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# Contents   Volume 34:5   October 2011

<b>Elqayam, S. &amp; Evans, J. St. B. T.</b> Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking	233
<b>Open Peer Commentary</b>	
<b>Achourioti, T., Fugard, A. &amp; Stenning, K.</b> Throwing the normative baby out with the prescriptivist bathwater	249
<b>Bonnefon, J.-F.</b> Norms for reasoning about decisions	249
<b>Brase, G. L. &amp; Shanteau, J.</b> The unbearable lightness of “Thinking”: Moving beyond simple concepts of thinking, rationality, and hypothesis testing	250
<b>Buckwalter, W. &amp; Stich, S.</b> Competence, reflective equilibrium, and dual-system theories	251
<b>Douven, I.</b> A role for normativism	252
<b>Dutilh Novaes, C.</b> The historical and philosophical origins of normativism	253
<b>Foss, J.</b> Just the facts, and only the facts, about human rationality?	254
<b>Fuller, T. &amp; Samuels, R.</b> Overselling the case against normativism	255
<b>Girotto, V.</b> Undisputed norms and normal errors in human thinking	255
<b>Gold, N., Colman, A. M. &amp; Pulford, B. D.</b> Normative theory in decision making and moral reasoning	256
<b>Hahn, U.</b> Why rational norms are indispensable	257
<b>Hrotic, S.</b> Defending normativism	258
<b>Kim, K. &amp; Park, Y.</b> Cultural and individual differences in the generalization of theories regarding human thinking	259
<b>McNair, S. &amp; Feeney, A.</b> Norms and high-level cognition: Consequences, trends, and antidotes	260
<b>Nickerson, R. S.</b> Norms, goals, and the study of thinking	261
<b>Oaksford, M. &amp; Chater, N.</b> The “is-ought fallacy” fallacy	262
<b>Pfeifer, N.</b> Systematic rationality norms provide research roadmaps and clarity	263
<b>Pothos, E. M. &amp; Busemeyer, J. R.</b> A case for limited prescriptive normativism	264
<b>Proust, J.</b> Epistemic normativity from the reasoner’s viewpoint	265
<b>Quintelier, K. J. P. &amp; Fessler, D. M. T.</b> Naturalizing the normative and the bridges between “is” and “ought”	266
<b>Schurz, G.</b> Truth-conduciveness as the primary epistemic justification of normative systems of reasoning	266
<b>Spurrett, D.</b> Reason is normative, and should be studied accordingly	267
<b>Stanovich, K. E.</b> Normative models in psychology are here to stay	268
<b>Sternberg, R. J.</b> Understanding reasoning: Let’s describe what we really think about	269
<b>Stupple, E. J. N. &amp; Ball, L. J.</b> Normative benchmarks are useful for studying individual differences in reasoning	270
<b>Sun, Y. &amp; Wang, H.</b> Probability theory and perception of randomness: Bridging “ought” and “is”	271
<b>Thompson, V. A.</b> Normativism versus mechanism	272
<b>Waldmann, M. R.</b> Neurath’s ship: The constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories of rationality	273
<b>Weinberg, J. M.</b> What is evaluative normativity, that we (maybe) should avoid it?	274
<b>Authors’ Response</b>	
<b>Evans, J. St. B. T. &amp; Elqayam, S.</b> Towards a descriptivist psychology of reasoning and decision making	275

## Erratum

**Speekenbrink, M. & Shanks, D. R.** Is everyone Bayes? On the testable implications of Bayesian Fundamentalism – Erratum

291