

TOPICS OF ARISTOTLE'S *PROTREPTICUS* IN  
AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO  
THE TRANSMISSION OF CICERO AND THE  
CONTEXT OF THEIR USE

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*St. Augustine's knowledge of Aristotle was precarious and indirect. However, we find in his work traces of topics that seem to come from Aristotle's exoteric works, specifically the Protrepticus. These topics came to St. Augustine's knowledge through Cicero's Hortensius, as scholars already know. However, hitherto there has not been a study that jointly executes the following three tasks: analyze these topics systematically in order to discuss in a critical and updated way their nature and relevance; study what role Cicero played in their transmission; and examine St. Augustine's use of them in relation to the context in which he quotes them. I carry out this triple task in the present article.*

Augustine of Hippo's knowledge of Aristotle, his work, and his thought, was limited.<sup>1</sup> Regarding Aristotle, whom he mentions on few occasions, Augustine knew he was Plato's disciple and that he founded the Peripatetic school.<sup>2</sup> There is no evidence that he knew any more about the circumstances of his life. Augustine himself says to us in his *Confessions* that in his youth he read the *Categories* in a Latin translation entitled *Categoriae decem*<sup>3</sup> (*The Ten Categories*), a book he

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<sup>1</sup> For a good summary on the question of Augustine's knowledge of Aristotle, see G. C. Stead, "Aristoteles," in *Augustinus-Lexikon* (Basel and Stuttgart, 1986), 1:cols. 445–48; and M. W. Tkacz, "Aristotle," in *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia* (Cambridge, 1999), 57–59.

<sup>2</sup> Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 8.12, 9.4.

<sup>3</sup> Augustine, *Confessiones*, 4.16.28. Augustine knew a little Greek, but he did not seem to have the capacity to read Aristotle in his original language. Some authors, such as F. Bömer, P. Courcelle, H.-I. Marrou, and M. Testard, think that the Latin translation Augustine used was that of Marius Victorinus, although, according to L. Minio-Paluello, and supported by P. Hadot, this hypothesis is unlikely because there were several translations of the *Categories* available in Augustine's time, and he does not mention Marius Victorinus as the author of the version that he reads. See F. Bömer, *Der lateinische Neuplatonismus und Neupythagoreismus und Claudianus Mamertus in Sprache und Philosophie* (Leipzig, 1936), 87; P. Courcelle, *Late Latin Writers and Their Greek Sources* (Cambridge, MA, 1969), 168; H.-I. Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique*, 4th ed. (Paris, 1958), 34; M. Testard, *Saint Augustin et Cicéron*, vol. 1, *Cicéron dans la formation et l'oeuvre de Saint Augustin* (Paris, 1958), 10; L. Minio-Paluello, "The Text of the *Categoriae*: The Latin Tradition," *Classical Quarterly* 39 (1945): 63–74, at 66; P. Hadot, *Marius Victorinus: Recherches sur sa vie et ses oeuvres* (Paris, 1971), 188. Victorinus's translation no longer exists, and the only indications available in other works of his do not allow us to decide on this matter. On Aristotle's *Categories* and Augustine's use of this work in the *Confessions*, see D. K. House, "Manera de tratar

mentions in other instances throughout his writings. He used it, for example, in the treatise *De trinitate*<sup>4</sup> to demonstrate God's simple, absolute, and immutable nature, as well as the consubstantiality of the Persons of the Holy Trinity. Aristotelian categories were valued as a useful instrument in logical argumentation and dialectical debate. Augustine nevertheless continued to resist what he considered their improper use, especially where it led to (for him) heretical conclusions; he reproached Julian of Eclanum on this count several times.<sup>5</sup> It is possible, however, that Augustine also knew the work *On Interpretation*, translated into Latin by Marius Victorinus, but this is not certain.<sup>6</sup>

There is no evidence that Augustine had read any of Aristotle's other works.<sup>7</sup> However, we can find traces of Aristotelian ideas and topics of diverse origin and indirect transmission in his writings, the source of which in most cases is Cicero. Of these topics, we are especially interested in those that could have been treated in the *Protrepticus*, a work of exhortation to philosophy that Cicero used to write the *Hortensius*.<sup>8</sup>

These topics are already known. However, as far as I know, hitherto there has not been a study of them taking into consideration all of the three following aspects:

- 1) An analysis of these topics in order to discuss in a critical and updated way their nature and relevance.
- 2) An examination of the role that Cicero played in their transmission by studying the use he made of them in the *Hortensius*.<sup>9</sup> However, my

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Agustín a Aristóteles en el libro 4 de las Confesiones," *Augustinus* 40 (1995): 119–24; M. P. Foley, "Augustine, Aristotle, and the 'Confessions,'" *The Thomist* 67 (2003): 607–22.

<sup>4</sup> Augustine, *De trinitate*, 5.2.3–8.9, 7.5.10.

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, 1.4.12, 2.10.37, 5.14.51, 6.20.64, *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum*, 2.51. Julian himself (who was a Pelagian) makes the same charge against Augustine and calls him "Aristoteles Poenorum" (c. *Iul. imp.* 3.199).

<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., G. Combès, *Saint Augustin et la culture classique* (Paris, 1927), 14n11; Marrou, *Saint Augustin*, 34n7; and J. J. O'Donnell, *Augustine: Confessions*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1992), 2:264.

<sup>7</sup> He does seem to have read, however, the pseudo-Aristotelian *De mundo* in the Latin translation of Apuleius, whom Augustine considered to be the author of the work (civ. *Dei* 4.2).

<sup>8</sup> Cicero probably read the *Protrepticus* directly. O. Gigon, "Cicero und Aristoteles," *Hermes* 87 (1959): 143–62, at 144–46 and 154, demonstrates that Cicero depends on Hellenistic editions of Aristotle's works and specifically on exoteric writings such as the *Protrepticus* rather than on the extant *Corpus Aristotelicum*.

<sup>9</sup> Nowadays we cannot share the idea, held by P. Hartlich and popularized by E. Bignone and W. Jaeger, that this work was born as a kind of imitation of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*, whose topics, structure, and organization it followed: P. Hartlich, "De exhortationum a Graecis Romanisque scriptarum historia et indole," *Leipziger Studien zur klassischen Philologie* 11 (1889): 207–336; E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*

purpose is not to settle the issue of the dependence of the *Hortensius* on the *Protrepticus* or to what extent the *Hortensius* is inspired by the *Protrepticus* (an issue, as stated by a recent author,<sup>10</sup> still disputed).

- 3) An investigation of how Augustine adapted them to the context in which he quotes them.

That is the three-pronged task I set for myself in the present article.

Before I begin, I would like to clarify some points. Firstly, regarding Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, we cannot draw conclusions beyond any shadow of a doubt, given the scarcity of reliable testimonies and fragments that have reached us. I will nevertheless use Ingemar Düring's reconstruction of the *Protrepticus*, which in my opinion is the most reliable version we have to date, as a working instrument.<sup>11</sup>

Secondly, we can state something similar about Cicero's *Hortensius*, which has also come to us in a fragmentary state. However, in this case we are fortunate that

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(Milan, 2007; orig. publ. 1936), 82, 210, 339; and W. Jaeger, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development*, 2nd ed. (London, Oxford, and New York, 1962), 55, 63, 73. The author of a recent article even goes so far as to say that the *Hortensius* was a Latinized version of the *Protrepticus*: R. Trundle and J. Anoz, "Modalidades aristotélicas de San Agustín," *Augustinus* 42 (1997): 14. The *Hortensius* was inspired by the *Protrepticus* and it took several ideas and arguments in favor of philosophizing from it, but its formal structure and general purpose were different: see, e.g., W. G. Rabinowitz, *Aristotle's Protrepticus and the Sources of Its Reconstruction* (Berkeley, 1957); C. O. Brink, review of *L'Hortensius de Cicéron*, by M. Ruch, *Journal of Roman Studies* 51 (1961): 220–22; Gigon, "Cicero und Aristoteles," 154; A. Grilli, "Cicerone e l'Eudemo," *Parola del Passato* 17 (1962): 96; and H. Flashar et al., *Aristoteles: Werke in deutscher Übersetzung; Fragmente zu Philosophie, Poetik, Rhetorik* (Berlin, 2006): 120, 176. On the relationship between the *Hortensius* and the *Protrepticus*, and on the sources of the Ciceronian dialogues, see also H. Diels, "Zu Aristoteles' Protreptikos und Cicero's Hortensius," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 1 (1888): 477–97; and D. Turkowska, *L'Hortensius de Cicéron et le Protreptique d'Aristote* (Wrocław, 1965), especially 14–45.

<sup>10</sup> K. Schlapbach, "Hortensius," in *Augustinus-Lexikon* (Basel, 2006), 3:col. 426.

<sup>11</sup> I. Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction* (Gothenburg, 1961); and idem, *Der Protreptikos des Aristoteles* (Frankfurt am Main, 1969). This edition has been taken as a basis by subsequent ones, such as A. H. Chroust, *Aristotle: Protrepticus; A Reconstruction* (Notre Dame, 1964); E. Berti, *Aristotele: Protreptico; Esortazione alla filosofia* (Padua, 1967); or C. Megino, *Aristóteles: Protréptico; una exhortación a la filosofía* (Madrid, 2006). On other criteria, restrictive to excess, O. Gigon published this work within his compiled edition of Aristotle's fragments: *Aristotelis Opera*, vol. 3, *Librorum deperditorum fragmenta* (Berlin, 1987). G. Schneeweiss, *Aristoteles: Protreptikos – Hinführung zur Philosophie* (Darmstadt, 2005) proposes an alternative reconstruction, where he reorganizes the material and adds several more texts, especially of other works by Aristotle himself, although he probably makes a methodological error when he does not sort the texts, and as a result literal fragments get mixed with paraphrases, testimonies, and vestiges. I believe, however, that D. S. Hutchinson and M. R. Johnson, "Authenticating Aristotle's *Protrepticus*," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 29 (2005): 193–294 and H. Flashar, *Aristoteles*, are to be taken into account in order to correct and complement Düring's edition.

the reminiscences of the *Protrepticus* in Augustine's works belong to quotations explicitly ascribed to the *Hortensius*, or that can be easily attributable to this work, so that it is possible to regard these as reliable quotations from the *Hortensius*.<sup>12</sup> It is another question whether Augustine was aware that the passages of the *Hortensius* he mentioned could have been inspired by Aristotle's *Protrepticus*. It is not likely that he was aware of it, and it is even highly probable that he did not know of the existence of this Aristotelian work. Regardless, it has no influence on the fact that he used topics from it via the *Hortensius*, adapting them, no doubt, to his own philosophical and theological interests. It is necessary to take into account that, for Augustine, the value of the non-Christian, Greco-Roman philosophical tradition always had to be subordinated to the truths of the faith as stated in Holy Scripture. His use of Aristotle, Cicero, and other philosophers always depended on that premise.<sup>13</sup>

Further, it is also significant that most of the references to the *Hortensius* I discuss are direct quotations; this is not only of obvious importance for the reconstruction of the Ciceronian text but also helps establish the relationship between this and the *Protrepticus*, which seems to be the point of reference throughout. Augustine then, without being aware of it, provides evidence crucial to establishing the degree to which one work depends on the other,<sup>14</sup> and that must also be taken into account (although it is not my intention in this article to draw the pertinent conclusions about this dependence, but rather to clarify the nature and the

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<sup>12</sup> This is accepted by the three most recent editors of the *Hortensius*: M. Ruch, *L'Hortensius de Cicéron: Histoire et reconstitution* (Paris, 1958); A. Grilli, *M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius* (Milan, 1962); idem, *M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio* (Bologna, 2010); and L. Straume-Zimmermann, *Ciceros Hortensius* (Bern and Frankfurt, 1976). They unanimously admit the Augustinian quotations referred to as part of the work.

<sup>13</sup> I find very relevant in this regard the words of Tkacz, "Aristotle" (n. 1 above), 58: "In contrast to the generally anti-Aristotelian attitude among Latin Christian writers, some viewed Aristotle more favorably. Notable among these is Augustine, who not only considered him the source for the tradition of dialectical studies but also as part of the general pagan philosophical heritage available to Christian intellectuals. Accepting the Neoplatonic synthesis of Platonism and Aristotelianism into a single philosophy, Augustine understood the Peripatetic tradition as part of a Platonically oriented philosophy which can be put into service articulating the Christian faith." In that sense, and as this article tries to show, Grandgeorge's assertion that the influence of Aristotle on Augustine was virtually nil has no foundation. L. Grandgeorge, *Saint Augustin et le néo-platonisme* (Paris, 1896), 31.

<sup>14</sup> See, e.g., G. Lazzati, *L'Aristotele perduto e gli scrittori cristiani* (Milan, 1938), 44, who already noticed this fact. The relevance of the work of Augustine for the reconstruction of the *Protrepticus* and the *Hortensius* has been stressed by P. Valentin, who from the analysis of *Contra Academicos*, an exhortation to philosophy inspired by both works, has tried to deduce the plan and structure of these works. P. Valentin, "Un 'protreptique' conservé de l'Antiquité: le 'Contra Academicos' de saint Augustin," *Revue des sciences religieuses* 43 (1969): 1–26, 97–117.

path followed by some Aristotelian philosophical ideas reflected by Augustine, as well as to examine the use he makes of them).

## 1

The first relevant passage of the *Hortensius* is an extract cited in the *De trinitate* (14.9.12):

If we were allowed, when we departed from this life, to live an immortal life in the Isles of the Blessed, as legends tell, what need would we have of eloquence — if there would be no trials — or even of virtues themselves? For indeed, we would not need fortitude, for we would not be exposed to any toil or danger; nor justice, for there would be nothing of anybody else's to be desired; nor temperance to govern desires that would not exist. We would not even need prudence, for we would not be exposed to the choice between good and evil. We should be blessed, therefore, solely with the knowledge of nature and science by which alone also the life of the gods is to be praised. Hence we may deduce that everything else is subject to necessity, but only this one to will.<sup>15</sup>

Cicero refers here to the *topos* of life in the Isles of the Blessed<sup>16</sup> as a mythical example in order to point out, firstly, that happiness consists in the knowledge of nature and in the science by which the life of the gods is praised and, secondly, that that happy life (i.e., the life in the Isles of the Blessed), is accepted willingly, in contrast to what happens in the present life, in which the virtues of prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice are needed (to which Cicero, revealing his love of oratory, adds the virtue of eloquence<sup>17</sup>). Thereby the following concatenation of

<sup>15</sup> “Tullius in Hortensio dialogo disputans: Si nobis, inquit, cum ex hac vita migraverimus, in beatorum insulis immortale aevum, ut fabulae ferunt, degere liceret, quid opus esset eloquentia, cum iudicia nulla fierent, aut ipsis etiam virtutibus? nec enim fortitudine egeremus nullo proposito aut labore aut periculo, nec iustitia cum esset nihil quod adpetere alieni, nec temperantia quae regeret eas quae nullae essent libidines. nec prudentia quidem egeremus, nullo delectu proposito bonorum et malorum. una igitur essemus beati cognitione naturae et scientia, qua sola etiam deorum est vita laudanda. ex quo intellegi potest cetera necessitatis esse, unum hoc voluntatis.” Cic. *Hort. fr.* 92 Ruch = 110 Grilli = 101 St.-Zimm. Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.

<sup>16</sup> The mythical motif of the Isles of the Blessed, seen in Hesiod (*Op.* 167–73) for the first time, is introduced into philosophical literature by Plato, who refers to it on several occasions as the last place of residence for eminent men who deserve to be honored for their life, philosophers being among them (see e.g. Plato's *Symposium* 179e–180b, *Gorgias* 523b, 526c, *Republic* 519c, 540b). The use of this mythical motif is repeated in Aristotle (Düring, *Protrepticus*, B 43, *Politics*, 1334a 22–40), from whom Cicero could have taken it, as we will see.

<sup>17</sup> For eloquence owes its origin to human moral depravity, which it tries to mend in the sphere of the law: see Ruch, *L'Hortensius de Cicéron*, 162. It is also possible, however, that the

ideas can be detected: virtues are subordinated to the knowledge of nature, nature being conceived in the widest sense; this knowledge is regarded as a source of happiness,<sup>18</sup> which is an end in and of itself, and therefore subject to choice, but not to necessity, unlike virtues, which are necessary for an ulterior end; finally, it is suggested that this cognitive happiness makes human life similar to that of the gods.<sup>19</sup> The whole passage, as the *De trinitate* context suggests, seems to have a protreptical purpose: encouraging philosophizing, since philosophy is the activity of the happy life. In this way, Cicero gathers the inheritance of previous philosophers who thought that the happy life consisted of knowledge and science.<sup>20</sup>

These two terms, knowledge (“cognition”) and science (“scientia”), are also quoted together in a parallel passage from *De finibus* (5.18.48–19.53), wherein Cicero illustrates man’s innate love of learning and knowing (“cognitionis amor et scientiae”) with examples taken from daily life, from literature, and from previous philosophers, such as Pythagoras, Plato, and Democritus. Finally, he refers to the *topos* of the Isles of the Blessed:

And so, the ancient philosophers picture what the life of the wise will be in the Isles of the Blessed, who, released from all anxiety, needing none of the necessary equipment or accessories of life, think about doing nothing else but spend their whole time upon inquiry and learning about the knowledge of nature.<sup>21</sup>

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inclusion of eloquence had something to do with the fact that Hortensius, the interlocutor of the Ciceronian dialogue, considered it to be the supreme good: see Jaeger, *Aristotle*, 73.

<sup>18</sup> See Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, 5.24.68–25.71, wherein Cicero, speaking about the conditions required by the soul of the wise to enjoy the happy life, refers to, firstly, “the knowledge of the reality and the explanation of nature” (“cognitione rerum et explicatione naturae”), which is understood above all as the contemplation of the movements of stars and an investigation of the principles of reality. Once the wise man has contemplated all these things, he takes into consideration the human and worldly things with great peace of mind, from which the knowledge of virtue originates. See also *Republic*, 1.17.28.

<sup>19</sup> See, e.g., J. Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles* (Berlin, 1863), 120; Ruch, *L’Hortensius de Cicéron*, 161.

<sup>20</sup> See Augustine *De trinitate* 14.9.12 (this is the continuation of Cicero’s quoted passage): “Thus, when he praised philosophy, that great orator [Cicero], recalling what he had received from the philosophers and explaining it in a clear and persuasive manner, declared that only in this life, which we see filled with tribulations and delusions, are all four virtues necessary; that there will be none of them, however, when we have departed from this life [“cum ex hac vita emigraverimus”], provided only that we are permitted to live there where we can live blessedly; but that good minds are blessed merely by learning [“cognition”] and knowing [“scientia”], that is, by contemplating the nature [“contemplatione naturae”], than which there is none better and more amiable.” S. McKenna, trans., *St. Augustine: The Trinity*, The Fathers of the Church 45 (Washington, DC, 1963), 429.

<sup>21</sup> “Ac veteres quidem philosophi in beatorum insulis fingunt qualis futura sit vita sapientium, quos cura omni liberatos, nullum necessarium vitae cultum aut paratum

This text helps us to understand some points in the passage from the *Hortensius*. First, when Cicero talks about the knowledge and science of nature, he seems to refer to a continuous, diligent, and disinterested search for the truth, not to its definitive possession, which effectively reflects his Academic skepticism.<sup>22</sup> Second, the love of the intellectual activity is something innate and undertaken for its own sake, without any subsequent purpose.<sup>23</sup> And third, what characterizes wise men is not their desire to learn, but the object of this desire, that is, the truth about nature, which is genuinely what makes them happy.

When Cicero mentions the ancient philosophers who imagine life on the Isles of the Blessed, he refers to the same ones who tell the legends (“fabulae”) gathered by him in the *Hortensius*, namely, those who identified happiness with knowledge and science.<sup>24</sup> These philosophers were most likely Plato and Aristotle, who taught that the happy life consisted of exercising the best virtues and of contemplative life and, furthermore, mentioned the Isles of the Blessed as the final residence of men eminent for their virtues.<sup>25</sup>

However, the immediate source of the ideas reflected in the passages from the *Hortensius* is Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, as has been recognized, in general, in modern times.<sup>26</sup> In this work, Aristotle did indeed also refer to the *topos* of the Isles of the Blessed, which was introduced as a mythical example to support an argument in favor of the goodness of wisdom and knowledge. Both were inherently desirable, not for the sake of something else like the necessary things. In these Isles there is indeed no need of anything, nor can one get any benefit from anything other than the exercise of thought and contemplation, which is what wisdom entails:

To think wisely (φρονεῖν) and to have knowledge (γυγνώσκειν) is in itself desirable (αἰρετὸν καθ' αὐτὸ) for men, for it is not possible to live a human life without both these things. . . . To seek from all knowledge a

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requirientes, nihil aliud esse acturos putant, nisi ut omne tempus inquirendo ac discendo in naturae cognitione consumant.” Cicero, *De finibus*, 5.19.53.

<sup>22</sup> See Grilli, *M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio* (n. 12 above), 247–48.

<sup>23</sup> The connection between the innate love for knowing and the intellectual character of the happy life is repeated in *Tusc.* 1.44, where Cicero gives as cause of the purely intellectual character of the happy life the natural and innate desire for knowing the truth.

<sup>24</sup> See n. 20 above.

<sup>25</sup> See n. 16 above.

<sup>26</sup> See, e.g., Bernays, *Die Dialoge*, 121; V. Rose, *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta*, 3rd ed. (Leipzig, 1886), 68; R. Walzer, *Aristotelis dialogorum fragmenta* (Florence, 1934), 52; Jaeger, *Aristotle*, 72–73; D. Ross, *Aristotelis fragmenta selecta* (Oxford, 1955), 45–46; or Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus* (n. 11 above), 211–12 (who also adds later on as a possible source *EN* 1178b7–23). Turkowska, *L'Hortensius de Cicéron* (n. 9 above), 23–24, and Grilli, *M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius* (n. 12 above), 174, idem, *M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio*, 248–50, are of the same opinion. Others, however, are more skeptical, like Gigon, *Aristotelis Opera* (n. 11 above), fr. 824.

result other than itself, and to require that it must be useful, is the demand of someone completely ignorant of the distance that from the start separates things good from things necessary, for indeed they differ greatly. The things that we love for the sake of something else and without which life is impossible ought to be called “necessary” . . . , while those that we love for themselves, even if nothing else follows from them, ought to be called “good” in the strict sense. . . .

Best of all one would see the truth of what we are saying if someone carried us in thought to the Isles of the Blessed, for in that place there would be no need of anything, nor profit from any other thing; only thought and contemplation (τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν) would remain, which even now we describe as the free life. If this is true, would not any one of us be rightly ashamed if when granted the possibility to live in the Isles of the Blessed, he were by his own fault unable to do so? Therefore the reward given to men who pursue knowledge is not to be despised, nor slight the good that comes from it, for as, according to the wise among the poets, we receive the rewards of justice in Hades, so, it would seem, we reap those of wisdom in the Isles of the Blessed.<sup>27</sup>

Possibly, Aristotle added that this philosophical way of life, characteristic of wise men, was the most similar to the gods’ way of life.<sup>28</sup> That argument was situated within a wider context, wherein the reasoning offered for philosophizing was the

<sup>27</sup> Arist. *Protr.* B 41–43 Düring (= *Iambl. Protr.* 41.7–9, 52.16–23, 53.2–15 Pistelli): τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ γινώσκειν ἐστὶν αἰρετὸν καθ’ αὐτὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (οὐδὲ γὰρ ζῆν δυνατόν ὡς ἀνθρώποις ἄνευ τούτων). . . . Τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν ἀπὸ πάσης ἐπιστήμης ἕτερόν τι γενέσθαι καὶ δεῖν χρησίμην αὐτὴν εἶναι, παντάπασιν ἀγνοοῦντός τινός ἐστιν ὅσον διέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα· διαφέρει γὰρ πλείστον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δι’ ἕτερον ἀγαπώμενα τῶν πραγμάτων, ὧν ἄνευ ζῆν ἀδύνατον, ἀναγκαῖα . . . λεκτέον, ὅσα δὲ δι’ αὐτά, κἂν ἀποβαίνειν μηδὲν ἕτερον, ἀγαθὰ κυρίως. . . . Ἴδοι δ’ ἂν τις ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀληθῆ ταῦτα λέγομεν, εἴ τις ἡμᾶς οἶον εἰς μακάρων νήσους τῆ διανοία κομίσειεν. ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὐδενὸς χρεία οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τινὸς ὄφελος ἂν γένοιτο, μόνον δὲ καταλείπεται τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν, ὅπερ καὶ νῦν ἐλευθέρων φαμεν βίον εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, πῶς οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιτο δικαίως ὅστις ἡμῶν ἐξουσίας γενομένης ἐν μακάρων οἰκῆσαι νήσους ἀδύνατος εἴη δι’ ἑαυτόν; οὐκοῦν οὐ μεμπτός ὁ μισθός ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐδὲ μικρὸν τὸ γινόμενον ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ἀγαθόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ὡς φασιν οἱ σοφοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ἐν Ἄιδου κομιζόμεθα τὰς δωρεάς, οὕτως τῆς φρονήσεως ἐν μακάρων νήσους, ὡς ἔοικεν.

<sup>28</sup> That is what can be deduced from Cicero’s testimony (*fin.* 5.11), which, as Düring maintains in *Aristotle’s Protrepticus*, 44–45 (Düring lists it as test. A 7), can be referred to the *Protrepticus*: “The way of life that they [sc. Aristotle and Theophrastus] most commended was one spent in quiet contemplation [“contemplatio”] and study [“cognitio”]. This is the most god-like of lives, and so most worthy of the wise person. Some of their most noble and distinguished writing is to be found on this theme.” J. Annas, ed., *Cicero: On Moral Ends*, trans. R. Woolf (Cambridge and New York, 2001), 121. Düring maintains that the words *contemplatio* and *cognitio* seem an echo of διανοεῖσθαι and θεωρεῖν from the fragment of Aristotle.

fact that it is useful and desirable in itself, and therefore it is not just good, but the greatest of all goods.<sup>29</sup>

We see, therefore, that the same topics we find in the *Hortensius* passage are present: reference to the Isles of the Blessed as a mythical example to illustrate the superiority of theoretical knowledge over all other human activity, including the exercise of virtues; underlining this superiority with the argument that said knowledge is desirable in itself (αἰρετὸν καθ' αὐτὸ), namely, it is sought only voluntarily (“unum hoc voluntatis”), without any ulterior end; the presentation of the happy life as an activity (not as a state) and its identification with the exercise of thinking applied to knowledge alone, which is denominated with a very similar hendiadys (τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν, which corresponds closely to “cognitio et scientia”).<sup>30</sup> There are also differences, of course, pointed out by Grilli,<sup>31</sup> but they are variations of detail that do not contradict the fundamental parallelism that makes the Aristotelian passage the textual referent of the Ciceronian text.

In the passage from Cicero, the traditional image of the Isles of the Blessed is also exploited for its exemplary effect. It shows the same eagerness to distinguish what is necessary from what is good by subordinating the former to the latter, the same will to urge knowledge as the object of the happy life, and the same protreptical intention for the exhortation to philosophy. However, Cicero prefers to put special emphasis on the role that ethical virtues play in the present life and their insignificance for the ideal of a contemplative life, similar in its happiness to that of the gods, whereas Aristotle does not compare knowledge and wisdom, characteristic of a happy life, with the ethical virtues. On the contrary, he presents them as the only activity worthy of being deemed blissful.

In this sense, Cicero also seems to draw inspiration from a passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics*,<sup>32</sup> wherein Aristotle, in order to illustrate the conclusion that perfect happiness lies in contemplative activity, demonstrates that this is the only activity to be attributable to the gods by means of the reduction to the absurd of the alternative thesis, which is to make happiness lie in the exercise of the ethical virtues.<sup>33</sup> Cicero, as we have already seen, repeats the same *topos*

<sup>29</sup> See Arist. *Protr.* B 40–42 D. (= Iambl. *Protr.* 39.20–40.1, 41.6–15, 52.16–53.2 P.)

<sup>30</sup> This textual parallelism is shown by Grilli, *M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio*, 105, 249, who also points out the correspondence between ἐξουσία and *liceret*, extended to οἰκῆσαι and “degree,” and, of course, the one between ἀναγκαῖα and *cetera necessitatis*.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 248–49. Grilli talks, for example, about the *mise en scène*, the vision of the Isles of the Blessed, the underlying approach, and the reference to the virtues.

<sup>32</sup> As it has already been pointed out by Turkowska, *L'Hortensius de Cicéron*, 24–25 and Grilli, *M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio*, 250.

<sup>33</sup> “But that perfect happiness is a contemplative activity will appear from the following consideration as well. We assume the gods to be above all other beings blessed and happy; but what sort of actions must we assign to them? Acts of justice? Will not the gods seem absurd if they make contracts and return deposits, and so on? Acts of a brave man, then, confronting

in the work *De finibus* with an end similar to that of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* passage: to show that the contemplative life has to be the one characteristic of the happy life, since this is the only life possible in a place prototypical for the ideal life, that is, the Isles of the Blessed. All this would indicate, as Düring suggests,<sup>34</sup> that Aristotle himself could have used the same *topos* in different works with a similar intention<sup>35</sup> — although he stressed different aspects of the issue — and that Cicero could have known both passages and could have drawn his inspiration from them, in a free manner adapted to his own interests. We do not have enough information to assert, as Jaeger<sup>36</sup> does, that the Iamblichus text, from which the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* passage is taken, had summarized the original content, omitting the exclusion of the ethical virtues in the supreme state of happiness characteristic of the contemplative life, whereas the *Hortensius*, which does refer to them, would reflect with more exactitude the tenor of the *Protrepticus* text. The passage quoted from the *Ethics* cannot be offered as proof, contrary to Jaeger's pretensions, for there is no reason to suppose that Aristotle drew his inspiration from the *Protrepticus* when he wrote it, instead of using a parallel argument to support a similar thesis — that is, the superiority of intellectual knowledge as the object of a happy life.

As for the use Augustine makes of Cicero's words, the former adapts them from the protreptical context wherein they were written to another one of a theological character, where the aim is to elucidate whether the four cardinal virtues — prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice — will disappear in the future life. Augustine accepts from Cicero both that those four virtues are necessary in the present life and that happiness lies in the knowledge and contemplation of nature, although in the Christian mind of the saint "nature" refers to a

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dangers and running risks because it is noble to do so? Or liberal acts? To whom will they give? It will be strange if they are really to have money or anything of the kind. And what would their temperate acts be? Is not such praise tasteless, since they have no bad appetites? If we were to run through them all, the circumstances of action would be found trivial and unworthy of gods. Still, every one supposes that they live and therefore that they are active; we cannot suppose them to sleep like Endymion. Now if you take away from a living being action, and still more production, what is left but contemplation? Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness." *Aristotle: Nichomachean Ethics*, trans. W. D. Ross (Oxford, 2009), 1178b 7–23 (p. 197).

<sup>34</sup> Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus*, 211.

<sup>35</sup> And even with a different purpose, as it happens in *Politics* 1334a28–34, where Aristotle mentions the Isles of the Blessed again, but this time in order to describe them as the place where his inhabitants are more in need of philosophy (φιλοσοφία), prudence (σοφροσύνη), and justice (δικαιοσύνη), for they are necessary in order to prevent the abundance of the goods they enjoy turning them to pride.

<sup>36</sup> Jaeger, *Aristotle*, 72–74. Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus*, 211, for example, denies his thesis.

supreme divine nature that creates all the other natures.<sup>37</sup> Augustine denies, however, that those four virtues were unnecessary in an ideal happy life. Quite the opposite, he admits that they can survive in the happiness of the eternal life as long as they are not understood according to the actions characteristic of them in this life, but only as vestiges present in memory that will be known and loved, forming in the soul a sort of image of the Holy Trinity, comprising memory, knowledge, and will.<sup>38</sup>

## 2

The second passage that Augustine quoted from the *Hortensius*, and wherein we can see Aristotelian traces, is in his work *Contra Iulianum* (4.15.78):

Those offenses and miseries of human life sometimes cause that those ancient seers or interpreters of the divine mind who transmit the sacred rites and initiations, who said that we are born to atone with punishment for the crimes committed in a previous life, appear to have seen something, and that it is true what we read in Aristotle, that we suffer a punishment similar to that of those who, in times past, when they fell into the hands of Etruscan pirates, were murdered with ingenious cruelty: their bodies, the living with the dead, were tied face-to-face as close as possible; thus our souls, bonded to their bodies, are like the living bonded to the dead.<sup>39</sup>

This passage belongs to the final part of the Ciceronian dialogue, wherein the vanity and misery of human life — attached to the passions of the body and origin of the evils of man — are mentioned in distinct contrast with a philosophical life consecrated to the knowledge of nature and the exercise of virtues. That

<sup>37</sup> See H. Hagendahl, *Augustine and the Latin Classics*, 2 vols. (Gothenburg, 1967), 2:495.

<sup>38</sup> See Aug. *Trin.* 14.9.12: “And so these works of the virtues, which are necessary for this mortal life, like the faith to which they must be referred, will be reckoned among the things that have passed; and they form one trinity now, when we hold on to them as present, contemplate them, and love them; they will form another trinity then, when we shall find that they no longer are, but have been, by means of some traces of their passing which they have left in the memory, because even then there will be a trinity when that trace, of whatever sort it may be, will be retained in the memory, will be truly known, and both of these will be joined together by the will as a third.” McKenna, *The Trinity* (n. 20 above), 430.

<sup>39</sup> “Ex quibus humanae vitae erroribus et aerumnis fit ut interdum veteres illi sive vates sive in sacris initiisque tradendis divinae mentis interpretes, qui nos ob aliqua scelera suscepta in vita superiore poenarum luendarum causa natos esse dixerunt, aliquid vidisse videantur verumque sit illud quod est apud Aristotelem, simili nos affectos esse supplicio atque eos qui quondam, cum in praedonum Etruscorum manus incidissent, crudelitate excogitata necabantur, quorum corpora viva cum mortuis, adversa adversis accommodata quam aptissime colligabantur: sic nostros animos cum corporibus copulatos ut vivos cum mortuis esse coniunctos.” Cic. *Hort. fr.* 85 Ruch = 112 Grilli = 99 St.-Zimm.

contrast, based on the opposition between the immortal and divine soul, rational principle and source of wisdom, and the mortal body, cause of limitations, errors, and vices, is illustrated here by a mythical explanation and a historical simile. Both the mythical explanation, according to which the present life is a divine punishment for the offenses committed in a previous life, and the historical simile (the existence of the soul in the body is like the torture the Etruscans inflicted upon their prisoners, consisting of tying the living face-to-face with the dead) achieve the same purpose: the undervaluing of the present life with all its superficiality, futility, and transitoriness, as a way of extolling, by contrast, an alternative way of life based on knowledge and wisdom so that it can be presented as a superior, divine way of life and, therefore, worthy of being lived.

Cicero's text, with both its mythical explanation and its historical example, is based on a passage of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* that must also have been, like the Ciceronian passage, part of the conclusion of the work, wherein the reference was introduced to the rites that taught that life is the result of a punishment for great offenses committed in the long distant past, and also the simile that illustrates the ordeal of the Etruscan pirates (although Cicero names only Aristotle in relation to the latter).<sup>40</sup> The motivation for these references was the same: to extol the philosophical life by contrast, inasmuch as it corresponds to the only things immortal and divine in man, namely, reason (νοῦς) and wisdom (φρόνησις).<sup>41</sup> Aristotle's text is as follows:

Which of us, looking to these facts, would think himself happy and blessed if all of us are from the very beginning (as those who chant initiations say) shaped by nature as though for punishment? For the ancients say that this is divine, to assert that the soul suffers punishment and that we live for the atonement of great offenses. For, indeed, the marriage of the soul with the body looks very much like this. For as the Etruscans are said often to torture captives by chaining dead bodies face-to-face with the living, fitting part to part, so the soul seems to be extended throughout and affixed to all the sensitive members of the body.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>40</sup> According to Lactantius (*Inst.* 3.18.18), Cicero had already stated this same doctrine in the *Consolatio* to his daughter Tullia. The *Protrepticus* as the origin of the idea that life is a punishment for old offenses is also recognized by K. Schlapbach, "Hortensius" (n. 10 above), col. 432.

<sup>41</sup> See Arist. *Protr.* B 108 D. (= Iambl. *Protr.* 48.9–13 P): "Mankind has nothing worthy of consideration as being divine or blessed, except what there is in us of reason (νοῦς) and wisdom (φρόνησις); this alone of our possessions seems to be immortal, this alone to be divine." Düring, *Protrepticus*, 91. See also Turkowska, *L'Hortensius de Cicéron*, 34.

<sup>42</sup> Arist. *Protr.* B 106–07 D. (= Iambl. *Protr.* 47.21–48.9 P): τίς ἂν οὖν εἰς ταῦτα βλέπων οἷοιτο εὐδαιμῶν εἶναι καὶ μακάριος, οἱ πρῶτον εὐθύς φύσει συνέσταμεν, καθάπερ φασὶν οἱ τὰς τελευτὰς λέγοντες, ὥσπερ ἂν ἐπὶ τιμωρία πάντες; τοῦτο γὰρ θεῖος οἱ ἀρχαιότεροι λέγουσι τὸ φάναρ διδόναι τὴν ψυχὴν τιμωρίαν καὶ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ κολάσει μεγάλων τινῶν ἀμαρτημάτων.

We can see indeed the same description of life as a punishment, although Aristotle specifies that it is not man as such but his soul that lives, punished, incarnated in a body. We can also see the attribution of that doctrine to “those who chant initiations,” who would take it from “more ancient” authors, in a clear reference to the officiating priests of the Orphic rites<sup>43</sup> and the writers from whom they took their doctrines. These writers were authors of theogonies and cosmogonies attributed to the mythical Orpheus,<sup>44</sup> wherein it was taught that the human soul lived yoked to the body as if the latter were a grave as punishment for ancient offenses.<sup>45</sup> These offenses, according to some testimonies,<sup>46</sup> were identified with the crime committed by the Titans — ancestors of men in the Orphic myth — against the god Dionysus. Cicero paraphrases Aristotle, adding names such as “ancient seers” and “interpreters of the divine mind” for those Orphic authors, which seems to be a

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πάνυ γὰρ ἡ σύζευξις τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς. ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Τυρρηνίᾳ φασὶ βρασιλεύειν πολλακίς τοὺς ἀλισκομένους προσδεσμεύοντας κατ' ἀντικρὺ τοῖς ζῶσι νεκροὺς ἀντιπροσώπους ἕκαστον πρὸς ἕκαστον μέρος προσαρμόττοντας, οὕτως ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ διατετάσθαι καὶ προσκεκολληθῆσθαι πᾶσι τοῖς αἰσθητικοῖς τοῦ σώματος μέλεσιν. I accept the common opinion that this passage comes from the *Protrepticus*. There are authors who have held that this fragment comes from the dialogue *Eudemus*, a lost work of Aristotle's youth: see, e.g., Gigon, “Prolegomena to an Edition of the *Eudemus*,” in *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century*, ed. I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen (Gothenburg, 1960), 27–28; Grilli, “Cicerone e l'Eudemo,” 114–16; J. Bruntschwig, “Aristote et les pirates tyrrhéniens (A propos des fragments 60 Rose du *Protreptique*),” *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* 153 (1963): 171–90.

<sup>43</sup> See Plato, *Phaedo* 69c, wherein there is a reference to these officiating priests as “those who instituted the initiations” (οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες), terms similar to those Aristotle uses.

<sup>44</sup> It is said of Orpheus that it was he who introduced the initiation rites (τελεταί) amongst the Greeks (Ephor. *FGrHist* 70 F 104 ap. D. S. 5.64.4 = *Orph. Fr.* 519 Bernabé) and that he was an officiating priest of mystery rites (Strab. VII fr. 18).

<sup>45</sup> See Plato, *Cratylus* 400c, *Meno* 81b, *Phaedo* 62b and *Schol. ad loc.* (10 Greene), *Gorgias* 493a. The terminology that Aristotle uses to refer to this Orphic doctrine reminds one of the terminology Plato uses in some passages wherein the same doctrine is referred to, as, e.g., in the *Seventh Letter* (335a), wherein the idea that we must “pay with the greatest of punishments” (τίθειν τὰς μεγίστας τιμωρίας) is attributed to the “ancient sacred tales”; or in *Cratylus* (400c), wherein the idea that the body is the enclosure where the soul “pays its penalty” (δικτὴν διδούσης) is explicitly applied to Orpheus and his followers. On the Orphic references in the Aristotelian passage, see, e.g., J. Pépin, “La légende orphique du supplice tyrrhéniens,” in *L'art des confins: mélanges offerts à Maurice de Gandillac*, ed. A. Cazenave and J. F. Lyotard (Paris, 1985), 387–406; É. Des Places, *Jamblique: Protreptique* (Paris, 1989), 78n1; A. Bernabé, “Platone e l'orfismo,” in *Destino e salvezza: Tra culti pagani e gnosi cristiana: Itinerari storico-religiosi sulle orme di Ugo Bianchi*, ed. G. Sfameni Gasparro (Cosenza, 1998), 76; P. F. Beatrice, “Le corps-cadavre et le supplice des pirates tyrrhéniens,” in *Kêpoi: De la religion à la philosophie: Mélanges offerts à André Motte*, ed. E. Delruelle and V. Pirenne-Delforge (Liège, 2001), 269–83; and C. Megino, “Aristóteles y el Liceo ante el orfismo,” in *Orfeo y la tradición órfica: Un reencuentro*, ed. A. Bernabé and F. Casadesús (Madrid, 2008), 2: 1296–98.

<sup>46</sup> See, e.g., Xenocrates, fr. 219, M. Isnardi Parente, ed., *Senocrate-Ermodoro* (Naples, 1982), 132; and *D. Chr.* 30.10.

reminiscence of a fragment by Philolaus quoted by Clement of Alexandria that says:

The ancient theologians and seers also give testimony of it: in order to comply with certain punishment, the soul is yoked to the body and is buried in it as though in a sepulcher.<sup>47</sup>

The expression “ancient theologians and seers” is a clear reference to Orpheus and the literature attributed to him.<sup>48</sup> It is possible that Aristotle quoted Philolaus, or at least used a similar terminology in the *Protrepticus* (we know that Iamblichus, through whom we know this work, had a tendency to summarize and adapt the text that he quoted) and that Cicero reflected that terminology if it conformed to his own vocabulary and style.<sup>49</sup> Cicero seems to be less faithful when asserting that the punishment man is to face is to atone for offenses committed in a previous life (“suscepta in vita superiore”), not for “great offenses” as Aristotle declares. In this case it seems that Cicero paraphrases, trusting in certain knowledge of the Orphic doctrines, according to which the original sin of the Titans was transmitted to the human souls, who had to go through a cycle of successive reincarnations to atone for that innate stain.

The fragment of Aristotle also shows that Cicero adopted the reference to the *topos* of the Etruscan pirates’ torture and its moral and anthropological interpretation in quite a faithful manner and within the same context.<sup>50</sup>

Augustine, for his part, quotes the fragment of Cicero with other ends and within a different context. Augustine brings up this passage from the *Hortensius* because of its similarity to the Christian doctrine of original sin as a source of evil

<sup>47</sup> Philol. 44 B 14 Diels-Kranz (= Clem. Al., *Strom.* 3.3.17): μαρτυρούνται δὲ καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ θεόλογοι τε καὶ μάντιες, ὡς διὰ τινος τιμωρίας ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι συνέζευκται καὶ καθάπερ ἐν σήματι τούτῳ τέθειται.

<sup>48</sup> We can find the description of Orpheus as a “theologian” in several authors, Aristotle himself being one of them. Orpheus being considered as a “seer” is found in Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 F 76.

<sup>49</sup> We cannot accept Ruch’s assertion that Cicero would have quoted Aristotle through Posidonius because we have no testimony by Posidonius that could corroborate such an assertion: see M. Ruch, *L’Hortensius de Cicéron* (n. 12 above), 156. As Brink in his review of Ruch’s work claimed, nothing indicates an intermediate source, and Reinhardt already remarked that the following series is false: Plato, Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*, Posidonius, Cicero’s *Hortensius*. Brink, review of *L’Hortensius* (n. 9 above), 221; K. Reinhardt, *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumwissenschaft* 22, 1 (1953), col. 768.

<sup>50</sup> The same *topos* on the Etruscan pirates also appears in Servius, *Commentarii in Aeneidem*, 8.497 (who takes it from Cicero) and in Valerius Maximus, 9.2.10. On said *topos*, see, e.g., J. Brunshwig, “Aristote et les pirates tyrrhéniens,” 171–90; J. Pépin, “La légende orphique du supplice tyrrhénien,” 387–406; P. F. Beatrice “Le corps-cadavre,” 278–83; A. P. Bos, “Aristotle on the Etruscan Robbers: A Core Text of ‘Aristotelian Dualism,’” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 41 (2003): 289–306.

in man and in particular to the idea that human life, full of deception and misery, owes its condition to a divine judgment that decreed a punishment for men for their first sin.<sup>51</sup> The reason for the use of a pagan author as an example that, from among ancient philosophers, doctrines close to the Christian faith can be extracted is to be found within the context of the polemic that Augustine holds against the thesis of the Pelagian Julian of Eclanum in favor of considering corporeal pleasure and concupiscence of the flesh as good. In order to support this thesis, Julian had quoted several pagan Greek philosophers in relation to his opinions on natural causes, which he even preferred to those of his Christian adversaries, such as Augustine.<sup>52</sup> However, he had avoided quoting philosophers who dealt with ethical issues because the majority of them were against considering the pleasures of the body as good. Augustine reproaches him for this peculiarity and replies to Julian himself by quoting one of the philosophers opposed to pleasures — Cicero — with the intention of proving that even a pagan author is closer to the orthodox Christian doctrine (which considers corporeal pleasure and concupiscence of the flesh as an evil derived from the original sin) than Julian himself in his defense of the goodness of pleasures.<sup>53</sup> Therefore Augustine uses Aristotelian ideas of Orphic origin that are expounded in Cicero to support a thesis of ethical and anthropological character which is of diverse origin and an object of theological polemic.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>51</sup> “It seems significant that some of them approximated the Christian Faith when they perceived that this life, which is replete with deception and misery, came into existence only by divine judgment, and they attributed justice to the Creator by whom the world was made and is administered. How much better than you and nearer the truth in their opinions about the generation of man are those whom Cicero names in the last part of the *Hortensius*, who seemed to be drawn and compelled by the very evidence of things.” Aug. *c. Iul.* 4.15.78 (trans. M. A. Schumacher, *Saint Augustine: Against Julian* [New York, 1957], 234). However, Augustine rejects the idea that the soul is embodied as a punishment for previously committed wrongs. See *Gn. litt.* 6.9.15 (K. Schlapbach, *Augustin: Contra Academicos [vel de Academicis]*, Buch 1 [Berlin and New York, 2003], 31n8). For Augustine’s critique of reincarnation as punishment, see, e.g., G. O’Daly, *Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987), 71–73.

<sup>52</sup> Aug. *c. Iul.* 4.15.75.

<sup>53</sup> “Did not the philosophers who thought these things perceive much more clearly than you the heavy yoke upon the children of Adam, and the power and justice of God, though not aware of the grace given through the Mediator for the purpose of delivering men? Following your suggestion, then, I have found in the writings of the Gentile philosophers a teaching that can justly be preferred to you, although you, who could find no such thing in them and were not willing to hold your peace, were the occasion of my discovering matter to be used against you.” *Ibid.*, 4.15.78; trans. Schumacher, 235.

<sup>54</sup> Augustine, however, was not the first Christian author to do something similar in perceiving the doctrinal parallelism between the content of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*’s passage and the Christian conception of human life as a punishment resulting from original sin. Before him Clement of Alexandria already made reference to that parallelism in the following terms: “For that wicked reptile monster, by his enchantments, enslaves and plagues

The next passage where Cicero could be acting as intermediary between Aristotle and St. Augustine is more questionable. Augustine, in a context where he comments upon John's sentence "We will be like him, for we will see him just as he is,"<sup>55</sup> considering it as the announcement of the beatific vision that we will have after the resurrection of the flesh, quotes a passage from the *Hortensius* wherein he sees a reflection of a similar thought applied to contemplative wisdom, which Augustine himself identifies with the wisdom of the divine:

Upon recommending this contemplative wisdom, which I believe is properly called wisdom in the Sacred Scriptures, as distinct at least from the science of man, which not only does not belong to him, but comes from him by whose participation the rational and intellectual mind can become wise, Cicero says at the end of the *Hortensius*: "For us, who day and night consider these things and sharpen our understanding, which is the eye of the mind, taking care that it not ever be dulled, that is, who live dedicated to philosophy, there is great hope: if that which we feel and know is mortal and transitory, death will be pleasant for us once our human offices are fulfilled, and the end will not seem painful, but a rest from life; or else if, as the ancient philosophers, and the greatest and most distinguished among them, agreed,<sup>56</sup> we have souls eternal and divine, we ought to consider then that the more constant they shall have been in their proper course, that is, in reasoning and in the desire of knowledge, and the less they shall have mixed and entangled themselves in the vices and errors of men, the easier would their ascent and return to heaven be." He then says, adding the following conclusion to finish the discussion with a recapitulation: "Therefore, and to end my discourse, if we

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men even till now; inflicting, as seems to me, such barbarous vengeance on them as those who are said to bind the captives to corpses till they rot together" (*Protr.* 1.7.4). In fact, Walzer and Ross, in their editions of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, include this passage, together with Augustine's quotation from Cicero, as fragment 10b of the work, although it is in fact only a vestige of the original text, just like the passage in Augustine. On the possible influence of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* on Clement, see, e.g., Lazzati, *L'Aristotele perduto* (n. 14 above), 16–18, who, however, tends to exaggerate that influence, as Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus* (n. 11 above), 265, observes.

<sup>55</sup> 1 John 3:2: ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ ἐσόμεθα, ὅτι ὁψόμεθα αὐτὸν καθὼς ἐστίν, which Augustine quotes as follows (*Trin.* 14.19.25): "Similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est."

<sup>56</sup> According to Grilli, *M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius* (n. 12 above), 169, who relates this sentence to one of Iamblichus in his work *On the Soul* (*ap.* Stob. 1.49.32.90 W.) and to others of Cicero himself in *De divinatione* (1.30.62) and *Tusculanae Disputationes* (1.23.55), these ancient philosophers would be Socrates, Plato, Pythagoras, and the Aristotle of the *Eudemus*. Straume-Zimmermann, *Ciceros Hortensius* (n. 12 above), 223, for his part, believes that they are Plato and Aristotle.

wish for a tranquil extinction after consuming our life in these studies, or else to migrate without delay from this dwelling to another one better in no small way, we are to make every effort and take every care upon such endeavors."<sup>57</sup>

Cicero's intention in this final passage of the *Hortensius* seems clear: he firmly establishes the idea that a life dedicated to philosophy is worthy of living and therefore highly recommended to every man. For this he presents as a last argument the good that that kind of life supposes at the time of death, whether one believes in an afterlife or thinks that everything ends with the current life. In the first instance, the good will entail the soul returning to heaven, that is to say, to the divine abode that is its rightful, natural place, in order to have a happy life there;<sup>58</sup> in the second instance, however, the good will entail having a quiet, pleasant death perceived as a rest from the hardship of existence.

The protreptical intention of the passage then is clear, and it coincides in spirit and message with the one Aristotle's *Protrepticus* seems to have had in its last paragraphs. However, other than that coincidence in points of view, it is hard to find clear textual echoes that could demonstrate that Cicero's text was inspired by Aristotle's in something other than its spirit. Ruch,<sup>59</sup> for instance, thought he saw those echoes in the consideration of philosophy in the Ciceronian passage as *ars virtutis*, which, according to him, is clear when one reads the phrase *cum in his*

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<sup>57</sup> "Hanc contemplativam sapientiam, quam proprie puto in Litteris sanctis a scientia distinctam sapientiam nuncupari, duntaxat hominis, quae quidem illi non est, nisi ab illo cuius participatione vere sapiens fieri mens rationalis et intellectualis potest, Cicero commendans in fine dialogi Hortensii: 'Quae nobis,' inquit, 'dies noctesque considerantibus, acutibusque intelligentiam, quae est mentis acies, caventibusque ne quando illa hebescat, id est, in philosophia viventibus magna spes est aut si hoc quo sentimus et sapimus mortale et caducum est, iucundum nobis perfunctis muneribus humanis occasum, neque molestam extinctionem, et quasi quietem vitae fore, aut, si ut antiquis philosophis iisque maximis longeque clarissimis placuit, aeternos animos ac divinos habemus, sic existimandum est, quo magis hi fuerint semper in suo cursu, id est in ratione et investigandi cupiditate, et quo minus se admiscuerint atque implicuerint hominum vitiis et erroribus, hoc iis faciliorem adscensum et reditum in caelum fore.' deinde addens hanc ipsam clausulam repetendoque sermonem finiens, 'Quapropter,' inquit, 'ut aliquando terminetur oratio, si aut exstingui tranquille volumus, cum in his artibus vixerimus, aut si ex hac in aliam haud paulo meliorem domum sine mora demigrare, in his studiis nobis omnis opera et cura ponenda est.'" Aug. *Trin.* 14.19.26 = Cic. *Hort.* fr. 93 Ruch = 115 Grilli = 102 St.-Zimm.

<sup>58</sup> The exclusivity of this happy end for the philosophical souls is an idea underlined by Cicero in the final part of the *Hortensius*, wherein he, mainly following Plato, distinguishes between the good and bad fate of souls in the afterlife, linking that fate to their morality in the present life (*Hort.* fr. 114 G. = 83 St.-Zimm.). In *Tusc.* 1.44–47, Cicero himself offers a description of the happy life awaiting the soul after death, free from the body, and of its ascension to its natural home, the heaven beyond the clouds.

<sup>59</sup> Ruch, *L'Hortensius de Cicéron*, 165.

*artibus*<sup>60</sup> *vixerimus* in light of a paragraph of the work *De officiis* (2.6), wherein philosophy is defined as the *ars* whose objects are the most important questions and, therefore, as the one by which perseverance (“constantia”) and virtue (“virtus”) are acquired: in short, an *ars* or *disciplina virtutis*. Such a conception of philosophy coincides, according to Ruch, with the one Aristotle offers in the *Protrepticus* when he talks of it as “a discipline (ἐπιμέλεια) and an art (τέχνη) of the soul and its virtues.”<sup>61</sup> However, if it is true that in this case the *Protrepticus* could have been useful to Cicero as a precedent, it is also true that, in the works of Aristotle, at least in the ones that have survived, we do not find any allusion to death as a rest from life nor as a passage to a better life in the other world, ideas central to the passage in Cicero, but we do find them in Plato, for example. In the *Phaedo* (63e–64a), it is said that it is logical that a man who has devoted his life to philosophy would expect to obtain the greatest good in the life that awaits him after death. There, too, appears the image of the emigration of the soul to the Hereafter.<sup>62</sup> In the *Theaetetus* (176a–b), it is asserted that, since all evils are necessarily linked to mortal nature, it is necessary to escape from this life to the other one by means of becoming as similar to divinity as possible, that is to say, by becoming a just and pious being through wisdom (μετὰ φρονήσεως). And one must not forget the declaration of the *Apology of Socrates* (40c–e) regarding the good of death conceived as emigration from this dwelling to that of the dead. These passages have led us to believe that the first part of the passage of the *Hortensius* would be a kind of paraphrase of the Platonic opinions quoted, whose common ground would be the conviction that only a life devoted to philosophy deserves to be lived.<sup>63</sup> Perhaps that is going too far, since the mere precedence of motives and ideas, even if their influence could be accepted, does not imply that Cicero limited himself to a mere adaptation of them, nor that they were the only ones he took into consideration.

<sup>60</sup> On the impossibility of the “arcibus” reading that, since Rose (n. 26 above), *Aristotelis*, 73, some editors have adopted, such as Walzer, *Aristotelis* (n. 26 above), 47 and Ross, *Aristotelis* (n. 26 above), 43, see Düring, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus* (n. 26 above), 268.

<sup>61</sup> Arist. *Protr.* B 34 D. See also *fr.* B 37 D: “science of truth and science of the virtue of the soul” (τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς περὶ ψυχῆν ἀρετῆς ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη).

<sup>62</sup> As Grilli, *M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio* (n. 12 above), 246 points out, “in aliam haud paulo meliorem domum . . . demigrare” is a textual echo of the ἀποδημία (61e, 67c) and the μετοίκησις (117c) in the *Phaedo*. Grilli also shows that the conversation between Socrates and Simmias in the *Phaedo* is in the background of the final part of the Ciceronian dialogue: e.g., the assertion that truth and perfect wisdom (66e, 68b) are only reached after death because of the obstacle of the body (65b–c, 66a), the same assertion to which it refers the *fr.* 108 G.; the image of body as prison of the soul (62b), to which it also refers the *fr.* 108 G.; or the difference in the fate of soul in the afterlife according to its merits in this life (63c), to which it refers the *fr.* 114 G.

<sup>63</sup> Düring, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus*, 267.

At the same time, the only phrase of the *Protrepticus* that could have been useful as a model to Cicero, especially to the final part of his fragment — “either we ought to philosophize, or to say farewell to life and depart hence”<sup>64</sup> — must be placed in relation to the pessimistic declaration quoted by Aristotle himself in the *Eudemian Ethics*. According to this text, if a human life were to be judged by its hardship, it would have been preferable from the beginning not to have been born<sup>65</sup> (1215b 18–22). What Aristotle means to say, in both passages, is that only the philosophical life is deserving of being lived, and, therefore, if faced with the alternative of a life without philosophy — that is to say, a miserable and terrible life — death is preferable. And this does not necessarily imply the existence of a life in the other world, except perhaps for the intellect (νοῦς), which is immortal and divine. In fact, Aristotle, throughout his works, has always been known for seeing the possibility of happiness in the present life, if only in theoretical activity (which is an activity of the intellect, the most divine thing), without giving rise to transcendent hopes.<sup>66</sup>

Nevertheless, we can find in Aristotle a precedent for the Ciceronian reference to the passage to a better life, although not in the *Protrepticus* but rather in the *Eudemus*, a work of his youth in dialogue form, of which only some fragments remain. This precedent can be found in a passage quoted by Cicero himself in his work *De divinatione*,<sup>67</sup> wherein he describes a dream of Eudemus of Cyprus, a friend of Aristotle in memory of whom his homonymous work was written. In that dream a young man appeared before Eudemus and foretold him, among other things, that he would return home in five years’ time. However, in the fifth year, Eudemus fell fighting in Syracuse, leading Aristotle to interpret the dream as meaning that Eudemus’s spirit returned home when it abandoned his body. Even though this interpretation is a simple, *ad hoc* explanation to adapt the content of the dream to what happened and save in this way the prophetic character of the dream, the fact that the departure of the soul from the body is interpreted as “returning home” (“domum revertisse”) can only mean the return of the soul to its natural dwelling, that is, to its divine origin, where it can lead a better life than it did when it was incarnate. It is this “return home” of the soul that, in my opinion, Cicero is referring to in the *Hortensius* when he speaks of “migrating without delay from this dwelling to another better in no small way” (“ex hac in aliam haud paulo meliorem domum sine mora

<sup>64</sup> Arist. *Protr.* B 110 D: ἢ φιλοσοφητέον οὖν ἢ χαίρειν εἰποῦσι τῷ ζῆν ἀπιτέον ἐντεῦθεν. According to Düring, *Aristotle’s Protrepticus*, 267–68, this sentence would be the model for the final declaration of the *Hortensius* passage that follows “sermonem finiens.”

<sup>65</sup> See also Arist. *Eudemus fr.* 44 Rose = 65 Gigon. This is a traditional idea in Greek thought: see, e.g., Thgn. 425–26, Young, *Hdt.* 1.31, 7.46, S. *OC* 1225, E. *Cresph. fr.* 449 Nauck-Snell. Cicero also echoes it in *Tusc.* 1.48.115.

<sup>66</sup> See, e.g., *EN* 1177a12, *EE* 1249b16, *Pol.* 1323b21.

<sup>67</sup> Cic. *Div.* 1.25.53 = Arist. *Eudemus fr.* 37 Rose = 56 Gigon.

demigrare”).<sup>68</sup> Aristotle adopts the Orphic belief that death is a birth to the true life, insofar as it is the returning of the soul to its natural home, in the *Eudemus*, where he defends a Platonic position regarding pre-existence, immortality, and reincarnation of the soul.<sup>69</sup> Surely, this position had already been abandoned in the *Protrepticus*, in which only the doctrinal grounds on which this set of ideas was based would be of interest, that is, the negative consideration of human life as a kind of divine punishment for ancient transgressions, which Aristotle applied to a life away from philosophy.<sup>70</sup> This protreptical application of Orphic ideas, filtered through the Platonic spirit, would be what inspired Cicero in the *Hortensius* and is what is reflected both in the previous passage, also quoted by Augustine,<sup>71</sup> and in this one.

All these ideas hardly find a reflection, however, in the context where Augustine quotes the passage from Cicero. The reason why Augustine brings up this passage is his urging to philosophy, a discipline that takes one to the contemplation of truth. That is a kind of wisdom that Augustine interprets as being far from human science and close to the true wisdom found in the divinely inspired Scriptures, which announce the contemplation of God that man will attain after the resurrection. Augustine praises Cicero on his promise of a happy death to men who have devoted their lives to philosophy. He ascribes this happiness to the disappearance of what is mortal and transitory, that is, the body and what belongs to it. But he praises him above all for his defense of the immortality of the soul and his exhortation to the desire for knowledge, which is the path — if it is accompanied by faith — that leads the soul in its return to God.<sup>72</sup> Therefore, Augustine

<sup>68</sup> That is not an obstacle to the argument that the primary source is the *Phaedo*, as Grilli, *M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio*, 246, wants, since, as is known, the Aristotelian *Eudemus* was written taking Plato’s dialogue as a model.

<sup>69</sup> See, e.g., G. Méautis, “L’orphisme dans l’ ‘Eudème’ d’Aristote,” *Revue des études anciennes* 57 (1955): 254–66; and C. Megino, “Aristóteles y el Liceo ante el orfismo,” 1299.

<sup>70</sup> Arist. *Protr.* B 106–7 D. (= Iambl. *Protr.* 47.21–48.9 P).

<sup>71</sup> See above, *c. Iul.* 4.15.78 = *Cic. Hort. fr.* 85 Ruch = 112 Grilli = 99 St.-Zimm.

<sup>72</sup> “I marvel here that a man of such talent promises a pleasant setting upon the discharge of their human offices to those who have spent their lives in philosophy, which makes men happy by the contemplation of the truth, if our sentiments and knowledge are mortal and transitory, just as if this which we did not love, or rather fiercely hated, were then to die and be reduced to nothing so that its setting might be pleasant for us . . . . But, as he himself admits, he had learned from the philosophers, ‘the greatest and by far the most illustrious,’ that souls are eternal. For eternal souls are not unfittingly aroused by this exhortation, so that they may be found in their proper course when the end of this life comes, that is, in reason and in the eagerness for investigating, and they mingle less and become less entangled in the vices and delusions of men, in order that their return to God may be easier. But this course, which consists in the love of God and in the search for the truth, does not suffice for the miserable, that is, for all mortals who rely on this reason alone without the faith of the Mediator.” Aug. *Trin.* 14.19.26. McKenna, *The Trinity* (n. 20 above), 448–49.

again adapts pagan religious and philosophical concepts to Christianity, bestowing on the Aristotelian-Ciceronian conception of the philosophical and contemplative life a transcendent meaning in which its final end — that is, truth, happiness, and the promised return of the soul to its divine dwelling — is assimilated to God and the contemplation of God in the beatitude of eternal life.

## 4

There are two other texts by Augustine in which one may see the mark of the *Protrepticus*. They are both found in the first book of the dialogue *Contra Academicos*, a work of his youth composed immediately after his conversion in which he discusses and criticizes skeptical arguments against the possibility of men finding truth.

The first of these texts (1.3.7) is a passage that also comes from Cicero, very likely from the *Hortensius*,<sup>73</sup> although in this case it is in the form of a paraphrase rather than a literal quotation:

Cicero held that he is happy who searches for the truth, even if he is unable to find it. . . . Who does not know that Cicero vehemently declared that man cannot perceive anything, and that nothing is left for the wise man to do but the conscientious search for truth, for if the wise man were to assent to uncertain matters, even if perchance they were true, he could not be free from error? This is the wise man's greatest fault. Hence, if we are to believe that the wise man is necessarily happy, and that the mere search for truth is the perfect function of wisdom, why do we hesitate to consider that the happy life can also be achieved by the very search for truth?<sup>74</sup>

Among declarations characteristic of Academic skepticism, Cicero echoes an idea also found in the *Protrepticus*: that happiness entails the investigation of truth and

<sup>73</sup> Grilli, *M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius* (n. 12 above), 147–49, and idem, *M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio*, 242–43, proves it so, and he opposes Hirzel's, Ruch's, and others' reservations on some parts of the passage in question coming from the *Hortensius*. R. Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften*, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1883), 3:297n2; Ruch, *L'Hortensius de Cicéron* (n. 12 above), 168. Of the same opinion as Grilli is Schlapbach, *Augustin: Contra Academicos* (n. 51 above), 91.

<sup>74</sup> "Placuit enim Ciceroni nostro beatum esse qui veritatem investigat, etiamsi ad eius inventionem non valeat pervenire. . . . Quis ignorat eum adfirmasse vehementer nihil ab homine percipi posse nihilque remanere sapienti nisi diligentissimam inquisitionem veritatis, propterea quia si incertis rebus esset assensus, etiam si fortasse verae forent, liberari errore non posset? Quae maxima est culpa sapientis. Quam ob rem si et sapientem necessario beatum esse credendum est et veritatis sola inquisitio perfectum sapientiae munus est, quid dubitamus existimare beatam vitam etiam per se ipsa investigatione veritatis posse contingere?" Cic. *Hort. fr.* 95 Ruch = 107 Grilli = 91 St.-Zimm.

that this investigation is the most perfect function (*munus*) of man.<sup>75</sup> This declaration, as Grilli suggests,<sup>76</sup> can be put in relation to the one in the fragment of the *Hortensius* quoted above,<sup>77</sup> which places the hope of a happy life in the practice of philosophy or, likewise, in the continual exercise of mind and intellect in the quest for knowledge. Cicero, in the tradition of Academic skepticism, would insist on the idea that happiness is not something one acquires once and for all but is rather a continual conquest, a constant investigation of truth, the work of a lifetime dedicated to study and research.<sup>78</sup> Such Ciceronian conviction is similar to the one we find in the *Protrepticus*: from the difference that Aristotle establishes between possession and use, and the preference for the latter over the former,<sup>79</sup> happiness is shown to consist in the use of the soul itself, which is man's most excellent part, and particularly in its best possible use, which is that of its intellectual part. This use is identified with its proper function (ἔργον),<sup>80</sup> the exercise of thought and reason, which is equivalent to the contemplation of truth,<sup>81</sup> which, in turn, is what wisdom consists in.<sup>82</sup> This agreement of ideas between Cicero and Aristotle is well reflected in another paragraph of the *Protrepticus* that could be used as the culmination of what has been said:

But unless one thinks one ought to endure living on any terms whatever, it is ridiculous not to suffer every toil and bestow every care to gain that kind of wisdom which will know the truth.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>75</sup> Arist. *Protr.* B 65 D. (= Iambl. *Protr. fr.* 42.13–23 P): “If then man is a simple animal and his being is ordered according to reason and intelligence, he has no other proper function [ἔργον, cf. “munus”] than the attainment of the most exact truth [μόνη ἢ ἀκριβεστάτη ἀλήθεια, cf. “diligentissimam inquisitionem veritatis”], truth about reality; but if he is composed of several faculties, it is clear that when someone can perform several functions, the best of them is always his proper function; health is the proper function of the doctor, and safety that of the sea-captain. Now we can name no better function of thought or of the thinking part of the soul [διανοίας] than the attainment of truth. Truth therefore is the supreme function [τὸ κυριώτατον ἔργον] of this part of the soul.”

<sup>76</sup> Grilli, *M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius*, 151; idem, *M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio*, 244–45.

<sup>77</sup> *Hort. fr.* 93 Ruch = 115 Grilli = 102 St.-Zimm.

<sup>78</sup> See Grilli, *M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius*, 150–52; idem, *M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio*, 244–45. See also Testard, *Saint Augustin et Cicéron* (n. 3 above), 27.

<sup>79</sup> See, e.g., Arist. *Protr.* 79–81 D. (= Iambl. *Protr. fr.* 56.15–57.12 P).

<sup>80</sup> It is possible that the *munus* of the Ciceronian-Augustinian passage echoed this Aristotelian ἔργον.

<sup>81</sup> Arist. *Protr.* B 65–66, 85 D. (= Iambl. *Protr. fr.* 42.13–29, 58.3–10 P).

<sup>82</sup> Arist. *Protr.* B 66–70 D. (= Iambl. *Protr. fr.* 42.23–43.25 P).

<sup>83</sup> Trans. by Düring; Arist. *Protr.* B 103 D. (= Iambl. *Protr. fr.* 46.28–47.4 P): ὅστις δὲ οἶται μὴ πάντα τρόπον ὑπομένειν αὐτὸ δεῖν, καταγέλαστον ἤδη τὸ μὴ πάντα πόνον πονεῖν καὶ πᾶσαν σπουδὴν σπουδάζειν ὅπως κτήσεται ταύτην τὴν φρόνησιν ἣτις γινώσεται τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

We cannot say with any degree of certainty that such an agreement of ideas is the product of Cicero borrowing from Aristotle, but it is possible that Cicero took into account, when echoing those ideas, the Aristotelian position, as he did in other parallel passages of the *Hortensius*.<sup>84</sup>

In Augustine, Cicero's thesis — which was an attempt to defend the skeptical Academic doctrine according to which the mere investigation of truth is enough for the wise man who wants to be happy — is invoked as an argument from authority in favor of the same doctrine, held by Licentius, one of the interlocutors in the dialogue *Contra Academicos*, in opposition to Trygetius's contrary view that only the wise man who is perfect can be happy and that he who seeks and investigates truth without ever finding it cannot be perfect. Augustine then quotes Cicero as the representative of Licentius's Academic view. Augustine criticizes this view throughout the work, since he believes in the possibility of attaining the truth, although for him the use of understanding and the dedication to philosophy are not alone sufficient for this, since faith in Christ is also necessary. Nevertheless, he does share with the Academics, that is, Cicero and, by extension, as we have just seen, Aristotle,<sup>85</sup> the conviction that the path to truth goes through investigation and the practice of philosophy.

The second Augustinian passage of the dialogue *Contra Academicos*, in which there seem to be echoes of the *Protrepticus*,<sup>86</sup> is a previous text (1.2.5), on which Licentius makes the happy life consist of “living in accordance with the best in man” (“secundum id quod in homine optimum est vivere”), where what is best is “that part of the soul to which, because it is dominant, it is convenient that the other parts in man submit” (“eam partem animi, cui dominanti obtemperare convenit caetera quaeque in homine sunt”). This is called mind or reason (“mens aut ratio”).<sup>87</sup> We can see in these words the trail of certain ideas present in the *Protrepticus*. For example, there is a distinction in the soul between a superior part that governs, called “reason” (λόγος), and an inferior one that is governed. The superior part, that is, the one that possesses reason and thought (λόγος καὶ δίανοια), is identified as the best and most desirable thing found in man, its

<sup>84</sup> I. Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus* (n. 11 above), 134, for instance, recognizes that precedent in Aristotle, and he quotes the passage from Augustine in relation to fragment 45 of the *Protrepticus*, although he does not explain the relation in his comment. Grilli, *M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius*, 149, *M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio*, 245, and Schlapbach, *Augustin: Contra Academicos*, 91 also recognize the precedent.

<sup>85</sup> Augustine, following the Neoplatonic thesis, believes these doctrines to be in accordance with Plato's, since they, considered under the light of the Christian revelation, constitute the true philosophy (c. *Acad.* 3.19.42).

<sup>86</sup> So, e.g., G. Lazzati, *L'Aristotele perduto* (n. 14 above), 47–49, Schlapbach, *Augustin: Contra Academicos* (n. 51 above), 82–83.

<sup>87</sup> See c. *Acad.* 3.12.27 and *Trin.* 15.7.11, wherein the most excellent part of the soul is called *mens* once again, for it is the only thing that can be called properly the “image of God.”

characteristic function being the contemplation of truth, which is what wisdom (φρόνησις) consists in. That is why happiness is the exercise of that function, that is, contemplating truth.<sup>88</sup> The similarity of the ideas, as in the previous passage, is obvious. The problem is that, in this case, the connection between the text of Augustine and the corresponding one of Aristotle is not so clear, since there is no explicit proof that in this case Augustine was repeating the doctrine of the *Hortensius*. Nevertheless, if we take into account that Augustine tells us earlier that the *Hortensius* had won the participants of the dialogue over to philosophy<sup>89</sup> and that, in the following chapter, in the passage quoted above, he quotes Cicero on the same issue, I think that it is perfectly reasonable to assume that Cicero could also be behind the definition of happiness given here and that it was through him that Augustine echoed that doctrine already present in the *Protrepticus*.<sup>90</sup> As a matter of fact, the passages of *Contra Academicos* complement each other, and the foundation of that complement is the same concatenation of ideas that we see in the *Protrepticus* regarding the soul, thought, truth, and happiness.

## 5

Other Augustinian passages where the trail of the *Protrepticus* seems to appear have been adduced. However that trail, if it exists, is almost always excessively hypothetical and vague.

For example, Walzer included in his compilation of fragments of the *Protrepticus* two more texts by Augustine that also consisted of quotations from the *Hortensius*. The first one comes from the treatise *De trinitate* (13.4.7), in which Augustine quotes the following words from the *Hortensius*: “Certainly, we all want to be happy.”<sup>91</sup> Walzer puts these words in relation to others of Iamblichus’s *Protrepticus* that are an exact transposition to Greek: Πάντες ἄνθρωποι βουλόμεθα εὖ πράττειν.<sup>92</sup> The problem in this text is that, while Augustine himself declares that it appeared in the exordium of the *Hortensius*, there is nothing to guarantee that it was also part of the *Protrepticus*. It is a declaration already present in Plato’s *Euthydemus*,<sup>93</sup> precisely the one that opens the

<sup>88</sup> Arist. *Protr.* B 60–70D.

<sup>89</sup> Aug. *c. Acad.* 1.1.4.

<sup>90</sup> See G. Lazzati, *L’Aristotele perduto*, 47–50.

<sup>91</sup> Cic. *Hort. fr.* 59 Ruch = 58 Grilli = 69 St.-Zimm. = Arist. *Protr. fr.* 4 Walzer: “Beati certe omnes esse volumus.” Augustine also quotes this sentence, with slight variations, in other passages from the *Hortensius*: see *c. Iul. imp.* 6.26, *b. vit.* 2.10, *epist.* 130.5.10, *Trin.* 13.5.8, *mor. eccl.* 1.3.4, etc.

<sup>92</sup> Iambl. *Protr.* 24.22 P. = Arist. *Protr. fr.* 4 Walzer.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. Pl. *Euthyd.* 278e: ἄρα γε πάντες ἄνθρωποι βουλόμεθα εὖ πράττειν.

protreptical argumentation of this dialogue, which is important because it was used as a model for later protreptical works, including Aristotle's.

However we do not have proof that such a declaration was so formulated in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, since Iamblichus, our main source for the reconstruction of the work, takes it directly from Plato, from whom he also transcribes, by summary, the whole of his protreptical argumentation.<sup>94</sup> Jaeger<sup>95</sup> tries to explain Iamblichus's omission of that declaration in his quotation from the *Protrepticus* by the fact that he had already quoted it a few pages earlier, taking it from Plato. But this explanation is mere conjecture, as is denying that Cicero took the quotation directly from the *Euthydemus* because it did not fit his work method.<sup>96</sup> It can be argued that the idea that all men want to be happy was widespread in Antiquity and was regarded as the foundation of philosophy and that for this reason it was present in Aristotle.<sup>97</sup> But that does not necessarily mean that Aristotle quoted that sentence in the *Protrepticus*. It can be claimed that it is typical of Aristotle to begin an inquiry with a principle whose truth is commonly recognized, like that declaration,<sup>98</sup> and that in a protrepticus to philosophy this declaration could be used as the point of departure of the discussion.<sup>99</sup> But that proves nothing, since there is no evidence that Aristotle began his *Protrepticus* with this sentence. It is true, however, that we also do not have facts to rule out the view that it echoes Aristotle. But since the burden of proof is on the side that asserts, and one cannot assert without doubt that the formula "we all want to be happy" was quoted in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, its trace in this case must be put in brackets and be regarded as dubious.<sup>100</sup>

<sup>94</sup> Iambl. *Protr.* 24.22–26.24 P, wherein the *Euthydemus*'s argument is reproduced from 278a to 282d.

<sup>95</sup> Jaeger, *Aristotle* (n. 9 above), 63.

<sup>96</sup> Recently, Grilli, *M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio* (n. 12 above), 192–93, has echoed Jaeger's argument, denying that Cicero took it directly from Plato and suggesting that the intermediary source was Aristotle. Nevertheless, he does not mention the *Protrepticus* as source, but the beginning of *Nicomachean Ethics* (1094a): Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τὰ γαθόν, οὐδ' ἅπαντ' ἐφίεται. "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim" (trans. by W. D. Ross [n. 33 above], 3). However, the sentence from the *Euthydemus* is a clearer textual precedent of "beati certe omnes esse volumus." If it is denied that the *Euthydemus* is the direct source for Cicero, it should be taken as the intermediary source the *Protrepticus* (as Jaeger does), but that, as I say, is doubtful and conjectural.

<sup>97</sup> See Ruch, *L'Hortensius de Cicéron* (n. 12 above), 127–28.

<sup>98</sup> See Schlapbach, *Augustin: Contra Academicos* (n. 51 above), 77, who quotes other examples of similar declarations in Aristotle, as, e.g., *APo* 1, 1, 71a 1, *Metaph.* 1, 1, 980a 21, *Pol.* 1, 1, 1252a 1–6, and *EN* 1, 1, 1094a 1.

<sup>99</sup> See Schlapbach, *Augustin: Contra Academicos*, 77.

<sup>100</sup> Rabinowitz, Düring, and Hagendahl, for example, also express themselves in this sense. Rabinowitz, *Aristotle's Protrepticus* (n. 9 above), 52–54; Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus*

The second text comes from the treaty *Contra Iulianum* (4.14.72), and it is a Ciceronian speech denouncing the pleasures of the body, which are described as “enticements and baits of evil” (“illecebrae atque escae malorum”) and are accused of being the enemies of philosophy and incompatible with thought because they prevent the normal functioning of the mind. Because of this, according to Cicero, he who is blessed with a good mind would rather be without the pleasures that nature bestows.<sup>101</sup> Walzer<sup>102</sup> thinks that this diatribe against pleasure comes from the *Protrepticus* because it is supposed to be related to another one by Plutarch,<sup>103</sup> according to which Chrysippus attributes to Aristotle the idea that to consider pleasure as an end entails the elimination of justice and the other virtues, an idea that would come from the *Protrepticus*. However, several considerations, such as the fact that the attribution of this idea to Aristotle comes from a work by Chrysippus entitled *On Justice*, wherein the Stoic philosopher argued with the Stagirite about this same issue, or that the relation between justice, pleasure, and the virtues was a subject discussed in Aristotle’s dialogue *On Justice*, lead us to believe that Chrysippus’s quotation referred to this dialogue rather than to the *Protrepticus*.<sup>104</sup> In the *Protrepticus* he discussed the pleasure involved in philosophy and the contemplative life, due to this activity being perfect and without

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(n. 11 above), 156; Hagendahl, *Augustine* (n. 37 above), 490n2. Most of the editors of the *Protrepticus* after Walzer, like D. Ross, A. H. Chroust, E. Berti, and O. Gigon, do not include the formula that Iamblichus quoted. However, Schneeweiss, *Aristoteles* (n. 11 above), 58 does do it as *fr.* 1a, but he does not offer any explanation for its inclusion.

<sup>101</sup> “See what he [sc. Cicero in the *Hortensius*] says about the quality of the mind over against the pleasure of the body [“vide quod iste pro vivacitate mentis contra voluptatem corporis dicat”]. He says: ‘Should one seek the pleasures of the body, which, as Plato said truly and earnestly, are the enticements and baits of evil [“illecebrae esse atque escae malorum”]? What injury to health, what deformity of character and body, what wretched loss, what dishonor is not evoked and elicited by pleasure? Where its action is the most intense, it is the most inimical to philosophy. The pleasure of the body is not in accord with great thought. Who can pay attention or follow a reasoning or think anything at all when under the influence of intense pleasure [“voluptate ea qua nulla possit maior esse”]? The whirlpool of this pleasure is so great that it strives day and night, without the slightest intermission, so to arouse our senses that they be drawn into the depths. What fine mind would not prefer that nature had given us no pleasures at all?’” Cic. *Hort. fr.* 77 Ruch = 84 Grilli = 84 St.-Zimm. = Arist. *Protr. fr.* 17 Walzer. (Trans. M. A. Schumacher [n. 51 above], 229.) Augustine echoes the same ideas in *c. Iul.* 5.8.33 and 5.10.42. He takes them from the same passage of Cicero’s *Hortensius*.

<sup>102</sup> Walzer, *Aristotelis* (n. 26 above), 61–62.

<sup>103</sup> Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantibus*, 1040e.

<sup>104</sup> As a matter of fact, the editors of Aristotle’s fragments after Walzer believe so. They consider that the fragment of Plutarch comes from the dialogue *On Justice*. See Ross, *Aristotelis* (n. 26 above), 98; R. Laurenti, *Aristotele: I Frammenti dei dialoghi* (Naples, 1987), 1:138; and Gigon, *Aristotelis Opera* (n. 11 above), 258.

obstacles,<sup>105</sup> but nowhere is the question of pleasure suggested as an end, and he does not discuss the possibility that considering pleasure as an end entails the elimination of the virtues.

Walzer echoed the conclusions of Bignone,<sup>106</sup> who contended that the Ciceronian text showed the controversy in the *Protrepticus* against the hedonism of the Cyrenaics who held that the bodily pleasure was the supreme good. As Walzer and Bignone would have it, that controversy would be evidenced in the words “vide quod iste [sc. Cicero] pro vivacitate mentis contra voluptatem corporis dicat,” with which Augustine introduces the quotations already mentioned from the *Hortensius*.<sup>107</sup> These words would be related to another passage of Cicero that goes back to the *Protrepticus*, wherein the Arpinate bases his rejection of the hedonist theory of Aristippus and the Cyrenaics on the Aristotelian thesis that the human being was born to understand and to act<sup>108</sup> because the human being’s end is contemplative and active wisdom, not physical pleasure. Bignone also added textual parallels, as between “voluptas ea qua possit maior esse . . . in summis voluptatibus” and νεανικωτάτας ἡδονάς, the latter appearing in a fragment from the *Protrepticus* wherein Aristotle argues for the practice of philosophy by saying that “no one would choose to live possessing the greatest possible wealth and power but deprived of thought and mad, not even if one were to be pursuing with delight the most violent pleasures, as some madmen do.”<sup>109</sup>

However, the textual parallels are too general, and the anti-hedonist arguments only agree to deny that pleasure is the end of human life. According to the text at our disposal, in the *Protrepticus* it is not said that bodily pleasure is an obstacle to knowledge, which is the core of the Ciceronian argument in the fragment quoted from the *Hortensius*. Rather, this is said in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1152b16–19),

<sup>105</sup> See, e.g., Arist. *Protr.* B 56, 87, 91–92, 98 D. (= Iambl. *Protr.* 40.20–41.2, 58.15–17, 59.7–18, 45.6–13 P.).

<sup>106</sup> Bignone, *L’Aristotele perduto*, 343–45. A more recent author, J. Doignon, also follows Bignone in regarding the *Protrepticus* as the source of the Ciceronian attack on bodily pleasures in the *Hortensius* passage. “Une leçon méconnue du fragment 81 (Müller) de l’*Hortensius* de Cicéron transmis par saint Augustin,” *Revue de philologie, de littérature et d’histoire ancienne* 55 (1981): 237–44, at 243.

<sup>107</sup> The connection of these words with the *Protrepticus* is accepted by Grilli, *M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio* (n. 26 above), 222, who refers to Bignone.

<sup>108</sup> “Omnino a philosophia semovendas putabo, primum Aristippi Cyrenaicorumque omnium, quos non est veritum in ea voluptate, quae maxima dulcedine sensum moveret, summum bonum ponere contententis istam vacuitatem doloris. hi non viderunt, ut ad cursum equum, ad arandum bovem, ad indagandum canem, sic hominem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad intellegendum et agendum, esse natum quasi mortalem deum.” Cic. *Fin.* 2.13.39–40.

<sup>109</sup> *Protr.* B 98 D.: Παντί δὴ οὖν τοῦτο γε πρόδηλον, ὡς οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔλοιτο ζῆν ἔχων τὴν μεγίστην ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων οὐσίαν καὶ δύναμιν, ἐξεστηκῶς μέντοι τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ μαίνόμενος, οὐδ’ εἰ μέλλοι τὰς νεανικωτάτας ἡδονὰς διώκειν χαίρων, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι τῶν παραφρονούντων διάγουσιν.

in a passage where the textual parallels are much clearer. It seems that Cicero did not know this work of Aristotle's directly,<sup>110</sup> therefore it must be assumed to have another source. That could be the *Protrepticus*, but it is a mere hypothesis that cannot be proved from the testimonies we have. Furthermore, there are other possibilities.<sup>111</sup>

At the same time, there is no evidence that in the *Protrepticus* there was an attack against the pleasures of the body similar to the one Cicero started in the passage Augustine quoted. As a matter of fact, Cicero himself quotes Plato as holding the opinion that pleasures are "baits of evil,"<sup>112</sup> and the anti-hedonist opinion he holds in that passage is closer to the Platonic opinions than to the one that Aristotle may have held in the *Protrepticus*.<sup>113</sup> Aristotle agrees with Plato that certain pleasures are an obstacle to thought, and that there are harmful and shameful pleasures.<sup>114</sup> However, he also defends the existence of good pleasures, such as the one that goes with contemplative activity, which it perfects inasmuch as it is a kind of consummation of it.<sup>115</sup> It is also his opinion that happiness, consisting of that same activity, which is understanding, is not only pleasurable but involves a higher pleasure.<sup>116</sup> Therefore, we cannot assert here with certainty that Augustine, quoting Cicero's *Hortensius*, is reflecting a doctrine in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*. It is possible that when Cicero wrote this passage he had the *Protrepticus* in mind, but almost certainly he was thinking to a greater extent of the Platonic doctrine, or even the Stoic one, on the pleasure of the body and its excesses.

#### CONCLUSION

I started from the premise that the evidence in Augustine's writings of some subjects that refer back to Aristotle's *Protrepticus* is indirect and limited to a few passages, manifesting itself, moreover, in differing degrees of clarity. We have seen that the source halfway between Aristotle and Augustine is always the same one: Cicero's *Hortensius*, a dialogue very well known and used by

<sup>110</sup> See, e.g., Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto*, 148, 179; Grilli, *M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio*, 222.

<sup>111</sup> For example, Grilli, *M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio*, 222, after mentioning the possibility of the *Protrepticus* being the source, proposes as an alternative that the intermediary could be Antiochus of Ascalon, teacher of Cicero and an author markedly antihedonist, in whom Cicero had found the teachings of Plato and Aristotle.

<sup>112</sup> Pl. *Tim.* 69d: ἡδονήν, μέγιστον κακοῦ δέλεαρ.

<sup>113</sup> This was recognized by Testard, *Saint Augustin et Cicéron* (n. 3 above), 26, for whom Cicero "y développe le thème platonicienne de l'incompatibilité de la vie de l'esprit avec les voluptés du corps."

<sup>114</sup> See, e.g., Arist. *EN* 1152b 16–22.

<sup>115</sup> Arist. *EN* 1174b 20–1175a 1.

<sup>116</sup> Arist. *Protr.* B 87–92 D., *EN* 1177a 23–27, *Metaph.* 1072b 24.

Augustine throughout his work, particularly in the Cassiciacum dialogues (386–87) and in the treatises *De trinitate* (416) and *Contra Iulianum* (421), in the last years of his life.<sup>117</sup> It is very probable that Cicero read the *Protrepticus* directly, the *Hortensius* being its debtor in many respects, so it is not necessary to include other sources between them. Cicero does not quote the *Protrepticus* in a mechanical manner, but rather takes the ideas that interest him and adapts them to his own ideas and the context in which he uses them, although most of the time keeping the spirit of exhortation to philosophy that inspires them. Augustine, for his part, quotes Cicero very accurately, abounding in literal quotations, which is favorable to the subjects present in the *Protrepticus* leading to Augustine without much change. These subjects are as follows:

- 1) Happiness consists of theoretical knowledge, hence the need for philosophizing as a path to reach such knowledge. The idea is justified by saying that this knowledge is the typical and only activity on the Isles of the Blessed and therefore the most similar to the gods' own activity. This is because it is the only activity desirable for itself, that is, subject to will, not to necessity, in contrast to the virtues.
- 2) The present life is undervalued through a mythical explanation (the present life is a divine punishment for ancient offenses committed) and a historical example (the present life, with the soul incarnated in a body, is like the torment the Etruscans put their prisoners through by chaining the living face-to-face with the dead). By contrast, the philosophical life based on knowledge and wisdom is extolled.
- 3) A life dedicated to philosophy is a life worth living and, therefore, highly recommended for every man because with this life there is hope for a good death, which leads to rest from life or to return to heaven in order to have a much better life. In this idea the belief — which likely comes from the *Eudemus* — that death is birth to the true life would be implicit because it means the return of the soul to its natural home.
- 4) Happiness consists of the investigation of truth, which is the purpose of what is best in man: the intellectual part of his soul, that is, understanding, which is the part that governs. This subject is complementary to (1).

<sup>117</sup> “The great majority [sc. of the fragments of the *Hortensius* quoted by Augustine] fall within the Cassiciacum dialogues (386–387). In the writings dating from 387 to 413 there are only repetitions of previously quoted passages. New and important fragments appear, on the other hand, in the last books of *De trinitate* (416 or later) and in *Contra Iulianum* (421). At that time Augustine renewed his acquaintance with the *Hortensius*: it came once more to influence his thought as it had done at the beginning of his literary activity.” Hagendahl, *Augustine* (n. 37 above), 489. See also Madec, “L’*Hortensius* de Cicéron dans les livres XIII–XIV du *De Trinitate*,” *Revue des études augustiniennes* 15 (1969): 167–73, at 167.

However, other topics, such as the principle that all men want to be happy, or denial that physical pleasure is the end of human life because it incites one to evil and is the enemy of philosophy, cannot be certainly ascribed to the *Protrepticus*, although they may be present in it.

All of these subjects have an ethical character and are centered on a common denominator: the idea that the practice of philosophy, understood as the exercise of intellectual thought in the search for truth, is a necessary condition to be happy.

Augustine does not echo these opinions directly. He sees them through the Ciceronian filter, changing their original context and adapting them to Christian doctrine in such a way as to support philosophically the truths of faith. However, in his early period, Augustine does adopt that common denominator of them all, speech in defense of philosophy, as a means to find truth and happiness. This would bring a crucial change to his whole life path. Indeed Augustine himself relates on several occasions how the reading of the *Hortensius* in his youth was of great importance in his life, turning him towards the search for truth through the desire to philosophize.<sup>118</sup> In fact, the *Hortensius*, in addition to being a work in the defense of philosophy as a necessary cultural element for the good speaker, was an exhortation to philosophy where the ideal life was dedicated to the exercise of understanding and reason, whose end was the study and investigation of truth. In that protreptical sense the *Hortensius* was indebted to the *Protrepticus*, no matter what value one is to give to testimonies such as Trebellius Pollio's when he says that Cicero wrote the *Hortensius* "ad exemplum Protreptici"<sup>119</sup> or to Lactantius's when he tells us that the speaker Hortensius, a character who gives the name to the Ciceronian dialogue, found himself caught up in an ingenious argument: namely, that one philosophizes even when one speaks against the need to philosophize.<sup>120</sup> This argument was defended in the *Protrepticus* with the purpose of demonstrating the need for philosophizing.<sup>121</sup> We can therefore assert that this impulse towards philosophy that the *Hortensius* formed in Augustine's spirit had as a first precedent (although it may not have

<sup>118</sup> *B. vita*, 1.4, *Conf.* 3.4.7, 8.7.17. A sign of this importance is that Augustine mentions it more often than any other work of Cicero's except *De republica*, as Hagendahl, *Augustine*, 488, pointed out. A detailed examination of the impact that reading the *Hortensius* had on Augustine and of the long process of inner change that led to his conversion can be seen in T. C. Madrid, "Agustín y el Hortensio," *Revista agustiniana* 33 (1992): 169–224. See also Testard, *Saint Augustin et Cicéron*, 19–39, 2:74–81; Hagendahl, *Augustine*, 486–88; F. B. A. Asiedu, "El *Hortensius* de Cicerón, la filosofía y la vida mundana del joven Agustín," *Augustinus* 45 (2000): 5–25; Schlapbach, "Hortensius," cols. 428–29. For someone who minimizes the importance of that impact, see J. J. O'Meara, *The Young Augustine: The Growth of St. Augustine's Mind up to His Conversion* (London, 1954), 57–59.

<sup>119</sup> *Hist. Aug.* 2.97.20–22.

<sup>120</sup> *Lact. Inst.* 3.16 = *Cic. Hort. fr.* 32 Ruch = 54 Grilli = 49 St.-Zimm.

<sup>121</sup> *Arist. Protr.* A 2–6 D. See also Brink, review of *L'Hortensius*, by Ruch (n. 9 above), 221.

been the only one) that φιλοσοφητέον that was the *leitmotif* of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.<sup>122</sup>

Nevertheless, the influence of the *Protrepticus* through the *Hortensius* became, over time, a simple pagan reference brought up to defend Christian theses alien to the spirit of exhortation to philosophy that inspired it. We can see this both in the two passages of *De trinitate* and in the passage of *Contra Iulianum*, whose origin is certainly the *Protrepticus*, and in the two fragments whose connection with the *Protrepticus* is doubtful. Indeed, in *De trinitate* 14.9.12, Cicero takes from Aristotle the reference to the Isles of Blessed in order to justify that felicity consists in theoretical knowledge, while Augustine does it to confirm the necessity of virtues to lead a happy life and to ensure that a happy life is the knowledge of God, not the knowledge of nature. In *De trinitate* 14.9.26, Cicero defended the preeminence of the philosophical life because this kind of life led to a more desirable death and even to a better life in the hereafter, while Augustine quotes Cicero because he recommends a sort of wisdom that he identifies with the science of God and because he defends the immortality of the soul. In *De trinitate* 13.4.7, Augustine ignores the protreptic intention that the sentence "we all want to be happy" had in the *Hortensius* and treats the claim as a true principle from which to deduce the two conditions of happiness: to have all we desire and to want nothing wrong. In *Contra Iulianum* 4.15.78, Cicero followed Aristotle in undervaluing the present life in order to extol, by contrast, a philosophical life, while Augustine quotes the passage to show Cicero's closeness to the Christian doctrine of original sin as the origin of evil in man. Finally, in *Contra Iulianem* 4.14.72, the Ciceronian argument against bodily pleasures because they are incompatible with thought and are the enemies of philosophy is quoted for the purpose of supporting the thesis that the concupiscence of the flesh is evil in the context of a theological controversy.

The previous paragraph does not mean to imply that Augustine changed his mind over time about the goodness of philosophy as a means to achieving a happy life but only that the subjects from the *Protrepticus* detected in his works, most of which are a product of a rereading of the *Hortensius*, are quoted for a purpose other than that for which they were written in the *Protrepticus* and taken up in the *Hortensius*.

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**Keywords:** Aristotle, *Protrepticus*, Cicero, *Hortensius*, Augustine of Hippo

<sup>122</sup> See, e.g., E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto*, 39; G. Lazzati, *L'Aristotele perduto* (n. 9 above), 44–45, although I do not share the laxity of these authors when finding Aristotelian echoes in Augustine. See also Trundle, "Modalidades aristotélicas de San Agustín" (n. 9 above), 14.