

# WORLD POLITICS

*A Quarterly Journal of  
International Relations*

Volume 64, Number 3 July 2012

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF  
PRINCETON INSTITUTE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL STUDIES

PUBLISHED BY CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

*EDITORIAL BOARD*

ATUL KOHLI, *Chair*

NANCY BERMEO, MARY E. GALLAGHER, ANNA GRZYMAŁA-BUSSE, TORBEN IVERSEN,  
STATHIS KALYVAS, JONATHAN KIRSHNER, MICHAEL MASTANDUNO, KEVIN O'ROURKE,  
JONAS PONTUSSON, DANIEL N. POSNER, KENNETH SCHEVE, KENNETH A. SCHULTZ,  
EDWARD S. STEINFELD, MICHAEL TOMZ, NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE, JOHN WATERBURY

*Editorial Committee:* MARK R. BEISSINGER, THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN, CHRISTINA L. DAVIS,  
JOANNE GOWA, G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AMANEY A. JAMAL, HAROLD JAMES,  
ATUL KOHLI (*Chair*), EVAN S. LIEBERMAN, DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, DEBORAH J. YASHAR

*Associate Editors:* DELIA BALDASSARRI, DANIELA CAMPELLO, RAFAELA DANCYGIER,  
DAVID LEHENY, XUN PANG, GRIGORE POP-ELECHES, KRISTOPHER W. RAMSAY,  
JACOB N. SHAPIRO, BRADLEY SIMPSON

*Executive Editor:* ILENE P. COHEN    *Assistant Editor:* JOY M. SCHARFSTEIN  
*Office Coordinator:* CAROLE FRANTZEN

The editors invite submission of articles, research notes, and review articles bearing upon problems in international relations and comparative politics. Manuscripts and notes should be double-spaced and submitted through the Web-based submission system, Manuscript Central, at <http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/wp>. *World Politics* guidelines permit submissions of up to 12,500 words in length, including notes and references (excluding tables, figures, and appendixes); research notes may be up to 10,000 words in length, including notes. Word count should be indicated. Manuscripts that exceed the limit *will not be considered*. Guidelines for review articles, guidelines for special issues, tables of contents, and other information can be found the *World Politics* home page, at <http://www.princeton.edu/piirs/worldpolitics-journal>.

Authors can expect to receive decisions on their submissions within four months. Procedures for reviewing manuscripts are based on the anonymity of the author and the confidentiality of readers' and editors' reports; author anonymity is preserved, as well, during the editorial decision-making process. Self-references should therefore be removed. Referees are drawn from Princeton and other institutions; published articles have usually been reviewed by at least one editor and two readers from other institutions. Referees for the previous calendar year are acknowledged annually in issue 4 of the journal. In the case of an article deemed to be inappropriate for *World Politics*, the editors strive to notify the author within a month of submission that the article has been withdrawn from consideration.

*World Politics* does not accept manuscripts that have already been published, are scheduled for publication elsewhere, or have been simultaneously submitted to another journal; this applies to both print and online formats. Statements of fact and opinion appearing in the journal are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publisher. The journal does not publish communications to the editor or rejoinders to specific articles. Scholars who believe they have been challenged are encouraged to submit an article that will advance the scholarly debate.

# WORLD POLITICS

Vol. 64

July 2012

No. 3

## CONTENTS

Global Networks and Domestic Policy Convergence: A Network Explanation of Policy Changes	<i>Xun Cao</i>	375
Disguised Protectionism and Linkages to the GATT/WTO	<i>Moonhawk Kim</i>	426
Coalitions and Language Politics: Policy Shifts in Southeast Asia	<i>Amy H. Liu and Jacob I. Ricks</i>	476
Associational Networks and Welfare States in Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan	<i>Cheol-Sung Lee</i>	507
In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign Public Opinion Matter for US Foreign Policy?	<i>Benjamin E. Goldsmith and Yusaku Horiuchi</i>	555
The Contributors		ii
Abstracts		iii

## THE CONTRIBUTORS

XUN CAO is an assistant professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University and is affiliated with the Penn State Institutes of Energy and the Environment. His research interests include international and comparative political economy, environmental and energy politics, network analysis, and spatial models. He can be reached at [xuc11@psu.edu](mailto:xuc11@psu.edu).

MOONHAWK KIM is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Colorado at Boulder. His research focuses on challenges states confront in governing international trade and the evolution of institutional solutions that states devise to meet these challenges. His current project analyzes the changes in the characteristics of trade agreements over time. He can be reached at [moonhawk.kim@colorado.edu](mailto:moonhawk.kim@colorado.edu).

AMY H. LIU is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Her area of scholarly interest is comparative politics, with a substantive focus on language politics and regional concentration in Southeast Asia. Her book manuscript examines language regime choice and the economic effects of this choice. She has published in various journals. She can be reached at [amy.liu@colorado.edu](mailto:amy.liu@colorado.edu).

JACOB I. RICKS is a Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science Department at Emory University. His research interests include the political economy of development, national identity issues, and democratization. He is currently writing his doctoral dissertation about the conditions that encourage developing states to engage in institutional reforms necessary for participatory water resource management. He has published his work in academic journals. He can be reached at [jiricks@emory.edu](mailto:jiricks@emory.edu).

CHEOL-SUNG LEE is an assistant professor at the University of Chicago. He is interested in comparative welfare states and social movements. His current research focuses on the effects of the organizational configuration of civil society on institutional changes and social policy outcomes. He can be reached at [chslee@uchicago.edu](mailto:chslee@uchicago.edu).

BENJAMIN E. GOLDSMITH is an associate professor in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney. He is the author of *Imitation in International Relations* (2005) and articles in leading academic journals. He is currently investigating regional patterns of interstate conflict and working to develop forecasting models for genocide and politicide. He can be reached at [ben.goldsmith@sydney.edu.au](mailto:ben.goldsmith@sydney.edu.au).

YUSAKU HORIUCHI is an associate professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College and holds the Mitsui Chair in the Study of Japan. His research interests include electoral politics, political economy, public opinion, and research methods. He can be reached at [yusaku.horiuchi@gmail.com](mailto:yusaku.horiuchi@gmail.com).

## ABSTRACTS

### GLOBAL NETWORKS AND DOMESTIC POLICY CONVERGENCE

#### A NETWORK EXPLANATION OF POLICY CHANGES

By XUN CAO

National economies are embedded in complex networks such as trade, capital flows, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). These globalization forces impose differential impacts on national economies depending on a country's network positions. This article addresses the policy convergence–divergence debate by focusing on how networks at the international level affect domestic fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policies. The author presents two hypotheses: first, similarity in network positions induces convergence in domestic economic policies as a result of peer competitive pressure. Second, proximity in network positions facilitates policy learning and emulation, which result in policy convergence. The empirical analysis applies a latent-space model for relational/dyadic data and indicates that position similarity in the network of exports induces convergence in fiscal and regulatory policies; position similarity in the network of transnational portfolio investments induces convergence in fiscal policies; and position proximity in IGO networks is consistently associated with policy convergence in fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policies.

### DISGUISED PROTECTIONISM AND LINKAGES TO THE GATT/WTO

By MOONHAWK KIM

Member states of the GATT/WTO have linked some issue-areas outside trade to the institution and did so with varying depths. At the same time they have chosen not to link other issue-areas. What accounts for this variation? The author argues that states establish a legalized linkage between the GATT/WTO and an issue-area outside it when they are uncertain about the possibilities of disguised protectionism. Such uncertainty exists under two conditions: when diversity in regulations in an issue-area across states generates a large adverse impact on trade (negative externalities) but that diversity can be justified at the international level for (1) having an independent objective apart from hampering trade and (2) when there are few alternative policies to achieve that objective (legitimacy). States establish a highly legalized linkage in these situations to reduce the uncertainty and minimize disguised protectionism. By contrast, when regulatory diversity exhibits low legitimacy, states establish only a weakly legalized linkage. In the absence of meaningful externalities, they do not establish any linkages. The author evaluates this argument in two ways. He provides an overview of eleven issue-areas about which there have been some debates or conflicts about linkages to the GATT/WTO. In addition, he carries out in-depth case studies of three issue-areas—labor standards, environmental standards, and health safety standards. The findings of this article contribute to a better understanding of international institutions and cooperation as well as of the evolution of the multilateral trade institution.

### COALITIONS AND LANGUAGE POLITICS

#### POLICY SHIFTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

By AMY H. LIU and JACOB I. RICKS

Why is it that some governments recognize only one language while others espouse multilingualism? Related, why are some governments able to shift language policies, and if there is a shift, what explains the direction? In this article, the authors argue that these choices are the product of coalitional constraints facing the government during critical junctures in history. During times of political change in the state-building process, the effective threat of an alternate linguistic group determines the emergent language policy. If the threat is low, the government moves toward monolingual policies. As the threat increases, however, the government is forced to co-opt the alternate linguistic group by shifting the policy toward a greater degree of multilingualism. The authors test this argument by examining the language policies for government services and the education system in three Southeast Asian countries (Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand).

## ASSOCIATIONAL NETWORKS AND WELFARE STATES IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, SOUTH KOREA, AND TAIWAN

By CHEOL-SUNG LEE

This article investigates the structures of civic networks and their roles in steering the political choices of party and union elites regarding the retrenchment or expansion of welfare states in four recently democratized developing countries. Utilizing coaffiliation networks built upon two waves of *World Values Surveys* and evidence from comparative case studies for Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan, the study develops two explanatory factors that account for variations in welfare politics: cohesiveness and embeddedness. In Argentina and, to a lesser degree, in Taiwan, party and union leaders' cohesive relationships, being disarticulated from the informal civic sphere, allowed them to conduct elite-driven social policy reforms from above, by launching radical neoliberal reforms (Argentina) or by developing a generous transfer-centered welfare state (Taiwan). In Brazil and South Korea, however, party and union leaders' durable solidarity embedded in wider civic communities enabled them to resist the retrenchment of welfare states (Brazil) or implement universal social policies (South Korea) based on bottom-up mobilization of welfare demands. This article demonstrates that elites in the formal sector make markedly different political choices when confronting economic crisis and democratic competition depending upon their organizational connections in formal and informal civic networks.

## IN SEARCH OF SOFT POWER

DOES FOREIGN PUBLIC OPINION MATTER FOR US FOREIGN POLICY?

By BENJAMIN E. GOLDSMITH and YUSAKU HORIUCHI

Does "soft power" matter in international relations? Specifically, when the United States seeks cooperation from countries around the world, do the views of their publics about US foreign policy affect the actual foreign policy behavior of these countries? The authors examine this question using multinational surveys covering fifty-eight countries, combined with information about their foreign policy decisions in 2003, a critical year for the US. They draw their basic conceptual framework from Joseph Nye, who uses various indicators of opinion about the US to assess US soft power. But the authors argue that his theory lacks the specificity needed for falsifiable testing. They refine it by focusing on foreign public opinion *about US foreign policy*, an underemphasized element of Nye's approach. Their regression analysis shows that foreign public opinion has a significant and large effect on troop commitments to the war in Iraq, even after controlling for various hard power factors. It also has significant, albeit small, effects on policies toward the International Criminal Court and on voting decisions in the UN General Assembly. These results support the authors' refined theoretical argument about soft power: public opinion about US foreign policy in foreign countries does affect their policies toward the US, but this effect is conditional on the salience of an issue for mass publics.