

Technical Summary



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TS.1 Framing and Context

This chapter frames the context, knowledge-base and assessment approaches used to understand the impacts of 1.5°C global warming above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, building on the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.

Human-induced warming reached approximately 1°C (likely between 0.8°C and 1.2°C) above pre-industrial levels in 2017, increasing at 0.2°C (likely between 0.1°C and 0.3°C) per decade (high confidence). Global warming is defined in this report as an increase in combined surface air and sea surface temperatures averaged over the globe and over a 30-year period. Unless otherwise specified, warming is expressed relative to the period 1850–1900, used as an approximation of pre-industrial temperatures in AR5. For periods shorter than 30 years, warming refers to the estimated average temperature over the 30 years centred on that shorter period, accounting for the impact of any temperature fluctuations or trend within those 30 years. Accordingly, warming from pre-industrial levels to the decade 2006–2015 is assessed to be 0.87°C (likely between 0.75°C and 0.99°C). Since 2000, the estimated level of human-induced warming has been equal to the level of observed warming with a likely range of $\pm 20\%$ accounting for uncertainty due to contributions from solar and volcanic activity over the historical period (high confidence). {1.2.1}

Warming greater than the global average has already been experienced in many regions and seasons, with higher average warming over land than over the ocean (high confidence). Most land regions are experiencing greater warming than the global average, while most ocean regions are warming at a slower rate. Depending on the temperature dataset considered, 20–40% of the global human population live in regions that, by the decade 2006–2015, had already experienced warming of more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial in at least one season (medium confidence). {1.2.1, 1.2.2}

Past emissions alone are unlikely to raise global-mean temperature to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (medium confidence), but past emissions do commit to other changes, such as further sea level rise (high confidence). If all anthropogenic emissions (including aerosol-related) were reduced to zero immediately, any further warming beyond the 1°C already experienced would likely be less than 0.5°C over the next two to three decades (high confidence), and likely less than 0.5°C on a century time scale (medium confidence), due to the opposing effects of different climate processes and drivers. A warming greater than 1.5°C is therefore not geophysically unavoidable: whether it will occur depends on future rates of emission reductions. {1.2.3, 1.2.4}

1.5°C emission pathways are defined as those that, given current knowledge of the climate response, provide a one-in-two to two-in-three chance of warming either remaining below 1.5°C or returning to 1.5°C by around 2100 following

an overshoot. Overshoot pathways are characterized by the peak magnitude of the overshoot, which may have implications for impacts. All 1.5°C pathways involve limiting cumulative emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide, and substantial reductions in other climate forcers (high confidence). Limiting cumulative emissions requires either reducing net global emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases to zero before the cumulative limit is reached, or net negative global emissions (anthropogenic removals) after the limit is exceeded. {1.2.3, 1.2.4, Cross-Chapter Boxes 1 and 2}

This report assesses projected impacts at a global average warming of 1.5°C and higher levels of warming. Global warming of 1.5°C is associated with global average surface temperatures fluctuating naturally on either side of 1.5°C, together with warming substantially greater than 1.5°C in many regions and seasons (high confidence), all of which must be considered in the assessment of impacts. Impacts at 1.5°C of warming also depend on the emission pathway to 1.5°C. Very different impacts result from pathways that remain below 1.5°C versus pathways that return to 1.5°C after a substantial overshoot, and when temperatures stabilize at 1.5°C versus a transient warming past 1.5°C (medium confidence). {1.2.3, 1.3}

Ethical considerations, and the principle of equity in particular, are central to this report, recognizing that many of the impacts of warming up to and beyond 1.5°C, and some potential impacts of mitigation actions required to limit warming to 1.5°C, fall disproportionately on the poor and vulnerable (high confidence). Equity has procedural and distributive dimensions and requires fairness in burden sharing both between generations and between and within nations. In framing the objective of holding the increase in the global average temperature rise to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C, the Paris Agreement associates the principle of equity with the broader goals of poverty eradication and sustainable development, recognising that effective responses to climate change require a global collective effort that may be guided by the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. {1.1.1}

Climate adaptation refers to the actions taken to manage impacts of climate change by reducing vulnerability and exposure to its harmful effects and exploiting any potential benefits. Adaptation takes place at international, national and local levels. Subnational jurisdictions and entities, including urban and rural municipalities, are key to developing and reinforcing measures for reducing weather- and climate-related risks. Adaptation implementation faces several barriers including lack of up-to-date and locally relevant information, lack of finance and technology, social values and attitudes, and institutional constraints (high confidence). Adaptation is more likely to contribute to sustainable development when policies align with mitigation and poverty eradication goals (medium confidence). {1.1, 1.4}

Ambitious mitigation actions are indispensable to limit warming to 1.5°C while achieving sustainable development and poverty eradication (high confidence). Ill-designed responses,

however, could pose challenges especially – but not exclusively – for countries and regions contending with poverty and those requiring significant transformation of their energy systems. This report focuses on ‘climate-resilient development pathways’, which aim to meet the goals of sustainable development, including climate adaptation and mitigation, poverty eradication and reducing inequalities. But any feasible pathway that remains within 1.5°C involves synergies and trade-offs (*high confidence*). Significant uncertainty remains as to which pathways are more consistent with the principle of equity. {1.1.1, 1.4}

Multiple forms of knowledge, including scientific evidence, narrative scenarios and prospective pathways, inform the understanding of 1.5°C. This report is informed by traditional evidence of the physical climate system and associated impacts and vulnerabilities of climate change, together with knowledge drawn from the perceptions of risk and the experiences of climate impacts and governance systems. Scenarios and pathways are used to explore conditions enabling goal-oriented futures while recognizing the significance of ethical considerations, the principle of equity, and the societal transformation needed. {1.2.3, 1.5.2}

There is no single answer to the question of whether it is feasible to limit warming to 1.5°C and adapt to the consequences. Feasibility is considered in this report as the capacity of a system as a whole to achieve a specific outcome. The global transformation that would be needed to limit warming to 1.5°C requires enabling conditions that reflect the links, synergies and trade-offs between mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development. These enabling conditions are assessed across many dimensions of feasibility – geophysical, environmental-ecological, technological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional – that may be considered through the unifying lens of the Anthropocene, acknowledging profound, differential but increasingly geologically significant human influences on the Earth system as a whole. This framing also emphasises the global interconnectivity of past, present and future human–environment relations, highlighting the need and opportunities for integrated responses to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. {1.1, Cross-Chapter Box 1}

TS.2 Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5°C in the Context of Sustainable Development

This chapter assesses mitigation pathways consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. In doing so, it explores the following key questions: What role do CO₂ and non-CO₂ emissions play? {2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.6} To what extent do 1.5°C pathways involve overshooting and returning below 1.5°C during the 21st century? {2.2, 2.3} What are the implications for transitions in energy, land use and sustainable development? {2.3, 2.4, 2.5} How do policy frameworks affect the ability to limit warming to 1.5°C? {2.3, 2.5} What are the associated knowledge gaps? {2.6}

The assessed pathways describe integrated, quantitative evolutions of all emissions over the 21st century associated with global energy and land use and the world economy. The assessment is contingent upon available integrated assessment literature and model assumptions, and is complemented by other studies with different scope, for example, those focusing on individual sectors. In recent years, integrated mitigation studies have improved the characterizations of mitigation pathways. However, limitations remain, as climate damages, avoided impacts, or societal co-benefits of the modelled transformations remain largely unaccounted for, while concurrent rapid technological changes, behavioural aspects, and uncertainties about input data present continuous challenges. (*high confidence*) {2.1.3, 2.3, 2.5.1, 2.6, Technical Annex 2}

The Chances of Limiting Warming to 1.5°C and the Requirements for Urgent Action

Pathways consistent with 1.5°C of warming above pre-industrial levels can be identified under a range of assumptions about economic growth, technology developments and lifestyles. However, lack of global cooperation, lack of governance of the required energy and land transformation, and increases in resource-intensive consumption are key impediments to achieving 1.5°C pathways. Governance challenges have been related to scenarios with high inequality and high population growth in the 1.5°C pathway literature. {2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.5}

Under emissions in line with current pledges under the Paris Agreement (known as Nationally Determined Contributions, or NDCs), global warming is expected to surpass 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, even if these pledges are supplemented with very challenging increases in the scale and ambition of mitigation after 2030 (*high confidence*). This increased action would need to achieve net zero CO₂ emissions in less than 15 years. Even if this is achieved, temperatures would only be expected to remain below the 1.5°C threshold if the actual geophysical response ends up being towards the low end of the currently estimated uncertainty range. Transition challenges as well as identified trade-offs can be reduced if global emissions peak before 2030 and marked emissions reductions compared to today are already achieved by 2030. {2.2, 2.3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4}

Limiting warming to 1.5°C depends on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions over the next decades, where lower GHG emissions in 2030 lead to a higher chance of keeping peak warming to 1.5°C (high confidence). Available pathways that aim for no or limited (less than 0.1°C) overshoot of 1.5°C keep GHG emissions in 2030 to 25–30 GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ in 2030 (interquartile range). This contrasts with median estimates for current unconditional NDCs of 52–58 GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ in 2030. Pathways that aim for limiting warming to 1.5°C by 2100 after a temporary temperature overshoot rely on large-scale deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) measures, which are uncertain and entail clear risks. In model pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C, global net anthropogenic CO₂ emissions decline by about 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 (40–60% interquartile range), reaching net zero around 2050 (2045–2055 interquartile range). For limiting global warming to below 2°C with at least 66% probability CO₂ emissions are projected to decline by about 25% by 2030 in most pathways (10–30% interquartile range) and reach net zero around 2070 (2065–2080 interquartile range).¹ {2.2, 2.3.3, 2.3.5, 2.5.3, Cross-Chapter Boxes 6 in Chapter 3 and 9 in Chapter 4, 4.3.7}

Limiting warming to 1.5°C implies reaching net zero CO₂ emissions globally around 2050 and concurrent deep reductions in emissions of non-CO₂ forcers, particularly methane (high confidence). Such mitigation pathways are characterized by energy-demand reductions, decarbonization of electricity and other fuels, electrification of energy end use, deep reductions in agricultural emissions, and some form of CDR with carbon storage on land or sequestration in geological reservoirs. Low energy demand and low demand for land- and GHG-intensive consumption goods facilitate limiting warming to as close as possible to 1.5°C. {2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.3.5, 2.5.1, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}.

In comparison to a 2°C limit, the transformations required to limit warming to 1.5°C are qualitatively similar but more pronounced and rapid over the next decades (high confidence). 1.5°C implies very ambitious, internationally cooperative policy environments that transform both supply and demand (high confidence). {2.3, 2.4, 2.5}

Policies reflecting a high price on emissions are necessary in models to achieve cost-effective 1.5°C pathways (high confidence). Other things being equal, modelling studies suggest the global average discounted marginal abatement costs for limiting warming to 1.5°C being about 3–4 times higher compared to 2°C over the 21st century, with large variations across models and socio-economic and policy assumptions. Carbon pricing can be imposed directly or implicitly by regulatory policies. Policy instruments, like technology policies or performance standards, can complement explicit carbon pricing in specific areas. {2.5.1, 2.5.2, 4.4.5}

Limiting warming to 1.5°C requires a marked shift in investment patterns (medium confidence). Additional annual average energy-related investments for the period 2016 to 2050 in pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C compared to pathways without new climate policies beyond those in place today (i.e., baseline) are estimated to be around

830 billion USD₂₀₁₀ (range of 150 billion to 1700 billion USD₂₀₁₀ across six models). Total energy-related investments increase by about 12% (range of 3% to 24%) in 1.5°C pathways relative to 2°C pathways. Average annual investment in low-carbon energy technologies and energy efficiency are upscaled by roughly a factor of six (range of factor of 4 to 10) by 2050 compared to 2015, overtaking fossil investments globally by around 2025 (medium confidence). Uncertainties and strategic mitigation portfolio choices affect the magnitude and focus of required investments. {2.5.2}

Future Emissions in 1.5°C Pathways

Mitigation requirements can be quantified using carbon budget approaches that relate cumulative CO₂ emissions to global mean temperature increase. Robust physical understanding underpins this relationship, but uncertainties become increasingly relevant as a specific temperature limit is approached. These uncertainties relate to the transient climate response to cumulative carbon emissions (TCRE), non-CO₂ emissions, radiative forcing and response, potential additional Earth system feedbacks (such as permafrost thawing), and historical emissions and temperature. {2.2.2, 2.6.1}

Cumulative CO₂ emissions are kept within a budget by reducing global annual CO₂ emissions to net zero. This assessment suggests a remaining budget of about 420 GtCO₂ for a two-thirds chance of limiting warming to 1.5°C, and of about 580 GtCO₂ for an even chance (medium confidence). The remaining carbon budget is defined here as cumulative CO₂ emissions from the start of 2018 until the time of net zero global emissions for global warming defined as a change in global near-surface air temperatures. Remaining budgets applicable to 2100 would be approximately 100 GtCO₂ lower than this to account for permafrost thawing and potential methane release from wetlands in the future, and more thereafter. These estimates come with an additional geophysical uncertainty of at least ±400 GtCO₂, related to non-CO₂ response and TCRE distribution. Uncertainties in the level of historic warming contribute ±250 GtCO₂. In addition, these estimates can vary by ±250 GtCO₂ depending on non-CO₂ mitigation strategies as found in available pathways. {2.2.2, 2.6.1}

Staying within a remaining carbon budget of 580 GtCO₂ implies that CO₂ emissions reach carbon neutrality in about 30 years, reduced to 20 years for a 420 GtCO₂ remaining carbon budget (high confidence). The ±400 GtCO₂ geophysical uncertainty range surrounding a carbon budget translates into a variation of this timing of carbon neutrality of roughly ±15–20 years. If emissions do not start declining in the next decade, the point of carbon neutrality would need to be reached at least two decades earlier to remain within the same carbon budget. {2.2.2, 2.3.5}

Non-CO₂ emissions contribute to peak warming and thus affect the remaining carbon budget. The evolution of methane and sulphur dioxide emissions strongly influences the chances of limiting warming to 1.5°C. In the near-term, a

¹ Kyoto-GHG emissions in this statement are aggregated with GWP-100 values of the IPCC Second Assessment Report.

weakening of aerosol cooling would add to future warming, but can be tempered by reductions in methane emissions (*high confidence*). Uncertainty in radiative forcing estimates (particularly aerosol) affects carbon budgets and the certainty of pathway categorizations. Some non-CO₂ forcers are emitted alongside CO₂, particularly in the energy and transport sectors, and can be largely addressed through CO₂ mitigation. Others require specific measures, for example, to target agricultural nitrous oxide (N₂O) and methane (CH₄), some sources of black carbon, or hydrofluorocarbons (*high confidence*). In many cases, non-CO₂ emissions reductions are similar in 2°C pathways, indicating reductions near their assumed maximum potential by integrated assessment models. Emissions of N₂O and NH₃ increase in some pathways with strongly increased bioenergy demand. {2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.2, 2.5.3}

The Role of Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR)

All analysed pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot use CDR to some extent to neutralize emissions from sources for which no mitigation measures have been identified and, in most cases, also to achieve net negative emissions to return global warming to 1.5°C following a peak (*high confidence*). The longer the delay in reducing CO₂ emissions towards zero, the larger the likelihood of exceeding 1.5°C, and the heavier the implied reliance on net negative emissions after mid-century to return warming to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). The faster reduction of net CO₂ emissions in 1.5°C compared to 2°C pathways is predominantly achieved by measures that result in less CO₂ being produced and emitted, and only to a smaller degree through additional CDR. Limitations on the speed, scale and societal acceptability of CDR deployment also limit the conceivable extent of temperature overshoot. Limits to our understanding of how the carbon cycle responds to net negative emissions increase the uncertainty about the effectiveness of CDR to decline temperatures after a peak. {2.2, 2.3, 2.6, 4.3.7}

CDR deployed at scale is unproven, and reliance on such technology is a major risk in the ability to limit warming to 1.5°C. CDR is needed less in pathways with particularly strong emphasis on energy efficiency and low demand. The scale and type of CDR deployment varies widely across 1.5°C pathways, with different consequences for achieving sustainable development objectives (*high confidence*). Some pathways rely more on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), while others rely more on afforestation, which are the two CDR methods most often included in integrated pathways. Trade-offs with other sustainability objectives occur predominantly through increased land, energy, water and investment demand. Bioenergy use is substantial in 1.5°C pathways with or without BECCS due to its multiple roles in decarbonizing energy use. {2.3.1, 2.5.3, 2.6.3, 4.3.7}

Properties of Energy and Land Transitions in 1.5°C Pathways

The share of primary energy from renewables increases while coal usage decreases across pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (*high confidence*). By 2050, renewables (including bioenergy, hydro, wind, and solar, with direct-

equivalence method) supply a share of 52–67% (interquartile range) of primary energy in 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot; while the share from coal decreases to 1–7% (interquartile range), with a large fraction of this coal use combined with carbon capture and storage (CCS). From 2020 to 2050 the primary energy supplied by oil declines in most pathways (–39 to –77% interquartile range). Natural gas changes by –13% to –62% (interquartile range), but some pathways show a marked increase albeit with widespread deployment of CCS. The overall deployment of CCS varies widely across 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot, with cumulative CO₂ stored through 2050 ranging from zero up to 300 GtCO₂ (minimum–maximum range), of which zero up to 140 GtCO₂ is stored from biomass. Primary energy supplied by bioenergy ranges from 40–310 EJ yr⁻¹ in 2050 (minimum–maximum range), and nuclear from 3–66 EJ yr⁻¹ (minimum–maximum range). These ranges reflect both uncertainties in technological development and strategic mitigation portfolio choices. {2.4.2}

1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot include a rapid decline in the carbon intensity of electricity and an increase in electrification of energy end use (*high confidence*). By 2050, the carbon intensity of electricity decreases to –92 to +11 gCO₂ MJ⁻¹ (minimum–maximum range) from about 140 gCO₂ MJ⁻¹ in 2020, and electricity covers 34–71% (minimum–maximum range) of final energy across 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot from about 20% in 2020. By 2050, the share of electricity supplied by renewables increases to 59–97% (minimum–maximum range) across 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot. Pathways with higher chances of holding warming to below 1.5°C generally show a faster decline in the carbon intensity of electricity by 2030 than pathways that temporarily overshoot 1.5°C. {2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.3}

Transitions in global and regional land use are found in all pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot, but their scale depends on the pursued mitigation portfolio (*high confidence*). Pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot project a 4 million km² reduction to a 2.5 million km² increase of non-pasture agricultural land for food and feed crops and a 0.5–11 million km² reduction of pasture land, to be converted into 0–6 million km² of agricultural land for energy crops and a 2 million km² reduction to 9.5 million km² increase in forests by 2050 relative to 2010 (*medium confidence*). Land-use transitions of similar magnitude can be observed in modelled 2°C pathways (*medium confidence*). Such large transitions pose profound challenges for sustainable management of the various demands on land for human settlements, food, livestock feed, fibre, bioenergy, carbon storage, biodiversity and other ecosystem services (*high confidence*). {2.3.4, 2.4.4}

Demand-Side Mitigation and Behavioural Changes

Demand-side measures are key elements of 1.5°C pathways. Lifestyle choices lowering energy demand and the land- and GHG-intensity of food consumption can further support achievement of 1.5°C pathways (*high confidence*). By 2030 and 2050, all end-use sectors (including building, transport, and industry) show marked energy demand reductions in modelled 1.5°C pathways,

comparable and beyond those projected in 2°C pathways. Sectoral models support the scale of these reductions. {2.3.4, 2.4.3, 2.5.1}

Links between 1.5°C Pathways and Sustainable Development

Choices about mitigation portfolios for limiting warming to 1.5°C can positively or negatively impact the achievement of other societal objectives, such as sustainable development (*high confidence*). In particular, demand-side and efficiency measures, and lifestyle choices that limit energy, resource, and GHG-intensive food demand support sustainable development (*medium confidence*). Limiting warming to 1.5°C can be achieved synergistically with poverty alleviation and improved energy security and can provide large public health benefits through improved air quality, preventing millions of premature deaths. However, specific mitigation measures, such as bioenergy, may result in trade-offs that require consideration. {2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3}

TS.3 Impacts of 1.5°C Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems

This chapter builds on findings of AR5 and assesses new scientific evidence of changes in the climate system and the associated impacts on natural and human systems, with a specific focus on the magnitude and pattern of risks linked for global warming of 1.5°C above temperatures in the pre-industrial period. Chapter 3 explores observed impacts and projected risks to a range of natural and human systems, with a focus on how risk levels change from 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming. The chapter also revisits major categories of risk (Reasons for Concern, RFC) based on the assessment of new knowledge that has become available since AR5.

1.5°C and 2°C Warmer Worlds

The global climate has changed relative to the pre-industrial period, and there are multiple lines of evidence that these changes have had impacts on organisms and ecosystems, as well as on human systems and well-being (*high confidence*). The increase in global mean surface temperature (GMST), which reached 0.87°C in 2006–2015 relative to 1850–1900, has increased the frequency and magnitude of impacts (*high confidence*), strengthening evidence of how an increase in GMST of 1.5°C or more could impact natural and human systems (1.5°C versus 2°C). {3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, Cross-Chapter Boxes 6, 7 and 8 in this chapter}

Human-induced global warming has already caused multiple observed changes in the climate system (*high confidence*). Changes include increases in both land and ocean temperatures, as well as more frequent heatwaves in most land regions (*high confidence*). There is also *high confidence* that global warming has resulted in an increase in the frequency and duration of marine heatwaves. Further, there is substantial evidence that human-induced global warming has led to an increase in the frequency, intensity and/or amount of heavy precipitation events at the global scale (*medium confidence*), as well as an increased risk of drought in the Mediterranean region (*medium confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, Box 3.4}

Trends in intensity and frequency of some climate and weather extremes have been detected over time spans during which about 0.5°C of global warming occurred (*medium confidence*). This assessment is based on several lines of evidence, including attribution studies for changes in extremes since 1950. {3.2, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4}

Several regional changes in climate are assessed to occur with global warming up to 1.5°C as compared to pre-industrial levels, including warming of extreme temperatures in many regions (*high confidence*), increases in frequency, intensity and/or amount of heavy precipitation in several regions (*high confidence*), and an increase in intensity or frequency of droughts in some regions (*medium confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, Table 3.2}

There is no single '1.5°C warmer world' (*high confidence*). In addition to the overall increase in GMST, it is important to consider the

size and duration of potential overshoots in temperature. Furthermore, there are questions on how the stabilization of an increase in GMST of 1.5°C can be achieved, and how policies might be able to influence the resilience of human and natural systems, and the nature of regional and subregional risks. Overshooting poses large risks for natural and human systems, especially if the temperature at peak warming is high, because some risks may be long-lasting and irreversible, such as the loss of some ecosystems (*high confidence*). The rate of change for several types of risks may also have relevance, with potentially large risks in the case of a rapid rise to overshooting temperatures, even if a decrease to 1.5°C can be achieved at the end of the 21st century or later (*medium confidence*). If overshoot is to be minimized, the remaining equivalent CO₂ budget available for emissions is very small, which implies that large, immediate and unprecedented global efforts to mitigate greenhouse gases are required (*high confidence*). {3.2, 3.6.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in this chapter}

Robust¹ global differences in temperature means and extremes are expected if global warming reaches 1.5°C versus 2°C above the pre-industrial levels (*high confidence*). For oceans, regional surface temperature means and extremes are projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of global warming (*high confidence*). Temperature means and extremes are also projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C in most land regions, with increases being 2–3 times greater than the increase in GMST projected for some regions (*high confidence*). Robust increases in temperature means and extremes are also projected at 1.5°C compared to present-day values (*high confidence*) {3.3.1, 3.3.2}. There are decreases in the occurrence of cold extremes, but substantial increases in their temperature, in particular in regions with snow or ice cover (*high confidence*) {3.3.1}.

Climate models project robust² differences in regional climate between present-day and global warming up to 1.5°C³, and between 1.5°C and 2°C³ (*high confidence*), depending on the variable and region in question (*high confidence*). Large, robust and widespread differences are expected for temperature extremes (*high confidence*). Regarding hot extremes, the strongest warming is expected to occur at mid-latitudes in the warm season (with increases of up to 3°C for 1.5°C of global warming, i.e., a factor of two) and at high latitudes in the cold season (with increases of up to 4.5°C at 1.5°C of global warming, i.e., a factor of three) (*high confidence*). The strongest warming of hot extremes is projected to occur in central and eastern North America, central and southern Europe, the Mediterranean region (including southern Europe, northern Africa and the Near East), western and central Asia, and southern Africa (*medium confidence*). The number of exceptionally hot days are expected to increase the most in the tropics, where interannual temperature variability is lowest; extreme heatwaves are thus projected to emerge earliest in these regions, and they are expected to already become widespread there at 1.5°C global warming (*high confidence*). Limiting global warming to 1.5°C instead of 2°C could result in around 420 million fewer people being frequently exposed to extreme heatwaves,

and about 65 million fewer people being exposed to exceptional heatwaves, assuming constant vulnerability (*medium confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.3.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in this chapter}

Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would limit risks of increases in heavy precipitation events on a global scale and in several regions compared to conditions at 2°C global warming (*medium confidence*). The regions with the largest increases in heavy precipitation events for 1.5°C to 2°C global warming include: several high-latitude regions (e.g. Alaska/western Canada, eastern Canada/Greenland/Iceland, northern Europe and northern Asia); mountainous regions (e.g., Tibetan Plateau); eastern Asia (including China and Japan); and eastern North America (*medium confidence*). Tropical cyclones are projected to decrease in frequency but with an increase in the number of very intense cyclones (*limited evidence, low confidence*). Heavy precipitation associated with tropical cyclones is projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of global warming (*medium confidence*). Heavy precipitation, when aggregated at a global scale, is projected to be higher at 2°C than at 1.5°C of global warming (*medium confidence*) {3.3.3, 3.3.6}

Limiting global warming to 1.5°C is expected to substantially reduce the probability of extreme drought, precipitation deficits, and risks associated with water availability (i.e., water stress) in some regions (*medium confidence*). In particular, risks associated with increases in drought frequency and magnitude are projected to be substantially larger at 2°C than at 1.5°C in the Mediterranean region (including southern Europe, northern Africa and the Near East) and southern Africa (*medium confidence*). {3.3.3, 3.3.4, Box 3.1, Box 3.2}

Risks to natural and human systems are expected to be lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C of global warming (*high confidence*). This difference is due to the smaller rates and magnitudes of climate change associated with a 1.5°C temperature increase, including lower frequencies and intensities of temperature-related extremes. Lower rates of change enhance the ability of natural and human systems to adapt, with substantial benefits for a wide range of terrestrial, freshwater, wetland, coastal and ocean ecosystems (including coral reefs) (*high confidence*), as well as food production systems, human health, and tourism (*medium confidence*), together with energy systems and transportation (*low confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.4}

Exposure to multiple and compound climate-related risks is projected to increase between 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming with greater proportions of people both exposed and susceptible to poverty in Africa and Asia (*high confidence*). For global warming from 1.5°C to 2°C, risks across energy, food, and water sectors could overlap spatially and temporally, creating new – and exacerbating current – hazards, exposures, and vulnerabilities that could affect increasing numbers of people and regions (*medium confidence*). Small island states and economically disadvantaged populations are particularly at risk (*high confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.4.5.3, 3.4.5.6, 3.4.11, 3.5.4.9, Box 3.5}

² Robust is used here to mean that at least two thirds of climate models show the same sign of changes at the grid point scale, and that differences in large regions are statistically significant.

³ Projected changes in impacts between different levels of global warming are determined with respect to changes in global mean near-surface air temperature.

Global warming of 2°C would lead to an expansion of areas with significant increases in runoff, as well as those affected by flood hazard, compared to conditions at 1.5°C (medium confidence). Global warming of 1.5°C would also lead to an expansion of the global land area with significant increases in runoff (*medium confidence*) and an increase in flood hazard in some regions (*medium confidence*) compared to present-day conditions. {3.3.5}

The probability of a sea-ice-free Arctic Ocean⁴ during summer is substantially higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of global warming (medium confidence). Model simulations suggest that at least one sea-ice-free Arctic summer is expected every 10 years for global warming of 2°C, with the frequency decreasing to one sea-ice-free Arctic summer every 100 years under 1.5°C (*medium confidence*). An intermediate temperature overshoot will have no long-term consequences for Arctic sea ice coverage, and hysteresis is not expected (*high confidence*). {3.3.8, 3.4.4.7}

Global mean sea level rise (GMSLR) is projected to be around 0.1 m (0.04 – 0.16 m) less by the end of the 21st century in a 1.5°C warmer world compared to a 2°C warmer world (medium confidence). Projected GMSLR for 1.5°C of global warming has an indicative range of 0.26 – 0.77m, relative to 1986–2005, (*medium confidence*). A smaller sea level rise could mean that up to 10.4 million fewer people (based on the 2010 global population and assuming no adaptation) would be exposed to the impacts of sea level rise globally in 2100 at 1.5°C compared to at 2°C. A slower rate of sea level rise enables greater opportunities for adaptation (*medium confidence*). There is *high confidence* that sea level rise will continue beyond 2100. Instabilities exist for both the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, which could result in multi-meter rises in sea level on time scales of century to millennia. There is *medium confidence* that these instabilities could be triggered at around 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming. {3.3.9, 3.4.5, 3.6.3}

The ocean has absorbed about 30% of the anthropogenic carbon dioxide, resulting in ocean acidification and changes to carbonate chemistry that are unprecedented for at least the last 65 million years (high confidence). Risks have been identified for the survival, calcification, growth, development and abundance of a broad range of marine taxonomic groups, ranging from algae to fish, with substantial evidence of predictable trait-based sensitivities (*high confidence*). There are multiple lines of evidence that ocean warming and acidification corresponding to 1.5°C of global warming would impact a wide range of marine organisms and ecosystems, as well as sectors such as aquaculture and fisheries (*high confidence*). {3.3.10, 3.4.4}

Larger risks are expected for many regions and systems for global warming at 1.5°C, as compared to today, with adaptation required now and up to 1.5°C. However, risks would be larger at 2°C of warming and an even greater effort would be needed for adaptation to a temperature increase of that magnitude (*high confidence*). {3.4, Box 3.4, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this chapter}

Future risks at 1.5°C of global warming will depend on the mitigation pathway and on the possible occurrence of a transient overshoot (high confidence). The impacts on natural and human systems would be greater if mitigation pathways temporarily overshoot 1.5°C and return to 1.5°C later in the century, as compared to pathways that stabilize at 1.5°C without an overshoot (*high confidence*). The size and duration of an overshoot would also affect future impacts (e.g., irreversible loss of some ecosystems) (*high confidence*). Changes in land use resulting from mitigation choices could have impacts on food production and ecosystem diversity. {3.6.1, 3.6.2, Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in this chapter}

Climate Change Risks for Natural and Human systems

Terrestrial and Wetland Ecosystems

Risks of local species losses and, consequently, risks of extinction are much less in a 1.5°C versus a 2°C warmer world (high confidence). The number of species projected to lose over half of their climatically determined geographic range at 2°C global warming (18% of insects, 16% of plants, 8% of vertebrates) is projected to be reduced to 6% of insects, 8% of plants and 4% of vertebrates at 1.5°C warming (*medium confidence*). Risks associated with other biodiversity-related factors, such as forest fires, extreme weather events, and the spread of invasive species, pests and diseases, would also be lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C of warming (*high confidence*), supporting a greater persistence of ecosystem services. {3.4.3, 3.5.2}

Constraining global warming to 1.5°C, rather than to 2°C and higher, is projected to have many benefits for terrestrial and wetland ecosystems and for the preservation of their services to humans (high confidence). Risks for natural and managed ecosystems are higher on drylands compared to humid lands. The global terrestrial land area projected to be affected by ecosystem transformations (13%, interquartile range 8–20%) at 2°C is approximately halved at 1.5°C global warming to 4% (interquartile range 2–7%) (*medium confidence*). Above 1.5°C, an expansion of desert terrain and vegetation would occur in the Mediterranean biome (*medium confidence*), causing changes unparalleled in the last 10,000 years (*medium confidence*). {3.3.2.2, 3.4.3.2, 3.4.3.5, 3.4.6.1, 3.5.5.10, Box 4.2}

Many impacts are projected to be larger at higher latitudes, owing to mean and cold-season warming rates above the global average (medium confidence). High-latitude tundra and boreal forest are particularly at risk, and woody shrubs are already encroaching into tundra (*high confidence*) and will proceed with further warming. Constraining warming to 1.5°C would prevent the thawing of an estimated permafrost area of 1.5 to 2.5 million km² over centuries compared to thawing under 2°C (*medium confidence*). {3.3.2, 3.4.3, 3.4.4}

⁴ Ice free is defined for the Special Report as when the sea ice extent is less than 106 km². Ice coverage less than this is considered to be equivalent to an ice-free Arctic Ocean for practical purposes in all recent studies.

Ocean Ecosystems

Ocean ecosystems are already experiencing large-scale changes, and critical thresholds are expected to be reached at 1.5°C and higher levels of global warming (*high confidence*).

In the transition to 1.5°C of warming, changes to water temperatures are expected to drive some species (e.g., plankton, fish) to relocate to higher latitudes and cause novel ecosystems to assemble (*high confidence*). Other ecosystems (e.g., kelp forests, coral reefs) are relatively less able to move, however, and are projected to experience high rates of mortality and loss (*very high confidence*). For example, multiple lines of evidence indicate that the majority (70–90%) of warm water (tropical) coral reefs that exist today will disappear even if global warming is constrained to 1.5°C (*very high confidence*). {3.4.4, Box 3.4}

Current ecosystem services from the ocean are expected to be reduced at 1.5°C of global warming, with losses being even greater at 2°C of global warming (*high confidence*). The risks of declining ocean productivity, shifts of species to higher latitudes, damage to ecosystems (e.g., coral reefs, and mangroves, seagrass and other wetland ecosystems), loss of fisheries productivity (at low latitudes), and changes to ocean chemistry (e.g., acidification, hypoxia and dead zones) are projected to be substantially lower when global warming is limited to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). {3.4.4, Box 3.4}

Water Resources

The projected frequency and magnitude of floods and droughts in some regions are smaller under 1.5°C than under 2°C of warming (*medium confidence*). Human exposure to increased flooding is projected to be substantially lower at 1.5°C compared to 2°C of global warming, although projected changes create regionally differentiated risks (*medium confidence*). The differences in the risks among regions are strongly influenced by local socio-economic conditions (*medium confidence*). {3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.4.2}

Risks of water scarcity are projected to be greater at 2°C than at 1.5°C of global warming in some regions (*medium confidence*). Depending on future socio-economic conditions, limiting global warming to 1.5°C, compared to 2°C, may reduce the proportion of the world population exposed to a climate change-induced increase in water stress by up to 50%, although there is considerable variability between regions (*medium confidence*). Regions with particularly large benefits could include the Mediterranean and the Caribbean (*medium confidence*). Socio-economic drivers, however, are expected to have a greater influence on these risks than the changes in climate (*medium confidence*). {3.3.5, 3.4.2, Box 3.5}

Land Use, Food Security and Food Production Systems

Limiting global warming to 1.5°C, compared with 2°C, is projected to result in smaller net reductions in yields of maize, rice, wheat, and potentially other cereal crops, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central and South America; and in the CO₂-dependent nutritional quality of rice and wheat

(*high confidence*). A loss of 7–10% of rangeland livestock globally is projected for approximately 2°C of warming, with considerable economic consequences for many communities and regions (*medium confidence*). {3.4.6, 3.6, Box 3.1, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this chapter}

Reductions in projected food availability are larger at 2°C than at 1.5°C of global warming in the Sahel, southern Africa, the Mediterranean, central Europe and the Amazon (*medium confidence*). This suggests a transition from medium to high risk of regionally differentiated impacts on food security between 1.5°C and 2°C (*medium confidence*). Future economic and trade environments and their response to changing food availability (*medium confidence*) are important potential adaptation options for reducing hunger risk in low- and middle-income countries. {Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this chapter}

Fisheries and aquaculture are important to global food security but are already facing increasing risks from ocean warming and acidification (*medium confidence*). These risks are projected to increase at 1.5°C of global warming and impact key organisms such as fin fish and bivalves (e.g., oysters), especially at low latitudes (*medium confidence*). Small-scale fisheries in tropical regions, which are very dependent on habitat provided by coastal ecosystems such as coral reefs, mangroves, seagrass and kelp forests, are expected to face growing risks at 1.5°C of warming because of loss of habitat (*medium confidence*). Risks of impacts and decreasing food security are projected to become greater as global warming reaches beyond 1.5°C and both ocean warming and acidification increase, with substantial losses likely for coastal livelihoods and industries (e.g., fisheries and aquaculture) (*medium to high confidence*). {3.4.4, 3.4.5, 3.4.6, Box 3.1, Box 3.4, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this chapter}

Land use and land-use change emerge as critical features of virtually all mitigation pathways that seek to limit global warming to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). Most least-cost mitigation pathways to limit peak or end-of-century warming to 1.5°C make use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR), predominantly employing significant levels of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and/or afforestation and reforestation (AR) in their portfolio of mitigation measures (*high confidence*). {Cross-Chapter Box 7 in this chapter}

Large-scale deployment of BECCS and/or AR would have a far-reaching land and water footprint (*high confidence*). Whether this footprint would result in adverse impacts, for example on biodiversity or food production, depends on the existence and effectiveness of measures to conserve land carbon stocks, measures to limit agricultural expansion in order to protect natural ecosystems, and the potential to increase agricultural productivity (*medium agreement*). In addition, BECCS and/or AR would have substantial direct effects on regional climate through biophysical feedbacks, which are generally not included in Integrated Assessments Models (*high confidence*). {3.6.2, Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in this chapter}

The impacts of large-scale CDR deployment could be greatly reduced if a wider portfolio of CDR options were deployed, if a

holistic policy for sustainable land management were adopted, and if increased mitigation efforts were employed to strongly limit the demand for land, energy and material resources, including through lifestyle and dietary changes (*medium confidence*). In particular, reforestation could be associated with significant co-benefits if implemented in a manner that helps restore natural ecosystems (*high confidence*). {Cross-Chapter Box 7 in this chapter}

Human Health, Well-Being, Cities and Poverty

Any increase in global temperature (e.g., +0.5°C) is projected to affect human health, with primarily negative consequences (*high confidence*). Lower risks are projected at 1.5°C than at 2°C for heat-related morbidity and mortality (*very high confidence*), and for ozone-related mortality if emissions needed for ozone formation remain high (*high confidence*). Urban heat islands often amplify the impacts of heatwaves in cities (*high confidence*). Risks for some vector-borne diseases, such as malaria and dengue fever are projected to increase with warming from 1.5°C to 2°C, including potential shifts in their geographic range (*high confidence*). Overall for vector-borne diseases, whether projections are positive or negative depends on the disease, region and extent of change (*high confidence*). Lower risks of undernutrition are projected at 1.5°C than at 2°C (*medium confidence*). Incorporating estimates of adaptation into projections reduces the magnitude of risks (*high confidence*). {3.4.7, 3.4.7.1, 3.4.8, 3.5.5.8}

Global warming of 2°C is expected to pose greater risks to urban areas than global warming of 1.5°C (*medium confidence*). The extent of risk depends on human vulnerability and the effectiveness of adaptation for regions (coastal and non-coastal), informal settlements and infrastructure sectors (such as energy, water and transport) (*high confidence*). {3.4.5, 3.4.8}

Poverty and disadvantage have increased with recent warming (about 1°C) and are expected to increase for many populations as average global temperatures increase from 1°C to 1.5°C and higher (*medium confidence*). Outmigration in agricultural-dependent communities is positively and statistically significantly associated with global temperature (*medium confidence*). Our understanding of the links of 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming to human migration are limited and represent an important knowledge gap. {3.4.10, 3.4.11, 5.2.2, Table 3.5}

Key Economic Sectors and Services

Risks to global aggregated economic growth due to climate change impacts are projected to be lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C by the end of this century (*medium confidence*). {3.5.2, 3.5.3}

The largest reductions in economic growth at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of warming are projected for low- and middle-income countries and regions (the African continent, Southeast Asia, India, Brazil and Mexico) (*low to medium confidence*). Countries in the tropics and Southern Hemisphere subtropics are projected to experience the largest impacts on economic growth due to climate

change should global warming increase from 1.5°C to 2°C (*medium confidence*). {3.5}

Global warming has already affected tourism, with increased risks projected under 1.5°C of warming in specific geographic regions and for seasonal tourism including sun, beach and snow sports destinations (*very high confidence*). Risks will be lower for tourism markets that are less climate sensitive, such as gaming and large hotel-based activities (*high confidence*). Risks for coastal tourism, particularly in subtropical and tropical regions, will increase with temperature-related degradation (e.g., heat extremes, storms) or loss of beach and coral reef assets (*high confidence*). {3.3.6, 3.4.4.12, 3.4.9.1, Box 3.4}

Small Islands, and Coastal and Low-lying areas

Small islands are projected to experience multiple inter-related risks at 1.5°C of global warming that will increase with warming of 2°C and higher levels (*high confidence*). Climate hazards at 1.5°C are projected to be lower compared to those at 2°C (*high confidence*). Long-term risks of coastal flooding and impacts on populations, infrastructures and assets (*high confidence*), freshwater stress (*medium confidence*), and risks across marine ecosystems (*high confidence*) and critical sectors (*medium confidence*) are projected to increase at 1.5°C compared to present-day levels and increase further at 2°C, limiting adaptation opportunities and increasing loss and damage (*medium confidence*). Migration in small islands (internally and internationally) occurs for multiple reasons and purposes, mostly for better livelihood opportunities (*high confidence*) and increasingly owing to sea level rise (*medium confidence*). {3.3.2.2, 3.3.6–9, 3.4.3.2, 3.4.4.2, 3.4.4.5, 3.4.4.12, 3.4.5.3, 3.4.7.1, 3.4.9.1, 3.5.4.9, Box 3.4, Box 3.5}

Impacts associated with sea level rise and changes to the salinity of coastal groundwater, increased flooding and damage to infrastructure, are projected to be critically important in vulnerable environments, such as small islands, low-lying coasts and deltas, at global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C (*high confidence*). Localized subsidence and changes to river discharge can potentially exacerbate these effects. Adaptation is already happening (*high confidence*) and will remain important over multi-centennial time scales. {3.4.5.3, 3.4.5.4, 3.4.5.7, 5.4.5.4, Box 3.5}

Existing and restored natural coastal ecosystems may be effective in reducing the adverse impacts of rising sea levels and intensifying storms by protecting coastal and deltaic regions (*medium confidence*). Natural sedimentation rates are expected to be able to offset the effect of rising sea levels, given the slower rates of sea level rise associated with 1.5°C of warming (*medium confidence*). Other feedbacks, such as landward migration of wetlands and the adaptation of infrastructure, remain important (*medium confidence*). {3.4.4.12, 3.4.5.4, 3.4.5.7}

Increased Reasons for Concern

There are multiple lines of evidence that since AR5 the assessed levels of risk increased for four of the five Reasons for Concern

(RFCs) for global warming levels of up to 2°C (*high confidence*). The risk transitions by degrees of global warming are now: from high to very high between 1.5°C and 2°C for RFC1 (Unique and threatened systems) (*high confidence*); from moderate to high risk between 1°C and 1.5°C for RFC2 (Extreme weather events) (*medium confidence*); from moderate to high risk between 1.5°C and 2°C for RFC3 (Distribution of impacts) (*high confidence*); from moderate to high risk between 1.5°C and 2.5°C for RFC4 (Global aggregate impacts) (*medium confidence*); and from moderate to high risk between 1°C and 2.5°C for RFC5 (Large-scale singular events) (*medium confidence*). {3.5.2}

1. **The category 'Unique and threatened systems' (RFC1) display a transition from high to very high risk which is now located between 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming** as opposed to at 2.6°C of global warming in AR5, owing to new and multiple lines of evidence for changing risks for coral reefs, the Arctic and biodiversity in general (*high confidence*). {3.5.2.1}
2. **In 'Extreme weather events' (RFC2), the transition from moderate to high risk is now located between 1.0°C and 1.5°C of global warming**, which is very similar to the AR5 assessment but is projected with greater confidence (*medium confidence*). The impact literature contains little information about the potential for human society to adapt to extreme weather events, and hence it has not been possible to locate the transition from 'high' to 'very high' risk within the context of assessing impacts at 1.5°C versus 2°C of global warming. There is thus *low confidence* in the level at which global warming could lead to very high risks associated with extreme weather events in the context of this report. {3.5}
3. **With respect to the 'Distribution of impacts' (RFC3) a transition from moderate to high risk is now located between 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming**, compared with between 1.6°C and 2.6°C global warming in AR5, owing to new evidence about regionally differentiated risks to food security, water resources, drought, heat exposure and coastal submergence (*high confidence*). {3.5}
4. **In 'global aggregate impacts' (RFC4) a transition from moderate to high levels of risk is now located between 1.5°C and 2.5°C of global warming**, as opposed to at 3.6°C of warming in AR5, owing to new evidence about global aggregate economic impacts and risks to Earth's biodiversity (*medium confidence*). {3.5}
5. **Finally, 'large-scale singular events' (RFC5), moderate risk is now located at 1°C of global warming and high risk is located at 2.5°C of global warming**, as opposed to at 1.6°C (moderate risk) and around 4°C (high risk) in AR5, because of new observations and models of the West Antarctic ice sheet (*medium confidence*). {3.3.9, 3.5.2, 3.6.3}

TS.4 Strengthening and Implementing the Global Response

Limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels would require transformative systemic change, integrated with sustainable development. Such change would require the upscaling and acceleration of the implementation of far-reaching, multilevel and cross-sectoral climate mitigation and addressing barriers. Such systemic change would need to be linked to complementary adaptation actions, including transformational adaptation, especially for pathways that temporarily overshoot 1.5°C (medium evidence, high agreement) {Chapter 2, Chapter 3, 4.2.1, 4.4.5, 4.5}. Current national pledges on mitigation and adaptation are not enough to stay below the Paris Agreement temperature limits and achieve its adaptation goals. While transitions in energy efficiency, carbon intensity of fuels, electrification and land-use change are underway in various countries, limiting warming to 1.5°C will require a greater scale and pace of change to transform energy, land, urban and industrial systems globally. {4.3, 4.4, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in this Chapter}

Although multiple communities around the world are demonstrating the possibility of implementation consistent with 1.5°C pathways {Boxes 4.1-4.10}, very few countries, regions, cities, communities or businesses can currently make such a claim (high confidence). To strengthen the global response, almost all countries would need to significantly raise their level of ambition. Implementation of this raised ambition would require enhanced institutional capabilities in all countries, including building the capability to utilize indigenous and local knowledge (medium evidence, high agreement). In developing countries and for poor and vulnerable people, implementing the response would require financial, technological and other forms of support to build capacity, for which additional local, national and international resources would need to be mobilized (*high confidence*). However, public, financial, institutional and innovation capabilities currently fall short of implementing far-reaching measures at scale in all countries (*high confidence*). Transnational networks that support multilevel climate action are growing, but challenges in their scale-up remain. {4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, Box 4.1, Box 4.2, Box 4.7}

Adaptation needs will be lower in a 1.5°C world compared to a 2°C world (high confidence) {Chapter 3; Cross-Chapter Box 11 in this chapter}. Learning from current adaptation practices and strengthening them through adaptive governance {4.4.1}, lifestyle and behavioural change {4.4.3} and innovative financing mechanisms {4.4.5} can help their mainstreaming within sustainable development practices. Preventing maladaptation, drawing on bottom-up approaches {Box 4.6} and using indigenous knowledge {Box 4.3} would effectively engage and protect vulnerable people and communities. While adaptation finance has increased quantitatively, significant further expansion would be needed to adapt to 1.5°C. Qualitative gaps in the distribution of adaptation finance, readiness to absorb resources, and monitoring mechanisms undermine the potential of adaptation finance to reduce impacts. {Chapter 3, 4.4.2, 4.4.5, 4.6}

System Transitions

The energy system transition that would be required to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial conditions is underway in many sectors and regions around the world (medium evidence, high agreement). The political, economic, social and technical feasibility of solar energy, wind energy and electricity storage technologies has improved dramatically over the past few years, while that of nuclear energy and carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) in the electricity sector have not shown similar improvements. {4.3.1}

Electrification, hydrogen, bio-based feedstocks and substitution, and, in several cases, carbon dioxide capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) would lead to the deep emissions reductions required in energy-intensive industries to limit warming to 1.5°C. However, those options are limited by institutional, economic and technical constraints, which increase financial risks to many incumbent firms (medium evidence, high agreement). Energy efficiency in industry is more economically feasible and helps enable industrial system transitions but would have to be complemented with greenhouse gas (GHG)-neutral processes or carbon dioxide removal (CDR) to make energy-intensive industries consistent with 1.5°C (high confidence). {4.3.1, 4.3.4}

Global and regional land-use and ecosystems transitions and associated changes in behaviour that would be required to limit warming to 1.5°C can enhance future adaptation and land-based agricultural and forestry mitigation potential. Such transitions could, however, carry consequences for livelihoods that depend on agriculture and natural resources {4.3.2, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3}. Alterations of agriculture and forest systems to achieve mitigation goals could affect current ecosystems and their services and potentially threaten food, water and livelihood security. While this could limit the social and environmental feasibility of land-based mitigation options, careful design and implementation could enhance their acceptability and support sustainable development objectives (medium evidence, medium agreement). {4.3.2, 4.5.3}

Changing agricultural practices can be an effective climate adaptation strategy. A diversity of adaptation options exists, including mixed crop-livestock production systems which can be a cost-effective adaptation strategy in many global agriculture systems (robust evidence, medium agreement). Improving irrigation efficiency could effectively deal with changing global water endowments, especially if achieved via farmers adopting new behaviours and water-efficient practices rather than through large-scale infrastructural interventions (medium evidence, medium agreement). Well-designed adaptation processes such as community-based adaptation can be effective depending upon context and levels of vulnerability. {4.3.2, 4.5.3}

Improving the efficiency of food production and closing yield gaps have the potential to reduce emissions from agriculture, reduce pressure on land, and enhance food security and future mitigation potential (high confidence). Improving productivity of

existing agricultural systems generally reduces the emissions intensity of food production and offers strong synergies with rural development, poverty reduction and food security objectives, but options to reduce absolute emissions are limited unless paired with demand-side measures. Technological innovation including biotechnology, with adequate safeguards, could contribute to resolving current feasibility constraints and expand the future mitigation potential of agriculture. {4.3.2, 4.4.4}

Shifts in dietary choices towards foods with lower emissions and requirements for land, along with reduced food loss and waste, could reduce emissions and increase adaptation options (high confidence). Decreasing food loss and waste and changing dietary behaviour could result in mitigation and adaptation (high confidence) by reducing both emissions and pressure on land, with significant co-benefits for food security, human health and sustainable development {4.3.2, 4.4.5, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 5.4.2}, but evidence of successful policies to modify dietary choices remains limited.

Mitigation and Adaptation Options and Other Measures

A mix of mitigation and adaptation options implemented in a participatory and integrated manner can enable rapid, systemic transitions – in urban and rural areas – that are necessary elements of an accelerated transition consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C. Such options and changes are most effective when aligned with economic and sustainable development, and when local and regional governments are supported by national governments {4.3.3, 4.4.1, 4.4.3}. Various mitigation options are expanding rapidly across many geographies. Although many have development synergies, not all income groups have so far benefited from them. Electrification, end-use energy efficiency and increased share of renewables, amongst other options, are lowering energy use and decarbonizing energy supply in the built environment, especially in buildings. Other rapid changes needed in urban environments include demotorization and decarbonization of transport, including the expansion of electric vehicles, and greater use of energy-efficient appliances (medium evidence, high agreement). Technological and social innovations can contribute to limiting warming to 1.5°C, for example, by enabling the use of smart grids, energy storage technologies and general-purpose technologies, such as information and communication technology (ICT) that can be deployed to help reduce emissions. Feasible adaptation options include green infrastructure, resilient water and urban ecosystem services, urban and peri-urban agriculture, and adapting buildings and land use through regulation and planning (medium evidence, medium to high agreement). {4.3.3, 4.4.3, 4.4.4}

Synergies can be achieved across systemic transitions through several overarching adaptation options in rural and urban areas. Investments in health, social security and risk sharing and spreading are cost-effective adaptation measures with high potential for scaling up (medium evidence, medium to high agreement). Disaster risk management and education-based adaptation have lower prospects of scalability and cost-effectiveness (medium evidence, high agreement) but are critical for building adaptive capacity. {4.3.5, 4.5.3}

Converging adaptation and mitigation options can lead to synergies and potentially increase cost-effectiveness, but multiple trade-offs can limit the speed of and potential for scaling up. Many examples of synergies and trade-offs exist in all sectors and system transitions. For instance, sustainable water management (*high evidence, medium agreement*) and investment in green infrastructure (*medium evidence, high agreement*) to deliver sustainable water and environmental services and to support urban agriculture are less cost-effective than other adaptation options but can help build climate resilience. Achieving the governance, finance and social support required to enable these synergies and to avoid trade-offs is often challenging, especially when addressing multiple objectives, and attempting appropriate sequencing and timing of interventions. {4.3.2, 4.3.4, 4.4.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 4.5.4}

Though CO₂ dominates long-term warming, the reduction of warming short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs), such as methane and black carbon, can in the short term contribute significantly to limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Reductions of black carbon and methane would have substantial co-benefits (high confidence), including improved health due to reduced air pollution. This, in turn, enhances the institutional and socio-cultural feasibility of such actions. Reductions of several warming SLCFs are constrained by economic and social feasibility (*low evidence, high agreement*). As they are often co-emitted with CO₂, achieving the energy, land and urban transitions necessary to limit warming to 1.5°C would see emissions of warming SLCFs greatly reduced. {2.3.3.2, 4.3.6}

Most CDR options face multiple feasibility constraints, which differ between options, limiting the potential for any single option to sustainably achieve the large-scale deployment required in the 1.5°C-consistent pathways described in Chapter 2 (high confidence). Those 1.5°C pathways typically rely on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), afforestation and reforestation (AR), or both, to neutralize emissions that are expensive to avoid, or to draw down CO₂ emissions in excess of the carbon budget {Chapter 2}. Though BECCS and AR may be technically and geophysically feasible, they face partially overlapping yet different constraints related to land use. The land footprint per tonne of CO₂ removed is higher for AR than for BECCS, but given the low levels of current deployment, the speed and scales required for limiting warming to 1.5°C pose a considerable implementation challenge, even if the issues of public acceptance and absence of economic incentives were to be resolved (*high agreement, medium evidence*). The large potential of afforestation and the co-benefits if implemented appropriately (e.g., on biodiversity and soil quality) will diminish over time, as forests saturate (*high confidence*). The energy requirements and economic costs of direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS) and enhanced weathering remain high (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). At the local scale, soil carbon sequestration has co-benefits with agriculture and is cost-effective even without climate policy (*high confidence*). Its potential feasibility and cost-effectiveness at the global scale appears to be more limited. {4.3.7}

Uncertainties surrounding solar radiation modification (SRM) measures constrain their potential deployment. These uncertainties include: technological immaturity; limited physical

understanding about their effectiveness to limit global warming; and a weak capacity to govern, legitimize, and scale such measures. Some recent model-based analysis suggests SRM would be effective but that it is too early to evaluate its feasibility. Even in the uncertain case that the most adverse side-effects of SRM can be avoided, public resistance, ethical concerns and potential impacts on sustainable development could render SRM economically, socially and institutionally undesirable (*low agreement, medium evidence*). {4.3.8, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in this chapter}

Enabling Rapid and Far-Reaching Change

The speed of transitions and of technological change required to limit warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels has been observed in the past within specific sectors and technologies {4.2.2.1}. But the geographical and economic scales at which the required rates of change in the energy, land, urban, infrastructure and industrial systems would need to take place are larger and have no documented historic precedent (limited evidence, medium agreement). To reduce inequality and alleviate poverty, such transformations would require more planning and stronger institutions (including inclusive markets) than observed in the past, as well as stronger coordination and disruptive innovation across actors and scales of governance. {4.3, 4.4}

Governance consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C and the political economy of adaptation and mitigation can enable and accelerate system transitions, behavioural change, innovation and technology deployment (medium evidence, medium agreement). For 1.5°C-consistent actions, an effective governance framework would include: accountable multilevel governance that includes non-state actors, such as industry, civil society and scientific institutions; coordinated sectoral and cross-sectoral policies that enable collaborative multi-stakeholder partnerships; strengthened global-to-local financial architecture that enables greater access to finance and technology; addressing climate-related trade barriers; improved climate education and greater public awareness; arrangements to enable accelerated behaviour change; strengthened climate monitoring and evaluation systems; and reciprocal international agreements that are sensitive to equity and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). System transitions can be enabled by enhancing the capacities of public, private and financial institutions to accelerate climate change policy planning and implementation, along with accelerated technological innovation, deployment and upkeep. {4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4}

Behaviour change and demand-side management can significantly reduce emissions, substantially limiting the reliance on CDR to limit warming to 1.5°C {Chapter 2, 4.4.3}. Political and financial stakeholders may find climate actions more cost-effective and socially acceptable if multiple factors affecting behaviour are considered, including aligning these actions with people's core values (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Behaviour- and lifestyle-related measures and demand-side management have already led to emission reductions around the world and can enable significant future reductions (*high confidence*). Social innovation through bottom-up initiatives can result in greater participation in the governance of systems transitions and increase support for technologies, practices

and policies that are part of the global response to limit warming to 1.5°C. {Chapter 2, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, Figure 4.3}

This rapid and far-reaching response required to keep warming below 1.5°C and enhance the capacity to adapt to climate risks would require large increases of investments in low-emission infrastructure and buildings, along with a redirection of financial flows towards low-emission investments (*robust evidence, high agreement*). An estimated mean annual incremental investment of around 1.5% of global gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) for the energy sector is indicated between 2016 and 2035, as well as about 2.5% of global GFCF for other development infrastructure that could also address SDG implementation. Though quality policy design and effective implementation may enhance efficiency, they cannot fully substitute for these investments. {2.5.2, 4.2.1, 4.4.5}

Enabling this investment requires the mobilization and better integration of a range of policy instruments that include the reduction of socially inefficient fossil fuel subsidy regimes and innovative price and non-price national and international policy instruments. These would need to be complemented by de-risking financial instruments and the emergence of long-term low-emission assets. These instruments would aim to reduce the demand for carbon-intensive services and shift market preferences away from fossil fuel-based technology. Evidence and theory suggest that carbon pricing alone, in the absence of sufficient transfers to compensate their unintended distributional cross-sector, cross-nation effects, cannot reach the incentive levels needed to trigger system transitions (*robust evidence, medium agreement*). But, embedded in consistent policy packages, they can help mobilize incremental resources and provide flexible mechanisms that help reduce the social and economic costs of the triggering phase of the transition (*robust evidence, medium agreement*). {4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5}

Increasing evidence suggests that a climate-sensitive realignment of savings and expenditure towards low-emission, climate-resilient infrastructure and services requires an evolution of global and national financial systems. Estimates suggest that, in addition to climate-friendly allocation of public investments, a potential redirection of 5% to 10% of the annual capital revenues⁵ is necessary for limiting warming to 1.5°C {4.4.5, Table 1 in Box 4.8}. This could be facilitated by a change of incentives for private day-to-day expenditure and the redirection of savings from speculative and precautionary investments towards long-term productive low-emission assets and services. This implies the mobilization of institutional investors and mainstreaming of climate finance within financial and banking system regulation. Access by developing countries to low-risk and low-interest finance through multilateral and national development banks would have to be facilitated (*medium evidence, high agreement*). New forms of public-private partnerships may be needed with multilateral, sovereign and sub-sovereign guarantees to de-risk climate-friendly investments, support new business models for small-scale enterprises and help households with limited access to capital. Ultimately, the aim is to promote a portfolio shift towards long-term low-emission assets that

would help redirect capital away from potentially stranded assets (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). {4.4.5}

Knowledge Gaps

Knowledge gaps around implementing and strengthening the global response to climate change would need to be urgently resolved if the transition to a 1.5°C world is to become reality. Remaining questions include: how much can be realistically expected from innovation and behavioural and systemic political and economic changes in improving resilience, enhancing adaptation and reducing GHG emissions? How can rates of changes be accelerated and scaled up? What is the outcome of realistic assessments of mitigation and adaptation land transitions that are compliant with sustainable development, poverty eradication and addressing inequality? What are life-cycle emissions and prospects of early-stage CDR options? How can climate and sustainable development policies converge, and how can they be organised within a global governance framework and financial system, based on principles of justice and ethics (including 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' (CBDR-RC)), reciprocity and partnership? To what extent would limiting warming to 1.5°C require a harmonization of macro-financial and fiscal policies, which could include financial regulators such as central banks? How can different actors and processes in climate governance reinforce each other, and hedge against the fragmentation of initiatives? {4.1, 4.3.7, 4.4.1, 4.4.5, 4.6}

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⁵ Annual capital revenues are the paid interests plus the increase of the asset value.

TS.5 Sustainable Development, Poverty Eradication and Reducing Inequalities

This chapter takes sustainable development as the starting point and focus for analysis. It considers the broad and multifaceted bi-directional interplay between sustainable development, including its focus on eradicating poverty and reducing inequality in their multidimensional aspects, and climate actions in a 1.5°C warmer world. These fundamental connections are embedded in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The chapter also examines synergies and trade-offs of adaptation and mitigation options with sustainable development and the SDGs and offers insights into possible pathways, especially climate-resilient development pathways towards a 1.5°C warmer world.

Sustainable Development, Poverty and Inequality in a 1.5°C Warmer World

Limiting global warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C above pre-industrial levels would make it markedly easier to achieve many aspects of sustainable development, with greater potential to eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities (medium evidence, high agreement). Impacts avoided with the lower temperature limit could reduce the number of people exposed to climate risks and vulnerable to poverty by 62 to 457 million, and lessen the risks of poor people to experience food and water insecurity, adverse health impacts, and economic losses, particularly in regions that already face development challenges (medium evidence, medium agreement). {5.2.2, 5.2.3} Avoided impacts expected to occur between 1.5°C and 2°C warming would also make it easier to achieve certain SDGs, such as those that relate to poverty, hunger, health, water and sanitation, cities and ecosystems (SDGs 1, 2, 3, 6, 11, 14 and 15) (medium evidence, high agreement). {5.2.3, Table 5.2 available at the end of the chapter}

Compared to current conditions, 1.5°C of global warming would nonetheless pose heightened risks to eradicating poverty, reducing inequalities and ensuring human and ecosystem well-being (medium evidence, high agreement). Warming of 1.5°C is not considered 'safe' for most nations, communities, ecosystems and sectors and poses significant risks to natural and human systems as compared to the current warming of 1°C (high confidence). {Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5} The impacts of 1.5°C of warming would disproportionately affect disadvantaged and vulnerable populations through food insecurity, higher food prices, income losses, lost livelihood opportunities, adverse health impacts and population displacements (medium evidence, high agreement). {5.2.1} Some of the worst impacts on sustainable development are expected to be felt among agricultural and coastal dependent livelihoods, indigenous people, children and the elderly, poor labourers, poor urban dwellers in African cities, and people and ecosystems in the Arctic and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (medium evidence, high agreement). {5.2.1, Box 5.3, Chapter 3, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}

Climate Adaptation and Sustainable Development

Prioritization of sustainable development and meeting the SDGs is consistent with efforts to adapt to climate change (high

confidence). Many strategies for sustainable development enable transformational adaptation for a 1.5°C warmer world, provided attention is paid to reducing poverty in all its forms and to promoting equity and participation in decision-making (medium evidence, high agreement). As such, sustainable development has the potential to significantly reduce systemic vulnerability, enhance adaptive capacity, and promote livelihood security for poor and disadvantaged populations (high confidence). {5.3.1}

Synergies between adaptation strategies and the SDGs are expected to hold true in a 1.5°C warmer world, across sectors and contexts (medium evidence, medium agreement). Synergies between adaptation and sustainable development are significant for agriculture and health, advancing SDGs 1 (extreme poverty), 2 (hunger), 3 (healthy lives and well-being) and 6 (clean water) (robust evidence, medium agreement). {5.3.2} Ecosystem- and community-based adaptation, along with the incorporation of indigenous and local knowledge, advances synergies with SDGs 5 (gender equality), 10 (reducing inequalities) and 16 (inclusive societies), as exemplified in drylands and the Arctic (high evidence, medium agreement). {5.3.2, Box 5.1, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 4}

Adaptation strategies can result in trade-offs with and among the SDGs (medium evidence, high agreement). Strategies that advance one SDG may create negative consequences for other SDGs, for instance SDGs 3 (health) versus 7 (energy consumption) and agricultural adaptation and SDG 2 (food security) versus SDGs 3 (health), 5 (gender equality), 6 (clean water), 10 (reducing inequalities), 14 (life below water) and 15 (life on the land) (medium evidence, medium agreement). {5.3.2}

Pursuing place-specific adaptation pathways towards a 1.5°C warmer world has the potential for significant positive outcomes for well-being in countries at all levels of development (medium evidence, high agreement). Positive outcomes emerge when adaptation pathways (i) ensure a diversity of adaptation options based on people's values and the trade-offs they consider acceptable, (ii) maximize synergies with sustainable development through inclusive, participatory and deliberative processes, and (iii) facilitate equitable transformation. Yet such pathways would be difficult to achieve without redistributive measures to overcome path dependencies, uneven power structures, and entrenched social inequalities (medium evidence, high agreement). {5.3.3}

Mitigation and Sustainable Development

The deployment of mitigation options consistent with 1.5°C pathways leads to multiple synergies across a range of sustainable development dimensions. At the same time, the rapid pace and magnitude of change that would be required to limit warming to 1.5°C, if not carefully managed, would lead to trade-offs with some sustainable development dimensions (high confidence). The number of synergies between mitigation response options and sustainable development exceeds the number of trade-offs in energy demand and supply sectors; agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU); and for oceans (very high confidence). {Figure 5.2, Table 5.2 available at the end of the chapter} The 1.5°C

pathways indicate robust synergies, particularly for the SDGs 3 (health), 7 (energy), 12 (responsible consumption and production) and 14 (oceans) (*very high confidence*). {5.4.2, Figure 5.3} For SDGs 1 (poverty), 2 (hunger), 6 (water) and 7 (energy), there is a risk of trade-offs or negative side effects from stringent mitigation actions compatible with 1.5°C of warming (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.4.2}

Appropriately designed mitigation actions to reduce energy demand can advance multiple SDGs simultaneously. Pathways compatible with 1.5°C that feature low energy demand show the most pronounced synergies and the lowest number of trade-offs with respect to sustainable development and the SDGs (*very high confidence*). Accelerating energy efficiency in all sectors has synergies with SDGs 7 (energy), 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure), 11 (sustainable cities and communities), 12 (responsible consumption and production), 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), and 17 (partnerships for the goals) (*robust evidence, high agreement*). {5.4.1, Figure 5.2, Table 5.2} Low-demand pathways, which would reduce or completely avoid the reliance on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) in 1.5°C pathways, would result in significantly reduced pressure on food security, lower food prices and fewer people at risk of hunger (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.4.2, Figure 5.3}

The impacts of carbon dioxide removal options on SDGs depend on the type of options and the scale of deployment (*high confidence*). If poorly implemented, carbon dioxide removal (CDR) options such as bioenergy, BECCS and AFOLU would lead to trade-offs. Appropriate design and implementation requires considering local people's needs, biodiversity and other sustainable development dimensions (*very high confidence*). {5.4.1.3, Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3}

The design of the mitigation portfolios and policy instruments to limit warming to 1.5°C will largely determine the overall synergies and trade-offs between mitigation and sustainable development (*very high confidence*). Redistributive policies that shield the poor and vulnerable can resolve trade-offs for a range of SDGs (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Individual mitigation options are associated with both positive and negative interactions with the SDGs (*very high confidence*). {5.4.1} However, appropriate choices across the mitigation portfolio can help to maximize positive side effects while minimizing negative side effects (*high confidence*). {5.4.2, 5.5.2} Investment needs for complementary policies resolving trade-offs with a range of SDGs are only a small fraction of the overall mitigation investments in 1.5°C pathways (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.4.2, Figure 5.4} Integration of mitigation with adaptation and sustainable development compatible with 1.5°C warming requires a systems perspective (*high confidence*). {5.4.2, 5.5.2}

Mitigation consistent with 1.5°C of warming create high risks for sustainable development in countries with high dependency on fossil fuels for revenue and employment generation (*high confidence*). These risks are caused by the reduction of global demand affecting mining activity and export revenues and challenges to rapidly decrease high carbon intensity of the domestic economy (*robust*

evidence, high agreement). {5.4.1.2, Box 5.2} Targeted policies that promote diversification of the economy and the energy sector could ease this transition (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.4.1.2, Box 5.2}

Sustainable Development Pathways to 1.5°C

Sustainable development broadly supports and often enables the fundamental societal and systems transformations that would be required for limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (*high confidence*). Simulated pathways that feature the most sustainable worlds (e.g., Shared Socio-Economic Pathways (SSP) 1) are associated with relatively lower mitigation and adaptation challenges and limit warming to 1.5°C at comparatively lower mitigation costs. In contrast, development pathways with high fragmentation, inequality and poverty (e.g., SSP3) are associated with comparatively higher mitigation and adaptation challenges. In such pathways, it is not possible to limit warming to 1.5°C for the vast majority of the integrated assessment models (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.5.2} In all SSPs, mitigation costs substantially increase in 1.5°C pathways compared to 2°C pathways. No pathway in the literature integrates or achieves all 17 SDGs (*high confidence*). {5.5.2} Real-world experiences at the project level show that the actual integration between adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development is challenging as it requires reconciling trade-offs across sectors and spatial scales (*very high confidence*). {5.5.1}

Without societal transformation and rapid implementation of ambitious greenhouse gas reduction measures, pathways to limiting warming to 1.5°C and achieving sustainable development will be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to achieve (*high confidence*). The potential for pursuing such pathways differs between and within nations and regions, due to different development trajectories, opportunities and challenges (*very high confidence*). {5.5.3.2, Figure 5.1} Limiting warming to 1.5°C would require all countries and non-state actors to strengthen their contributions without delay. This could be achieved through sharing efforts based on bolder and more committed cooperation, with support for those with the least capacity to adapt, mitigate and transform (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.5.3.1, 5.5.3.2} Current efforts towards reconciling low-carbon trajectories and reducing inequalities, including those that avoid difficult trade-offs associated with transformation, are partially successful yet demonstrate notable obstacles (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). {5.5.3.3, Box 5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 13 in this chapter}

Social justice and equity are core aspects of climate-resilient development pathways for transformational social change. Addressing challenges and widening opportunities between and within countries and communities would be necessary to achieve sustainable development and limit warming to 1.5°C, without making the poor and disadvantaged worse off (*high confidence*). Identifying and navigating inclusive and socially acceptable pathways towards low-carbon, climate-resilient futures is a challenging yet important endeavour, fraught with moral, practical and political difficulties and inevitable trade-offs (*very high confidence*). {5.5.2, 5.5.3.3, Box 5.3} It entails deliberation and problem-solving

processes to negotiate societal values, well-being, risks and resilience and to determine what is desirable and fair, and to whom (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Pathways that encompass joint, iterative planning and transformative visions, for instance in Pacific SIDS like Vanuatu and in urban contexts, show potential for liveable and sustainable futures (*high confidence*). {5.5.3.1, 5.5.3.3, Figure 5.5, Box 5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 13 in this chapter}

The fundamental societal and systemic changes to achieve sustainable development, eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities while limiting warming to 1.5°C would require meeting a set of institutional, social, cultural, economic and technological conditions (*high confidence*). The coordination and monitoring of policy actions across sectors and spatial scales is essential to support sustainable development in 1.5°C warmer conditions (*very high confidence*). {5.6.2, Box 5.3} External funding and technology transfer better support these efforts when they consider recipients' context-specific needs (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.6.1} Inclusive processes can facilitate transformations by ensuring participation, transparency, capacity building and iterative social learning (*high confidence*). {5.5.3.3, Cross-Chapter Box 13, 5.6.3} Attention to power asymmetries and unequal opportunities for development, among and within countries, is key to adopting 1.5°C-compatible development pathways that benefit all populations (*high confidence*). {5.5.3, 5.6.4, Box 5.3} Re-examining individual and collective values could help spur urgent, ambitious and cooperative change (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {5.5.3, 5.6.5}