

"right the balance" between Congress and the executive in foreign policy making. The experience of the Reagan years demonstrates that the president remains preeminent in foreign policy and that Congress is less assertive than in the previous decade, though not pliant. The Senate's role in the ABM treaty reinterpretation dispute and the House's role on the issue of Contra aid, among others, are illustrative.

Conflict and Consensus is divided into three parts. The first examines briefly the historical record of legislative-executive competition in foreign policy; the second the procedures and perspectives each branch brings to the competition; and the third the key areas of struggle that have marked the recent record, notably the Reagan years. The last part is the meat of the book and where Warburg is at his best. Congress's powers to declare war, approve treaties, control the purse, and otherwise affect through its general legislative powers the form and flow of foreign relations in such seemingly disparate areas as arms sales, human rights, and strategic weapons are explored. The specific issues examined simultaneously catalog many of the most important foreign policy issues of the Reagan era and those that lie at the center of the legislative-executive struggles of the past two decades. Conditionality, micromanagement, and a host of other strategies familiar to congressional scholars become the expression of the policy disagreements in the context of divided government that lie at the core of the struggles. Arguably there is nothing new or distinctive in the treatment here, but that does not detract from its utility and from the contribution it makes to an understanding of the cyclical character of legislative-executive relations.

Warburg's treatment of the counterreformation of the 1980s is written with the flair of a political journalist and is laced with prescrip-

tive judgments that reflect his long experience as a staffer on Capitol Hill and as a political consultant. Inevitably, this sometimes leads to conclusions that are not beyond dispute. That is nowhere more evident than in the concluding chapter, where the author argues that "ideological convergence" (p. 309) and "the wane of ideology" (p. 310) have become characteristic of foreign policy making. The assertions are at odds with a growing number of systematic analyses that document extensive and persistent partisan and ideological divisions in the foreign policy domain comparable to what was long thought to apply only to domestic policy issues. Moreover, as the Soviet empire disintegrates and the anticommunist sentiments that once sustained the myth that politics stop at the water's edge dissipate, partisan and ideological dispute will become more prevalent, not less. Moreover, the conclusion is at odds with much of Warburg's own analysis. Still, the book merits attention as a useful contribution toward understanding an enduring struggle.

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Errata

Vol. 84, No. 3, p. 990. *How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965*. Should be properly attributed to John P. Burke and Fred I. Greenstein with the collaboration of Larry Berman and Richard Immerman. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Vol. 84, No. 3, p. 1007. *Elite Cadres and Party Coalitions: Representing the Public in Party Politics*. Should be properly attributed to Denise A. Baer and David Bositis. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.