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established in 12ff.: namely, 1–11 regards phlegm as a *cold* humour, though its original meaning was “burning” or “inflammation”, and recognizes the existence of black bile as an independent humour (for a criticism of an earlier version of this thesis see R. Joly, ‘Sur une chronologie des traités Cnidiens du Corpus Hippocratique’, *Episteme*, 1972, 6: 3ff.). From this basis, Jouanna proceeds to give a general picture of the development of the school which I find extremely interesting and of great suggestive value. The early Cnidians had views on the aetiology of disease, but they did not emphasize these views nor develop them into a systematic theory. For them, diseases are caused by humours (bile, phlegm, and others as well), but these humours are regarded “quantitatively” rather than “qualitatively”—humours cause trouble simply when there is too much of them. The later humoral theory, in which humours are correlated with the “opposites” hot and cold, moist and dry, and react to the presence of these opposites in climatic conditions, comes into the picture not earlier than *circa* 410–400 B.C. (the date of the treatise *The nature of man*). It was taken over by the Cnidian school, and thereafter influenced to an increasing extent not only the content of their treatises, but also their format (aetiological passages are first *added* to the original format name-symptomatology-therapy (as in *Internal affections*) and later *combined* with both symptomatology and therapy (*Affections* and *Diseases* 1) so that the original format is progressively altered). Jouanna traces these developments through the texts which he believes to stand in a relation of direct descent to the *Cnidian sentences*, and which *therefore* reflect the changing doctrine of the Cnidian school.

It will be seen that Jouanna’s thesis is exposed to the same logical objections as that of Grensemann. Similarity of format does not in itself constitute a text as the product of a Cnidian school, although that and parallel passages do show that the text has at least a literary relation to the *Cnidian sentences*. Moreover, divergences in form, or, as in Grensemann’s case, divergences in complexity do not necessarily indicate chronological divergences. (There is of course some non-formal evidence of Cnidian doctrine, but of set intent neither Grensemann nor Jouanna make this their main criterion. We do not know how far such doctrines—the practice of succussion in diseases of the chest, for example—may have been adopted by the Coans: here again, the absence of specifically Coan therapeutic works is crucial). However, logical objections are not necessarily decisive—it depends, as Aristotle said, upon the subject matter. Jouanna’s reconstructed “elevation” is *aesthetically* plausible, and his work, for the subsequent development of the school, and Grensemann’s for its early fifth-century stage, together provide a model with which, in future, one will at least be able to work.

FELIX GRAYEFF, *Aristotle and his School. An inquiry into the history of the Peripatos with a commentary on ‘Metaphysics’ Z, H, Λ and Θ*, London, Duckworth, 1974, 8vo, pp. 230, £4.95.

In view of their volume and diversity, scholars have frequently wondered whether Aristotle was author of all the works now attributed to him. Dr. Grayeff, a philosopher, is certain he was not, and claims that the bulk of the Aristotelian corpus consists of lectures delivered by his successors in the Peripatetic school, during two

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or three subsequent generations. His evidence is in two parts: that gleaned from a study of the life of Aristotle and of the school that he founded; and that derived from an analysis of four books of the *Metaphysics* (zeta, eta, lambda and theta). The second is the larger part, and in it the author contends that lecture courses, simple and complex can be identified.

This is a revolutionary view, which is also based on the deep contradictions Grayeff can point to in Aristotle's writings. He, thus, rejects Jaeger's theory that these can be explained by the gradual evolution of Aristotle's thought, which resulted in the composite nature of his works. Most scholars will say that he goes too far with this argument, but it would be interesting to see if the statistical methods used by Professor W. C. Wake to analyse multi-authored works such as the Hippocratic writings can help with the problem.

Scholars will find this a provocative and challenging book, but as it is also contentious and puts forward an unproved idea, it is not for the general reader.

DAVID DE GIUSTINO, *Conquest of the mind. Phrenology and Victorian social thought*, London, Croom Helm, 1975, 8vo, pp. viii, 248, £6.00.

It is well known that phrenology was a potent force in the nineteenth-century. It exercised widespread influence, and, as is being shown by Roger Cooter, had a very significant role to play in the evolution of Victorian psychiatry. Its social effects have long been known, but this book is the first to deal with them in detail.

First, the reception and diffusion of the pseudoscience are discussed, but the author does not give much information on its origins at the beginning of the nineteenth century, nor on its status in medicine or physiology, either initially or later in the century, when the basic idea of cerebral localization at which phrenology hinted was shown to exist. It had widespread appeal for a variety of reasons discussed here, despite the fact that it challenged traditional religion and other established practices. It had much in common with rationalism, as related to man and society, it placed the mind in the brain once and for all, and it seemed destined to elucidate the enigmas of human conduct. The second part of Dr. Giustino's book concerns two worthy and respectable social movements influenced by phrenology: prison reform and national education which were two of the most controversial issues of the day.

On the whole, the book is based on the work of the Edinburgh phrenologist, George Combe (1787–1858), who wrote extensively and had wide influence, but one of its weaknesses is that Combe is given too much attention and other purveyors of phrenology who influenced social thought are either omitted or not given their due. However, Dr. Giustino has made a valuable contribution to the history of phrenology, a topic of ever-growing interest. He has presented his material well and in a scholarly fashion, some of it deriving from unpublished materials such as the George Combe Papers, and those of Richard Cobden. There is adequate documentation, but the bibliography omits several important secondary sources, the most striking omission being Temkin's important paper of 1947. There are no illustrations, which is a curious oversight in as much as the phrenologists themselves relied so heavily on them. Even a few line-drawings in the text would have helped the reader to appreciate the basic cranial topographic facts of phrenology.