

edge of their duties and some basic discipline—for instance, who is pilot and who is crew.

As we read this excellent book—almost a primer in government—and think of our own situation, we should yearn for a little of the discipline in duties and training in performing them, the importance of which it stresses. Since Mr. Lefever is not only a Doctor of Philosophy but also a Bachelor of Divinity (both from Yale, I might add), we might think of him as

suggesting two new beatitudes:

Blessed are the disciplined; for by minding their own business they permit others to mind theirs.

Blessed are the informed who are also modest; for they tread warily.

Perhaps we would add clarification to an older one:

Blessed are the peacemakers, if they are successful and if the price paid is right.

correspondence

"THE BETRAYAL OF LANGUAGE" CONT'D.

Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir: I wish to respond at some length to Paul Ramsey's article, "The Betrayal of Language" (*worldview*, February, 1971).

First, Ramsey's condemnation of both the "systemic violence" and those who use it is based on a very labored argument, the purpose of which seems to be to portray all those who seek systemic change as "holy war" advocates of revolutionary violence. His explanations of why the term is used could be applied just as readily to the use of his own suggested alternative phrase, "the system is gravely unjust," and possibly even with more justification if, as he correctly says, "injustice is a far worse thing than violence." Violence in reaction to injustice runs the same risk of taking on a "crusading mentality" as does violence in reaction to any other perceived wrong. The word used is not the determining factor; moral limits are neither fixed nor removed on the basis of a term.

Furthermore, there are many who with Ramsey are concerned for "ordered liberty, for democratic processes, and for law," and who, far from considering these concerns as "Agnewisms," react against Agnewistic suggestions (such as peremptorily removing certain segments of our population from society) precisely because of these concerns. While I have no particular attachment to the term "systemic violence," it does serve as a meaningful symbol to many in our society, particularly those in the ghettos who know first hand the lack of ordered liberty and the sense of "caughtness" which middle-class America can only imagine.

Second, I find it difficult to follow the logic of Ramsey's insistence that foreign policy and domestic policy must be considered independently of each other. His point is well taken that the security of the nation, like the health of the individual, is a conditional value, i.e., a pre-condition for the pursuit of any other purposes

or policies or values. But neither security nor health can be arbitrarily subdivided into independent components. Physical health and mental health are part of a psychosomatic whole. External security and internal security are likewise interrelated, charges of "category-mistakes" to the contrary notwithstanding. Furthermore, good health does not result from taking more pills, doing more exercises, visiting more doctors, taking more x-rays, than anyone else. Such indiscriminate pursuit of health can only endanger health, thereby defeating the purpose of the pursuit. The same is true of the pursuit of security. If such pursuit causes neglect at home because of the lack of resources, particularly when those suffering the consequences at home believe their deprivation is compounded by the pursuit of wasteful and unnecessary policies abroad, the security of the nation can only decline.

In concrete terms, is the conditional value being sought one of keeping U.S. cities from being blown up by the USSR, or keeping U.S. cities from being blown up, period? I believe it is the latter, and therefore find it self-defeating to make such arbitrary distinctions regarding the cause of the problem. It is true that "priority on a scale of excellence . . . cannot displace fundamental challenges to any life at all or to national security," but those challenges can come from more than one source. There are basic values conditional to more excellent values both at home and abroad, and neither set of basic values is independent of the other. One does not starve himself and his family (health) in order to put all his money into life insurance (security), no matter how dangerous his environment.

Third, Ramsey unfairly implies that all those he is arguing against are saying that the "nation's policy is too outgoing and should be more ingrown." This is of course a gross oversimplification which I am sure Ramsey knows is misleading. There is a great difference between an outgoing nation and an overbearing one. Many of those Ramsey is speaking of would, for example, like to see much more than 3/10 of 1% of our G.N.P. applied to

international development projects. There is, likewise, a great difference between an ingrown nation and one with a proper concern for domestic tranquillity and the general welfare. Furthermore, a case can be made for saying that a nation which tries too hard to re-make the world in its own image has more characteristics of being ingrown than outgoing. Rather than "committing suicide for the sake of domestic good to come," a nation which separates foreign policy from domestic questions as completely as Ramsey advocates runs the danger even more of committing suicide for the sake of an illusory "national security" to come.

Fourth, Ramsey implies that much of the condemnation of current U.S. foreign policy is merely a tactic used by those whose real purpose is to solve domestic problems and who have been frustrated in that purpose. Anyone who knows the extent and depth of the anti-war sentiment in our country, and the inclusion in the anti-war ranks of countless foreign policy experts, many of whom have been intimately involved with Vietnam, knows that the current condemnation of U.S. foreign policy is based on the merits of the case and does not stem initially from frustration over domestic reforms. Likewise, lamentation over domestic policies is based initially on the merits of that case. Ramsey imputes a cause and effect relationship which is not valid. It is true that each group of critics tends to support the other and receives additional impetus from the convincing case made by the other. But this phenomenon is more logically seen as adding to the evidence that domestic and foreign needs or crises can never be considered independently rather than as supporting Ramsey's "post hoc ergo propter hoc" argument. A conviction of the waste on the one hand and a knowledge of the need on the other hand binds the foreign and domestic critics together. There can be "vital interests" involved in either domestic or foreign policy, and in the present case it is the conviction on the part of growing numbers that we have few if any vital interests in Vietnam, which compounds both the tragedy and the frustration.

Fifth, toward the end of his article Ramsey offers another of his dualistic, either-or choices (a function of his two-kingdoms theology?) by trying to force a choice between "flexible response" (moral) and "massive retaliation" (immoral). This is a false dichotomy and is not really at issue. The fact is, as made evident in the Urban Coalition's "counter-budget" and by many expert witnesses before the two Armed Services Committees, that the military budget can be cut substantially without loss to a "flexible response" capability. Why do we need 15 carriers? Why do we need over 3000 bases abroad? Why do we need the B-1 bomber when existing B-52's can be modified at a fraction of the cost to do the job better? Why MIRV? Why A.B.M.? Why a "Pentagon propaganda machine"? Why billions in waste and cost overruns? Why an 8-1 ratio of support troops to combat troops? Why the projected geometric growth in nuclear warheads? We are already "protected by the most immoral weapons" so why do we need more?

The issue is really one of trimming excessive layers of

flexible response, which we will always be tempted to use if it is available in abundance, in order that we might be able, in Ramsey's words "to cure pollution, to aid our decaying cities, etc." These are basic social health issues which I consider rather more important than Ramsey's "etc." seem to indicate he does. I would be willing to see some cuts in the number of carriers, reduction of some under-utilized military manpower, and closer scrutiny of defense contracts in order to pursue some of the conditional values which are basic for domestic health, heretical and neo-isolationist as that might appear. And this transfer of emphasis and funds can be done, though it is not a foregone conclusion. Such a transfer requires political will. The chances that such a re-balancing will occur between two sets of interrelated conditional values will be improved when men of the stature and esteem of Paul Ramsey become as concerned with real mistakes as they are with "category mistakes."

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"PHILOSOPHERS & PUBLIC POLICY"

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Dear Sir: Kudos to Bernard Murchland and his "Philosophers and Public Policy" (*worldview*, April, 1971). I think an additional perspective is needed, however. This perspective concerns the use of the word "philosophy." Lewis Feuer's pronouncement of the death of Philosophy implies a particular view of the nature and task of Philosophy. And fortunately or unfortunately, the problem of its own nature and task is an issue within the discipline itself. And it would appear that Coroner Feuer's assessment is of one view of the nature and task of Philosophy. Whether positivistic philosophy's "withdrawal" constitutes a demise is in itself debatable. Whether this is the pre-occupation of most undergraduate and graduate programs in Philosophy needs to be checked for reliability. But the point is, this is only one way to view the nature and task of Philosophy.

But why must we philosophers be forced into this dichotomy? C.D. Broad (fair company, indeed) has suggested a place for both critical and "speculative" philosophy. The term "speculative" may need some demythologization, but the point is well made. There is a role for both. And don't crowd the boys in Analytical Philosophy. Recoiling from the obfuscation of Hegelian-like philosophical architectonics, they made an important discovery—language, the basic building block of any human enterprise needing critical study. Some of their theories may be disputed, and some may feel they have "withdrawn," but in point of fact, they're engaged in a vitally important area. Must Philosophy then wait until this analytical groundwork is finished? I think not, for the

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