

THE FRAGILE REVOLUTION: Cacique Politics and Revolutionary Process in Yucatán*

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INTRODUCTION

It is a paradox that historians of the Mexican Revolution have paid so little attention to the complex social phenomenon that has come to be called *caciquismo*. *Caciques*—for the moment, let us identify them as local bosses, strongmen, or chiefs—were such a plague on the Mexican rural populace during the porfiriato that “Mueran los caciques!” took its place alongside “Tierra y libertad!” and “México para los mexicanos!” as the central rallying cries of the 1910 Revolution. Moreover, it is difficult to refute John Womack’s proposition that to capture the intent of Madero’s slogan “Sufragio efectivo y no reelección,” still the first commandment of the Institutionalized Revolution, it should properly be rendered: “A real vote and no boss rule.”¹ Now, though only recently, a steadily increasing number of studies at the regional level by historians and social scientists is beginning to document that the epic Revolution found its energies in the small towns and villages and that the millions who fought, although primarily moved by the promise of land reform, were more immediately preoccupied with the related problem of breaking the political and economic stranglehold of the local power-brokers.

Indeed it has been persuasively suggested (by anthropologists Oscar Lewis and Victor Goldkind as well as revolutionary intellectual Mariano Azuela) that neither of the other two more traditional enemies of the Mexican Revolution, the *hacendados* or the agents of foreign imperialism, ever provoked the rural masses to hostility of the same emotional intensity.² Luis González tells us, for example, that although San José de Gracia’s landless aspired to own property, they were terribly

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reluctant, even after the ratification of the 1917 Constitution, to apply for land, refusing to believe that the government was really serious about offering it to them.³ For many *campesinos*, therefore, land reform, though central, remained a somewhat distant goal, one which the villagers sensed would require the government to institute significant structural changes. On the other hand, removal of an unscrupulous cacique—let us say, a monopolistic merchant, notorious for price gouging, loan sharking, and the hoarding of essential goods—need not be beyond the immediate aspirations or reach of an indignant pueblo. Moreover, unlike the majority of hacendados who were absentees maintaining a low profile, the cacique was almost always an identifiable village presence. Oscar Lewis tells us that when the deluge came to Morelos in 1910, the ubiquitous cacique class was the first to be swept away by the *zapatista* pueblos risen in arms. Nor were they missed, in contrast to the ruined hacendados who, for all their shortcomings, still had provided the villages with appreciable work opportunities.⁴

Of course, one has only to consult today's headlines to appreciate that the despised institution has not withered away. From time to time, in the face of hostile criticism, the revolutionary regime has seized upon the cacique as a kind of scapegoat, foisting upon him most of the outstanding sins of omission and commission that the Revolution has accumulated over the course of its first half century. Thus could President José López Portillo, while on the campaign trail, candidly admit that the nation still had not succeeded in dispelling *los mismos fantasmas* that oppressed the countryside in 1910, chief among them the specter of caciquismo.⁵ Indeed, the irony is that while the regime has consistently attacked caciques, these strongmen often continue to be its formal representatives or informal agents at the local level. They are among the Revolution's true winners, "new men" who have appropriated older networks of control following the defeat of the old order.

Nor have their contributions to the revolutionary process been perceived as entirely negative. In his examination of Tarascan cacicazgos in Michoacán prior to, during, and following the active phases of the Revolution, Paul Friedrich highlights certain positive aspects of caciquismo and the contributions of individual "agrarian caciques," such as Primo Tapia, in enabling the pueblos of one region to acquire more quickly the principal means of production, land. Indeed, he seems primarily concerned with the behavior of "agrarian cacicazgos" and goes so far as to build an "agrarian base" into his understanding of the phenomenon: "Caciquismo, in its various forms, has arisen in the region as a direct, political consequence of a polemical struggle over . . . land."⁶ But an artificial dichotomy between "good" and "bad" caciquismo need

not be drawn. Friedrich's agrarian cacique may work in one instance to further the aspirations of his campesino supporters to acquire land, only later to trample upon his clients' interests in order to aggrandize his own.

Some basic assumptions regarding the origins and essential characteristics of caciquismo have emerged, however. The term "cacique," a corruption of the Caribbean Arawak word *kassequa*, entered the Spanish vocabulary during the first generation of contact in the New World and, in the first instance, simply referred to a local Indian chief. Subsequently the term gained currency in Spain and the Americas and was extended to mean "él que manda," that is, any regional strongman regardless of race.⁷ Although the term is today used throughout the Spanish-speaking world, the meaning of "cacique" varies as widely as the political and socioeconomic conditions in which these leaders may be found. It may refer to the military dictator of a nation state, to a powerful, paternalistic backlands hacendado, to a regional agrarian leader, or to an entrepreneurial urban merchant-politico, in addition to still remaining applicable to the chief of a primitive band of South American tribesmen.⁸

In Mexico, where the term "cacique" seems to have indelibly etched itself into the national consciousness and received more attention than elsewhere in the Americas, a definitional consensus, articulated by Friedrich, seems to have been achieved for the modern Mexican version, the local boss who has successfully adapted himself to a variety of regimes from the nineteenth century on. He is "a strong and autocratic leader in local and regional politics whose characteristically informal, personalistic, and often arbitrary rule is buttressed by a core of relatives, 'fighters,' and dependents, and is marked by the diagnostic threat and practice of violence."⁹ Fellow anthropologists Eric Wolf, Henning Siverts, and the team of Mexican sociologists headed by Roger Bartra have joined Friedrich in adding the important amendment that these caciques act as political and cultural "middlemen," minimizing the gap between the campesino in the rural community and the customs, law, and government of the state and nation.¹⁰

It is interesting that the generic term "caudillo" has never achieved the notoriety that its variant or related term "cacique" has. This despite the fact that the caudillo is merely a cacique writ large—a cacique who has mobilized his supporters for the purpose of extending his local base of power. Moreover, the cacique is a sine qua non in the emergence of a regional or national caudillo. For, given the geographic isolation and size of some of Mexico's regions, control of the local rural domains of caciques was fundamental to the rise of the caudillo.¹¹ In fact, the early stages of the Mexican Revolution produced an inordinate number of

these cacique-to-caudillo progressions: Francisco Villa, Emiliano Zapata, Primo Tapia, and Felipe Carrillo Puerto among the notable ones. Yet whereas many regional and national caudillos gained acceptance as “heroes” and “warriors” and were eventually enshrined in the national revolutionary pantheon, the local cacique has often been viewed with opprobrium, at best regarded as an undisciplined species of “social bandit,” at worst as an out-and-out tyrant.¹²

One of the little appreciated virtues of John Womack’s acclaimed study of zapatismo in Morelos is his sensitivity to cacique phenomena. Most notable is his rendering of the thorny problems that Zapata, the regional caudillo, faced in his successful attempts to knit the refractory, competing local chiefs together into a coherent regional movement around a carefully formulated revolutionary ideology and agenda. Womack points out that Zapata and his intellectual brain trust “feared accusations of banditry, and to avoid them, wanted formal appointments [of local chiefs] and a definite program.”¹³ Indeed, we learn that during the early years of the rebellion it was by no means assured that Zapata would succeed in winning the disciplined support and allegiance of many of these local caciques.¹⁴

CACIQUE POLITICS IN YUCATÁN DURING THE CARRILLO PUERTO REGIME, 1922–1924

Unfortunately, few historians of the Mexican Revolution seem to have been influenced by Womack’s conception of disparate cacique phenomena forged—often with great difficulty—into larger social movements. To illustrate further the role that such phenomena played in the local revolutionary process, I will examine a controversial historiographical problem taken from the revolutionary experience of Yucatán: the dilemma faced by revolutionary governor Felipe Carrillo Puerto as he sought to mobilize Yucatán’s rural sector and bring a radical social revolution to the region in the early 1920s.

Essentially, Felipe’s dilemma may be summarized as follows:¹⁵ his Socialist Party of the Southeast (PSS)—a coalition led by disaffected members of the middle, lower middle, and urban working class and drawing its support from a small urban labor movement and the rural masses—had been beset with political and economic problems since late 1916. Venustiano Carranza’s conservative national government had come within a hair of driving the PSS out of existence in 1919. The First Chief had disarmed the Yucatecan campesinos whom Carrillo Puerto had been organizing for his newly formed resistance leagues (*ligas de resistencia*), harassed the leagues with federal troops, and driven Carrillo and other

socialist leaders into exile. Political opposition from the center had subsided after the success of the Agua Prieta movement in 1920, but by then Yucatán's wartime henequen boom had busted, and money to sustain the moderate agrarian reform and social welfare programs of Carrillo's predecessor, General Salvador Alvarado—let alone implement the more radical measures that Carrillo had in mind, such as an expropriation of the henequen plantations—had dried up. However, the henequen market, upon which Yucatán was almost completely dependent, showed signs of rejuvenation in 1922, as Carrillo Puerto personally claimed the state governorship from a caretaker Socialist government headed by his close friend, Manuel Berzunza.

It was at this crucial juncture that Carrillo, committed to bringing a socialist revolution to Yucatán, took stock of the objective conditions within the region, and at the national and international levels as well, and weighed his various policy options. He realized that whereas formerly Yucatán's powerful agro-commercial bourgeoisie had been divided in its reaction to Alvarado's moderate revolutionary reforms, now it would close ranks in the face of the much more serious challenge that he posed. He knew that his regional revolutionary coalition was a fragile one at best. His support from the urban labor movement, which was never the focus of his efforts or interest as it had been Alvarado's, was growing more tenuous. Carrillo's attempts to manipulate union politics and restrain constantly escalating wage demands during the postwar economic crisis infuriated many of the several thousand stevedores and railroad workers who comprised Yucatán's "labor aristocracy." Finally, in 1922, hostile members of these unions came close to assassinating him in a dramatic bomb attempt.

Of course, Carrillo appreciated that since Yucatán was overwhelmingly an agricultural region, it would be the agrarian sector that would provide him with the base of power he needed to wage a successful social revolution. However, although he had been developing cadres of full-time agitators and propagandists (*agentes de propaganda*) as well as training activist schoolteachers, Felipe realized that a thoroughgoing mobilization of the countryside would be a slow and demanding process. He was well aware that even after almost two years of PSS rule (1920–22), during a time when economic crisis had created significant privation and rural unrest, political mobilization had still not progressed very far. Yucatán's already primitive road and communications networks had been allowed to deteriorate further during the economic recession. Moreover, Carranza's reign of terror in the rural sector had worked to the advantage of the hacendados, largely nullifying the previous attempts at organizing campesinos made by Carrillo and other agrarian

agitators during the Alvarado regime. Furthermore, the majority of these former efforts had been restricted to recruiting the campesinos of the pueblos or "free villages." Alvarado's agentes de propaganda had made few inroads into the hacienda communities where the great majority of Yucatán's campesinos actually lived or worked much of the time.

Indeed, it was no coincidence that the Revolution had arrived in Yucatán belatedly in 1915, "from without," nor that it was made "from above," first by General Alvarado, and later, by Carrillo Puerto's Socialist regime. Prior to Alvarado's arrival, Yucatán's entrepreneurial hacendados had constructed a multitiered repressive mechanism that commanded the respect and envy of their counterparts elsewhere in the Republic. Porfirio Díaz's federal government had provided regular army battalions and *rurales* to complement the state militia and police as well as the special detective forces and armed guards hired by the large hacendados. Díaz's defeat in 1911 and the invasion of Yucatán by Alvarado's eight-thousand-man Revolutionary "Army of the Southeast" in 1915 swept away the landed bourgeoisie's monopoly of force in the region, but did relatively little to loosen the hacendado's social control over the campesino.

The extent of that social control can better be gauged through an examination of Yucatán's agrarian structure. By the turn of the century, the great majority of free Maya pueblos had lost their lands to expanding henequen plantations. Landless, or very nearly so, the villagers became helpless to avoid domination by the large estate and the proletarianizing process it promoted. The basic dichotomy that had traditionally existed in Yucatán, between the large estate and the landholding peasant village, was obliterated as the free village succumbed to the henequen plantation's advance. First the campesinos were enslaved by the planters through the mechanism of debt, then they were systematically isolated on the plantations. Hacendados made sure, for example, to separate local Maya workers from the rebel Maya prisoners taken on the Quintana Roo frontier, and discouraged the build-up of great numbers of Yaqui deportees in a single area. Whenever possible, urban visitors and merchants were kept off the estates. The individual nature of work tasks in the production of henequen also reinforced the isolation of the campesinos.

Thus, the repeated contemporary characterization of pre-revolutionary Yucatán's *campesinado* as a passive, politically inert mass, while exaggerated, still contains a good deal of truth and has been verified in its essentials by the recent researches of Friedrich Katz and others.¹⁶ A major power shift in favor of the campesinos was required

merely to gain access to them for the purpose of mobilization. Alvarado's invasion and subsequent regime effectively broke this isolation; however, following his departure in 1918, the mobilization of Yucatán's campesinado suffered a severe setback during the concerted reign of terror and repression waged against the PSS by Carranza's officers. Resurrecting what little remained of his former network of resistance leagues in 1921, Don Felipe appreciated that he would have to begin again, almost from scratch, the difficult task of mobilizing Yucatán's agrarian sector.

Nor was there any way of knowing how much more time he would be granted to galvanize the campesinado into an effective political force through his centralized network of resistance leagues. Thus far the military capability of such a force was virtually nil, since the Yucatecan campesinos, whatever their numbers, still lacked sufficient guns and ammunition and any real semblance of military training. Although, after Agua Prieta, Obregón and Calles had approved the return of some of the shotguns confiscated by Carranza's federals, these ancient pieces in most cases were barely sufficient to knock pheasant out of the air. Nor could Governor Carrillo have taken heart from a variety of petitions that implored the Socialist government to teach them basic self-defense techniques. As the president of the resistance league of a small Maya pueblo confessed in 1922: "The truth is, *Sucúm* Felipe, we don't know how to fire a pistol at a simple target."¹⁷

The lukewarm support that Obregón and Calles gave to campesino rearmament raised serious questions about their future commitment to Yucatán's revolutionary effort. Felipe wondered whether Obregón and Calles were likely to sanction his plans to expropriate the valuable henequen plantations, which produced sizable federal revenues. More importantly, he recalled Carranza's ultimatum to Alvarado in 1916 to halt his modest agrarian reform. That move had been prompted, it seemed, by intense pressure applied upon Mexico City by Yucatán's wealthiest hacendados, and by the U.S. government, acting on behalf of the powerful North American cordage manufacturers who controlled the henequen market and received upwards of 90 percent of Yucatán's crop. Would Obregón, if subjected to similar pressure, step in and thwart his agrarian reform?

Such, then, was Carrillo Puerto's dilemma: he appreciated the difficulties of waging social revolution from above and realized that only a mass movement, mobilizing social groups and classes around a coherent revolutionary ideology and agenda, had any prospects of success. However, the creation of a broad revolutionary base would take time, more time than he probably had, considering the powerful opponents

and obstacles arrayed against him. The solution would be to buy more time, if possible, by consolidating a series of strategic alliances with powerful subregional caciques, as well as cementing a stronger relationship with one or both of his national patrons, Obregón and Calles. The way Felipe Carrillo went about applying this solution not only sheds light on the cacique phenomenon, but suggests answers to a number of difficult questions relating to the initial success of his regime and its eventual demise.

Traditional historical interpretations of Carrillo Puerto have not recognized the existence of a dilemma. They have stressed Carrillo's tenure as an agronomist with the zapatistas in 1915 and his undisputed Marxist sympathies, which are invariably documented with mention of his correspondence with Lenin.¹⁸ Having established his ideological credentials as an *indigenista* and an agrarian socialist, these accounts go on to emphasize his personal charisma with the Indian masses, which facilitated the creation of the ligas de resistencia. These leagues, it is held, assured Felipe a dedicated peasant militia of anywhere from sixty to ninety thousand strong—the accounts vary but, by any account, clearly the largest force of its kind in the Republic. Indeed the tenor of the traditional literature, suggesting a widespread mobilization of the Yucatecan countryside almost by virtue of the sheer force of Carrillo's ideals and personality, is captured in the verse of Yucatán's revolutionary poet, Elmer Llanes Marín:¹⁹

A su gesto y a su voz,
Sesenta millares de voces airadas,
Sesenta millares de almas iluminadas
Repitieron
El decálogo rojo.

At his gesture and at his command,
Sixty thousand voices raised,
Sixty thousand spirits joined
Repeating
The Red Commandments.

However, too often historiography has melded into hagiography. The manner in which Felipe met his death—he was executed by insurgent federal troops during the de la Huerta rebellion in January 1924—has been given higher priority than the struggles and strategies that gave meaning to his political life. Carrillo Puerto has, alternately, been declared a "revolutionary martyr," a secular "saint of the proletariat," a "Mexican Allende," and even "Yucatán's Abraham Lincoln."²⁰ Explana-

tions for Felipe's fall fill many volumes and articles and sort themselves out around three general, potentially overlapping theories (which, it will be observed, become progressively less plausible): (1) that Carrillo's death warrant was bought by the large henequen hacendados whom he was threatening with expropriation and, it has been suggested as a corollary, with the assistance or connivance of the North American corporations whose control of the henequen market Carrillo sought to break; (2) that Felipe, essentially a pacifist, allowed himself to be martyred rather than shed the blood of his numerous, poorly armed Maya supporters; and (3) that consumed by the passion provoked by his dalliance with North American journalist Alma Reed, Governor Carrillo gave up any prospects of a fight with the insurgent federals and was captured in his impetuous flight to join his mistress.²¹

Carrillo's achievements as a social revolutionary are a matter of record and are not at the center of this discussion. It is sufficient to point out that under his leadership, Yucatán came to be regarded by the rest of the Republic as a social laboratory for the Revolution, where exciting experiments in labor and educational reform and women's rights were carried out. The focal point of Felipe's social vision was land, and during his regime the pace of agrarian reform accelerated to the point that, by 1924, Yucatán had distributed more land than any other state, save Morelos. Moreover, it was under his aegis that the relations of production on haciendas changed in fact as well as in law and the Yucatecan slave-peon found himself well along the road to becoming a unionized agricultural worker.²² The stature of the man need not be demeaned by an attempt to demystify his political persona and reassert his standing as an astutely pragmatic revolutionary leader, very much in the caudillo mold.

Like so many of the Revolution's caciques and caudillos, Felipe Carrillo Puerto began his career as a member of what has been called the "noncommissioned class," or in-between element of society. The son of a small merchant, Carrillo was essentially an autodidact and in rapid succession pursued brief careers as a railroad conductor, woodcutter, backcountry carter and mule driver, small merchant, stevedore (while in exile in New Orleans), journalist, and finally, as an agronomist. These various lines of work enabled him to crisscross the Yucatán peninsula, come into contact with large numbers of campesinos, sharpen his command of Maya, and generally expand and refine his political consciousness and savvy.²³ Following Alvarado's introduction of a mild agrarian reform, Carrillo was selected by his pueblo (Motul)—much as Zapata had been chosen in Anenecuilco—to head the community's fight to regain its former lands.²⁴ He quickly became a powerful force in local

and regional politics and his organizational talents and prominence as an agrarian agitator were soon recognized by Alvarado, who directed him to create a network of resistance leagues for the nascent Socialist party. By the time Alvarado was recalled from Yucatán by Carranza in 1918, Carrillo had established himself as the most powerful man in the region. After weathering in exile Carranza's purge of socialism in Yucatán, Carrillo returned to the state, a leader committed to profound structural change, but highly adept at working through the maze of formal and informal political networks that had brought him to power. When he became governor in 1922, he was a seasoned, practical Mexican politician who had, at one time or another, already held every other major post in Yucatán.²⁵

In Felipe's own career, first as a local agrarian cacique and later as a regional caudillo, we can identify many of the essential characteristics of caciquismo: the rise to power from a local or subregional base; a predilection for working through informal political networks structured by the bonds of kinship and personalistic patron-client arrangements; a consistent tactical use of violence (or the threat of violence) and the timely manipulation of ideological symbols; and the performance of a "middleman" role in dealings with both state and national structures and with local campesinos.

For example, Carrillo (like Primo Tapia, whose career has been examined carefully by Friedrich) constructed a tightly knit faction of close relatives and intimate friends in Motul that later formed the heart of his party organization and state administration. No major revolutionary leader appears to have utilized the bonds of kinship more fully than did Carrillo: according to one estimate, 142 members of his extended family took positions in the state government, in addition to scores of long-standing friends (e.g., Manuel Berzunza, his "proxy" as governor.²⁶) Of the three brothers who accompanied Felipe to the *paredón*, Wilfrido was chief of the secret police, Benjamín the secretary of the Central Resistance League (and formerly a federal deputy), and Edesio was jointly the municipal president and president of the Resistance League of Motul. Other siblings, who managed to avoid execution, ran the state's feminist leagues, directed the state-owned railroads, and headed up the state treasury. A brother-in-law controlled the Mérida ayuntamiento.²⁷

Nor did Don Felipe neglect to cultivate informal patron-client networks in his dealings with the national power structure. In 1919, he had become the first regional leader to declare his support for Álvaro Obregón's candidacy in the upcoming presidential elections—going so

far as to issue Obregón a red card for membership in Yucatán's Central Resistance League. This calculated move was to prove remarkably fortuitous and foresighted, enabling him to eliminate his last serious rival at the regional level, Governor Carlos Castro Morales. Morales, who had pledged himself to support Carranza and uphold the formal, legally constituted process, paid for backing the wrong horse with years in political exile. Carrillo, on the other hand, had found himself a powerful benefactor. Following Agua Prieta, Felipe, while continuing to support Obregón, went out of his way to secure General Plutarco Elias Calles, Obregón's Minister of the Interior (*Gobernación*), as his principal patron. Carrillo had sensed early on that Calles would be a force in national politics for years to come. More immediately, he sought to insure that Calles (and *Gobernación*) would place no obstacles in the path of his social programs. Most importantly, as Carrillo confided to the visiting José Vasconcelos, he understood "support from Calles" to mean "federal troops on request."²⁸ Accordingly, Carrillo lavished gifts on Calles' personal secretary and contributed 100,000 pesos to Calles' campaign for the presidency in 1923.²⁹

Both Obregón and Calles rewarded Carrillo for his loyalty and service, first by supporting him against a renewed challenge to his regional hegemony by Salvador Alvarado and then by giving him a free hand to implement his programs in Yucatán and, increasingly, throughout the entire Southeast.³⁰ Beginning in 1920, for example, *carrillista* agents backed by fifteen hundred regular and irregular Yucatecan troops, invaded neighboring Campeche, organized resistance leagues, and, splitting the existing majority party in two, established the hegemony of the PSS. Following the explicit orders of Calles, federal troops remained as spectators and subsequent *campechano* protests against this violation of state sovereignty fell on Obregón's deaf ears. Less dramatic and decisive political incursions were made into Chiapas and Tabasco (and "feelers" were even sent to Cuba and Guatemala) as Carrillo attempted to enlarge his sphere of action and give substance to his party's hitherto formal pretensions of being "El Gran Partido Socialista del Sureste."³¹ Don Felipe transcended his image as a regional leader in 1921 and early 1922, when he led the PSS into the so-called "Partidos Coaligados," a loose political federation that would later evolve under Calles' direction into the PNR. By late 1923, as he seemed prepared to embark upon a major expropriation of henequen plantations, there was some talk both within the region and outside that Carrillo might now be contemplating a national following and a run at the presidency. Despite Felipe's own declaration of support for Calles' candidacy, these rumors could not

have pleased the man whose protection Carrillo had sought and enjoyed, the man whom Yucatecan socialists referred to as *el amo*—"the boss."³²

Contrary to the popular mythology that has depicted Carrillo Puerto as a pacifist by nature, and imbued him with the gentle qualities that befit a martyr executed along with twelve of his "disciples,"³³ the documentary evidence reveals a shrewd regional chief who did not shrink from the use of violence or political homicide in gaining or maintaining power. In his early career, Felipe's marksmanship protected him from at least one assassination attempt and, along with his bold leadership of peasant land invasions, won him a reputation as a man of action.³⁴ More importantly, under Carrillo Puerto's orders, brother Wilfrido's small but efficient force of secret police (*policía judicial*), working in alliance with local power-brokers, violently and systematically quelled dissent throughout the region, smashing the rival Partido Liberal Yucateco (PLY), disbanding competing parties in Campeche, and ultimately establishing the PSS as the only party in the peninsula by late 1922.³⁵

Generally speaking, it is fair to say that the popular notion of revolutionary violence that disrupted and dislocated the Mexican society and economy—the violence of free-ranging armies and cacique bands—was mostly restricted to large areas of the north, north central, west central, and south central parts of the Republic, particularly ravaging the Bajío and states such as Morelos, Chihuahua, San Luis Potosí, and Durango. For the most part, it is also fair to say that the south and southeast, including the Yucatán peninsula, were relatively free of such apocalyptic violence. On the other hand, the popular characterization of twentieth-century Yucatán as *el país tranquilo*, a society rendered docile and passive by the bloody and traumatic nineteenth-century *Guerra de Castas*, is clearly a myth. Rather, it seems more likely that low-level factional cacical violence became institutionalized into the political and social fabric of the countryside. Moreover, at least during circumscribed intervals of the 1918–24 period, such violence could be especially intense.

In some parts of the state, settlement patterns were severely, if usually only temporarily, affected, as band violence uprooted large communal segments and in some cases depopulated entire villages and hamlets. Indeed, atrocities as grisly as any reported elsewhere in revolutionary Mexico were carried out in Yucatán, although, mercifully, they tended to be isolated episodes. Yet on several occasions, there was nervous speculation in Mérida's cafés and press about the possibility of another Caste War.³⁶ The nature and use of such violence by regional (and later national) revolutionary caudillos such as Carrillo Puerto (and

later, Cárdenas) suggest that the Revolution often failed to destroy traditional mechanisms of social control in the rural areas. Rather than restructuring political and socioeconomic relationships in the countryside, the programs of the revolutionary regime and the formal administrative apparatus created to implement them were often appropriated and adapted by local power-brokers to consolidate and legitimize their informal control. In other words, a new class of caciques replaced the old one.³⁷

It appears that Carrillo pacted with a variety of local bosses and strongmen, most of whom came from a petty bourgeois or working class background (e.g., hacienda *mayacol*, *mayordomo*, *ranchero*, artisan, peon), and a number of whom would seem to satisfy Eric Hobsbawm's description of the "social bandit." Most of them established local cacicazgos either during the first sporadic rebellions surrounding the Madero rebellion (1909–11) or, more commonly, following Alvarado's occupation of Yucatán in 1915. Arriving with his powerful Army of the Southeast, Alvarado had shattered the repressive mechanism of the region's agro-commercial bourgeoisie, which had included *jefes políticos*, detachments of *rurales*, state police, and the private forces of individual hacendados.

Indeed, the evidence suggests that some of these incipient caciques began their careers as retainers and henchmen of the hacendados, "white guards," or "landlords' bandits," to use Hobsbawm's phrase. The majority of these men had little opportunity for advancement under the Porfirian regime, based as it was on the large estate, henequen monoculture, and a harsh dependent labor system. Most seem to have reconciled themselves to the rather meager prospects of life on the margin, in the interstices, or directly within the orbit of the large estate. A few, however, attempted to improve life's chances and give vent to their frustrations through banditry. In sweeping aside the custodians of the Porfirian mechanism of social control in the *campo*, Alvarado created new opportunities that became more easily exploited following the general's departure in 1918 and the intensification of conflict between Carrillo's Partido Socialista and the Partido Liberal.³⁸ The following chart is a listing, no doubt incomplete, of the major caciques active in Yucatán during the 1915–24 period. The main occupation of the cacique, when known, and the location of the cacicazgo, as can best be determined (i.e., *municipio* and/or *departamento*) appear following the cacique's name. Matching letters following names indicate strong evidence of a dual cacicazgo.³⁹

As Carrillo Puerto advanced in his political career, and especially as he toured the state promoting the resistance leagues that he envisioned would one day become the backbone of the PSS, he sought to

<i>Name</i>	<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Municipio</i>	<i>Departamento</i>
Loreto Baak ^d	bandit	Santa Elena	Ticul
Donato Bates	ranchero		Valladolid
Juan Campos	bandit		Temax
Pedro Crespo	ex-officer, state militia		Temax
Agustín Espinosa ^d			Acanceh
Braulio Euán		Opichén	Maxcanú
Bartolomé García Correa	maestro	Umán	Hunucmá
Manuel González ("Polín")	mayordomo	?	?
José Ma. Iturralde Traconis	maestro	Valladolid	Valladolid
Felipe Lara		Cenotillo	Espita
Humberto León	barber	Halachó	Maxcanú
Manuel Mendoza Rosado ^d		Santa Elena	Ticul
Lino Muñoz		Progreso	Progreso
Anaceto Moreno ^b		Yaxcabá	Sotuta
Miguel Ortiz ^c		Muna	Ticul
José D. Presuel			Valladolid
José Pío Chuc	ranchero	Hunucmá	Hunucmá
Ignacio Solís ^a			Acanceh
"Los Hermanos Vargas" (Lisandro and Benjamín) ^c		Muna	Ticul
Demetrio Yamá ("El Tuerto" — "Wall-Eye") ^b	peon	Yaxcabá	Sotuta

identify and enlist the support of these incipient power-brokers for the Socialists. Similar efforts by agents of the PLY gave the routine factional conflicts of cacical politics an intensely "ideological" flavor, especially during the period of Carranza's persecution of the Socialist party (1918–20). More often than not, however, regional politics served merely as a pretext, an overlay for deep-seated rivalries over land, cattle, and commercial rights, and, of course, over the accession to local power that would assure the winning faction of control over these economic resources. A "liberal" faction would literally drive its "socialista" rival out of town, the latter taking refuge in a "friendly" (i.e., Socialist-controlled) pueblo nearby. The victors would then seize lands and goods and often take over the losers' jobs on neighboring haciendas. Then the political balance of regional politics would shift, the socialistas getting the upper hand and the division of spoils would be reversed.

By 1921, however, the issue was no longer in doubt. Backed by Obregón and Calles, Carrillo Puerto had effectively employed a variety of forms of patronage to come to terms with all factional leaders of consequence and put the Liberals out of business. He had instructed

General Alejandro Mange, his loyal zone commander, not to interfere with his Socialist allies as they enforced their political authority within their informal domains. Upon occasion, however, state police and federal troops did intervene in support of local Socialist bosses, and there is evidence that the PSS itself sent small shipments of guns to a favored few in 1920. Generally speaking, after 1921, Carrillo seems to have condoned the practice of controlled violence for limited political ends, while impressing upon these caciques the importance of braking indiscriminate acts of criminal violence and banditry, especially against the henequen plantations whose continued production was so central to the regional economy.⁴¹ Carrillo stepped up his campaign against lawlessness after formally taking office in 1922, when, with fiber prices again on the upswing, it was especially imperative to ensure the social peace. Particularly egregious behavior by local caciques, such as the assassination of hacendados and mayordomos, brought some form of immediate retribution from Mérida. Usually the guilty pistolero was jailed and the existing cacicazgo dissolved in favor of a rival faction.⁴²

To ensure the loyalty of more discreet and sensible bosses, Carrillo Puerto elevated a number to the state legislature (e.g., Braulio Euán, Bartolomé García Correa, Demetrio Yamá, Manuel González, Juan Campos), and awarded others the plums of civil government and agrarian office to hold themselves or bestow as they saw fit. Many, in addition to being municipal presidents, were also entrusted with the presidency of their local resistance leagues (e.g., Lino Muñoz, Loreto Baak, Pedro Crespo, Felipe Lara, Juan Campos, Donato Bates).⁴³ The Liberal, hacendado-controlled press raged against what it viewed as Carrillo Puerto's "bloody system of political rule in the countryside, dictated by the personal whim of *caciquillos*." Even more infuriating to them was the spectacle of "barely literate Maya pistoleros" taking up seats in the state legislature in Mérida: "rude assassins who walk our streets and ride about in chauffeured automobiles with total immunity from the law!" Here, the editorial writer of the conservative *Revista de Mérida* lamented, was a macabre, plebeian version of the Porfirian peace, with all of the evils of the old jefe político system, but with none of its dignified stability.⁴⁴

Moreover, Carrillo had been careful, whenever possible, not to impinge upon the established economic preserves of his local allies. In a variety of *memorias* to Felipe, campesinos continuously protested against abuses that, in most cases, they explicitly linked to individual caciques; for example: illegal sales taxes (*alcabalas*); unwarranted exemptions from the payment of taxes; clandestine liquor traffic—especially rife since the puritanical Alvarado decreed Yucatán to be *el estado seco* in 1915, and Carrillo had not seen fit to repeal; irregularities in the implementation of

agrarian reform, including personal control of the best ejidal lands; violations in landlord-tenant arrangements; the use of unpaid communal labor (*fagina*); corruption in the management of Carrillo's rural consumer cooperative stores, often in collusion with monopolistic merchants—to name only the most regularly appearing complaints.⁴⁵ Carrillo's response was invariably to promise redress, and in many cases, he made good on his promise. Yet the frequency of such memorias suggests either an inability or, in certain situations, an unwillingness to act. In the case of the contraband liquor trade, one of the local bosses' most lucrative sidelines, it was common knowledge that the law would not be enforced. Indeed, one of the rising young men in Carrillo's inner circle, Bartolomé García Correa, soon to become governor in his own right, was acknowledged to be one of the worst *contrabandistas de aguardiente* in the western part of the state.⁴⁶

In addition to respecting existing sources of cacical income, Carrillo Puerto extended preferential treatment to his most favored clients. Thus, García Correa received a juicy concession to establish a badly needed electric plant; Lino Muñoz got a sizable land option in the state's best grazing area; free passes and railroad privileges to move goods were bestowed generously upon these allies while they were denied to the great hacendados who attempted to buck Don Felipe's agrarian reform and new wage tariffs. Moreover, it seems clear that the petitions that these influential chiefs brought on behalf of their pueblos and individual supporters—requests for ejidal grants, increased wages, and additional hacienda employment—were received much more favorably by the governor than those that filtered up to him from less politically favored petitioners.⁴⁷

In return, Carrillo's clientele group recognized his absolute authority within the state and performed a variety of services for its patron, who, by 1923, was being commonly hailed as "El César Rojo."⁴⁸ Not only was violence selectively brought to bear against opponents of the regime to ensure Carrillo's PSS a political monopoly within the region, but the caciques doubled as informal ward bosses, guaranteeing through a variety of incentives and coercive techniques the enrollment of local campesinos in the *ligas de resistencia*. Occasionally, local bosses organized leagues themselves. More common was the combination of initial contact by cadres of propagandists and rural teachers followed up, when needed, by the strong-arm tactics of a local boss.⁴⁹ The result was a dramatic rise in league recruitment over the course of Carrillo Puerto's governorship. By the end of 1922 there were approximately 73,000 *ligados* in 417 leagues. A year later, on the eve of the de la Huerta revolt, the membership rolls had swelled to well over 80,000.⁵⁰

In addition, the local cacique also played a significant auxiliary role in Felipe's campaign to raise the political consciousness of the Maya campesino and wean him away from the traditional institutions of the old regime. Local leaders were instructed to paint all the buildings red, encourage the wearing of red sashes, and conduct all official correspondence in red ink. Moreover, in keeping with Carrillo's commandment that *yucatecos* should "flee from the Church as if from a plague," a manipulation and transference of symbols was to be encouraged for ideological reasons. Thus, the red equilateral triangle, the logo of the Socialist party, would replace the cross, and "socialist marriages and baptisms" would supersede the traditional Catholic versions of these sacraments.⁵¹ Finally, the speaking of Maya and the teaching of Mayan culture and art forms were to be encouraged and every effort made to instill a sense of pride in the rural masses by appealing to the great tradition to which they were heir. In fact, it would be the responsibility of the caciques to organize communal work details to begin construction on serviceable roads to the largely inaccessible ruins of Chichén Itzá and Uxmal, both of which Carrillo was now working to restore in collaboration with a team of archaeologists from the Carnegie Institution.⁵²

Therefore, it seems that if Carrillo Puerto was so successful in creating a statewide network of resistance leagues based upon the support of the countryside, this success was somewhat less attributable to his recognized charisma with the masses than to his skill in working with existing cacique networks. But having accounted in large part for his rise, how are we to explain Carrillo's fall? Assuming, as the evidence seems to warrant, that his capture and execution were engineered by *delahuertista* officers in league with influential local hacendados, how was this effected if Felipe had the support of at least the legendary "sixty thousand strong" behind him?

Traditional writers have been either unaware or reluctant to admit that the resistance leagues, the cornerstone of Felipe's political edifice, were conceived with a basic organizational flaw that proved fatal when the far-flung network was put to a severe test. In the absence of a thorough political mobilization of the masses, Carrillo had attempted to consolidate his control through existing power-brokers. Consequently, many of the over four hundred ligas that existed in the region on the eve of the de la Huerta revolt in 1923, which gave Carrillo his sixty to ninety thousand, were in reality paper organizations, nominally kept behind him by local caciques, with highly inflated membership lists. After all, Yucatán's population at the time, including infants and children, was only three hundred thousand! Such an organizational arrangement was well-suited to maintaining control against internal threats, since it pos-

sessed a virtual monopoly of force within the region and had been sanctioned in its use of violence by the Obregón government. But it remained vulnerable to a swift attack from without by a powerful, well-equipped force and/or by defecting federal troops from within the region—both of which occurred in December 1923.

When Carrillo's regime was challenged during the de la Huerta revolt, the majority of the irregular bands led by caciques proved unreliable; in fact, available evidence suggests that remarkably few of them mounted even token resistance against the insurgent federals. According to one Mérida newspaper, Carrillo's "socialist caciques fled shamelessly with their tails between their legs."⁵³ Braulio Euán was a significant exception. From his large western cacicazgo in the country around Opichén and Maxcanú, he summoned two hundred men for Carrillo Puerto and mounted guerilla forays on insurgent federals in the area for some time after his caudillo's execution.⁵⁴ More common, however, was the behavior of the Vargas brothers and Miguel Ortiz in nearby Muna. These caciques found in the de la Huerta revolt an opportunity to liquidate their factional rivals and seize their competitors' property. To gain their ends they had armed the local campesinos and declared for Felipe in the name of Muna's resistance league. However, later, when the delahuertista troops closed in, they left the area with their immediate inner circle of supporters, abandoning the local campesinos to their fate. Hangings and reprisals followed in the Muna plaza. A short time later the trio of caciques signed on with the delahuertistas to hunt down Socialists and confiscate their property.⁵⁵ A number of other local chiefs, such as Loreto Baak, a seasoned campaigner and popular "social bandit," immediately took their bands over to the insurgent federals.⁵⁶ A contemporary participant has gone so far as to suggest that several of Carrillo's more influential local allies—who remain unnamed—betrayed him, conspiring with a handful of powerful henequen hacendados to buy his death warrant from the federals.⁵⁷

Hobsbawm's insights regarding the problem of effectively incorporating social bandits into revolutionary movements seems apropos here. The truth is that few of Don Felipe's cacique allies were ever really ideologically motivated or organizationally prepared to transcend their condition as "primitive rebels" and become dedicated and disciplined Socialist revolutionaries. According to Hobsbawm, these are the two major limitations that social bandits pose for modern social movements.⁵⁸

Moreover, in the absence of reliable leadership, the fabled peasant leagues were revealed to be paper tigers. Fifteen hundred armed campesinos declared for Felipe in his hometown of Motul, but few assembled spontaneously elsewhere throughout the state. The fact that these

leagues declined so rapidly in number and membership, and lost sight of their initial social goals in the aftermath of Carrillo's assassination, is further proof of the incomplete mobilization that was carried out during the Carrillo Puerto regime.⁵⁹

Supporting this "structural argument" is the compelling circumstantial factor of timing. The immediate outbreak of the revolt was unexpected and the speed with which the insurgents travelled through the peninsula worked to exacerbate the internal weaknesses of the regime's defense system, predicated primarily on the *ligas* and a rather small state police force. Less than twenty-four hours after the revolt broke out in Campeche, the rebels had taken Mérida and its nearby port, Progreso, forcing Governor Carrillo to flee and affording him little time to mobilize his far-flung network of poorly armed peasant leagues against the well-armed federal regulars. Moreover, in moving first against the peninsula's only significant urban centers, the insurgents hit Carrillo where he was weakest. The small size of the urban labor movement, coupled with its lack of enthusiastic support for Carrillo, rendered it an ineffective ally in the face of outside invasion and forestalled desperate eleventh-hour plans to form "red workers' batallions."⁶⁰

However, the most tragic revelation that has emerged from Carrillo's failed defense of the region is that he had ordered his local leaders to begin full-scale military training and emergency mobilization of the leagues only *one day* before the revolt actually broke out in Campeche. In the circular issuing this order, references are made to the lack of organization and discipline that continued to plague the *ligas*.⁶¹ The historian is left to wonder whether Felipe's excessive delay in ordering full-scale military preparedness was due to some combination of enemy surprise and colossal oversight (not likely, since Carrillo had expressly taken up the matter of possible military defection with Obregón weeks earlier in Mexico City); to a principled unwillingness to shed campesino blood, as traditional historians hold (why, then, did he ultimately call for a mobilization?); or to a growing realization (and resignation) that a defense predicated upon the organizational capability and military skill of the *ligas* would likely be futile, the more so in light of his recent unsuccessful attempt to secure arms shipments from the federal government.⁶²

Perhaps Felipe knew that, realistically speaking, his regime would rise or fall on the success of a sustained guerrilla counterattack against the delahuertistas, a campaign waged not with massed troops of poorly armed *ligados*, but with small and mobile cacique bands. No doubt, he also appreciated that in large part the lack of organization hampering the *ligas* was attributable to poor leadership provided by the local cacique

que—often the founder or president of the league or else the grey eminence behind its activities. The cacique depended upon, and preferred to exert his force through, his smaller band of hand-picked advisors and seasoned *luchadores*. Consequently, these caciques were usually not interested, even when guns were available, in arming and training the rural masses who technically comprised the membership of the ligas. Governor Carrillo received scores of petitions from groups of ligados asking that they be given back the shotguns they originally lost to Carranza's federals. In addition, he received many more requests that he dispatch government instructors for the purpose of teaching campesinos how to defend themselves, especially against the "bandits" (*ladrones*) and "caciquillos" who regularly preyed upon them.⁶³

Finally, it is also possible that, in waiting so long, Felipe might have harbored the faint hope that Obregón and Calles would, if they could, bail him out with arms and reinforcements. This of course raises the final larger question of the federal government's abandonment of the Carrillo Puerto regime. As mentioned, Carrillo had visited Obregón and Calles some weeks before the revolt erupted, seeking federal military guarantees for his region in the event of invasion, and requesting modern rifles to arm ligados. Obregón had hedged and ultimately denied these requests, minimizing the threat to Carrillo's Socialist revolution and arguing that the federal government would be forced to attach its defense priorities to other regions of the Republic that he judged to be more vulnerable than Yucatán. Carrillo immediately returned to Mérida and frantically began negotiations with the United States for the purchase of guns and ammunition—negotiations that were still in progress when the revolt broke out.⁶⁴

Some Yucatecan historians have charged, in a more conspiratorial vein, that Obregón and Calles did little to aid their loyal governor before and during the insurgency and nothing to rescue or ransom him once he fell into enemy hands.⁶⁵ In the absence of hard evidence (unlikely to appear), we can only speculate upon the possibility of a betrayal during the de la Huerta revolt. Yet there is good reason to suppose that by late 1923, Mexico City found its former clients, Carrillo and the PSS, expendable. Certainly Don Felipe's imminent plans to expropriate the henequen plantations, in the face of substantial U.S. pressure upon Mexico City to resist such a move, and Obregón's special reluctance to anger the North Americans in the wake of the Bucareli Conferences, must be seriously considered. Moreover, when we add the threat that Carrillo Puerto's substantial power as a regional caudillo and his growing reputation as a national figure was beginning to pose for Calles and Obregón, we have the basis of a plausible argument as to why these

national leaders might have chosen to desert their former client. Following Felipe's death, Obregón concertedly purged influential carrillistas from positions of power within the PSS, a fact that further substantiates the argument.⁶⁶

Indeed, historians are now beginning to view the Obregón-Calles period, commencing in the early 1920s, as the first significant moment of consolidation and centralization in the development of Mexico's new revolutionary corporatist state.⁶⁷ This was a time when, in order to promote national unity and forge a modern state, the central government began systematically to undercut the power and autonomy of the regional caudillos. In certain instances, Mexico City regarded these regional strongmen as being too progressive or extreme. Such was the case with Adalberto Tejeda (Veracruz), Primo Tapia (Michoacán), and Carrillo Puerto, each of whom approximated, in varying degree, the radical populist style of leadership that would only later emerge at the national level with Lázaro Cárdenas. In other instances, such as the case of the Cedillo brothers in San Luis Potosí or that of the Figueroas in Guerrero, the federal government was critical of regional bosses for not being progressive enough, for applying a rude and anachronistic nineteenth-century political style to twentieth-century conditions. In either case, whether it perceived them to be forward or backward looking, Mexico City found these regional chiefs out of step with *its Revolution* and therefore politically expendable.⁶⁸

While it cannot be said without gross distortion that caciquismo was directly responsible for Felipe Carrillo Puerto's rise and fall, I have attempted to show that any analysis of the regime that does not take the phenomenon into account is likely to misrepresent its strengths and weaknesses and fail to appreciate the logic of the local revolutionary process. In presenting the argument, it was necessary to "demystify" Carrillo Puerto and his regime, although it was not intended to cast doubt upon his motives as an agrarian leader nor suggest that he preferred to work with "corrupt" caciques and "pistoleros" rather than with the people. He sought alliances with local caciques because they constituted powerful, ready-made, and often popular allies at a point when time itself might determine the success or failure of his incipient Socialist revolution. More the shrewd revolutionary politician than the gentle humanist, Carrillo Puerto was astute enough to realize that he could buy time for the future creation of a mass revolutionary base only by enlisting the aid of existing power-brokers and "holding the ring" in the meantime. That the amount of time he was ultimately able to buy—several years—was not greater, seems to have been attributable, in part, to significant problems inherent in such a strategy, and in part to larger

structural factors that were essentially beyond his control (and a more complete discussion of which would extend beyond the bounds of this essay).⁶⁹

In retrospect, the irony has been that these selfsame caciques and their successors, still by and large powerful bosses in their individual spheres, have in conjunction with the revolutionary regime been highly instrumental in fashioning and perpetuating the historical myth of Felipe Carrillo Puerto. As with Emiliano Zapata and Primo Tapia, the number of local politicians who claim to have fought the good fight with Don Felipe or to have had some intimate connection with one who did, continues to multiply geometrically. And in the half century that has elapsed since Carrillo's celebrated martyrdom, a number of the wealthiest hacendado families he threatened with expropriation—later carried out by Cárdenas—have found their way into the highest circles of the regime and themselves taken a hand in manipulating the protective symbols of the regional revolutionary myth. That myth, although now a bit frayed, still confers a measure of legitimacy upon those who respectfully invoke it.

NOTES

Abbreviations

AGE	Archivo General del Estado de Yucatán, Ramo de Gobierno, Mérida
AGN	Archivo General de la Nación, Papeles Presidenciales, Ramo de Obregón-Calles, D.F.
BdU	<i>Boletín de la Universidad Nacional del Sureste</i> , Mérida
C	<i>El Correo</i> , Mérida
DdY	<i>Diario de Yucatán</i> , Mérida
DO	<i>Diario Oficial del Estado</i> , Mérida
HAHR	<i>Hispanic American Historical Review</i>
P	<i>El Popular</i> , Mérida
RdY	<i>Revista de Yucatán</i> , Mérida
RUY	<i>Revista de la Universidad de Yucatán</i> , Mérida
RDS	U.S. Department of State. <i>Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910–1929</i> . Microfilm Copy 274. Washington, D.C.: National Archives, 1959.
SD-CPR	National Archives, U.S. Department of State Consular Post Records: Progreso. Washington, D.C.
La Voz	<i>La Voz de la Revolución</i> , Mérida

1. *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York, 1969), p. 55.
2. Lewis, *Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlán Restudied* (Urbana, 1951), p. 51; Goldkind, "Class Conflict and Cacique," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 22: 4 (Winter 1966): 341–42; Azuela, *The Underdogs*, tr. F. K. Hendricks (San Antonio, 1963), pp. 189–91, and *The Bosses*, tr. L. B. Simpson (Berkeley, 1970). Cf. the essays in Roger Bartra, ed., *Caciquismo y poder político en el México rural* (México, 1975), which argue that the logic of capitalist development has strategically allied caciquismo with the forces of imperialism and latifundismo.
3. *San José de Gracia: Mexican Village in Transition*, tr. John Upton (Austin, 1974), p. 144.

4. Pedro Martínez, *A Mexican Peasant and His Family* (New York, 1964), pp. 75–77, 84.
5. *DaY*, 13 Nov. 1975, p. 1.
6. Paul Friedrich, "A Mexican Cacicazgo," *Ethnology* 4:2 (Apr. 1965): 192.
7. Hugh Hamill, ed. *Dictatorship in Spanish America* (New York, 1965), pp. 10–11; François Chevalier, "'Caudillos' et 'caciques' en Amérique," *Bulletin Hispanique* 64 bis (1962), p. 33; Ricardo E. Alegria, "Origin and Diffusion of the Term 'Cacique,'" *Selected Papers of the XXIX International Congress of Americanists*, ed. Sol Tax (Chicago, 1952), pp. 313–16. For an understanding of how the meaning of the term evolved throughout the colonial period and the nineteenth century, also see Robert Gilmore, *Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela, 1810–1910* (Athens, Ohio, 1964), pp. 3–13; Eric Wolf and Edward Hansen, "Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis," *Journal of Comparative Studies in Society and History* 9:2 (1967): 177–79; Richard M. Morse, "Toward a Theory of Spanish American Government," *Journal of Ideas* 15 (1954):79; and Tulio Halperin-Donghi, "El surgimiento de los caudillos en el marco de la sociedad rioplatense postrevolucionaria," *Estudios de la historia social* 1 (Buenos Aires, 1965).
8. Much as Eul-Soo Pang, "The Politics of Coronelismo in Brazil: The Case of Bahia, 1889–1930" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of California at Berkeley, 1969), pp. 45–55, established a broad, seven-fold, functional typology of Brazilian *coronéis*, the student of Spanish American caciquismo might profit diagnostically by constructing a similar model. Pang's types include: coronel-landlord, merchant, industrialist, priest, warlord ("a coronel of coronéis," comparable to a Spanish American caudillo), *cangaceiro* (social bandit), and party cadre. Indeed, with the possible exception of the coronel-priest, these Brazilian types would find counterparts in the existing literature on Spanish American caciques. Moreover, the studies of anthropologists Ricardo Pozas and Henning Siverts for Chiapas, and my own research on Yucatán, suggest that the increasingly powerful revolutionary *maestro* (rural schoolteacher) and the dictatorial ladino "secretary" or "agent" in isolated Indian communities might also qualify as possible Mexican cacique types. Pozas, *Juan the Chamula*, tr. Lysander Kemp (Berkeley, 1962), pp. 79–83; Siverts, "On Politics and Leadership in Highland Chiapas," in E. Z. Vogt and Alberto Ruz, *Desarrollo cultural de los mayas* (México, 1964), pp. 367–68, 374–76. As with the generic term "peasant," social scientists continue to debate the merits of a broad or narrow construction of "cacique." For the problems of defining such terms, see Henry Landsberger, "The Role of Peasant Movements and Revolts in Development," in Landsberger, ed. *Latin American Peasants* (Ithaca, 1969), pp. 3–5.
9. Paul Friedrich, "The Legitimacy of a Cacique," in Marc J. Swartz, ed., *Local Level Politics* (Chicago, 1968), p. 247.
10. Wolf, "Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society: Mexico," *American Anthropologist* 58 (1956): 1015–78; Siverts, "The 'Cacique' of K'ankujk," *Estudios de cultura maya* (México), 5 (1965):339–60; Bartra, ed., *Caciquismo*, pp. 48–49, 139–47 and *passim*. I have attempted to flesh out the central features of this definition in "Caciquismo and Revolutionary Process: An Analysis and a Yucatecan Case Study," in D. A. Brading and Jean Meyer, eds., *Peasant and Caudillo in Modern Mexico* (Cambridge, U.K., forthcoming). For a slightly different definition of caciquismo, see Robert Kern and Ronald Dolkart, eds., *The Caciques* (Albuquerque, 1973).
11. Hamill, *Dictatorship*, pp. 10–11.
12. For example, cf. the distinction between the "caudillo" and the "cacique" found in Fernando N. A. Cuevillas, "El régimen del caudillaje en Hispanoamérica," *Boletín del Instituto de Sociología* (Buenos Aires) 11 (1953):60–75.
13. *Zapata*, p. 72.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 73, 81–82, 111, 131.
15. The following discussion draws heavily upon chaps. 6, 7, and 8 of my larger treatment "Revolution from Without: The Mexican Revolution in Yucatan, 1915–1940" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1978), which contains extensive bibliographic references and more complete documentation of events than space will permit here.

16. John K. Turner, *Barbarous Mexico* (Chicago, 1910), pp. 9–66; Henry Baerlein, *Mexico, Land of Unrest* (Philadelphia, 1914), pp. 143–98; Frederick J. T. Frost and Channing Arnold, *The American Egypt* (New York, 1909); Salvador Alvarado, *Actuación revolucionaria del General Salvador Alvarado en Yucatán* (México, 1965); Friedrich Katz, "Labor Conditions on Porfirian Haciendas: Some Trends and Tendencies," *HAHR* 54:1 (Feb. 1974):14–23, 44–47.
17. AGE, Felipe Ayala M. to Felipe Carrillo Puerto, 21 March 1922. *Sucúm* is Yucatec Maya for "our big brother," a term of great respect and affection, which Carrillo's status as Yucatán's regional caudillo warranted and the use of which he openly encouraged. Cf. the very personal, kinship-oriented terms of respect that are used to address caciques in Tzeltal Chiapas (*mamtik*, "respected grandfather") and Tarascan Michoacán (*tata*, "father"). "The 'Cacique' of K'ankujk," p. 356; Friedrich, "A Mexican Cacicazgo," p. 153.
18. E. g., Renán Irigoyen, *Felipe Carrillo Puerto* (Mérida, 1973), pp. 6, 18–19, 39; R. A. Sosa Ferreyro, *El crimen del miedo* (México, 1969), pp. 25–29; Antonio Betancourt Pérez, "Nuestro viejo abuelo," *RUY* 85 (Jan.–Feb. 1973):66–67. For having sent Lenin's embattled Soviet regime shipments of food and medical supplies in 1920, a street in Moscow was named after Yucatán's revolutionary governor.
19. "Poemas de Elmer Llanes Marín," *Orbe* (Mérida) 44 (Dec. 1955):98.
20. For Carrillo Puerto's mythologized portrayal in the traditional historiography, see Joseph, "Revolution from Without," chaps. 6, 8; cf. the June 1974 issue of the popular satirical comic book, *Los Agachados*, entitled "Felipe Carrillo Puerto: El Salvador Al-lende Mexicano."
21. Joseph, "Revolution from Without"; Antonio Betancourt Pérez, *El asesinato de Carrillo Puerto* (Mérida, 1974), esp. pp. 17–28; Irigoyen, *Felipe Carrillo Puerto*, p. 41; Alma Reed, "Felipe Carrillo Puerto," *BdU* 4:1 (June 1924): 20–21; J. W. F. Dulles, *Yesterday in Mexico* (Austin, 1961), p. 231; Sosa Ferreyro, *El crimen*, pp. 42, 115; Rosa Castro, "Sobre la ruta de Carrillo Puerto, el Mesías de Motul," *Hoy*, 15 March 1952.
22. Gilbert M. Joseph, "Apuntes hacia una nueva historia regional: Yucatán y la Revolución Mexicana, 1915–1940," *RUY* 19:109 (Jan.–Feb. 1977): 12–35.
23. Arelío Carrillo Puerto, *La familia Carrillo Puerto de Motul* (Mérida, 1959), pp. 11–12, 23–32; interview with Felipe Carrillo's sister, Angelina Carrillo Puerto de Triay Esperón, 7 Nov. 1975; Frank Tannenbaum, *Peace by Revolution* (New York, 1933), p. 159.
24. Carrillo Puerto, *La familia*, pp. 31–32; cf. Womack, *Zapata*, pp. 3–9.
25. AGE, Jacinto Coahuich to Alvarado, 20 Dec. 1916; AGE, Víctor J. Manzanilla and Rafael E. Matos to Alvarado, 30 Aug. 1917. Bernardino Mena Brito, *Reestructuración histórica de Yucatán* 3 (México, 1969), p. 301, points out that during the early part of his political career, Carrillo enjoyed the protection of perhaps the most powerful Yucatecan boss of his time, Gen. Francisco Cantón.
26. *New York Times*, 16 Sept. 1923, p. 10; AGE, Gov. Manuel Berzunza to Subsrio. de Gobernación, 16 Mar. 1921; cf. Paul Friedrich, *Agrarian Revolt in a Mexican Village* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970), pp. 79–90.
27. Carrillo Puerto, *La familia*, pp. 80–115.
28. José Vasconcelos, *El desastre: Tercera parte de Ulises Criollo* (México, 1968), p. 86; Dulles, *Yesterday*, pp. 57, 77–78, 121, 136–37.
29. AGE, typescript, "Que el Gobierno de Yucatán fomenta el bolshevismo en México y en Cuba," n.d. (1924); *RdY* 28 July 1924, p. 1; Alfonso Taracena, *La Verdadera Revolución Mexicana* 9 (México, 1965), pp. 42, 123. Also see the warm cable correspondence between Calles and Carrillo in the AGE's special "Telegramas" files for 1922 and 1923.
30. RDS, 812.00/25188; SD-CPR, *Confidential Correspondence, 1917 to 1935* (hereafter cited as *Con. Corr.*), File 800, Marsh to Secretary of State, 29 Sept. 1921; AGN, 424-H-2, María del Pilar Pech to Manuel Carpio, 8 Jan. 1921; *RdY*, 21 Feb. 1921, pp. 1–2.
31. *P*, 8 Mar. 1923, pp. 1, 4; Francisco Paoli B., "Carrillo Puerto y el PSS," *RUY* 16:91 (Jan.–Feb. 1974):87–91; Ernest Gruening, *Mexico and Its Heritage* (New York, 1928), pp. 404–5; Marjorie R. Clark, *Organized Labor in Mexico* (Chapel Hill, 1934), p. 208.

32. Paoli, "Carrillo Puerto," p. 89; AGE, Rafael Gamboa to Felipe Carrillo Puerto, 3 Mar. 1923; *RdY*, 28 July 1924, p. 1.
33. For some of the religious images and symbols captured in the "martyrological" treatments of Carrillo Puerto, see Betancourt Pérez, "Nuestro abuelo," p. 67; Eduardo Urzáiz, "El simbolismo de la Resurrección," *BdU* 4:1 (June 1924):6–8; Irigoyen, "Carrillo Puerto, Mártir de la cultura," *RUY* 1:1 (Jan.–Feb. 1959):20–23.
34. AGE, Jacinto Cochuich, Nicolás Sánchez, and others to Alvarado, 20 Dec. 1916; Carrillo Puerto, *La familia*, pp. 28–31.
35. Sosa Ferreyro, *El crimen*, pp. 31ff; Luis Monroy Durán, *El último caudillo* (México, 1924), p. 477.
36. *RDS*, 812.00/25068; SD-CPR, *Corr.*, 1924, vol. 3, File 350, "Declaration of Manuel López," n.d. (1921); AGE, Berzunza to Procurador General de Justicia, 27 June 1921; AGE "Relación de los departamentos administrativos del Estado. . .," 23 Sept. 1924 (see especially the category entitled "localidades deshabitadas"); *RdY*, 7 Nov. 1920, p. 1, 21 Dec. 1920, p. 1, 10 June 1922, p. 5.
37. Joseph, "Revolution from Without," chaps. 6, 7, and 8; cf. Bartra, "Caciquismo," p. 39.
38. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels* (New York, 1959), pp. 3–6, 13–56; Friedrich Katz, "Labor Conditions," pp. 44–45; Moisés González Navarro, *Raza y tierra* (México, 1970), p. 231.
39. The chart summarizes disparate data uncovered during the course of systematic year-by-year archival (e.g., AGE, AGN, *RDS*, SD-CPR) and press research (*RdY*, *DdY*, *P*, *C*, *La Voz*) for the 1915–40 period. Documentary evidence was corroborated, in several cases, by interviewing at the local level. Due to the sensitive political nature of these interviews, the names of these informants will not appear in print.
40. SD-CPR, *Corr.*, 1921, 4, 800, newsclipping of editorial from *RdY*, 24 June 1921, p. 1; *RdY*, 10 June 1922, p. 5; AGE, Memoria from vecinos of Yaxcabá to President, Liga Central de Resistencia, 25 Aug. 1920; AGE, Bartolomé García Correa, President, Liga Central to Gov. Iturralde, 2 Oct. 1925.
41. AGE, Municipal President, Sotuta, to Carrillo Puerto, 10 Oct. 1920; AGE, Municipal President, Dzán, to Carrillo Puerto, 3 Oct. 1922; *RdY*, 12 Nov. 1920, p. 2, 11 Aug. 1921, p. 1; *P*, 21 Mar. 1923, p. 1.
42. *RdY*, 19 Apr. 1922, p. 5; AGN, 408-Y-1, José B. Garma to Obregón, 9 Mar. 1922; AGN, 428-Y-3, Carmela Aragón to Obregón, 26 July 1922; *RDS*, 812.00/25608, 25654; AGE, "Circular núm. 27, a los CC. Presidentes y Comisarios Municipales . . .," 11 Aug. 1924; *P*, 27 Mar. 1923, p. 1, 4 Apr. 1923, pp. 1, 4. Also see *DO* for the years 1922–23, when the frequent replacement of municipal governments by order of the governor, in conjunction with other evidence, suggests that Felipe often strengthened an opposing faction at the expense of the incumbent cacicazgo.
43. *RdY*, 27 Mar. 1920, p. 3, 6 May 1921, pp. 1–2, 31 Oct. 1922, p. 5; *DO*, 3 Jan. 1922, p. 2; Sosa Ferreyro, *El crimen*, pp. 54–55.
44. *C*, 21 Apr. 1923, pp. 1–2, 13 Oct. 1923, pp. 1, 4, 1 Dec. 1923, pp. 1–2, 4; *RdY*, 13 July 1920, p. 3, 19 Nov. 1923, p. 3.
45. AGE, Municipal President, Tahmek, to Liga Central, 11 June 1919; AGE, Miguel Cantón to Carrillo Puerto, 21 Dec. 1920, Cantón to Carrillo, 28 Mar. 1921; AGE, Vecinos of Dzilnup to Carrillo, 11 Dec. 1922; *RdY*, 12 Mar. 1919, p. 7, 21 Feb. 1920; *C*, 15 Nov. 1923, p. 1; Goldkind, "Class Conflict," pp. 333–44.
46. AGE, Decree by Carrillo Puerto amending *el estado seco*, 14 June 1923; AGE, Regidor, Ayuntamiento de Umán, to Gov. Carrillo, 29 June 1922.
47. AGE, Felipe Carrillo authorizes García Correa's concession, 28 Mar. 1923; AGE, El Oficial Mayor Segundo, Sría, de Fomento, Dpto. de Colonización, to Carrillo, 20 Nov. 1922; *RdY*, 18 Aug. 1921, p. 3; AGE, Cantón to Braulio Euán, 26 Aug. 1921.
48. AGE, Circular from Benjamín Carrillo Puerto, Secretary of the Liga Central, to "compañeros," n.d. (1923); *C*, 23 Nov. 1923, p. 1; *Tierra*, 27 May 1923, p. 22; *P*, 10 July 1922, p. 1, 12 July 1922, pp. 1, 4; *RdY*, 12 Sept. 1921, p. 1.

49. Joseph, "Revolution from Without," chap. 6; RDS, 812.61326/254, 812.00/22315, 22887; Manuel M. Escoffié, *Yucatán en la cruz* (Mérida, 1957), pp. 197–203; and see the frequent accounts of violence, "bandolerismo," and "caciquismo" in C and RdY during the 1918–23 period.
50. AGE, "Relación de las Ligas de Resistencia . . . adscritas a la . . . Liga Central del Gran Partido Socialista del Sureste . . ." 1 Sept. 1922; Felipe Carrillo Puerto, "New Yucatán," *Survey* 52 (1 May 1924): 141. Cf. Dulles, *Yesterday*, p. 137, who estimates League membership to be as high as ninety thousand.
51. DO, 13 Mar. 1922; RdY, 23 Mar. 1922, p. 3; Vasconcelos, *El desastre*, p. 69; Ernest Gruening, *Un viaje al Estado de Yucatán* (Guanajuato, 1924), p. 14; Acrelio Carrillo Puerto, *La familia*, p. 31; Sosa Ferreyro, *El crimen*, pp. 24, 29.
52. Irigoyen, *Felipe Carrillo Puerto*, pp. 21–27; Castro, "Sobre la ruta," *Hoy*, 15 Mar. 1952, pp. 27, 66; P, 9 Mar. 1923, p. 1.
53. C, 15 Dec. 1923, p. 1; cf. Sosa Ferreyro, *El crimen*, pp. 107–110.
54. RdY, 17 Dec. 1923, p. 1.
55. *Ibid.*; AGE, President, Liga de Opichén, to Iturralde, 17 Feb. 1925.
56. RdY, 24 Apr. 1924, p. 1; cf. RdY, 18 Dec. 1923, p. 1.
57. Mena Brito, *Reestructuración* 3:336; Betancourt Pérez, *El asesinato*, p. 50.
58. *Primitive Rebels*, pp. 26–28.
59. RdY, 13 Dec. 1923, p. 1, 18 Dec. 1923, p. 6. Joseph, "Revolution from Without," chap. 9, discusses the decline in the vitality and organization of the ligas following the defeat of *delahuertismo* and the reinstatement of PSS rule in 1924–25; cf. Victor Goldkind, "Social Stratification in the Peasant Community: Redfield's Chan Kom Reinterpreted," *American Anthropologist* 67 (1965):879–80, for the ligas in the early 1930s.
60. RdY, 7 Dec. 1923, p. 1, 8 Dec. 1923, p. 1, 11 Dec. 1923, p. 6; AGE, "Ejército Revolucionario (i.e., delahuertista), Documentos de entrega de la Comandancia Militar," Apr. 1924; Betancourt Pérez, *El asesinato*, pp. 31–32.
61. "Militarización de las Ligas de Resistencia será desconocida la que no presente un sección cuando menos bien organizada," RdY, 12 Dec. 1923, p. 2.
62. RdY, 17 Aug. 1923, p. 3; Loló de la Torriente, *Memoria y razón de Diego Rivera 2* (México, 1959), pp. 225–28.
63. E.g., see AGE, 1920, for petitions from various pueblos and campesino groups for the return of their shotguns; AGE, Felipe Ayala, President of the Liga de Resistencia "Eulogio Rosado," to Carrillo Puerto, 21 Mar. 1922.
64. SD-CPR, *Con. Corr.*, 800, Marsh to Secretary of State, 11 Dec. 1923, Álvaro Gamboa Ricalde, *Yucatán desde 1910* 3 (México, 1955), p. 345.
65. Betancourt Pérez, *El asesinato*, pp. 20–22; Irigoyen, *Felipe Carrillo Puerto*, pp. 36–37.
66. Fidelio Quintal Martín, "Quince años trascendentales en la historia de Yucatán," RUY 93 (May-Aug. 1974), 130–31; AGN, 428-Y-5, Federico Carlos León to Obregón, 28 Apr. 1924; AGN, 428-Y-5, Elvia Carrillo Puerto to Obregón, 2 Sept. 1924; AGN, 428-Y-5, Pedro Lugo Z. et al. to Obregón, 3 Sept. 1924; AGN, 101-R2-4, José de la Luz Mena to Obregón, 13 May 1924.
67. See Joseph, "Revolution from Without," chap. 8. The Cambridge University conference on "Peasant and Caudillo in Modern Mexico" (Apr. 1977), in which the author participated, also arrived at this conclusion.
68. Cf. Heather Fowler Salamini, *Agrarian Radicalism in Veracruz, 1920–1938* (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1978), pp. 108–40; Friedrich, *Agrarian Revolt*, pp. 124–30; and the chapters by Dudley Ankersen (San Luis Potosí) and Ian Jacobs (Guerrero) in Brading and Meyer, eds. *Peasant and Caudillo*. It should be noted that the Figueroas have once more reasserted their power in Guerrero.
69. Joseph, "Revolution from Without," chap. 8.