

## Corrigendum

# The Non-Democratic Roots of Mass Education: Evidence from 200 Years—CORRIGENDUM

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
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**T**he original article “The Non-Democratic Roots of Mass Education: Evidence from 200 Years” concludes that, on average, (i) “central governments began to regulate primary education about a century before a country’s first transition to democracy” (180, see [Figure 3](#)); (ii) “over two-thirds of school-age children were already enrolled in primary school a decade before democratization” (180, see [Figure 4](#), Panel A); (iii) “democratization had no or little impact on primary school enrollment rates” (179, see [Figures 5 and 6](#)); and (iv) “democratization can lead to an expansion of primary schooling, but the key condition under which it does—when a majority lacked access to primary schooling before democratization—rarely holds” (179, see Panel B of [Figure 4](#), [Figure 7](#), and [Table 1](#)). This corrigendum corrects coding errors that affected [Figures 3-7](#) and [Table 1](#) of the original article. These errors led to (a) Barbados, Belize, Iceland, and Malta being classified as non-democracies according to Polity, when in fact they should be coded as missing; (b) many


countries being incorrectly coded as not having universal male suffrage (UMS) from 2001-2010 according to the PIPE dataset, when in fact they should be coded as having UMS; (c) countries that never democratized being accidentally dropped when producing Panel B of [Figure 6](#); and (d) data from 1830-2010 being used to produce [Figures 6-7](#) and [Table 1](#), when in fact data from 1820-2010 should be used as indicated by the title of these illustrations. The author regrets these errors. The revised code and dataset and the revised Supplementary Materials are available on the Dataverse. The revised code also includes information about the assumptions that were made when merging Lee and Lee’s (2016) school enrollment dataset with the three datasets used to measure the timing of democratization. As shown in corrected [Figures](#) and [Table](#) below, the difference between the original results and the corrected ones is barely perceptible. The conclusions of the original article remain unaltered.

**FIGURE 3. Timing of Democratization and State Intervention in Primary Education, by Country (Revised Results)**

Panel A: Europe and Latin America (33 countries)




Panel B: All Regions (109 countries)




Sources: Author for timing of primary education interventions in Panel A (see Online Appendix C); Lee and Lee (2016) for timing of primary school enrollment statistics in Panel B; Polity Project for timing of democracy.

**FIGURE 4. Primary School Enrollment Rates in Countries that Experienced Democratization, 1820–2010 (Revised Results)**

Panel A: Average Enrollment Rate Before and After Democratization, World and Regional Means



Panel B: Distribution of Enrollment Rates 5 Years Before Democratization




*Note:* For visualization purposes, in Panel A quinquennial data on enrollment rates were linearly interpolated to obtain annual estimates. Trends based on the original (quinquennial) data are shown in the revised Figure A5.


*Sources:* Lee and Lee (2016) for enrollment rates; Polity Project for timing of democracy.

**FIGURE 5. Average Primary School Enrollment Rates before and after Democratization, Treated and Comparison Countries, 1820–2010 and Subperiods (Revised Results)**



Panel A: 1820–2010



Panel B: 1820–1945



Panel C: 1945–2010




*Note:* Democratizing countries' trend in black; non-democracies' in gray. For visualization purposes, quinquennial enrollment rates at the country level were interpolated to obtain annual estimates. For each country that democratized in year  $t = T$ , I compute the average primary school enrollment rate of a comparison group, which in any given year  $t$  is composed of countries that were non-democratic in that year. I then compute the average primary school enrollment rate across all comparison groups, depicted by the gray line.


*Sources:* Lee and Lee (2016) for enrollment rates; Polity Project for timing of democracy.

**FIGURE 6. Estimated Effect of Democratization on Primary School Enrollment Rates, 1820–2010 and Subperiods (Revised Results)**

Panel A: Difference-in-Differences estimates




Panel B: Interrupted Times Series Estimates



*Note:* Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from standard errors clustered at the country level. In Panel B, point estimates reflect the effect of democracy within 10 years of democratization. A total of 105 countries contribute data to estimate the equations that span the entire period (1820–2010) and the post-war period (1945–2010); 93 countries contribute data to estimate the equations that focus on the pre-war period (1820–1944).

*Sources:* Lee and Lee (2016) for enrollment rates; Polity Project, BMR, and Przeworski et al. (2013) for timing of democracy.

**FIGURE 7. Average Primary School Enrollment Rates before and after Democratization, Treated Countries by Whether or Not a Majority of Children Were Already Enrolled in Primary Schooling before Democratization, and Comparison Countries, 1820–2010 (Revised Results)**



Note: Average primary school enrollment rate in democratizing countries where a majority of children were enrolled in primary education before democratization (black line), in democratizing countries where a majority of children were not enrolled in primary education before democratization (blue), and in control countries (light gray).

Sources: Lee and Lee (2016) for enrollment rates, Polity Project, BMR, and Przeworski et al. (2013) for timing of democracy.

**TABLE 1. Heterogeneous Effect of Democratization Depending on Whether a Majority of Children Already Had Access to Primary Education before Democratization, 1820–2010 (Revised Results)**

Independent variable:	Panel A: OLS			Panel B: Tobit		
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
	school enrollment rate			school enrollment rate		
<b>Polity2 between 6 and 10</b>						
<i>democracy</i>	5.3 (3.5035)	−5.0 (3.1997)	−2.4 (2.5656)	5.3 (3.0101)	−5.0 (3.2212)	−2.4 (2.5401)
<i>democracy x majority enrolled in primary</i>	−9.2* (4.0357)	13.5** (3.8962)	3.9 (3.1734)	−8.5* (3.7863)	13.4** (3.9217)	3.9 (3.1423)
<b>Democracy (BMR)</b>						
<i>democracy</i>	7.5* (3.0669)	−10.7** (2.6471)	−6.4** (2.1928)	5.8* (2.8445)	−10.9** (2.6781)	−6.4** (2.1720)
<i>democracy x majority enrolled in primary</i>	−9.6** (3.3068)	17.2** (3.0377)	5.8* (2.4700)	−7.0* (3.2983)	17.2** (3.0675)	5.8* (2.4473)
<b>Universal male suffrage (PIPE)</b>						
<i>democracy</i>	22.5** (3.3832)	−17.0** (2.8853)	−11.7** (1.7098)	21.5** (3.5752)	−17.1** (2.8793)	−11.7** (1.6929)
<i>democracy x majority enrolled in primary</i>	−22.2** (3.7182)	22.2** (3.4147)	10.8** (2.0133)	−19.6** (3.9454)	22.3** (3.3933)	10.8** (1.9934)

Note: Results based on a linear difference-in-differences model with country and year fixed effects similar to the one given by Equation 1 but allowing for heterogeneous treatment effects depending on the level of primary school enrollment rates prior to democratization. Ordinary least squares estimates (Panel A) and Tobit estimates (Panel B). Standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance at the \*0.05 and \*\*0.01 level. The number of countries contributing data is 109.

Sources: Lee and Lee (2016) for enrollment rates; Polity Project, BMR, and Przeworski et al. (2013) for timing of democracy.

## REFERENCES

- Lee, Jong-Wha, and Hanol Lee. 2016. "Human Capital in the Long Run." *Journal of Development Economics* 122: 147–69.
- Paglayan, Agustina S. 2021. "The Non-Democratic Roots of Mass Education: Evidence from 200 Years." *American Political Science Review* 115(1): 179–98.

Przeworski, Adam, *et al.* 2013. Political Institutions and Political Events (PIPE) Data Set. Department of Politics, New York University. <https://sites.google.com/a/nyu.edu/adam-przeworski/home/data>.