

analytical description. Philosophy may well begin where science and its analysis leaves off, but only by raising questions (in its characteristic language) that science never poses.

Bunge warns against falling prey to language but fails to realize that his ontological terms have no rules of application within ordinary usage, and, unlike the technical scientific terms he employs, could never be given any conditions of application within science. This means that what he, as ontologist, has to say is strictly unintelligible if we adhere to our natural acceptance of that common sense upon which science builds. Scientists could, therefore, hardly consider ontology (as Bunge conceives it) as part of the very stuff of their research.

(c) Much has recently been written about alleged metaphysical assumptions or pre-suppositions of science. Bunge offers his "principle of determinacy" as one more basic assumption. But scientists themselves need never appeal to such philosophical principles; at most they only pay lip service to their common-sense cores. And when the issue is pressed, it turns out that even this is unnecessary. The scientist himself, heartened by increasing success in representing nature, only need hope there *may* be detectable or simple laws in the particular area of his present inquiry; but he realizes that, if there are no such laws in this area, then his inductive procedures will fail. This article of his "animal faith" is a far cry from any "philosophical assumption" of determinacy, and it ought not be dignified (or distorted) by such a label.

(d) Bunge places Hume and current empiricists in the camp of *acausalism* chiefly because they strip causation of its efficacy and laws of their necessity. Bunge cites Hume's phenomenalism as ontologically deficient and circular because of its assumptions. But empiricists will note that Bunge's pretentious concern with ontology rests equally on *his* initial assumption"... that, to the extent to which the causal principle works, it reflects not only a feature of our cognitive relation with reality, but a trait of reality itself" (p. 58). Without such an assumption, moreover, Bunge's appeal to empirical science as ground for his ontological theory of determination is wholly specious. *Virgil Hinshaw, Jr., The Ohio State University.*

## ERRATA

Wispé's review of *Person perception and interpersonal behavior* by TAGIURI and PETRUILLO, which appeared in the July, 1960, issue, contained several misprints that should be corrected as follows: p. 323, line 43, read "effective" for "effect"; p. 324, line 40, read "psychology, while motivation is fundamental to American psychological thinking" for "psychologists"; lines 40, 41, delete "Perception has always been a central problem in German psychological thinking."; lines 42, 43, delete "The emphasis upon "person perception" grew."