

FOREWORD

ONE is sometimes asked, by maiden aunts and people at parties, what philosophy is. I remember, when I was a freshman at Cambridge, being told to reply, with a perfectly straight face, 'It's the attempt to discover, by the exercise of reason, the ultimate nature of reality'. What puzzled me was the injunction, 'with a perfectly straight face'. Was there something wrong with this answer? Would a more appropriate accompaniment have been a twinkle in the eye?

It was the time of 'therapeutic positivism', and 'the metamorphosis of metaphysics'.

Since then the winds of change have blown in philosophy as elsewhere. Even professors at Oxford practise descriptive metaphysics. And it is rumoured that the early and the later Wittgenstein were in fact the same man.

It is not, of course, simply a matter of going back to the old work with the old tools. The conception of the work has changed, and some of the tools have been discarded, new ones brought in, and others cleaned almost beyond recognition. But something of the old spirit is back. The twinkle is reserved for special occasions.

This is reflected in the present volume, although the work to which the new tools are put is mainly that of digging to expose the weak foundations of old work. But one doesn't worry about weak foundations unless one is in the building trade, or on the lookout for a soundly constructed place to live.

The foundation which May Brodbeck, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Minnesota, uncovers for inspection is the Cartesian notion of an 'idea'. 'Ideas are always present as the object of either thought or perception, whether or not anything corresponds to them in reality. If sometimes the ideas represent and sometimes they do not, then a criterion is needed to tell the one case from the other. Descartes supplies one: only clear and distinct ideas represent.' But what kind of things are ideas, and does the criterion work? Brodbeck contends that ideas are disguised universals. 'There are many whites, but there is only one idea of white. . . . Accordingly, the relation between the idea and what, if anything, it stands for is one-

many.' The many things the idea of white stands for are individualised qualities related by exact resemblance: *this* white and *that* white in two white things. Or, rather, they would be such individual qualities if the idea of white was the kind of idea that represents. But it isn't. It isn't a clear and distinct idea in the relevant (contextual) sense. 'An idea is clear and distinct if it occurs in an axiom, that is, if we know a necessary truth about it, such as the truths of geometry.' So only the kind of qualities that can be dealt with mathematically are objective – 'primary', in Locke's sense.

But Brodbeck is suspicious of the ease with which Descartes seems to have justified the science of his day. 'Suppose I hallucinate a triangle', she says. 'My idea, being of a triangle, will have all the same connections, expressed in the axioms of geometry, as a non-hallucinated triangle. Each, therefore, will be clear and distinct. The criterion does not distinguish between them.' Descartes doesn't really seem to be concerned about the existence, or non-existence, of individual objects. His interest is 'in the laws of science, particularly geometry, not in their instances'. In short, 'his solution to the sceptical and scientific predicaments has the result that he never knows any non-mental existent'.

Brodbeck remarks on how Descartes formulated his ontology in the context of the medieval tradition. But in giving ideas a role in his ontology the same as that of universals in realistic (non-nominalistic) ontologies, she remarks, he 'differs both from his medieval predecessors and his empiricist successors'.

It is interesting to see what became of the notion of an individualised quality in Descartes's empiricist successors. James Mill, in his *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind* (1869), uses the term 'individual quality' for that of which 'white' is the name. His son, John Stuart Mill, in an editorial footnote to the same work (pp. 260–1) asks, 'But what is meant by an individual quality?', and, under the influence of the causal theory of perception, gives the answer that the individual qualities of an object 'are only the various ways in which we or other minds are affected by it'. These 'affections', however, unlike Descartes's ideas as understood by Brodbeck, are not disguised universals. They are particulars. One cannot talk of *this* affection ('sensation') of white being the same as *that* one 'except in the sense in which the word same stands for exact similarity'. There is an 'exact similarity' between my sensations of white on the different occasions on which, as we would ordinarily say, I see something white. And the only meaning of predicating the quality white of something is to affirm this exact resemblance. What it means for a resemblance to be 'exact' emerges in Mill's *Logic* (bk I,

ch. vii, sect. 2). Nothing can be said about the *respect* in which my, or your, earlier and later sensations resemble one another. To say that they are alike in respect of whiteness would be like saying that I call them by the same name because I call them by the same name. This is because, on the view in question, 'in respect of whiteness' means no more than 'in respect of being like a certain earlier sensation'. It is not just that there is no public rule for the application of 'white'; there is no private rule, either. This is the end-product of trying to ground descriptive meaning on the twin pillars of the notion of an individualised quality and the causal theory of perception. It took Wittgenstein to see that descriptive meaning cannot be built on, such foundations.

One philosopher who resisted the move of Descartes and the empiricists towards making qualities essentially private was Leibniz. He went to the other extreme. In Lockean terms, he *identified* the secondary quality with its basis in primary qualities thus making it possible to recognise, say, redness in a variety of ways. The idea we have of a particular shade of colour from the use of our eyes is only a part of the full concept of that colour. We would have a fuller concept if we could identify that colour in other ways; for example, as a 'whirling of globules' of a certain kind.

Miss Hidé Ishiguro, Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of London, defends Leibniz against the charge that he has simply confused sensible qualities with their causes, and considers his solution to the problem of how one is to identify properties. It isn't simply a matter of meaning. 'Triangular' and 'trilateral' have different meanings but ascribe the same property. On the other hand, co-extensiveness is too inclusive to be the criterion of property identity. It must not be possible for anything to have ϕ without having ψ . But what is the relevant sense of 'possible'? Does it mean 'possible, given the laws of nature as they are'? It becomes a matter of trying to square Leibniz's wanting to say that all the features which we can define into our concept of red should hold of everything that is describable as red in any possible world, with his apparent belief that it is possible to have worlds in which different laws of nature hold. But in such worlds could there be the *redness* there is in ours? Isn't causal knowledge somehow involved in the very way we learn the ascription of predicates like 'is red'? And to the extent that this is so, does not physical necessity approximate to logical necessity?

P. T. Geach, Professor of Logic at the University of Leeds, starts out from a question about Spinoza's doctrine that the one substance, God, has infinitely many attributes. 'Each attribute has to be con-

ceived on its own account; being conceived on its own account is, however, a distinguishing mark of the one substance, so how is it that the many attributes, which Spinoza says are really distinct, are not so many distinct substances, so many Gods?’

There are, really, two questions: (1) What does Spinoza mean by the attributes being distinct? and (2) How are God’s attributes related to God?

(1) Geach’s answer to the first question is to refer us to Aquinas. Aquinas held that God has the power to bring about changes in bodies directly, that is, without the mediation of the normal subordinate causes. This is made possible by God’s nature ‘virtually containing’ the thing to be changed. But this ‘virtual containment’, Aquinas holds, is not a matter of God’s having Ideas of bodies. Similarly, Geach suggest, Spinoza holds that the modes proceeding from God under his attribute Extension are independent of his attribute Thought.

(2) His answer to the second question takes the form of reflections on the role of abstract nouns (e.g. ‘greatness’) and the corresponding concrete terms (‘great’). Spinoza’s doctrine, Geach thinks, cannot be understood without some knowledge of the history, going back to Plato, of talk about God and his attributes. One must, for example, have grasped how for a medieval it was natural to think of, say, whiteness as an individualised form if one is to understand why people should feel the need to say that God is ‘great just by the greatness which is God himself’.

J. J. MacIntosh, Professor of Philosophy at Calgary University, considers the bearing of Spinoza’s metaphysics on his epistemology. How, for example, does Spinoza’s substance-monism and ‘double-aspect’ theory of the relation of mind and body (‘Substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other’; ‘The first element, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually existing’; ‘The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body . . . and nothing else’; etc.) determine what he has to say about truth and falsity? Spinoza cannot accept the Cartesian doctrine of the will outrunning the intellect and, in any case, a correspondence theory is ruled out by his metaphysics. Equally, there being objects for some ideas, but not for others, is ruled out (all our ideas have, as their object, the body – presumably something happening in the brain). What he does is (i) to posit two distinct mental items, ideas and images, (ii) to endow ideas with ‘affirmation or negation’, (iii) to give them a dimension of ‘adequacy/inadequacy’, and (iv) to analyse falsity in terms of

the privation of knowledge that is involved in ideas being inadequate.

An attempt can be made to explain 'inadequacy' in terms of an example. The image I have of the sun is intrinsically indistinguishable from that of something only about 200 feet away. But a causal explanation of the image would involve the sun's true distance (and, of course, things about my body). My idea of the sun is inadequate, and I am in error in so far as I lack knowledge of the causal explanation of the image.

The trouble with this example is that it suggests that an 'idea' is what we would ordinarily call a 'thought'. But others of Spinoza's examples – such as the one about perceiving a winged horse – suggest that Spinoza's 'ideas' are what, in the Foreword to R. I. P. L. vol. 3, *Knowledge and Necessity*, I called 'epistemic appearances'. Epistemic appearances involve the requisite 'affirmation or negation', and, in this respect, are different from images (if by 'images' are meant what I called 'optical appearances'). But whether Spinoza's 'ideas' are epistemic appearances or thoughts makes no difference: he is still one item short. He asks 'What else is it to perceive a winged horse than to affirm of the horse that it has wings?' But there *are* two things: (1) something's looking like a winged horse, and (2) the thought (which can exist after the perception is over and done with) that there is a winged horse. It is true that the first, in the absence of 'reason for doubting its existence' may lead to the second; but that does not mean that the second is the first plus the absence of reason for doubting.

One of the commonest criticisms of Berkeley is that he was inconsistent in not applying the same objections to talk of spiritual substance as he applied to talk of material substance. S. C. Brown, Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of London, defends him against this criticism, in the various forms it takes. He does so by arguing that Berkeley held there to be a conceptual connection between ideas and spirits. Spirits 'support' ideas, though not in the way Locke held material substance to support them. For Berkeley, ideas are entities that need a support, related to them in a one-many relation. We cannot think of them as isolated. His opposition to abstractionism prevented him following the atomistic route taken by Locke and Hume.

One does not have to be acquainted with this 'support', by introspection, to affirm its existence. It is a matter of recognising the necessity for it. Berkeley's thought, in fact – as reconstructed by Brown – is distinctly Kantian.

If a collection of ideas, obtained at different times or by different

senses, is to be considered one thing, the ideas in question must be united in the mind which has so brought them together and conferred unity upon them. Such an artificial unity presupposes a real unity in that which confers it. It must, that is to say, be the self-same mind to which the ideas are given by which they are also collected together. It is a condition of my *perceiving a collection as one* that I be a true unity.

V. C. Chappell, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts, contrasts the ontology of Parts I, II and III of Book I of Hume's *Treatise* with that of Part IV, especially Sections 2 and 6. The ontology of Parts I, II and III is Lockean. That is, Hume acknowledges the existence, not only of perceptions, but also of perceivers (minds), and of things perceived (e.g. sensible qualities, and the bodies of which they are qualities). The ontology of Part IV is phenomenalist or, to use a term one associates with Mach, James, Holt and Russell, 'neutral monist'. Minds become 'bundles' of causally-related perceptions, and bodies are reduced to collections of qualities and these, in turn, are identified with perceptions.

Chappell speculates as to how Hume came to make this change in ontology. He must have started from the dictum that perceptions are the only things that are *perceived* and concluded that they are the only things that can be *conceived*. Chappell's criticism of this move is formulated in terms of Professor Anscombe's distinction between the 'intentional' and the 'material' objects of a sensation. Hume never made this distinction, Chappell says, but he often observed it. That is, he often recognised that a perception is *of something*, that it has a *content*, though what it is of may not actually exist. Hume's move, he says, is illegitimate since, as Hume allows, we can be conscious of the contents of perceptions as well as of perceptions, and the contents of perceptions are by no means restricted to perceptions.

Chappell then says: 'Of course we have then to face the question as to the precise nature of these contents of perceptions, the question of their ontological status.' But beyond recording his conviction that perceptions are 'queer entities', and that no ontology which is built upon them has any chance of success, he does not answer the question. I hope he will find an opportunity to do so. My own feeling is that the notion of an 'intentional' object is conceptually parasitic on that of a 'material' object, though this is not to say that there must always be a 'material' object.

The change in Hume's ontology, that is the subject of Chappell's paper, has consequences for Hume's concept of truth. If there are

only perceptions it cannot be said that their being true or false consists in their corresponding or not corresponding to things other than perceptions. W. H. Walsh, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, mentions this, but his main concern, if I am not mistaken, is with a wider question, the question of how Hume's 'Science of Human Nature' approach to philosophical questions leads on to Kant's approach in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. At the end of his paper he goes so far as to say that 'the Humean imagination is simply the Kantian understanding in disguise'.

The point is that although Hume's official doctrine is that truth is a 'natural effect' of the causal working of the imagination, he does distinguish between effects on other than 'natural' grounds. There are rules 'by which we ought to regulate our judgements concerning causes and effects', and distinguish 'accidental circumstances' from 'efficacious causes'. These rules, Walsh says,

function not as determinants which operates on us mechanically, like undetected prejudices, but as prescriptions which we know we have to follow if our thinking is to be effective. A rule prescribes what should happen, a general proposition records what does. And at least as regards the principle of causality, Hume recognises in practice that we ascribe to it more force than mere experience would justify: we refuse to accept the possibility of miraculous (uncaused) events, and where we cannot find causes are nonetheless convinced that they are there. How this could be if his official theory were correct is not apparent.

It is not a big step from this to Kant, for whom the understanding is 'the faculty of rules'. And if, as Walsh claims, 'Hume's arguments . . . reveal that empirical thinking has a basis which is neither analytic nor learnt from experience', the step hardly exists.¹

Anthony Manser, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southampton, contrasts Rousseau's account of reason with that to be given by Kant. 'The latter's achievement might crudely be said to lie in his examination of what was involved in human reason. For Rousseau it is not an original possession but something which required historical development, and this in a twofold sense: in the individual, reason developed through education; in society, reason evolved with the transition from primitive to civilised man.' Manser esteems Rousseau for his recognition of the way in which 'human

¹ Making the step, regardless of its size, is made easier by reading Walsh's paper on 'Categories' (*Kant-Studien*, Band 45, 1954, Kolner Universitats-Verlag, reprinted in *Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. R. P. Wolff, New York, Doubleday, 1967, London, Macmillan, 1968, pp. 54-70).

passions, language and reason all develop together'. Ethnologists have tried to explain man's aggressive feelings, for example, by reference to what occurs in the animal world. But, says Manser,

what is needed is an analysis of what is involved in having such feelings, and it seems clear to me that Rousseau is right to claim that a conception of the self and of the rival as another self is a minimum requirement, together with ideas of loss of future benefits and perhaps others. All of these need some kind of language in order to exist. In other words, our passions are in some sense 'linguistic'.

Manser disclaims trying to make Rousseau out to be a premature Wittgenstein, but the parallels are certainly striking. In particular, the sentence he quotes from the beginning of the second book of *Émile*, about speaking and crying, is very like what Wittgenstein says in *The Blue and Brown Books*, p. 103, and *Philosophical Investigations*, I 244, about words being used in the place of the natural expression of emotion.

Within the context of a comparison of Kant's idealism with that of Berkeley, John Watling, Reader in Philosophy at the University of London, examines Kant's explanation of the origin of the necessity of geometrical theorems and of certain properties of space and of objects in space. The origin lay, according to Kant, 'not in concepts or our understanding of concepts, but in the relationship between our faculty of sensible intuition and the nature of the objects with which, by means of that faculty, we become acquainted'. But what exactly is the relationship? Watling considers various alternatives. Is the explanation 'that the character of our faculty made us unable to intuit, and hence unable to perceive, any objects which were not spatial, and which did not obey the laws of geometry'? But this would only yield a limited idealism: the objects we could intuit would be independent of our minds, and could lack spatial properties. The relationship must account for the objects we intuit necessarily being in space and necessarily obeying the laws of geometry. Suppose we reinforce our explanation. The connection between being a thing we can intuit and being in space is one which holds necessarily. But still this won't do. Watling shows why, by means of an amusing analogy.

It is a fact that necessarily, if a fish meets a thing, that thing is met by a fish, but it is not a fact, and so cannot follow, that necessarily, if a fish meets a thing, that thing is a thing which is necessarily met by a fish. I have been met by a fish, yet I am not a thing

which was necessarily met by a fish. Similarly, our reinforced explanation does not have the consequence that, necessarily, if we can intuit a thing, that thing is a thing which is necessarily in space and necessarily obeys the laws of geometry.

The reinforced explanation needs further reinforcement. We must add: 'if we can intuit a thing, then it is a thing which necessarily can be intuited by us'. This has the desired consequence that the things we can intuit are necessarily in space and necessarily obey the laws of geometry. Watling proceeds to defend this interpretation of Kant's explanation against two possible objections, before returning to his comparison of Kant and Berkeley, and asking whether Kant's idealism escapes the implausibilities of Berkeley's. His conclusion is that the consequence of Kant's idealism, that a *thing*, a raindrop, is a mode of intuition, 'is, if anything, more absurd than the corresponding consequence of Berkeley's', that a *quality*, blue, is a mode of perception.

D. W. Hamlyn, Professor of Philosophy at the University of London, examines Schopenhauer's thesis that 'to be necessary can never mean anything but to result from a given reason', and, in particular, his attempt to derive, from the concept of a knowing consciousness, the restriction, to four, of the *ways* in which something must be so for a reason. Hamlyn cannot accept the idealism of Schopenhauer's point of departure, and knows of no other argument 'which could show *a priori* that necessity is conditional', but nevertheless finds things of value in Schopenhauer's treatment of necessity. For example, he thinks Schopenhauer may be right in making what we now call 'logical truths' conditional on certain metalogical truths, the 'laws of thought'. And he thinks that Schopenhauer's conjunction of the tenet that we have 'knowledge without observation' of what we do in intentional action, with the tenet that motions are causes seen from within, 'may suggest that Schopenhauer's views deserve examination by philosophers concerned with the philosophy of mind'. I can hardly disagree.¹

Phenomenologists claim that their philosophical method is a purely descriptive one, but the terms they choose in which to do the describing are usually about as theory-laden as any they could choose, and lead them to ask questions that can be answered only with a metaphysical commitment, often to some form of idealism. From what David Murray, Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of London, says about Hegel, it would appear that he was no exception. 'He proposes . . . merely to observe and to set out the

¹ Having examined some of Schopenhauer's views myself in *The Embodied Mind* (London, 1965) pp. 98–104.

forms of *apparent* knowledge'. But it is not long before he is asking some such question as 'A lump of salt appears to me to have many properties – to be white, cubical, etc. Does the apparent multiplicity arise from the object of perceptual consciousness or from my own constitution?', giving the answer 'Not from the object of perceptual consciousness, because perception alone does not even tell us that the perceived qualities are properties of something', and drawing the conclusion that there are things-in-themselves ('forces') hidden beyond sensible phenomena, understanding which will enable us to say *why* the salt looks white, etc., which forces then turn out to be 'reflections of the understanding consciousness into itself'.

In view of the nasty things Schopenhauer says about Hegel it is interesting to note how Schopenhauer's theory can be seen as a variation on Hegel's. Schopenhauer's conception of causality, as Hamlyn remarks, 'is simply that of a principle which regulates change, so that one state is explained by an earlier'. But besides having the concept of causality Schopenhauer had that of a 'force of nature'. If asked why a certain change had taken place we could answer by mentioning another, immediately preceding, change. If we were then asked 'Why, given this other change, should this one follow?' our answer would be a reference to a force of nature such as gravity, electricity or magnetism. Suppose, next, that we were asked for an explanation of the forces of nature. Schopenhauer says that forces of nature do not admit of physical explanation. But he does allow for what he calls a metaphysical explanation. 'Every true force of nature is a *qualitas occulta*, i.e. it does not admit of physical, but only of metaphysical explanation: in other words, of an explanation which transcends the world of phenomena'. That is in the *Fourfold Root*. In Book I of *The World as Will and Idea*¹ Schopenhauer develops this idea, and calls that which requires a metaphysical explanation 'the thing-in-itself'. He says that the thing-in-itself can be made intelligible only by what is said in Book II. In Book II he writes:²

Whoever has now gained . . . a knowledge that his will is the real inner nature of his phenomenal being . . . will find that of itself it affords him the key to the knowledge of the inmost being of the whole of nature. . . . The concept will . . . is of all possible concepts the only one which has its source *not* in the phenomenal, *not* in the mere idea of perception, but comes from within. . . . If, therefore, we refer the concept of *force* to that of *will*, we have in fact referred the less known to what is infinitely better known.

¹ Trans. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp (London, 1950) 1 106.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 141–2, 145.

I am not saying that Schopenhauer can be understood in terms of Hegel (or vice versa); merely that there are interesting resemblances.

G. H. R. Parkinson, Reader in Philosophy at the University of Reading, in a lecture which seems to me to be a model of how to put across a difficult subject, explains and defends Hegel's concept of freedom. Hegel says that willing involves (a) the pure thought of oneself, and (b) a content, which may either be given by nature (impulses, desires, inclinations) or be produced out of the concept of mind itself. In the former case freedom is mere 'arbitrariness' (the ability to do as we please). In the latter, the will is free not only 'in itself' but also 'for itself'. This is genuine freedom. But a problem arises. If the content is produced out of the concept of mind itself, and the pure thought of oneself is absolutely abstract, what guidance can it provide? The solution lies in rejecting the Cartesian concept of mind (the 'solitary thinker' to whom Murray refers at the end of his paper) in favour of a concept of mind that is manifested in the context of social institutions. A man's self-awareness is not limited to the particular empirical existence of an individual. His thinking is not restricted even to his membership of a particular state. It extends to the whole world. In so far as his thinking is so extended, he is truly free.

David Lyons, Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University, asks whether Bentham was a utilitarian, if utilitarianism is taken to mean that every affected interest is relevant to the moral appraisal of an act. He argues that Bentham's utilitarianism is not universalistic but parochial, and not even simply parochial. 'He embraces a dual standard – one for the public (or political) sphere, another for the private. But these are conceived by him as resting upon a more fundamental principle of utility.' Discovering what that principle is involves analysis of the phrase 'the party whose interest is considered'. It emerges (Lyons' paper reads rather like a detective story – a good one) that Bentham divides ethics, not in terms of those whose interests are affected, but by reference to the person or persons whose actions are directed (to the production of happiness). 'A man may direct either his own actions or those of other agents,' the latter if he is a 'government functionary'. Thus Bentham's basic principle of utility is a differential one. The range of relevant interests is not fixed in the usual way – by reference to the interests (either universal or parochial) affected. They are fixed by reference *either* to the person acting as a private individual (in which case the person's own actions are directed, and directed primarily, Lyons argues, to his own interests), *or* to the person acting as a government functionary (in which case it is the actions of others that are directed,

and directed to the public interest, the happiness of the community).

Much of Lyons' paper is taken up with a detailed defence of this dualistic interpretation of Bentham's principle against the standard universalistic interpretation. The defence involves him, among other things, in arguing that Bentham assumes that personal and community interests harmonise.

It is interesting to speculate as to what would happen to philosophical ideas were they transplanted from one country, or one century, to another. Manser, lecturing on Rousseau, and Parkinson, on Hegel, are concerned with the philosophical ideas of man as an essentially social creature, of reason as something he has in virtue of being a social creature, of his being more than just a part of nature in virtue of having reason, and of his freedom as being more than just his being able to satisfy his natural appetites and inclinations. What would become of these ideas were they transplanted to Victorian England? J. Kemp, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Leicester, gives us the answer. According to T. H. Green, man is more than just a part of nature in so far as he is self-conscious. In virtue of being self-conscious he can set against his actual self the idea of another, better self which it is within his power to realise. Moral action is action directed to such 'self-realisation'. The ideal self one seeks to realise is an essentially social being, a self whose good is the common good. One is free, in a positive sense, when one has attained this self-realisation, when one has developed to the full one's capacities in this respect.

Kemp has not a very high regard for Green as a philosopher. For one thing he does not approve of the practice of stretching the use of the word 'free' so that the approval that goes with the standard use (presumably as in 'Delicate Ariel, I'll set thee free for this') becomes attached to a non-standard use in which a man is free in so far as his life is devoted to the common good. He thinks Green has committed the excommunicable sin of subordinating philosophy to something else. That his bias is for doing good does not excuse him.

I am not sure about the distinction between philosophy for its own sake and philosophy subordinated to something else. In philosophical discussions we always think it is the other person whose bias prevents him recognising what a word really means, prevents him applying the rules of the language rightly. But for the other person his use is the right use. In all sincerity he prefixes his remarks with 'strictly speaking'. He thinks he can see through the appearances to the reality, and apprehend it by the pure light of reason – though these may no longer be the terms in which he describes his activity.

I am grateful to Renford Bambrough for suggesting the title *Reason and Reality* for this volume of Royal Institute of Philosophy lectures. Next year's lectures will be mainly on topics in aesthetics, and will be published under the title *Philosophy and the Arts*.

G. N. A. VESEY

Honorary Director
The Royal Institute of Philosophy
Professor of Philosophy
The Open University