

Lasswell Panelists Consider Integrity of Democracies When Defense Dominates

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The chair of the Lasswell Symposium, Matthew Holden of the University of Virginia, pointed out that this year's theme—"The Garrison State Reconsidered"—holds special interest and relevance; for we live with high levels of concentration on defense, a condition that Harold Lasswell predicted would undermine the integrity of democratic states.

The panel participants featured two distinguished scholars, Richard Rosecrance of Cornell University, and Yehezkel Dror of Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Dror, APSA's Fulbright 40th Anniversary Distinguished Lecturer, focused on selective



Yehezkel Dror of Hebrew University discusses the garrison state at the Lasswell Symposium.



Richard Rosecrance of Cornell University offers the trading state as an alternative to the garrison state.

reconsiderations of Lasswell's garrison state in three areas: (1) methodological aspects; (2) substantive propositions; and (3) policy recommendations.

With respect to methodological issues, Dror suggested that constructs like the garrison state must be distinguished from concepts invented for the purposes of empirical testing or refutation. The garrison state basically involves a conjecture, a possibility or building blocks for thinking.

He also noted that Anglo-American political scientists have shied away from mass psychology, an element central to Lasswell's thinking, in their research. This tendency to avoid the psychological dimensions of politics stems from its doubtful empirical base as well as the pessimistic conclusions often generated by such studies. Dror argued that this avoidance leads to a blind spot, a failure fully to treat the potentials of politics.

With respect to Lasswell's key propositions, Dror identified two as central to the garrison state argument. First, there is the prediction that the threat of war would generate internal decay in democracies, that experts in violence would rise to the foreground as decisionmakers. *Secondly, there was a concern that*

democracies would suffer from handicaps in facing an external environment of threats, a world of violent competition.

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According to Dror, world history since World War I refutes Lasswell's contentions. Under conditions of war-like tension, no transformation of democratic societies has taken place, although some encroachment in terms of the emergence of a class of experts in violence in realms like intelligence, defense, and crisis management has occurred.

Dror argued that democracies can best be regarded as mixed regimes containing, even relying on, non-democratic institutions. In the United States this would include the Supreme Court; and in the case of defense, a non-democratic class of experts with considerable power.

Democracies do encounter strategic handicaps. Dror noted that they are less capable of surprise, risk taking, mobilizing the population, tolerating pain, and more inhibited from using morally reprehensible but useful weapons like gas warfare. On the other hand, democracies possess great assets in the areas of science and technology.

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Can democracies gear themselves to face adversity? In this area Dror offered several recommendations for protecting democracies against the dangers of the garrison state, including (1) universal military service a la Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and Israel, in order to prevent an abyss between those who protect the country and those who pay for it; (2)

integrating military and civilian elites by involving them in shared learning experiences; and (3) improving the population's ability to understand complex issues, especially defense issues.

According to Rosecrance, the characteristics of the garrison state include (1) the dominance of the state by specialists on violence; (2) fighting effectiveness as the measure of state policy; (3) emphasizing danger and vigilance; (4) establishing a duty to work, coupled with the abolition of unemployment; (5) punishing those who violate military discipline; (6) using drugs to deaden critical functions; (7) disseminating propaganda to keep morale high; (8) the growth of dictatorial processes as independent organizations are abolished; (9) seeking popular acceptance by flattening the income pyramid while maintaining a steep power pyramid; (10) state control over production; and (11) war scares or actual war to convince people to forego consumption and secure allegiance.

Rosecrance argued that we have overestimated the military threat to democracies, and, in the process of preparing for war, hurt our society by neglecting other values. Like Dror, Rosecrance noted that there was nothing like the garrison state in the world, although some elements of garrison states flourish in individual countries. Instead of the garrison state model, Rosecrance suggested that another construct—the trading state—more accurately captures contemporary reality.

He accounted for the absence of the garrison state in today's world by arguing that such a state cannot provide for basic values like safety, income, and deference. When Lasswell developed the garrison state idea in the 1930s, there was the possibility that a single large garrison state could be economically and militarily self-sufficient. But reciprocal influence and access rather than hierarchical control and sovereignty mark the advent of the trading state. And as the Soviet experience demonstrates, maximizing the values of modern technology and the total military state poses fundamental inconsistencies.

In the discussion that followed the formal

presentations, questions were raised concerning the garrison state's applicability to the third world. Both Dror and Rosecrance maintained that the military's

role in underdeveloped countries aimed more at sustaining regimes in power or in saving countries from political chaos than protection against external threat. □

Participation by Women in the 1986 Meeting Holds Constant

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The profile of participation by women at the 1986 convention could be summarized by the adage "one step forward, one step back." Women were doing better in 1986 than in 1985 as to their numbers and percentages as paper givers and discussants but not well in their having been selected as section heads and chairpersons.

	Section Heads		
	Total	Women	%
1986	24	7	29.2
1985	23	8	34.8
1984	20	6	30.0
1983	24	7	29.2
1982	19	5	26.3
1981	16	3	18.8
1980	18	3	16.7

	Paper Givers		
	Total	Women	%
1986	904	175	19.4
1985	966	149	15.4
1984	804	142	17.7
1983	730	120	17.4
1982	557	109	19.6
1981	520	98	18.8
1980	453	99	21.9

	Chairpersons		
	Total	Women	%
1986	237	38	16.0
1985	260	51	19.6
1984	215	44	20.5
1983	196	35	17.9
1982	163	22	13.5
1981	137	16	11.7
1980	139	29	20.9

	Discussants		
	Total	Women	%
1986	314	61	19.4
1985	320	52	16.3
1984	294	58	19.7
1983	272	50	18.4
1982	184	28	15.2
1981	161	28	17.4
1980	160	19	11.9



Virginia Sapiro of the University of Wisconsin-Madison chairs APSA's Committee on the Status of Women in the Profession.



Janet Clark of the University of Wyoming takes over as President of the Women's Caucus for Political Science.