and allowed for the systematic application of orthodox policy remedies, whereas a more collegial structure of military power in Uruguay led to less autonomy for technocrats, less policy consistency, and less economic orthodoxy.

Variations in the size of the internal market, the pattern of sectoral conflict, the links between military and civilian elites, and the institutional structure of the state also appear important for explaining similarities and differences among cases. Depending on the particular focus of analysis, other factors might be added to the list of relevant variables; however, the previous suggestions indicate the wide variety of forces that need to be taken into consideration in accounting for postcoup patterns of change.

As O'Donnell has emphasized, many of the similarities and dif-

ferences among cases of bureaucratic-authoritarianism reflect previous patterns of economic development and political conflict, yet historical conditions are relevant to the understanding of postcoup developments only insofar as they shape the political "game" that emerges after the imposition of authoritarian rule. And, perhaps even more important, the forces that shape the political development of societies under authoritarian rule are not fixed at the time of regime imposition. The emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in itself constitutes a significant change in the previous situation, and, to the extent that the policies of such a regime alter the character of society, politics will be governed less and less by precoup conditions. The analysis of bureaucratic-authoritarian politics must therefore be predicated upon the empirical and theoretical consideration of emergent historical realities, rather than past configurations.

#### NOTES

1. Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, Politics of Modernization Series No. 9 (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973). A second edition was issued in 1979. Unless otherwise noted, all citations are to the first edition.
2. David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism In Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). See also David Collier's review article, "Industrial Modernization and Political Change: A Latin American Perspective," *World Politics* 30 (July 1978):593-614, which analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of O'Donnell's work for understanding the collapse of democratic regimes. Other relevant works include Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, "Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism,'" *American Political Science Review* 73 (Dec. 1979):967-86; Mario S. Broderson, "Sobre 'Modernización y Autoritarismo' y el estancamiento inflacionario argentina," *Desarrollo Económico* 13 (oct.-dic. 1973):591-605; Liliana de Rix, "Formas del estado y desarrollo del capitalismo en América Latina," *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 39 (abril-junio 1977):427-41; Daniel Levy, "Higher Education Policy in Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes: Comparative Perspectives on the Chilean Case," paper prepared for the meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, April 1979; Susan Kaufman Purcell, *The Mexican Profit-Sharing Decision: Politics in an Authoritarian Regime* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1975); Robert R. Kaufman, "Transitions to Stable Authoritarian-Corporate Regimes: The Chilean Case?" *Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics* 5 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976); Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarianism and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 3: *Macropolitical Theory* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Press, 1975); Daniel Hellinger, "Class and Politics in Venezuela: Prologue to a Theory of Democracy in Dependent Nations," paper prepared for the meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Bloomington, Indiana, October 1980; Michael Wallerstein, "The Collapse of Democracy in Brazil: Its Economic Determinants," *LARR*, 15, no. 3 (1980):3-40; Oscar Oszlak, "Notas críticas para una teoría de la burocracia estatal," Documento CEDES/G.E. CLACSO no. 8, Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad, Buenos Aires, 1977.
3. "Reflexiones sobre las tendencias generales de cambio en el estado burocrático-autoritario," Documento CEDES/G.E. CLACSO no. 1, Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad, Buenos Aires, 1975 and its English translation, "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," *LARR* 13, no. 1 (1978):3-38;

"Acerca del 'corporativismo' y la cuestión del estado," Documento CEDES/G.E. CLACSO no. 2, Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad, Buenos Aires, 1975 and its English translation, "Corporatism and the Question of the State," in *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, ed. James M. Malloy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 47–87; "Apuntes para una teoría del estado," Documento CEDES/G.E. CLACSO no. 9, Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad, Buenos Aires, 1977; "Tensiones en el estado burocrático-autoritario y la cuestión de la democracia," Documento CEDES/G.E. CLACSO no. 11, Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad, Buenos Aires, 1978 and its English version, "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy," in *New Authoritarianism*, pp. 285–318; Roberto Frenkel and Guillermo O'Donnell, "The 'Stabilization Programs' of the International Monetary Fund and Their Internal Impacts during Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Periods," Latin American Program, The Wilson Center, Working Papers, no. 14, Washington, D.C., 1978. The English versions are cited in all subsequent references.

4. *Modernization*, pp. 99–103.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 93, 95–96n. O'Donnell argued that this type of political system closely resembled the conservative and authoritarian responses to modernization in Eastern Europe during the 1930s, Franco's Spain, Greece under the military, and contemporary Mexico.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
8. *Ibid.*, 2nd ed., p. 206n.
9. The term "political system" is not explicitly defined in *Modernization*, but O'Donnell used the term in the sense of "regime" or institutionalized rules of political interaction. See, for example, p. 9.
10. O'Donnell's definition of the state is similar to that advanced by European neo-Marxists such as Nicos Poulantzas and Joachim Hirsch. An analysis of the theoretical issues this raises is beyond the scope of this paper, but for an incisive review and critique of the assumptions of such approaches, see Koen Koch, "The New Marxist Theory of the State or the Rediscovery of the Limitations of a Structural-Functionalist Paradigm," *The Netherlands Journal of Sociology* 16 (Apr. 1980):1–19.
11. "Tensions," p. 296. For a fuller exposition of O'Donnell's theory of the state, see "Apuntes."
12. "Tensions," p. 310.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 291–93. It should be noted that O'Donnell presents this definition in the context of a discussion of the *initial* stage of BA rule. Elsewhere he has emphasized two additional, and apparently longer term, characteristics of the BA state: namely, economic "deepening" and the "expansiveness" of the state. See "Corporatism," pp. 54, 59, 61, 78; "Reflections," pp. 6, 9–16. In "Tensions," O'Donnell only alludes briefly to these characteristics (pp. 303–4n, 307n).
14. "Corporatism," p. 53.
15. For example, David Collier has emphasized the need for the "disaggregation" of the variable in O'Donnell's model, particularly "regime," "coalition," and "policy." See Collier, "Industrial Modernization"; idem, "The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model: Synthesis and Priorities for Future Research," in *New Authoritarianism*, pp. 365–71. Fernando Henrique Cardoso argues that a distinction should be drawn between "state" and "political regime" on the grounds that "an identical form of state—capitalist and dependent, in the case of Latin America—can coexist with a variety of political regimes." "On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America," in *New Authoritarianism*, p. 39.
16. "Reflections," pp. 28–31; "Corporatism," pp. 53–54. In O'Donnell's more recent essay, "Tensions," Mexico is not referred to as a BA state (see, especially, p. 312). See also the glossary, pp. 399–400, in *New Authoritarianism*.
17. "Reflections," p. 7.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
20. "Tensions," pp. 297–98.

21. "Reflections," pp. 8–9.
22. "Tensions," p. 315.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 306.
24. "Reflections," pp. 16, 34n.
25. "Tensions," p. 306.
26. "Reflections," pp. 19–26.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 16–19, 22, 25–26; "Tensions," p. 312.
28. "Tensions," pp. 305–7.
29. "Reflections," pp. 18, 33n; "Tensions," p. 307n.
30. "State and Alliances in Argentina, 1956–1976." *Journal of Development Studies* 15 (Oct. 1978):3–33.
31. *Modernization*, p. 102; "Reflections," pp. 7, 32n.
32. "Tensions," pp. 306–7.
33. "Reflections," p. 7.
34. For a discussion of this issue, see Robert R. Kaufman, "Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule in Latin America: A Concrete Review of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model," in *New Authoritarianism*, pp. 187–89.
35. "Reflections," pp. 8–9.
36. See Amnesty International, *Relatório sobre as acusações de tortura no Brasil* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1972); Peter Flynn, *Brazil: A Political Analysis* (London: Ernest Benn, 1978), pp. 366–471.
37. Karen L. Remmer, "Political Demobilization in Chile, 1973–1978," *Comparative Politics* 12 (Apr. 1980):277–82.
38. Amnesty International, *Chile: An Amnesty International Report* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1974), pp. 16, 31.
39. Chicago Commission of Inquiry, "Chicago Commission of Inquiry," in *Chile: Under Military Rule*, comp. IDOC (New York: IDOC/North America, 1974), p. 59.
40. International Labour Office, *Year Book of Labour Statistics* (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1979), p. 592.
41. *Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Argentina, 6–15 November 1976* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1977), pp. 18, 27.
42. *Times of the Americas*, 29 Aug. 1979, p. 9; 20 June 1979, p. 13.
43. *Times of the Americas*, 30 Jan. 1980, p. 11. See also Anselmo Sule C., "La situación de los derechos humanos en Argentina," *Chile-América*, nos. 39–40 (1978), pp. 149–59; Stephen Kinzer, "Argentina in Agony," *New Republic*, 23 Dec. 1978, pp. 17–21; *The Guardian Weekly*, 24 June 1979, p. 16; Argentine Information Service Center, *Argentina Today: A Dossier on Repression and the Violation of Human Rights*, 2nd ed. (New York: n.p., 1977); "Argentina: Hemisphere's Worst Human Rights Violator," *Argentine Outreach* (Berkeley) 4 (Jan.-Feb. 1979), p. 3.
44. Remmer, "Political Demobilization," p. 278.
45. Alfredo Errandonea and Daniel Costabile, *Sindicato y sociedad en el Uruguay* (Montevideo: Biblioteca de Cultura Universitaria, 1969), p. 136.
46. Amnesty International, *Political Imprisonment in Uruguay* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1979), pp. 4, 5.
47. *Latin America Political Report* 11 (17 June 1977):181.
48. In 1978, for example, the Washington Office on Latin America described Uruguay as the "worst violator" of human rights in the hemisphere. "Uruguay: Five Years into the Military Dictatorship and Getting Worse," Washington, D.C., Oct. 1978 (mimeographed).
49. *Political Imprisonment*, pp. 5, 10. See also *Uruguay: Generals Rule* (London: Latin America Bureau, 1980), pp. 53–55.
50. *Modernization*, p. 29.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 54n.
52. See, in particular, "Reflections," p. 8.
53. *Modernization*, p. 101.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 103 (italics added).
55. It should be emphasized, however, that opposition from subordinate groups does not constitute the sole or even the most important explanation offered by O'Donnell of the varying paths of Brazilian and Argentine BA rule in the 1960s.

56. *Latin America* 10 (14 May 1976):147; 10 (1 Oct. 1976):302; 10 (12 Nov. 1976):351; 10 (3 Dec. 1976):373. *Latin America Economic Report* 7 (16 Feb. 1979):56; 7 (30 Mar. 1979):104; 7 (4 May 1979):136. *Latin America Political Report* 11 (4 Feb. 1977):39; 11 (18 Feb. 1977):52; 11 (4 Mar. 1977):72; 11 (25 Mar. 1977):95; 11 (4 Nov. 1977):337; 11 (11 Nov. 1977):345; 11 (9 Dec. 1977):381; 13 (27 Apr. 1979):121; 13 (4 May 1979):136. *Latin America Regional Reports: Southern Cone*, no. 1 (7 Dec. 1979), p. 2; no. 6 (1 Aug. 1980), p. 4. *Latin America Weekly Report*, no. 1 (2 Nov. 1979), p. 3; no. 5 (30 Nov. 1979), p. 52. *Conditions in Argentina* (New York: Argentine Information Service Center, 2 April 1979), pp. 8–10.
57. *Conditions*, p. 9; *Argentine Outreach* 4 (Jan.-Feb. 1979): 2.
58. See, for example, *Latin America Political Report* 11 (4 Feb. 1977):40; *Solidaridad* (Santiago), no. 58 (Nov. 1978), p. 7; *Chilean Resistance Courier* (Oakland, California), no. 5 (Oct. 1976), p. 25; *Chile-América*, nos. 22–24 (Aug.-Oct. 1976), pp. 62–68; *ibid.*, nos. 31–32 (May-June 1977), pp. 43–62; *ibid.*, nos. 35–36 (Sept.-Oct. 1977), pp. 134–41.
59. "Tensions," p. 306.
60. World Bank, *World Tables 1976* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 48–49, 60–61.
61. Inter-American Development Bank, *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 1978 Report* (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 1979), p. 3.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
63. Rosemary Thorp and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Inflation and Stabilization in Latin America* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), p. 6.
64. *Ibid.*
65. ECLA, *Economic Survey of Latin America 1977* (Santiago: United Nations, 1978), p. 33.
66. "Tensions," p. 293.
67. *Economic and Social Progress*, p. 452.
68. It should be noted, however, that the Uruguayan growth of the 1974–77 period partially represented a recovery from the decline of 1971 and 1972. Government incentives for the expansion of nontraditional manufacturing exports, which are discussed below, provided the main impetus for this recovery, but it also reflected the influence of factors beyond the control of Uruguayan policymakers. Argentine economic policy, in particular, fuelled tourist demand for Uruguayan goods and resort housing.
69. *World Tables*, p. 396.
70. "Tensions," p. 307.
71. *Economic and Social Progress*, p. 152.
72. *Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States: Argentina* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1980), p. 10.
73. *Quarterly Economic Review of Argentina* (London), 4th Quarter, 1979, p. 7.
74. "Tensions," p. 306.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
76. "Reflections," p. 17.
77. *Inflation and Stabilisation*, pp. 1–22; see also Thomas E. Skidmore, "Economic Stabilization Attempts in Latin America: Explaining 'Success' and 'Failure,'" paper prepared for the national meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Bloomington, Indiana, Oct. 1980.
78. M. H. J. Finch, "Stabilisation Policy in Uruguay since the 1950s," in *Inflation and Stabilisation*, p. 163.
79. Albert Fishlow, "Some Reflections on the Post-1964 Brazilian Economic Policy," in *Authoritarian Brazil*, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 72.
80. *Economic and Social Progress*, p. 433.
81. John Thompson, "Argentine Economic Policy under the Onganía Regime," *Inter-American Economic Affairs* 24 (Summer 1970):51–75; see also Richard D. Mallon, in collaboration with Juan V. Sourrouille, *Economic Policy-Making in a Conflict Society: The Argentine Case* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975).
82. "Chile Spin-Off of Corfo Holdings is Down to Last Few," *Business Latin America*, 23 Feb. 1977, p. 59.
83. *Latin America Regional Reports: Southern Cone*, no. 6 (27 June 1980), pp. 6–7; *Quarterly Economic Review of Argentina*, 1st Quarter 1979, p. 13. On the Brazilian tariff reform,

- see Joel Bergsman, *Brazil: Industrialization and Trade Policies* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).
84. World Bank, *Uruguay: Economic Memorandum* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1979), p. 15.
  85. Ibid.; Finch, "Stabilization Policy," pp. 144–80; Howard Handelman, "Economic Policy and Elite Pressures in Uruguay," *American Universities Field Staff Reports*, no. 27 (1979); *Bolsa Review* 13 (Mar. 1979):192.
  86. *Uruguay*, p. 49.
  87. Ibid.; *Latin America Regional Reports: Southern Cone*, no. 1 (1 Feb. 1980), p. 5.
  88. *Business Latin America*, 3 Sept. 1980, p. 284; Handelman, "Economic Policy," p. 15.
  89. *Latin America Regional Reports: Southern Cone*, no. 7 (5 Sept. 1980), p. 8; Organization of American States, *Short-Term Economic Reports*, vol. 8: *Argentina* (Washington, D.C.: OAS, 1979); *Latin America Weekly Report*, no. 34 (29 Aug. 1980), p. 4.
  90. "Tensions," p. 307n.
  91. See, in particular, R. Kaufman, "Industrial Change," pp. 165–253; José Serra, "Three Mistaken Theses Regarding the Connection between Industrialization and Authoritarian Regimes," in *New Authoritarianism*, pp. 99–163; Albert O. Hirschman, "The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for Its Economic Determinants," in *New Authoritarianism*, pp. 61–98.
  92. Ibid., p. 79; see also Cardoso, "Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes," p. 51.
  93. *Latin America Regional Reports: Southern Cone*, no. 6 (27 June 1980), p. 6.
  94. Handelman, "Economic Policy," pp. 11–16.
  95. *Latin America Regional Reports: Southern Cone*, no. 6 (27 June 1980), pp. 6–7.
  96. "Reflections," pp. 23–24.
  97. "Tensions," p. 305.
  98. Ibid., pp. 297–98.
  99. Ibid., p. 306.
  100. *Latin America Regional Reports: Southern Cone*, no. 1 (1 Feb. 1980), p. 5. For the reaction of Chilean and Argentine industrialists, see *ibid.*, no. 1 (7 Dec. 1979), pp. 2, 5; *Latin America Weekly Report*, no. 11 (14 Mar. 1980), p. 10; *Quarterly Economic Review of Chile*, 4th Quarter 1974, p. 2.
  101. Howard Handelman, "Class Conflict and the Repression of the Uruguayan Working Class," paper presented at the Conference on Contemporary Latin America, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, N.M., April 1977.
  102. Handelman, "Economic Policy," p. 16.
  103. In analyzing the relationships between the pattern of economic development and the nature of class interests in Argentina during the 1956–76 period, O'Donnell himself has emphasized the importance of sectoral conflicts for understanding the lack of intra-bourgeois cohesion in Argentina. See "State and Alliances."
  104. Liisa North, "The Military in Chilean Politics," in *Armies and Politics in Latin America*, ed., Abraham F. Lowenthal (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976), pp. 165–96. Edy Kaufman, *Uruguay in Transition* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1979), p. 75. Ronald M. Schneider, *The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime, 1964–1970* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 129, 199, indicates that major purges in 1964 resulted in 555 forced military retirements and 165 involuntary transfers to the reserves. No comparable evidence of military disunity exists for the post-1976 period in Argentina, despite continuing reports of factional struggles and interservice rivalries. Between April 1976 and April 1979, for example, *Latin America* and its successor, the *Latin America Political Report*, contained thirty-one separate stories dealing with Argentine military disunity; yet no profound break with professional norms for career advancement occurred during this period.
  105. *Latin America Political Report* 11 (1 Apr. 1977):103; 11 (27 May 1977):157; 11 (23 Sept. 1977):296; 12 (7 July 1978):208; 13 (2 Feb. 1979):38–39; *Uruguay in Transition*, pp. 75–76.
  106. See *Modernization*, p. 99.
  107. Richard Cornell, ed., *The Soviet Political System* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 1.