


RESEARCH ARTICLE

# Partisanship and Racial Affect Among Black and Latine Americans: Evidence from 2016 to 20 Panel Data

Reginald Pulley<sup>1</sup>, Hope Martinez<sup>2</sup> and Judd R. Thornton<sup>2</sup> 

<sup>1</sup>University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA and <sup>2</sup>Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA

**Corresponding author:** Judd R. Thornton; Email: [jrthornton@gsu.edu](mailto:jrthornton@gsu.edu)

(Received 18 November 2024; revised 3 July 2025; accepted 14 July 2025)

## Abstract

Partisanship and feelings about racial groups are increasingly linked among whites in the United States. Does this pattern extend to other Americans? To answer this question, we begin by examining trends in what has been termed “affective differentiation”—a measure of racial affect that is, in our case, the difference in ratings between one’s own group and white Americans—and partisanship to demonstrate first that affective differentiation has increased. Further, this measure of racial affect has a growing relationship with partisanship among Black and Latine Americans such that Democratic identification is associated with higher levels of affective differentiation. Next, using panel data from the two most recent presidential elections we find that the direction of influence flows from partisanship to affective differentiation. Higher levels of attachment to the Democratic Party are associated with greater affective differentiation in which respondents rate their own group more favorably than whites. In recent elections, there has been a stark polarization among political parties regarding the utilization of explicit racial rhetoric. Members of the electorate have taken notice, leading partisans to update their racial attitudes.

**Keywords:** Partisanship; racial attitudes; Affective differentiation; polarization

Scholars have increasingly examined the rise of explicit racial rhetoric in American political discourse (Jardina 2021; Jardina and Piston 2023; Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek 2018).<sup>1</sup> It is now well established that there is an increased correspondence between the racial attitudes of whites and partisan identities during this period. How have Black and Latine Americans responded? As American politics has become increasingly defined by explicit racial rhetoric, understanding how these dynamics shape the political attitudes of marginalized groups—the target of such rhetoric—is vital. Understanding how all groups are responding to the increased salience of race is critical for assessing the durability of multiracial democracy and the evolving nature of partisan identity in the United States.

© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Race, Ethnicity, and Politics Section of the American Political Science Association. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.

The literature has tended to center around white Americans' growing acceptance of explicit racial rhetoric (Berinsky *et al.* 2011; Huber and Lapinski 2008; Mendelberg 1997; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002; White 2007). President Trump has drawn on themes that resonate with white identity politics, including both implicit and explicit appeals to white grievance and nationalism, which appears to have strengthened his support among voters with strong white racial identities and conservative views on race and immigration (Sides *et al.* 2019). Such findings are consistent with evidence demonstrating a growing connection between racial attitudes and political factors, such as partisanship (Enders and Scott 2018), policies (Tesler 2013), and vote choice (Tesler 2012; Reny *et al.* 2019). Existing evidence from the pre-Obama-Trump era shows that negative explicit racial rhetoric about Black (White 2007) and Latine Americans (Pérez 2015) can activate positive in-group identification in response. However, comparatively less research has focused on how the recent increase in the salience of race is influencing these groups.

In this paper, we examine the relationship between partisan identification and a measure of racial affect—what has been termed “affective differentiation,” which is the difference in ratings between one’s own group and another racial group (e.g., Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996), in our case white Americans—among Black and Latine Americans.<sup>2</sup> Our goal is to assess both the strength and the direction of the relationship between these two orientations.<sup>3</sup> To do so, we use data from the American National Election Studies Cumulative File 1976–2020 to initially establish that (1) affective differentiation has increased in recent years and (2) it shares an increasingly strong relationship with partisanship. Against this backdrop, we employ panel data from the two most recent presidential elections using the American National Election Studies 2016–20 Panel Sample to trace the direction of influence between the two orientations.

Our results extend the research on racial attitudes and partisanship for Black and Latine people indicating that as the parties have polarized on the use of explicit racial rhetoric, the electorate has responded. Specifically, we find that Black and Latine partisans update their feelings about racial groups. In other words, as the current political climate has become increasingly and explicitly racialized, we observe an increased difference in how individuals rate their own group relative to others, on average. Further, we observe an increasing correspondence between partisanship and racial attitudes among different groups in the electorate, which suggests partisan divisions will remain challenging to overcome. As Mason and Wronski (2018, 274) state, the “convergence of social identities along partisan lines makes in-party preference more powerful and out-party tolerance ever more difficult.”

Our analysis of the panel data further underscores the substantial influence that partisanship has on other political and social attitudes. In particular, we find that while previous values of affective differentiation are unrelated to partisanship, partisanship in 2016 predicts racial attitudes in 2020. Namely, as Black and Latine people increase their attachment to the Democratic Party, they exhibit higher levels of affective differentiation. This result is robust to a series of modeling choices. A subsequent analysis indicates that partisanship shares a stronger relationship with feelings about one’s own group than with feelings about whites, similar to the expectations of Huddy and Bankert (2017).<sup>4</sup>

## Race and Partisanship in the United States

Political parties in the United States function fundamentally as coalitions of social groups, each vying to advance their interests and policy goals within the political system (Bawn et al. 2012). From this perspective, individuals align with parties based on how well the party represents the agendas of the groups they identify with, highlighting the group-based nature of partisan dynamics (Mason 2016). This process of social sorting—where identities such as race, religion, and class increasingly align with partisan affiliation—intensifies both evaluative judgments of and emotional attachments to political parties (Mason and Wronski 2018).

Miller et al. (1981) argue “group consciousness”—a sense of shared interests and collective political awareness within social groups—shapes political participation and party support. Such consciousness acts as an understanding of the group’s relative societal position, awareness of the group’s commitment to political action, and perceptions of how closely other social groups align with political parties (Miller and Wlezien 1993). Groups form connections to a political party when members associate that party with specific policies (Miller and Wlezien 1993) and “attachment to party-aligned groups is significantly related to party identity strength” (Mason and Wronski 2018, 270). That is, individuals interpret political parties through a group-centered lens where the party’s ideological or policy-driven objectives are proxies for social group interests. Given the close connection between group identity and partisanship, race emerges as a central dimension in how individuals understand politics and relate to political parties.

Indeed, a large body of evidence shows that race and racial group dynamics play an integral role in shaping party attachments (Frymer 1999; Huddy et al. 2016; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Wamble et al. 2022). Since the post-civil rights era, the Democratic Party has generally been perceived as representing the interests of people of color, while the Republican Party is more often associated with representing the interests of white Americans. However, this group-party link is not only driven by policy positions as it also reflects how parties are perceived socially, including how voters experience racial discrimination and social exclusion (Kuo et al. 2017; Berry et al. 2020).

Several studies highlight the connection between racial attitudes and political factors including partisanship (Enders and Scott 2018) and policies (Tesler 2013). The Implicit/Explicit (IE) model tells us white Americans resisted explicit racial appeals due to a social acceptance of the egalitarian antiracist ideals in America (Huber and Lapinski 2008; Mendelberg 1997). The theory of symbolic racism suggests that society has moved away from overt expressions of racism, whites relied on subtler expressions of racism that align with cultural values (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Sears 1981; McConahay and Hough 1976; Sears 1988). However, recent studies suggest a notable shift whereby explicitly racialized rhetoric has reemerged and become increasingly acceptable in mainstream political dialogue (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019; Tesler 2013; Valentino et al. 2018). Southern whites’ realignment to the Republican Party was significantly driven by racial conservatism, and in turn, the party adopted platforms that appeal to whites through both implicit and explicit racial appeals (Mendelberg 1997; Valentino and Sears 2005).

While the political significance of racial attitudes among white Americans is well established, less is known about how Black and Latine Americans respond to negative racial cues, and how these cues shape the relationship between their racial attitudes and partisanship. Typically, negative explicit racial appeals about Black and Latine Americans can activate positive in-group identification (Pérez 2015; White 2007). Furthermore, experiences of prejudice can lead to an increased identification with one's own group (Branscombe *et al.* 1999) suggesting that a racialized political climate heightens in-group solidarity and increases affective distance from whites. However, Herring *et al.* (1999) find that Black identity is not necessarily associated with negative feelings toward whites. Additionally, increased strength in cultural pride among Black and Latine people can counterintuitively lead to favorability toward whites unless they believe that the out-group views them negatively (Sullivan and Ghara 2014). We explore what the Republican Party's shift towards explicitly negative racial rhetoric means for Black and Latine Americans, who are often the subject of these appeals.

### **Black Partisanship**

Linked fate, a key model for understanding Black political decision making, is a cognitive shortcut where Black Americans use their perceptions of racial group interests to guide their decision-making (Dawson 1994). In low-information settings, linked fate operates as a bounded rationality tool, where an individual's well-being is perceived as intertwined with group outcomes. However, linked fate alone does not explain why Black Americans have historically chosen to support the Democratic Party and are largely still united in their support for the party (Tate 1993).

Black Americans widely view political unity as essential for having their collective demands recognized (White *et al.* 2014; White and Laird 2020), reflecting a broader strength of solidarity within the Black community and consistent with longstanding arguments about the need for collective Black political action to challenge systemic racial injustice (Shelby 2005). This collective strength is reinforced through social sanctions, which discourages political behavior that diverges from community norms—particularly when it comes to Black partisanship (Wamble *et al.* 2022; White *et al.* 2014; White and Laird 2020). Epithets such as “Uncle Tom” and “sellout” are a manifestation of preservation efforts within the group to encourage Democratic Party support because no one wants to be seen as hindering group progress (White and Laird 2020). This social constraint within the community is reflected in Black conservatives, who are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party in the presence of other Black community members (Wamble *et al.* 2022).

Black Americans are not a monolith of shared political ideology; however, favorability toward their own racial identity can, in part, be derived through their attachment to the Democratic Party because partisanship can act as an indicator of support for Blackness (White and Laird 2020). White (2007) finds that explicit racial cues activated Black Americans' in-group identification across two non-racial policy issues, further supporting the idea that explicit racial messages can play different roles in activating Blacks' racial group identification and Whites' racial group resentment. Therefore, the development of Black partisan attachments through racial cues is arguably also sensitive to the explicitness of the racial appeals. We

assess how the contemporary change in political communication norm—particularly by the Republican Party—has additionally influenced Black partisanship in a meaningful way. This shift may reinforce the symbolic and social boundaries separating Black voters from the Republican Party (Frymer 1999), strengthening in-group Democratic identification and intensifying the difference between out-group evaluations.

### **Latine Partisanship**

Trump's rhetoric framing immigrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border as "criminals," "rapists," and "murderers" prompted political science and race and ethnicity scholars to theorize that Latine people would increasingly begin to reject Trump (Cadena 2023, Igielnik et al. 2021). However, exit polls revealed up to 30% of Latine voters voted for Trump in 2016 (Jones-Correa et al. 2018). Although a majority of Latine voters identify with the Democratic party, the presence of a significant ideologically conservative segment within the Latine population complicates the application of theories developed to explain Black partisanship, such as linked fate and group consciousness. Instead, scholarship on Latine partisanship and voter behavior identifies national origin identity, religion, and racial policy positions as key influences of Latine party identification (Affigne 2000; Alvarez and Garcia-Bedolla 2003; Hero et al. 2000; Kelly and Kelly 2005; Wong 2000). These key identifiers combine into a process of assimilated consciousness (Cadena 2023).

Latine partisan choices reflect diverse experiences within America's complex racial hierarchy, including conformity to whiteness through assimilation and social treatment aimed at achieving mobility and acceptance from white Americans (Golash-Boza and Darity 2008; Cadena 2023). Political discourse in the United States often flattens the diversity of what it means for individuals to identify as a Latine person—e.g., a Mexican American and a Cuban American are categorized as Latine in the same way a person born in the U.S. territory Puerto Rico is categorized as Latine. This underscores the pivotal role of racial self-identification as a signal of alignment with whiteness in Latines. Among Latines, those who more strongly identify with their cultural group are stronger Democratic partisans (Huddy et al. 2016). Likewise, policy positions reveal that Latines who support affirmative action are more likely to identify as Democrats (Alvarez and Garcia-Bedolla 2003). Furthermore, racial attitudes among Latines—specifically racial resentment and adherence to color-blind racial ideologies—strongly correlate with Republican identification (Cuevas-Molina 2023). When Latine people immigrate to the United States, they are faced with new definitions of race and undergo a process of race acculturation that challenges their existing racial self-identifications (Roth 2012). In fact, 58% of Hispanics in the 2020 U.S. Census identified as white, or white in combination with other races (Cuevas-Molina 2023). Cuevas-Molina (2023) finds that self-identified white Latines exhibit a higher likelihood of identifying with the Republican Party compared to their counterparts. As such, Latine partisanship cannot be explained by a monolithic "Latine/Hispanic vote." Recognizing this heterogeneity is essential for understanding how racialized social structures shape partisanship among Latines and for moving beyond reductive frameworks that obscure the nuances of Latine political identity.

## Expectations

We argue that the return to explicit racial rhetoric by the Republican Party and its support from many white Americans has reshaped the political calculations of Black and Latine Americans. In particular, we anticipate that as race has become more salient at the national level and as the parties have taken distinct stands on the type of rhetoric used, we should see partisan identity increasingly bound up with racial affect. The timeframe we consider covers a period in which there were visible racially salient actions by the government. For example, the murder of George Floyd—which exemplified the excessive use of force by police—was followed by Trump’s supportive response to the event and his negative reaction to the subsequent protests. Similarly, the early response to the COVID-19 pandemic left American minority groups uniquely vulnerable as evidenced by the disproportionately poor outcomes across a variety of metrics (e.g., Magesh *et al.* 2021; Reyes 2020). Key to our argument is that these incidents all had, to some degree, a partisan element potentially connecting feelings about race to partisan identity among members of the electorate. Such events may have contributed to polarization by reinforcing a sense of group-based threat and solidarity among communities of color. We argue that the contrast between the treatment of their own racial or ethnic group and the perceived indifference of broader society—especially among white Americans—should heighten in-group attachment and out-group resentment.

While these dynamics may unfold differently for Black and Latine Americans, we expect that increasing racial polarization will heighten the salience of racial identity as it becomes more entangled with partisan attachments across both groups. For Black Americans, whose partisanship often stems from linked fate and a sense of racial unity, the Republican Party’s rhetoric may further strengthen Democratic identification as an act of collective resistance. Among Latine Americans, where partisanship is more varied and shaped by assimilation, national origin, and strength of Latine identity, reactions to Republican rhetoric may depend more on how individuals navigate their racial position within the U.S. hierarchy.

Within this framework, the Republican Party’s electoral success using explicit rhetoric serves as a signal of dominant white racial attitudes to both Black and Latine communities. These appeals would not result in electoral gains if they were widely rejected by white voters; their continued success thus suggests, minimally, tacit approval or acceptance. Consequently, some may begin to associate whiteness itself with the racially exclusionary messages promoted by the party. Further, perceptions of threat influence racial attitudes, especially when two groups are perceived to be in conflict (Stephan *et al.* 2002). In other words, we expect that a shift away from a political environment that once upheld principled racial egalitarianism and norms against overt racism, toward a more racially hostile and polarized political climate will strengthen the relationship between partisanship and racial affect. We therefore anticipate that over time, identification with the Democratic Party will be associated with higher levels of affective differentiation.

This brings us to our next, and central, question: how do these orientations influence one another over time? The first possible outcome is that racial attitudes dominate, such that shifts in these attitudes drive changes in partisanship. This expectation is consistent with a well-established body of research highlighting the

central role of group-based feelings in shaping political behavior (e.g., Miller et al. 1991; Dawson 1994; García Bedolla 2005). The second avenue of influence is from partisanship to racial attitudes; political parties actively structure group competition (De Leon et al. 2009), which is consistent with the argument that group evaluations are not necessarily exogenous to politics (Clifford et al. 2025). This expectation aligns with the literature's long focus on partisanship as a stable orientation that affects other politically relevant attitudes, supported by ample evidence (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960) and is consistent with what we observe among white Americans in recent years (Engelhardt 2021) and panel data indicating partisanship predicts perceptions of discrimination among Black and Latine Americans (Hopkins et al. 2020). The third and final possibility is that because both racial attitudes and partisanship can serve as "first movers," we will observe a reciprocal relationship between the two.

In addition to examining overall affect, there is reason to examine the relationship between partisanship and feelings of one's own group and whites separately. For example, intergroup bias results mainly from in-group favoritism rather than out-group derogation (e.g., Hewstone et al. 2002), including with respect to race (e.g., Dovidio and Gaertner 2000) and among white Americans, feelings toward out-groups share a stronger relationship with vote choice and candidate evaluations by 2016 compared to other racial groups (Jardina 2021). For example, Trump's campaign connected job losses for white workers with government policies favoring the interests of nonwhites and immigrants, fueling the strengthening of racial resentment and partisanship in white Americans (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019; Knuckey 2011; Knuckey and Kim 2015).

## Data

We employ the Cumulative File from the American National Election Studies (ANES) as well as the 2016–20 ANES Panel Sample, in which respondents from 2016 were re-interviewed in 2020. Our analysis proceeds in three steps. We initially use the Cumulative File from 1976–2020 to examine how racial affect has changed over time as well as track the relationship between affect and partisanship. Next, we make use of 2016–20 panel data to examine the direction of influence between the two orientations. We do so for a pooled sample as well as for both Blacks and Latines separately. Finally, we analyze ingroup and out-group feelings separately using both the 2016–20 panel data as well as pooled cross-sections from 2012 to 2020. We now detail our variables of interest.

## Affective Differentiation

This variable captures "positional commitments with a difference score" between one's own self-reported racial group and another racial group (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996, 892). Stated differently, this measure gauges the "emotional preference" for one group compared to another (e.g., Jackman and Crane 1986) and can also be thought of tapping feelings of ethnocentrism (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996). In other words, affective differentiation refers to the degree to which individuals express differing emotional evaluations toward their own racial or ethnic group compared



to other racial or ethnic groups such that higher levels of affective differentiation indicate that individuals feel more positively about their own group compared to others. For our purposes, affective differentiation is constructed using feeling thermometers of the respondent's own self-identified racial group and that of whites.<sup>5</sup> We subtract the rating of whites from one's own group so that higher values indicate relatively more favorable views of one's own group.

The measure is related to feelings of social distance (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996), and among whites is correlated with racial resentment (Goren and Plaut 2012).<sup>6</sup> Moreover, in Section E of the supplementary material (SM), we demonstrate the political relevance of the variable by showing it relates to vote choice even after controlling for a host of other relevant variables, including partisanship. The measure is related to that of Kam and Kinder's (2007; 2012) measure of ethnocentrism. Their measure subtracts the average rating of other racial and ethnic groups from one's in-group rating and thus focuses on one's in-group preference relative to all other groups rather than just one. Given our theory's focus on the political rhetoric of white politicians—as well as the dominant position white Americans have in the political system—we focus on ratings of just whites rather than an average of group ratings.<sup>7</sup> We argue this measure aligns with a view of party politics as a form of group competition, and this dyadic comparison of racial affect thus captures a politically and socially relevant dimension.

### **Partisanship**

The other primary variable of interest is partisan identification, which is measured using the standard seven-point scale. We code partisanship so that it ranges from strong Republican to strong Democrat.

### **Control Variables**

We control for a series of demographic variables. We include sex, where we code females as one and males as zero. Education, which is a five-point scale ranging from less than high school to advanced degree. Region is measured using census bureau coding—Midwest, West, South, with Northeast as the omitted reference category. Income is measured using a 28-point scale ranging from less than \$5,000 to \$250,000 or more. Age is measured in years. We also control for issue attitudes using a scale created from six issue questions—attitudes about defense spending, spending on services, aid to minorities, health insurance, guaranteed jobs, and abortion ( $\alpha = 0.782$ ). The issues are coded so that higher values represent more conservative responses. Finally, we control for church attendance, ranging from (1) never to (5) weekly. Each of the control variables is measured in 2016. Further details, including coding instructions, are included in SM Section A. In the SM (section G), we estimate models that control for ratings of Trump in 2016. Results are substantively identical to those presented below.

For each set of data, we initially pool Black and Latine respondents to increase our sample size. We note it is inappropriate to assume this dynamic operates the same across racial groups. Political science scholarship often aggregates racial and ethnic minorities under broader categorizations such as “people of color,” but doing



so risks obscuring the distinct group-level mechanisms driving partisan attachments. Because the measure of racial affect is made up of just two items, we cannot formally assess measurement invariance across the two groups (e.g., Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998). We do, however, segment the samples to assess if we reach similar conclusions when examining Black and Latine Americans separately. We examine this in more detail when discussing the results.


The data collection in 2020 was done almost entirely online due to the pandemic while a portion of respondents were originally interviewed face-to-face in 2016. Our primary analysis is limited to those who were interviewed online in both years given the possibility of mode effects on the measurement of racial attitudes (e.g., Simmons and Bobo 2015). Doing so allows us to rule out the change in mode among some respondents as a potential confounder. This choice does not drive our conclusions as we detail when discussing the results. As such we are left with 184 Black and 174 Latine respondents from the Panel Sample for our primary analysis. While this somewhat smaller sample size is lamentable, there are no other datasets that have both characteristics needed to test the expectations as this is the only panel data with the requisite variables. For example, the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey—which includes large samples of Black and Latine respondents as well as questions that might be suitable to operationalize racial attitudes—is cross-sectional.

### **Affective Differentiation and Partisanship 1976–2020**

Before examining the 2016–20 panel data, we begin by tracking the change in affective differentiation and its correlation with partisan identity over time to place our primary analysis in context.<sup>8</sup> Panel A of Figure 1 displays the average level of affective differentiation from 1976 to 2016, with a LOWESS curve included. We observe a decline in affective differentiation from the 1970s through 2000, followed by an increase which accelerates in 2016 and 2020. In 2020, there is a gap of about 18.4 points where Black and Latine respondents rate their own group, on average, about 83.0 while rating whites 64.6, compared to, for example, ratings of 80.7 and 73.6 in 2000, for a difference of 7.1. In short, levels of affective differentiation are meaningfully higher in recent elections.

We next turn to the correlation between partisanship and affective differentiation, displayed in panel B of Figure 1. We find that the two share a stronger relationship in recent elections. The correlation declined in magnitude from the 1970s through 2004, followed by a marked increase from 2012 onward. The correlation reached a nadir of 0.088 in 2004, compared to an average of 0.242 from 2012 to 2020.

Not only has affective differentiation increased, but it also now shares a stronger relationship with partisanship. Among Black and Latine respondents, we observe increasingly different racial attitudes across partisan groups. Given the relatively low sample sizes of these groups—especially in earlier years—the change in the correlation is not always significant from year to year. However, when we pool years into three-election periods to increase the sample size, the most recent period is distinguishable from earlier periods. We discuss this in more detail in Section C of the SM.



**Figure 1.** Average level of affective differentiation among Black and Latine respondents, where higher values indicate greater in-group favoritism (panel A) and its correlation with partisan identification (panel B) with LOWESS curves. Data: ANES Cumulative File,  $n = 7,422$ .

What do these trends look like if we disaggregate the measure and look at in-group and white ratings separately? We assess this in more detail in the SM (Section D) but let us briefly discuss the general patterns here. We find that feelings toward one's own group have held relatively steady since the late 1980s, with average ratings in the low 80s. Ratings of whites, on the other hand, have declined by roughly 9 points from 2000 to 2020, from 73.7 to 64.5. Turning to the relationship of each with partisanship, the correlation between partisanship and in-group affect has shown some fluctuation election-to-election but has remained relatively stable since 2004, averaging 0.182 during this period. The correlation between white affect and partisanship has increased in strength during this period, from a low of 0.034 in 2008 to  $-0.118$  in 2020. While the correlation between ratings of whites and partisanship has strengthened, the relationship between partisanship and in-group feelings has been stronger in each year from 1976 to 2020. Interestingly, in the panel data we employ, ratings of whites show greater stability ( $r = 0.346$ ) than ratings of one's in-group ( $r = 0.215$ ). We also note that both in-group and white ratings exhibited comparable levels of change from 2016 to 2020: the average absolute change for in-group ratings was 16.7, while for whites it was 18.6.

### Assessing The Direction of Influence Between Partisanship and Affective Differentiation

To investigate the direction of influence between the two orientations, we utilize the 2016–20 ANES Panel Sample. To do so, we specify a cross-lagged model (CLM), which allows us to assess the causal ordering of the variables (e.g., Enders and Lupton 2021; Finkel 1995; Evans and Neundorf 2020). In the model, 2016 values of each variable predict values in 2020. We wish to be clear about the limitations of this analysis. In particular, we have a relatively small sample size and are restricted to only two waves. Further, while a CLM allows us to assess the relative contribution of lagged values, our model cannot definitively establish causality, as any causal interpretation hinges on having a correctly specified model. Moreover, while we control for observed confounders, we cannot eliminate all sources of bias, particularly from time-invariant


**Table 1.** Cross-lagged model predicting partisanship and affective differentiation among Black and Latine respondents, 2016–2020. Data: ANES 2016–20 Panel Sample

	Partisanship <sub>2020</sub>	Affective differentiation <sub>2020</sub>
Affective differentiation <sub>2016</sub>	0.002 (0.003)	0.238* (0.088)
Partisanship <sub>2016</sub>	0.636* (0.060)	3.326* (0.952)
Female	0.277 (0.174)	0.710 (3.420)
Education	0.040 (0.083)	−0.850 (1.251)
Midwest	−0.448 (0.335)	8.098 (5.445)
South	−0.335 (0.314)	10.724* (3.771)
West	−0.452 (0.342)	2.950 (4.204)
Income	−0.006 (0.011)	0.071 (0.207)
Age	−0.000 (0.005)	−0.228 (0.107)
Issues	−0.142 (0.074)	−0.807 (1.630)
Church	0.022 (0.055)	−0.060 (1.106)
Constant	1.998 (0.592)	−1.862 (7.026)
<i>n</i>	358	

Note: Entries are MLE coefficients with standard errors in parentheses for variables of interest. \* $p < 0.05$ .

unobserved factors and time-varying shocks between 2016 and 2020.<sup>9</sup> As such, while our analysis allows us some degree of confidence about the ordering of the two variables, its results are best characterized as associational. Given panel attrition, we weight the data to the 2016 electorate and estimate the model with full information maximum likelihood.<sup>10</sup> Results are presented in Table 1 where entries are coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses).


Our results suggest that as race has become more central to American politics, partisans have updated their racial beliefs, consistent with substantial evidence



**Figure 2.** Predicted values of affective differentiation.

documenting the centrality of partisanship as a social identity. We observe that 2016 levels of partisanship predict both affective differentiation and partisanship in 2020 ( $p < 0.001$ ). On the other hand, 2016 levels of affective differentiation predict current levels in 2020 ( $p = 0.007$ ) but are unrelated to partisanship in 2020 ( $p = 0.465$ ). To get a sense of the substantive relationship, we calculate predicted values and find that moving from pure independent to strong Democrat is associated with an increase of affective differentiation of 9.979 (95% CI: 4.379, 15.579). We display predicted values across the entire range of partisanship in Figure 2. Among Republicans and strong Republicans, the average difference in how one rates their own group relative to whites is indistinguishable from zero. While this owes in part to increased uncertainty due to a smaller number of observations, the levels of affective differentiation are quite low among these groups.

We examine the robustness of this result in several ways. First, we continue to restrict our sample to those interviewed online but exclude respondents with missing data. Second, we include the face-to-face sample from 2016. In both cases, we continue to weight to the 2016 electorate. Finally, we demonstrate that the decision to use weights does not drive our result. Full results of these analyses are presented in Section B of the SM. We present the coefficients of interest (with 95% confidence intervals) from each model, along with those from Table 1 as a point of comparison, in Figure 3. In the figure, the rows represent the independent variable while the columns represent the dependent variable. For example, the upper-right panel (“Affective differentiation  $\rightarrow$  partisanship”) displays the coefficients where affective differentiation is the independent variable and partisanship is the dependent variable. In other words, the top row of panels displays affective differentiation as the independent variable, while the bottom row of panels displays partisanship as the independent variable. In each case we observe that the estimates are quite similar across the choice of which respondents to include in the analysis and if we weight the data.



**Figure 3.** Estimated coefficients from primary model in Table 1 as well as alternative models to examine the sensitivity of the estimate to choices about respondent inclusion. Data: ANES 2016–20 Panel Sample.

As our main analysis pools Black and Latine respondents to increase the sample size, it is worth examining if the result holds for each group separately. We have argued that the measure should share a similar relationship with partisanship for both groups, but ultimately this is an empirical question. To assess, this, we estimate models for both groups and present the quantities of interest in Table 2, with full results in Section B of the SM. Columns 1 and 2 present the model for Black respondents, with models for Latine respondents in columns 3 and 4. The results are very similar to those in Table 1. In both cases, partisanship in 2016 is a significant predictor of both affective differentiation ( $p < 0.05$ ) and partisanship ( $p < 0.05$ ) in 2020, whereas affective differentiation in 2016 is unrelated to partisanship in 2020 for both Black ( $p = 0.208$ ) and Latine ( $p = 0.783$ ) Americans. A shift from independent to strong Democrat is associated with an increase in affective differentiation of 16.480 among Black and 6.076 among Latine respondents. In summary, analyses of over-time trends and recent panel data lead us to conclude that the increasingly strong relationship between partisanship and affective

**Table 2.** Cross-lagged model predicting partisanship and affective differentiation among Black and Latine respondents, 2016–2020, for Black and Latine Respondents Separately. Data: ANES 2016–20 Panel Sample

	Black Americans		Latine Americans	
	Partisanship <sub>2020</sub>	Affective differentiation <sub>2020</sub>	Partisanship <sub>2020</sub>	Affective differentiation <sub>2020</sub>
Affective differentiation <sub>2016</sub>	0.004	0.153	0.002	0.316*
	(0.003)	(0.120)	(0.006)	(0.122)
Partisanship <sub>2016</sub>	0.589*	5.493*	0.639*	2.025*
	(0.106)	(1.731)	(0.066)	(0.869)
Constant	0.068	−0.764	−0.042	0.259
	(0.073)	(1.584)	0.084	(1.327)
<i>n</i>	184		174	

Note: Entries are MLE coefficients with standard errors in parentheses for variables of interest. Full results presented in SM (Section B). \**p* < 0.05.

differentiation among Black and Latine respondents is largely driven by partisanship: stronger Democrats exhibit increased levels of affective differentiation.

### Examining In-Group and Out-Group Ratings Separately

Having established that partisanship can predict affective differentiation, our focus now shifts to exploring the connection between partisanship and in-group and white thermometer scores separately. As noted, there are reasons to anticipate an asymmetric relationship between partisanship and the ratings of one’s own group and whites. As an initial test, we again utilize the 2016–20 panel data. However, the results are inconclusive. Consistent with the model in Table 1, we find that lagged values of feelings toward both groups are unrelated to partisanship. However, we find partisanship in 2016 is unrelated to feelings of either group on its own in 2020. We present the coefficients of interest in Table 3 with full results presented in the SM (Section D).

To further examine the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes, we increase our sample size by estimating a cross-sectional model in which we pool the ANES from 2012 to 2020 resulting in 1,539 Black and 1,709 Latine respondents to examine the contemporaneous association between the two orientations. We limit our analysis to these years given the increased correlation between partisanship and affective differentiation identified in Figure 1, where 2012 onward marks a meaningful shift relative to earlier years. Advantageously, the 2012 ANES includes an oversample of both groups increasing our sample size. We again utilize survey weights for this analysis.

To assess the relationship between partisanship and feelings about one’s own group and whites, we estimate a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) in which

**Table 3.** Cross-lagged models predicting partisanship and in-group rating (columns 1–2), partisanship and rating of whites (columns 3–4) among Black and Latine respondents, 2016 to 2020. Data: 2016–20 Panel Sample

	Partisanship <sub>2020</sub>	In-group <sub>2020</sub>	Partisanship <sub>2020</sub>	Whites <sub>2020</sub>
In-group <sub>2016</sub>	0.005 (0.005)	0.255* (0.080)		
Whites <sub>2016</sub>			0.001 (0.004)	0.320* (0.075)
Partisanship <sub>2016</sub>	0.639* (0.060)	0.947 (0.852)	0.647* (0.058)	–1.19 (0.935)
Constant	1.630 (0.577)	45.048 (9.541)	0.022 (0.055)	1.285 (0.959)
<i>n</i>	358		358	

Note: Entries are MLE coefficients with standard errors in parentheses for variables of interest. Full results presented in SM (Section D). \* $p < 0.05$ .

**Table 4.** The relationship between partisan identification and ratings of one's own group and whites among Black and Latine respondents. Data: 2012–2020 ANES

	In-group	Whites
Partisanship	1.496* (0.199)	–0.703* (0.233)
Constant	63.838 (1.999)	59.263 (2.336)
<i>n</i>	3,597	
$R^2$	0.053	0.037

Note: Entries are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses for variable of interest. Full results presented in SM (Section D). \* $p < 0.05$ .

partisanship predicts feeling thermometer ratings of both one's own group and whites. The SUR model allows for us to compare the size of the coefficient (in absolute value) for partisanship across the two dependent variables. Our justification for this model specification—with partisanship as the independent variable—follows from our earlier panel results in Table 1. We present the coefficients of interest, with standard errors in parentheses, in Table 4. Full results are presented in the SM (Section D).

We observe that partisanship is associated with both feelings about one's in-group and about whites. Most importantly for our purposes, the coefficient for partisanship in the in-group models is more than twice the size (in absolute value) compared to the model predicting ratings of whites and we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal in absolute value ( $p = 0.028$ ). Moving from



**Table 5.** The relationship between partisan identification and ratings of one's own group and whites among Black and Latine respondents. Data: 2012–2020 ANES

	Black Americans		Latine Americans	
	In-group	Whites	In-group	Whites
Partisanship	1.824*	–0.484	1.120*	–0.777*
	(0.335)	(0.420)	(0.270)	(0.295)
Constant	60.29	53.96	64.97	61.90
	(2.860)	(3.553)	(2.978)	(3.248)
<i>n</i>	1,789		1,808	
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.041	0.042	0.045	0.038

Note: Entries are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses for variable of interest. Full results presented in SM (Section D). \**p* < 0.05.

a pure independent to a strong Democrat is associated with an increase of 4.5 points toward one's own group and a decline of 2.1 toward whites. While feelings about both one's own racial group and whites are related to partisanship, the relationship is meaningfully stronger for one's own group.

Earlier we found that affective differentiation shared a similar relationship with partisanship across both groups. Is this also the case with ratings of one's in-group and whites separately? Though we have argued that the measure of affective differentiation should operate similarly for both, it is possible its individual components may not given the different dynamics at play in terms of partisanship for both groups. We re-estimate the model presented in Table 4 for both Black and Latine respondents separately. Coefficients of interest, those for partisanship, are presented in Table 5. Here we find among Black respondents only feelings about their own group relate to partisanship, while feelings about both groups share a significant relationship for Latine respondents. Moreover, among Latine respondents, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal in absolute value (*p* = 0.483) while we do for Black respondents (*p* = 0.033). This analysis indicates that while comparative evaluations of one's own group and whites—as captured by the measure of affective differentiation—operate similarly across the two groups, this is not the case for the individual components that make up the measure of affective differentiation. The result suggests among Latines, identifying with the Republican party makes one more favorable toward whites, consistent with evidence that white identification is associated with Republican support (e.g., Cuevas-Molina 2023), reflecting the dynamic nature of Latine identification.

## Conclusion

In this paper, we endeavored to extend research on feelings about racial groups and partisanship by focusing on Black and Latine Americans during a period marked by a heightened political significance of race. We found that like whites, there is an increased correspondence between the two orientations over the last 20 years. Panel data from two recent elections indicate that it is partisans updating their racial

attitudes rather than increased partisan sorting by affective differentiation. Such a result is consistent with substantial evidence of partisanship as a powerful influence on other political orientations. A subsequent analysis demonstrates that partisanship relates more strongly to one's in-group than to white Americans in our pooled sample and among Black respondents; among Latine respondents we find that partisanship shares a similar relationship with both ratings.

Our finding that partisanship drives this relationship is consistent with recent evidence among whites. Following Trump's surprise victory in 2016, it seemed plausible that we were observing a sorting of racially resentful whites into the Republican Party. Yet, panel data indicates that it was partisanship (Engelhardt 2021) and candidate support (Enns and Jardina 2021) that were driving a change in racial attitudes rather than racially resentful whites abandoning the Democratic Party. Recent evidence indicates that many trends among whites do not necessarily extend to others in the electorate neatly (e.g., Enders and Thornton 2022; Zingher 2023). Here, however, we find that the pattern of partisanship influencing feelings about racial groups does indeed generalize beyond whites. Our findings are also consistent with evidence that recent anti-immigrant rhetoric has not meaningfully altered partisanship among Latine people (Hopkins et al. 2023).

Our results have several substantive implications. First, increasing levels of affective differentiation that are more strongly related to partisanship indicate these identities—racial and partisan—could become increasingly linked over time. For Black and Latine Americans, this means that Democratic partisanship is increasingly intertwined with positive racial in-group affect—suggesting that the Democratic Party is not only a political home but also a symbolic one, affirming racial group identity in a political context marked by increasingly explicit racial rhetoric. This has implications for Democratic coalition maintenance, as it points to an emotional and identity-based anchor that may foster loyalty—but also may make societal divisions intractable (e.g., Mason and Wronski 2018). Moreover, our results also suggest that ambitious politicians may be able to further inflame existing divisions by increasingly tying feelings about racial groups to partisanship.

Our results also speak to the literature on Latine partisanship. While the literature on race and partisanship for both Black and white Americans is well-developed, less is known about Latine Americans. Evidence indicates that patterns of Latine party identification are unique in important ways, as they are shaped by country of origin and time spent in the U.S. (Alvarez and García-Bedolla 2003; Cain et al. 1991) as well as if they were born in the U.S. (Abrajano and Alvarez 2011). Our results squarely suggest that regarding the items considered here, Latine partisan identification operates in a manner similar to that of White and Black Americans. Further, our results are consistent with Cadena Jr. (2023, 806), who finds that Latine Republicans minimize Republicans' racial rhetoric and distance themselves from other Latines. In other words, by "positioning themselves in opposition to other racialized people" such individuals consequently express lower levels of affective differentiation. Similarly, Huddy et al. (2016) find it is Democratic identifiers who most strongly identify as Latino. As the Latine electorate becomes more politically diverse (Corral and Leal 2024), our expectation is that the relationship between partisanship and feelings about race will continue to strengthen. Further, given that our analyses indicates that partisanship predicts racial affect, a reasonable takeaway

is that if Latine (and Black) voters move toward the Republican Party—as they appear to have in 2024—we should see lower levels of affective differentiation among these individuals. Examining the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes among this set of voters is clearly needed moving forward.

No study is, of course, without its weaknesses. One weakness we identify is the relatively broad measure of racial affect based on feeling thermometers, which lack nuance and may be prone to noisy responses, limiting reliability. Future work might build on recent innovations measuring racial attitudes toward whites (e.g., Davis and Wilson 2022). An additional limitation is that, while panel data can be suggestive of the causal ordering between two variables, the models employed here cannot definitively establish causality and we need to be especially cautious with only two waves. Future experimental work might more thoroughly examine the possibility that partisanship can polarize racial attitudes by, for example, altering partisan framing to examine its influence on such sentiments. We conclude by noting while the discipline has made strides to better understand the attitudes of the public beyond white Americans, future data collection efforts might focus on the dynamic nature of the attitudes of people of color in the U.S. Similarly, while we focus on Black and Latine Americans, future work might examine how other groups have responded to increased racial salience—for example, the response of Native American communities to elected officials using language similar to that during the Indian Removal Era (Allread 2023). A broader understanding of how diverse groups interpret political cues will help build a more complete picture of public opinion in the United States.

**Supplementary material.** The supplementary material for this article can be found at <https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2025.10017>

**Funding statement.** The authors declare that there are no funding sources to report.

**Competing interests.** The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest associated with this submission.

## Notes

- 1 Data will be made available at the corresponding author's Dataverse page.
- 2 Various terms have been used to describe individuals that are residing in the U.S. who are Spanish-speaking or have Latin American heritage. We opt for Latine as a gender-neutral form of Latino and Latina. See Miranda et al. (2023) for a discussion of this topic.
- 3 Both partisanship (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960) and racial attitudes (Kinder and Kam 2010; Kinder and Winter 2001) can be thought of as an orientation, or a predisposition, in that both can shape how individuals process and perceive political information (Converse 1964).
- 4 A central motivation in the social identity approach to partisanship is in-group bias and a desire to advance one's party along with one's social group.
- 5 The ANES does not provide multiple racial or ethnic categories for respondents who identify as "Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino." As a result, we are unable to compare Latine respondents who, for example, also identify as Black with those who identify as white.
- 6 While we are limited in the creation of alternative measures of racial attitudes for people of color in America, we do note that the measure of affective differentiation shares a modest correlation ( $r = 0.3$ ) with a measure constructed from items tapping respondents' ratings of if groups are hardworking or lazy. Consistent with Kinder and Kam (2010, 204–205) we find that the item is distinct from that of linked fate, as our measure shares a correlation of 0.141 with linked fate.

7 Such comparative (or relative) measures are widespread in political science, economics, psychology, and other disciplines. Such measures do not assume that ratings of the groups are contingent on one another—respondents who feel warmly toward (or who dislike) both groups would have low levels of differentiation. Further, such comparative measures are associated with self-reported behavior (e.g., Weisberg and Miller 1979). In our case, the measure exhibits modest over-time stability,  $r = 0.301$  across the two elections. While feeling thermometers necessarily lack nuance given that they are open to interpretation, the items are reliable (Lupton and Jacoby 2016) and can reasonably be treated as interval (Jacoby 1999; Winter and Berinsky 1999). We assess if the relationship between partisanship and affective differentiation can be treated as linear in section F of the SM.

8 Descriptive statistics are calculated using survey weights provided by the ANES.

9 With only two waves, we are unable to include unit fixed effects.

10 Due to the complex sample design of the 2020 ANES—which includes the 2016 panel sample, reinterviews from the 2020 General Social Survey, and a mixed mode (phone, video, and internet) fresh sample—14 different weights are provided by the Center for Political Studies. We utilize the 2016–2020 panel pre-election weight.

## References

- Abrajano MA and Alvarez RM (2011) Hispanic public opinion and partisanship in America. *Political Science Quarterly* 126, 255–285.
- Abramowitz A and McCoy J (2019) United States: racial resentment, negative partisanship, and polarization in Trump's America. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 681, 137–156.
- Affigne T (2000) Latino politics in the United States: an introduction. *PS: Political Science & Politics* 33, 523–528.
- Allread WT (2023) The specter of Indian removal. *Columbia Law Review* 123, 1533–1610.
- Alvarez RM and Garcia-Bedolla L (2003) The foundations of Latino voter partisanship: evidence from the 2000 election. *Journal of Politics* 65, 31–49.
- Bawn K *et al.* (2012) A theory of political parties: groups, policy demands and nominations in American politics. *Perspectives on Politics* 10, 571–597.
- Berinsky AJ *et al.* (2011) Sex and race: are Black candidates more likely to be disadvantaged by sex scandals? *Political Behavior* 33, 179–202.
- Berry JA, Cepuran C and Garcia-Rios S (2020) Relative group discrimination and vote choice among Blacks, Latinos, Asians, and Whites. *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 10, 410–429.
- Bobo L and Zubrinsky CL (1996) Attitudes on residential integration: perceived status differences, mere in-group preference, or racial prejudice? *Social Forces* 74, 892.
- Branscombe NR, Schmitt MT and Harvey RD (1999) Perceiving pervasive discrimination among African Americans: implications for group identification and well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 77, 135–149.
- Cadena RS Jr (2023) Paradoxical politics? Partisan politics, ethnoracial ideologies, and the assimilated consciousnesses of Latinx Republicans. *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity* 9, 295–310.
- Cain BE, Kiewiet DR and Uhlener CJ (1991) The acquisition of partisanship by Latinos and Asian Americans. *American Journal of Political Science* 35, 390.
- Campbell A *et al.* (1960) *The American Voter*. New York: John Wiley
- Clifford S, Simas E and Suh J (2025) The policy basis of group sentiments. *Political Science Research and Methods* 13, 482–484.
- Converse PE (1964) The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In Apter DE (ed), *Ideology and Discontent*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Corral ÁJ and Leal DL (2024) El cuento del destino: Latino voters, demographic determinism, and the myth of an inevitable Democratic Party majority. *Political Science Quarterly* 139, 335–359.
- Cuevas-Molina I (2023) White racial identity, racial attitudes, and Latino partisanship. *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* 8, 469–491.
- Davis DW and Wilson DC (2022) *Racial Resentment in the Political Mind*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Dawson MC** (1994) *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- De Leon C, Desai M and Tuğal C** (2009) Political articulation: parties and the constitution of cleavages in the United States, India, and Turkey. *Sociological Theory* **27**, 193–219.
- Dovidio JF and Gaertner SL** (2000) Aversive racism and selective decisions: 1989–1999. *Psychological Science* **11**, 315–319.
- Enders AM and Lupton RN** (2021) Value extremity contributes to affective polarization in the U.S. *Political Science Research and Methods* **9**, 507–536.
- Enders AM and Scott JS** (2018) The increasing racialization of American electoral politics, 1988–2016. *American Politics Research* **47**, 275–303.
- Enders AM and Thornton JR** (2022) Polarization in Black and White: an examination of racial differences in polarization and sorting trends. *Public Opinion Quarterly* **86**, 293–316.
- Engelhardt AM** (2021) Racial attitudes through a partisan lens. *British Journal of Political Science* **51**, 1062–1079.
- Enns PK and Jardina A** (2021) Complicating the role of White racial attitudes and anti-immigrant sentiment in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. *Public Opinion Quarterly* **85**, 539–570.
- Evans G and Neundorff A** (2020) Core political values and the long-term shaping of partisanship. *British Journal of Political Science* **50**, 1263–1281.
- Finkel SE** (1995) *Causal Analysis with Panel Data*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Frymer P** (1999) *Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- García Bedolla L** (2005) *Fluid Borders: Latino Power, Identity, and Politics in Los Angeles*. California: University of California Press.
- Golash-Boza T and Darity W** (2008) Latino racial choices: the effects of skin colour and discrimination on Latinos' and Latinas' racial self-identifications. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* **31**, 899–934.
- Goren MJ and Plaut VC** (2012) Identity form matters: white racial identity and attitudes toward diversity. *Self and Identity* **11**, 237–254.
- Hero R et al.** (2000) Latino participation, partisanship, and office holding. *PS: Political Science and Politics* **33**, 529–534.
- Herring M, Jankowski TB and Brown RE** (1999) Pro-Black doesn't mean anti-White: the structure of African-American group identity. *Journal of Politics* **61**, 363–386.
- Hewstone M, Rubin M and Willis H** (2002) Intergroup bias. *Annual Review of Psychology* **53**, 575–604.
- Hopkins DJ et al.** (2020) Does perceiving discrimination influence partisanship among U.S. immigrant minorities? Evidence from five experiments. *Journal of Experimental Political Science* **7**, 112–136.
- Hopkins DJ, Kaiser C and Perez EO** (2023) The surprising stability of Asian Americans' and Latinos' partisan identities in the early Trump era. *Journal of Politics* **85**, 1321–1335.
- Huber GA and Lapinski JS** (2008) Testing the implicit-explicit model of racialized political communication. *Perspectives on Politics* **6**, 125–134.
- Huddy L and Bankert A** (2017) Political partisanship as a social identity. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Huddy L, Mason L and Horwitz SN** (2016) Political identity convergence: on being Latino, becoming a Democrat, and getting active. *Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences* **2**, 205–228.
- Hutchings V and Valentino N** (2004) The centrality of race in American politics. *Annual Review of Political Science* **7**, 383–408.
- Igielnik R, Scott K and Hannah H** (2021) *Behind Biden's 2020 Victory: An Examination of 2020 Electorate, Based on Validated Voters*. Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center.
- Jackman MR and Crane M** (1986) Some of my best friends are Black . . . : interracial friendship and Whites' racial attitudes. *Public Opinion Quarterly* **50**, 459–486.
- Jacoby WG** (1999) Levels of measurement and political research: an optimistic view. *American Journal of Political Science* **43**, 271–301.
- Jardina A** (2021) In-group love and out-group hate: White racial attitudes in contemporary U.S. elections. *Political Behavior* **43**, 1535–1559.
- Jardina A and Piston S** (2023) The politics of racist dehumanization in the United States. *Annual Review of Political Science* **26**, 369–388.

- Jones-Correa M, Al-Faham H and Cortez D (2018) Political (mis)behavior: attention and lacunae in the study of Latino politics. *Annual Review of Sociology* **44**, 213–235.
- Kam CD and Kinder DR (2007) Terror and ethnocentrism: foundations of American support for the war on terrorism. *Journal of Politics* **69**, 320–338.
- Kam CD and Kinder DR (2012) Ethnocentrism as a short-term force in the 2008 American presidential election. *American Journal of Political Science* **56**, 326–340.
- Kelly NJ and Kelly JM (2005) Religion and Latino partisanship in the United States. *Political Research Quarterly* **58**, 87–95.
- Kinder DR and Kam CD (2010) *Us Against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kinder DR and Sanders LM (1996) *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kinder DR and Sears DO (1981) Prejudice and politics: symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* **40**, 414–431.
- Kinder DR and Winter N (2001) Exploring the racial divide: Blacks, Whites, and opinion on national policy. *American Journal of Political Science* **45**, 439–456.
- Knuckey J (2011) Racial resentment and vote choice in the 2008 U.S. presidential election. *Politics & Policy* **39**, 559–582.
- Knuckey J and Kim M (2015) Racial resentment, old-fashioned racism, and the vote choice of southern and nonsouthern Whites in the 2012 U.S. presidential election. *Social Science Quarterly* **96**, 905–922.
- Kuo A, Malhotra N and Mo CH (2017) Social exclusion and political identity: the case of Asian American partisanship. *Journal of Politics* **79**, 17–32.
- Lupton RN and Jacoby WG (2016) The Reliability of the ANES Feeling Thermometers: An Optimistic Assessment. Paper presented at the 2016 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico.
- Magesh S *et al.* (2021) Disparities in COVID-19 outcomes by race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status: a systematic review and meta-analysis. *JAMA Network Open* **4**, e2134147.
- Mason L (2016) A cross-cutting calm: how social sorting drives affective polarization. *Public Opinion Quarterly* **80**, 351–377.
- Mason L and Wronski J (2018) One tribe to bind them all: how our social group attachments strengthen partisanship. *Political Psychology* **39**, 257–277.
- McConahay JB and Hough JC Jr (1976) Symbolic racism. *Journal of Social Issues* **32**, 23–45.
- Mendelberg T (1997) Executing Hortons: racial crime in the 1988 presidential campaign. *Public Opinion Quarterly* **61**, 134–157.
- Miller A, Wlezien C and Hildreth A (1991) A reference group theory of partisan coalitions. *Journal of Politics* **53**, 1134–1149.
- Miller AH *et al.* (1981) Group consciousness and political participation. *American Journal of Political Science* **25**, 494–511.
- Miller AH and Wlezien C (1993) The social group dynamics of partisan evaluations. *Electoral Studies* **12**, 5–22.
- Miranda AR, Perez-Brumer A and Charlton BM (2023) Latino? Latinx? Latine? A call for inclusive categories in epidemiologic research. *American Journal of Epidemiology* **192**, 1929–1932.
- Pérez EO (2015) Xenophobic rhetoric and its political effects on immigrants and their co-ethnics. *American Journal of Political Science* **59**, 549–564.
- Reny TT, Collingwood L and Valenzuela AA (2019) Vote switching in the 2016 election: how racial and immigration attitudes, not economics, explain shifts in White voting. *Public Opinion Quarterly* **83**, 91–113.
- Reyes MV (2020) The disproportional impact of COVID-19 on African Americans. *Health and Human Rights* **22**, 299–307.
- Roth W (2012) *Race Migrations: Latinos and the Cultural Transformation of Race*. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press
- Sears DO (1988) Symbolic racism. In Katz PA and Taylor DA (eds), *Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy*. New York: Plenum Press, pp. 53–84.
- Shelby T (2005) *We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.



- Sides J, Tesler M and Vavreck L** (2019) *Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Simmons AD and Bobo LD** (2015) Can non-full-probability internet surveys yield useful data? A comparison with full-probability face-to-face surveys in the domain of race and social inequality attitudes. *Sociological Methodology* **45**, 357–387.
- Steenkamp JBEM and Baumgartner H** (1998) Assessing measurement invariance in cross-national consumer research. *Journal of Consumer Research* **25**, 78–90.
- Stephan WG *et al.*** (2002) The role of threats in the racial attitudes of Blacks and Whites. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* **28**, 1242–1254.
- Sullivan JM and Ghara A** (2014) Racial identity and intergroup attitudes: a multiracial youth analysis. *Social Science Quarterly* **96**, 261–272.
- Tate K** (1993) *From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Tesler M** (2012) The return of old-fashioned racism to White Americans' partisan preferences in the early Obama era. *The Journal of Politics* **75**, 110–123.
- Tesler M** (2013) The spillover of racialization into health care: how President Obama polarized public opinion by racial attitudes and race. *American Journal of Political Science* **56**, 690–704.
- Valentino NA, Hutchings VL and White IK** (2002) Cues that matter: how political ads prime racial attitudes during campaigns. *American Political Science Review* **96**, 75–90.
- Valentino NA, Neuner FG and Vandenbroek LM** (2018) The changing norms of racial political rhetoric and the end of racial priming. *Journal of Politics* **80**, 757–771.
- Valentino NA and Sears DO** (2005) Old times there are not forgotten: race and partisan realignment in the contemporary South. *American Journal of Political Science* **49**, 672–688.
- Wamble JJ *et al.*** (2022) We are one: the social maintenance of Black Democratic Party loyalty. *Journal of Politics* **84**, 682–697.
- Weisberg HF and Miller AH** (1979) *Evaluation of the Feeling Thermometer*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies.
- White IK** (2007) When race matters and when it doesn't: racial group differences in response to racial cues. *American Political Science Review* **101**, 339–354.
- White IK and Laird CN** (2020) *Steadfast Democrats: How Social Forces Shape Black Political Behavior*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- White IK, Laird CN and Allen TD** (2014) Selling out? The politics of navigating conflicts between racial group interest and self-interest. *American Political Science Review* **108**, 783–800.
- Winter N and Berinsky AJ** (1999) What's Your Temperature? Thermometer Ratings and Political Analysis. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA.
- Wong JS** (2000) The effects of age and political exposure on the development of party identification among Asian American and Latino immigrants in the United States. *Political Behavior* **22**, 341–371.
- Zingher JN** (2023) How social group memberships interact to shape partisanship, policy orientations, and vote choice. *Political Behavior* **45**, 699–717.